IR 05000382/1990008
| ML20043C112 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 05/18/1990 |
| From: | Bess J, Gagliardo J, Hunter D, Vickrey P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043C109 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-90-08, 50-382-90-8, NUDOCS 9006040056 | |
| Download: ML20043C112 (19) | |
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e APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-382/9;-08 Operating License: NPF-38 Docket: ~ 50-382
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Licensee: Louisiana Power & Light Company (LP&L)
P.O. Box 60340 New Orleans, Louisiana 70160
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Facility Name: Waterford-3(Wat-3)
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Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana inspection Conducted: April 16-20, 1990 f
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!c Inspectors:
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b'/ l}/ f f. B. Gickrey, Reactor Inspector, Operational Date Programs Section, Division of Reactor Safety l
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K\\E. Be)s, Reactor Inspector, Operational Date Programs Section, Division of Reactor Safety L nd (
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D. R. Hunter, Senior Reactor Inspector, Date Operational Programs Section, Division of Reactor Safety
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L Accompanied By: 3.Brftt, Contractor,SAIC
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.lE. Gag)tiardo, Chief, Operational Programs Da'te I Section, Division of Reactor Safety
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Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted April 16 20, 1990 (Report 50-382/90-08)
Areas inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of training and qualifications effectiveness, followup of previously identified inspection findings, and weaknesses identified during the NRC maintenance team inspection conducted in early 1989.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified. Overall, the functioning of the training department, the quality of the instructors and the instructions given, the relationships within the training department, and the relationship between the training department and the plant staff were found to be satisfactory. The classroom and simulator training appeared to be well implemented, and the training material and student records were well maintained and current. The licensee continued to seek out and recognize areas of weaknesses and make appropriate improvements in the training program. The difficulties the training department was experiencing in recruiting experienced plant personnel for instructors vacancies was the only area of concern.
During the review of the licensee's actions regarding weaknesses identified during the maintenance team inspection, four inspector followup items were identified and discussed in this inspection report.
In most instances the i
licensee appeared to handle the identified weaknesses in a fully acceptable manner.
In a few instances the licensee could have handled the weaknesses and the generic implications in a more aggressive manner. The lack of a full understanding or implementation of the corrective action program appeared to be major contributors to the less than fully comprehensive actions associated with these weaknesses.
The involvement of the independent review, assessment, and audit groups was a minor weakness.
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M-3-DETAILS 1.
PERSONS CONTACTED LP&L
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- J. R. McGaha, Plant Manager, Nuclear
- D. F. Packer, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations and Maintenance
- J. M. O'Hern, Operations Training Supervisor
- L. W. Laughlin, Site Licensing Supervisor
- D E. Baker, Nuclear Operations Support and Assessment Manager
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- D. Harpe, Acting Maintenance Superintendent
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- T. P. Brennan, Design Engineering Manager
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- G. M. Davis, Manager, Events Analysis Reporting and Response
- J. J. Zabritski, Assistant Quality Assurance Manager
- P. V. Prasankuman, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Services
- W. T. LaBonte, Radiation Protection Superintendent C. J. Toth, Training Manager
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T. J. Gaudet, Engineer, Site Licensing Support D. Matheny, Assistant Superintendent, I&C Maintenance K. LeBlanc, Maintenance Engineer A. Larsan, Assistant Superintendent, Electrical Maintenance H. Thompson, Plant Support Engineer, Construction D. Dormady, Assistant Superintendent, Mechanical Maintenance
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The inspectors contacted other licensee personnel during the inspection.
- Denotes attendance at exit interview conducted on April 19, 1990.
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2.
TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION EFFECTIVENESS (41500)
This area was inspected using portions of the guidance in NUREG-1220. " Training Review Criteria and Procedures."
In evaluating the strengths of the licensee's training program, emphasis was not directed towards any particular area. The areas reviewed were selected based on their availability in the scheduled training at the time of the inspection and the inspector's background and knowledge in the subject areas.
Interviews were conducted with training department managers, supervisors, instructors, and students.
Inspection activities tiso included:
A tour of the training facilities and control room;
A review of selected training department procedures;
An audit of training presentations and associated lesson material; and
A review of previous licensee's QA audits and associated training department corrective actions.
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grades were recorded. A variety of reports could be obtained such as a listing of all classes taken by a particular student or a list of all attendees of a particular class during a specified time period. The system would even print notification letters to students who needed to attend a requalification training course.
During the tour of the electrical, I&C, and mechanical training facilities, the
inspectors noted that most of the training aids were operational. Components (
such as pumps, motors, valves, and instrumentation usually simulated plant
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conditions and design. Mock-up for steam generators and reactor coolant pumps were available for student training. The mock-up for the steam generator simulated working conditions in the plant. Housekeeping in the training facilities was good. The licensee stated that in order to meet their
comitment to established ALARA goals, the ALARA training f acility was of ten used. The inspet. tor noted that the ALARA training facility included an area where students could practice donning and removing protective clothing.
The inspector noted that the personnel involved with the training facilities
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showed pride in ownership and believed that the training facilities had the
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support of management. Enhancement of the training facilities was ongoing with l
the purchase of such training aids as vibration monitoring equipment.
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The inspector conducted a tour of the control room to observe the existing l
equipment conditions and abnormalities. During interviews with simulator
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l instructors and observation of the simulator status, the inspector found most l
of his control room observations had been simulated on the simulator. The j
instructors indicated that they interfaced with the operating crews regularly to establish simulator status as necessary to enhance training.
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2.2 Review of Selected Training Department Procedures (
In addition to review of selected student and instructor records, the i
procedures, guides, and instructions listed in Attachment A were reviewed.
Department procedures for initiating, developing, implementing, conducting, and revising training were reviewed. The procedures were clearly stated, and they explicitly defined the responsibilities of department personnel, referenced supporting documentation required to implement the procedure, arid described all s
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of the steps to be performed. When appropriate, flow charts were provided to illustrate the sequence of actions, decision points and options in the process.
The procedures were thorough in that they addressed all aspects of the training systemsdeve?opment(TSD) process. They were also well written and easily understood.
2.3 Audit of Training presentations and Review of Training Materials To provide an assessment of the overall quality of the course structures developed by the department, lesson plans were selected randomly and reviewed.
Subject matter areas in which reviews were conducted were health physics.
chemistry, mechanical, and simulator training. Three or four lesson plans were pulled from each subject matter area. Across all subject matter areas, learning objectives were well stated and adhered to T50 specifications.
Outlines flowed logically, and topics were cross-referenced to learning objectives.
In those courses which used materials other than student handouts the point at which the additional materials (slide, video tapes, films, etc.),
were to be used was cross-referenced to the course outline.
The inspector observed a class being taught to I&C technicians. The topic covered in the classroom was the reactor regulatory system. The inspector noted that most of the students attending the class were senior I&C technicians. The instructor demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the subject matter. Participation in the lecture by the students was encouraged by the instructor, and feedback between the students and instructor was positive.
The lesson plans reviewed were well written and contained the appropriate enabling objectives. The student handouts were well written and often followed the lesson plan. Prior to use in the classroom, the lesson plans were reviewed by a subject matter expert in the I&C shop for technical content, and a training form was written to ensure that changes to procedures and plant conditions were incorporated into the lesson plan. The lesson plans were upgraded every 2 years to ensure major plant modifications were implemented.
The 1&C department had two fully certified 1&C instructors.
In conjunction with their classroom duties, the instructors were required to spend a minimum of 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> a year in the plant. The time spent in the plant was documented and was auditable. One of the two 180 instructors had prior plant experience, and the personnel interviewed thought that it enhanced the I&C training program.
There were a variety of internal and external training programs that the instructors were required to complete; these included an evaluation in classroom presentation technique prior to certification as an instructor.
The inspectors observed simulator training related to systems being taught in classrooms and practice scenario sessions. The simulator training related to systems being taught was a new concept the licensee was incorporating into the lesson plans. This new approach provided the instructors with an opportunity to conduct various demonstrations of system responses to various conditions.
It also provided hands-nn practice for the students and opportunities to raise additional system-related questions and answers. This system training was also extended to the simulator emergency shutdown panel. This new concept in system
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-6-training appeared to be well developed with enthusiastic participation of the students and instructors. The practice scenario appeared well developed and smoothly conducted by the instructors. At the completion of the scenario, the
instructors conducted a thorough critique with the students. The critique covered all the events of the scenario. The instructors interfaced with the students to point out strengths and weaknesses and to probe areas for additional questions and answers. The instructors' experience and knowledge t
were evident to the inspectors during the above observations.
2.4 Interviews with Training Department Managers Supervisors. Instructors,
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and Students Interviews were conducted with two training supervisors, two instructional technologists, and one student (an auxiliary operator). The interviews with the training supervisors yielded the following salient points:
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Both had an in-depth knowledge of the TSD process and of their technical subject matter areas, and they were well qualified to lead training design, development, and implementation efforts. All supervisors were INP0 accredited TSD instructors.
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Plant management strongly supported the training department. This was evidenced by the fact that a substantial investment was being made for a job / task analysis that covered all job positions for which training was provided.
Major strengths of the department were the instructors, the management
controls on the TSD process, and management's willingness to recognize problems and seek creative solutions.
Instructional staff members were selected on the basis of technical expertise and training expertise. When possible, instructors were recruited from senior operator and technical positions in the plant. Each supervisor exercised direct control over the TSD process. Formal review and approval procedures governed all aspects
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of the TSD process and training supervisors were the primary quality assurance (QA) agents. A willingness to recognize problems and seek creative solutions was illustrated by the department's response to concerns about the adequacy of the earlier job analyses on which current
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training programs were based and concerns about the expertise of instructor staff in the TSD process. The department convinced plant management to make a substantial investment in a complete JTA for all jobs
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for which the department provided training. They also convinced the plant to fund the development of a JTA software package to help the department conduct its own JTA. Specifications for the package were developed by one of the training supervisors. Concerns over the expertise of instructor staff in the TSD process were addressed by establishing and filling two new instructional technologist (IT) positions. The ITs would be internal-TSD resources that instructors could draw upon.
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were defined. A program for implementing improvements in each area was already in place. Examples were the contractor JTA efforts which,
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g o-7-ultimately, should provide a more thorough delineation of learning objectives for current training courses JTA training for all department
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staff, and acquisition of two ITs to provide more TSD expertise. Also, more attention was going to be given to the process of evaluating the effectiveness of instruction provided by the department. This should be
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an area in which the ITs would be used.
Interviews with the two instructional technologists noted the following:
Both had special education backgrounds with a strong emphasis on
TSD-related activities such as task analysis, development of learning
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objectives, curriculum development, and performance evaluation. The positions were established in order to bring more professional expertise into the training design, development, and implementation arocess of the training der o ment. The ITs were to be resources that otler department personnel 4', turn to for advice and assistance on any aspect of the TSD process.
+ were to have direct involvement in analysis (e.g., JTA) and training w ? activeness evaluation activities.
Doth were involved in JTAs of management and technical (engineering) job
positions. Discussion of the JTA project demonstrated their sound understanding of the principles and methods of JTA.
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Neither IT had a background in the nuclear power industry. The departnent
had worked actively to develop their expertise in technical areas by
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sending the ITs to the appropriate training courses.
The training department was concerned about the professional development of its staff and frequently sent personnel to workshops, courses, or seminars to develop their training expertise. A contractor was conducting a week-long JTA seminar that was being attended by most of the training department staff.
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roth ITs perceived that plant management strongly supported the training
lepartment. Plant management was actively involved in the management and technical staff JTA project being conducted. During the course of one of the IT interviews, a senior plant manager called the IT to reouest a status on the project.
Interviews with the student noted in the following:
The student was a nuclear auxiliary operator who had previous experience in the Navy as a reactor operator.
- The student rated the quality of training in his primary job position as excellent. He noted that the instructors were very knowledgeable and that the students had much confidence in them. The instructors had been known to do followup in the plant (e.g., his instructor talked with his supervisor to find out how he did in a walkthrough).
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Objectives used in the courses were well stated and enabled the student to
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know exactly what was important to know and learn in a course. Compared
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with the Navy, the focus of training at Waterford was much better.
- Feedback was provided promptly after a test. When students failed,
instructors worked actively on remedial actions to get them through the course or qualification.
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Thestudenthadusedthetrainingfeedback(courseevaluation) process.
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He had observed cases when suggestions for improvements had been implemented.
- The student had used the training request process. His requests had been acknowledged, and he had been notified of the outcome of the department's assessment of his request although the decision had been to not provide the training.
The student was a member of the fire protection team and had made some
complaints about the training.
Specifically, he had received no training on the foam machine; the drills the team performed had not exercised a wide variety of situations, and the classroom training was repetitive in that the same materials were used repeatedly. The training department checked their records and acknowledged that he had not been trained on the fo6m machine but assured the inspector that he would receive the training in the future. The department had already recognized the need to improve classroom materials and drills, and was working toward making improvements.
The inspector conducted interviews with two I&C technicians, two instructors, an 180 supervisor, and the maintenance assistant superintendent (MAS). The personnel interviewed reported good communication within the training department and between the training department and the plant staff.
180 technicians interviewed stated that the training which the plant staff received was usually job related.
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The plant staff reported that the instructors were very knowledgeable of the subject matter and understood the craft personnel needs. The maintenance
. assistant superintendent (MAS) usually interfaced directly with the training instructors to establish training agenda. The MAS reported that the training department was always cooperative in supporting the training needs of the maintenance department. The MAS also stated that the training department supported the maintenance department by auditing the student on-the-job training (0JT) books and informing the MAS of each student's status.
A good rapport had been established between the training instructors and the maintenance departments. The training department appeared to be flexible in meeting the training needs of the students. Overall, the plant staff believed that the training programs were effective and had successfully prepared them for their jobs.
-There were 2 certified instructors and 54 techniciens in the I&C department.
Because of the training requirements of the maintenance departments, some
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-9-training instructors stated that more instructors should be hired if the staffing levels in the maintenance department continued to increase.
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The inspector discussed with the simulator training supervisor the vacant positions that existed for simulator instructors. The licensee had initiated
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action to fill these positions but was having difficulty in obtaining qualified personnel from the plant. Although the licensee would have preferred filling these positions with experienced personnel from the plant, it appeared that this might not be possible. The licensee was considering the idea of establishing a rotation system as an alternative to permanent positions.
2.5 Review of Licensee's QA Audits and Associated Training Department Corrective Actions The inspectors reviewed QA Audits SA-89-03A.1 and SA-89-003.1. These audits i
were of operator and STA training / qualifications and training and qualification performance, respectively. The review of these audits indicated that they were identifying weaknesses and inadequacies. The audits tracked findings and followed up on previous audit findings. The inspectors followed up on some recent finding of these audits and found that the training department was actively pursuing corrective actions in those areas. The inspectors concluded that the quality of the audits and the responsiveness of the training department to the findings were excellent.
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.
3.
F01.LOWUP ON pREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED INSPECTION FINDINGS (92701)
(Closed) Unresolved Item (382/8901-04): Seismic Qualifications of Air Operated
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Valves (Copper Tubina)
The seismic report for safety-related Valves SI-602A and SI-602B had not addressed the copper tubing air lines.
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's followup of this concern. The licensee had issued a Licensee Event Report, LER 89-002-01, Inadequate Qualification of Instrument Air Tubing During Initial Construction." The followup of the event by the licensee included a review and determination regarding the applicable j
design specifications, the verification of the actual installed conditions of l
the specific configuration, and a review and walkdown of an additional l
58 valves (24 valves with instrument air volume tanks and 34 valves with l
nitrogen accumulator tanks) which had instrument tubing installed to the same I
standards as Valves SI-602A and SI-602B, A number of discrepancies were l
identified with the hardware installation (e.g., tubing supports, check valves, l
fittings, etc.) and had been corrected.
l The licensee's determination that the installation of the compressed air system to the requirements of ANSI B31.1 (where required) and the Seismic Category 1 supports considerations, the identification and walkdown of the additional installations, and the correction of the identified deficiencies appeared to be acceptabl,
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The inspector has no further questions regarding this matter and this item is considered closed.
(Closed)UnresolvedItem(382/8901-07): Time Delay Between Calibration of Loop Instrumentation and the Primary Element Lengthy delays were identified between the completion of the instrumentation loop calibration procedure steps (e.g., components outside the containment) and the primary element procedure steps (e.g., component inside the containment building). Steps in the early sections of these procedures, as well as signoffs on controlling work authorizations, ensured operations shift supervisor authorization and cognizance. Upon completion of the outside containment instrumentation, the procedures did not include steps to notify operations that work was tem >orarily) stopped.later date (sometimes 2 montis later, to comple When work was restarted at a the procedures did not include steps to ensure operation's concurrence and verification of prerequisites.
The inspector reviewed the current practices and procedures and a draft procedure which specifically addressed the concern regarding the notification of operations. Document reviews and interviews revealed that the licensee planned to continue to perform the calibration of the current loop (PAC) prior to or during a refueling outage and the calibration of the primary element at a later date during the outage, as appropriate, in order to provide the most eff'cient utili7ation of manpower. The licensee stated that the loop and eleuent calibrations included sufficient " overlap" to ensure a complete system alignment. Additionally, the calibrations of both sections of the system were performed within the specified surveillance interval (early and late dates) and operations personnel were routinely notified prior to commencing each separate portion of the procedure.
The inspection revealed that the 160 procedures were presently being upgraded.
The plans indicated completion of the upgrade by the end of the next refueling outage (RF 4-1991) (map-5). The procedures were being revised based on the maintenance department procedure writer's guide and were be',ng tailored for the 1&C program. The possible neel for providing a department-specific writers'
guide / supplement to ensure continuing procedure consistency was discussed with the licensee for consideration. The inspector reviewed draft Procedure MI-005-600, " Chemical Volume Centrol Tank Loop Check and Calibration - CVC ILO227," and noted that the procedure included the performance of the initial procedure steps, including the notification of
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operations, imediately prior to the PAC calibration and again prior to the transmitter calibration. The licensee representative indicated that the revisions to all associated 1&C procedures being performed in two distinct parts should be completed prior to the next refueling outage.
The inspector selected and reviewed a number of recently completed calibration activities associated with safety-related instrumentation loops to verify that the practices were acceptable and included the appropriate steps to notify operations. The calibration records reviewed are shown in the Attachment B to this repor a
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Document review and interviews revealed that the shift supervisor was notified of the results of the calibration activities; however, a deficiency (which involved a condition adverse to quality) was neither clearly nor fully
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documented, and the records of the evaluation regarding the impact on operations of the out-of-tolerance condition associated with a transmitter was not apparent.
Interviews revealed that the out-of-tolerance information was routinely entered into the trending data base within 90 days, and if the second similar transmitter was found out-of-tolerance, the system would automatically flag the item for generic review. The time delay regarding the entry of the out-of-tolerance data into the trending data base was nonconservative, in that, the plant restart following an outage almost always occurs within 90 days; and generic implication of the out-of-tolerance condition on two or more pieces of equipment might not be evaluated prior to plant mode change. This situation was discussed with the licensee.
The inspector has no further questions regarding the time delay between the
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calibration of the loop instrumentation and the primary element, including the notification of operations, and this item is considered to be closed.
The handling of the identified out-of-tolerance conditions including the failuretodocumenttheidentifiedconditionclearly,theIailuretoprovide provisions for the evaluation of the condition by the shift supervisor, and the ormoresimilarcomponents)potentialgenericmatters(e.g.(382/9008-01)and lack of a timely review of the failure of two is an inspector followup item will receive further review during a subsequent inspection.
3.1 Maintenance Program and Implementation Weaknesses In the maintenance team inspection report (50-382/89-01), a number of
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weaknesses were identified in the Executive Summary Section of the report.
During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions related to these weaknesses.
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The licensee included the 17 weaknesses identified by the NRC and an additional 6 weaknesses identified internally in a maintenance action plan (MAP). The MAP
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provided the item number, title, primary and secondary responsible person, action and due dates, and item status.
The review of the MAP revealed that the majority of the items were complete; however, the MAP report was last updated and printed in August 1989.
Discussions with licensee representatives revealed current plans to update the MAP to ensure that all items were addressed as planned or to assure that revised action dates had been established.
Although interviews revealed that the QA involvement in the followup of the weaknesses identified by the maintenance team inspection report had been weak, the interviews also revealed that nuclear operations and support and assessments (NOSA) had processed the weaknesses within the routine program.
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-12-SafetyAwarenessofMaintenancePersonnel(MAP-1)
Discussions with licensee personnel revealed that the licensee had addressed personnel safety during routine monthly safety meetings, monthly maintenance reports, and training. The licensee noted the excellent " lost time" record at the station as an example of personnel safety awareness.
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Steam Leak Identification and Prompt Correction (MAP-4)
Discussions with licensee personnel revealed that the identification of steam leaks originated from the operations department with issuance of a CI (condition identification - work request) and during routine plant area waltdowns by management. The licensee representative indicated that each steam leak was to be evaluated within 7 days or less, depending upon the nature and location of the leak.
The inspector toured selected portions of the plant and did not note any significant steam leaks.
Control of the Withdrawal of Grease Guns From the Tool Room (MAP-8)
Document review and interviews revealed that the control of grease guns was deemed by the licensee to need improvements. The control of grease and grease guns had improved substantially. Grease guns were issued from the tool room with dedicated grease and were recalled when the shelf life of the grease expired.
The inspector reviewed Procedure UNT-5-007, " Plant Lubrication Program,"
Revision 3, which addressed the lubrication of installed equipment and equipment in storage. The procedure also addressed the hydraulic fluids to be used per the Plant Lubrication Manual (a controlled document).
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Additionally, during the followup of the identified weaknessess, the licensee
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evaluated all motor operated valves and identified about 20 valves which were l
questionable. Five of the motor operators required refurbishment and needed to
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have their grease changed.
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Measuring and Test Eouipment (M&TE) Usage In Excess of 16 Times (MAP-9)
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Document reviews and interviews revealed that the usage of M&TE was specified l
and controlled in the maintenance department per MD-001-021, "M&TE
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Accountability Procedure," Revision 3.
The procedure limited the usage of MATE to 16 quantitative / qualitative (Q/Q) uses. The M&TE was controlled and issued j
by the tool room and the Q/Q uses were logged when the M&TE was issued.
The inspector visited the tool room area and observed the implementation of the established controls. The inspector also interviewed M&TE personnel and found i
that the choice of 16 usages prior to the recalibration of the instrument was i
i arbitrary to limit the research if the instrument was found to be out of calibration. The procedure allowed an increase of the 16 Q/Q uses with approval of maintenance department supervisory personnel; however, the
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interviews revealed that the use of the extension allowance was limited and not a routine practice.
Postmaintenance Capacity Testing of the Instrument Air Compressors (MAP-11)
Interviews revealed that the air compressors were recuired to be refurbished routinely offsite. As part of the return to service, a capacity test was performed. The capacity of the air compressors was checked routinely
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(compressor cycling and flow rate) to ensure that the compressor capacity was maintained greater than 80 percent.
Routine Review of Completed Work Packages to Upgrade Quality (MAP-12)
The licensee formed a work closure task force with the responsibility of reviewing the completed maintenance packages to ensure package adequacy. The
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inspectors also interviewed personnel involved in this process and found that the review process included the first line supervision, the assistant superintendent, planners, quality control engineering, and the closure task force. The multi-level reviews provided additional assurance that the work packages / activities were completed and did not contain deficiencies.
The Scope of the Valves Tested Under the M0 VATS prnaram Has Been Limited (MAP-13)
The inspector reviewed the status of the MOVATS program application with the licensee.
Interviews revealed that all the safety-related motor operated valves (MOVs) at the site were manufactured by Limitorque, and that the licensee would complete the MOVATS testing program on the last 20 safety-related valves in the 1991 refueling outage (R4). The licensee had identified about 70 balance of plant valves and planned to complete the MOVATS testing program on these valves during the next two or three operating cycles l
based on such factors as the valve's importance to safe, reliable operation.
The inspector also reviewed the status of the missing torque limiter plates t
(MAP-20).
Interviews revealed that in the past, as torque switches were
replaced, the transfer of the torque limiter plate to the new torque switches I
was not well controlled. The licensee's walkdown of all limitorque valves,
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including both safety-related and balance-of-plant valve and had identified l
additional torque limiter plates which were missing. The missing plater were l
replaced. Additionally, the appropriate maintenance Procedure ME-7-008, " Motor Operated Valves," Revision 7, was revised to address the need to transfer the torque switch limiter plate (Step 4.1.4).
The inspector determined that the procedure could have been enhanced if it had included additional steps / checks for an independent verification of the transfer / installation of the torque limiter plate. This matter was discussed with the licensee for further
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consideration.
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-14-Torque Requirements in Procedures / Checklists for Safety-Related Switchgear IMAP-21)
The licensee indicated that the procedures had been reviewed and improved. The inspector reviewed the matter with the licensee and reviewed selected maintenance procedures associated with the electrical switchgear and breakers.
The procedures ME 4-121, *4.16KY Switchgear," Revision 4, and ME 4-141, " Low Voltage Switchgear," Revision 5, included the requirements to torque all bolts 3/8 inch and larger. The procedures could have been enhanced by including specific steps for torquing and for the independent verifications of the torquing activities. This matter was discussed with the licensee for further consideration.
Procedure HE 4-131
"4.16KV GE Magne Blast Breaker," Revision 6, did not specifically address torquing requirements. The procedure could have been enhanced by including the specific torque values and the independent verification of the torquing activities. This matter was discussed with the licensee for further consideration.
The program and procedures controlling the electrical maintenance activities required further review and possible enhancement. The provision of uniform and consistent torque requirements in the procedures / checklists for safety-related switchgear and breakers. This is an inspector followup item (382/9008-02) and will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection.
Components of the Air Operators for Air Operated Valves Were Not in a Preventative Maintenance Program (MAP-14)
Interviews revealed that the licensee was developing an enhanced preventative maintenance and testing program for air operated valves at the time of this inspection.
Thismatterisconsideredaninspectorfollowupitem(382/9008-03) and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
Nuclear Plant Island Structure Water Tioht Doors Here Not included in a Preventive Maintenance Program (MAP-16)
l The inspector reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee regarding this concern. Document reviews and interviews revealed that the licensee inspected the eight watertight (flood) doors and repaired identified deficiencies in five of the doors. The licensee also noted that the seals on
the flood doors had a limited shell/ usage life.
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Interviewsrevealedthat30special(flood, tornado /missle, containment) doors and a total of about 400 doors of different types (security, fire, airtight, administrative)wereinexistenceatthefacility. The licensee had developed inspection checklists for each category door and was in the process of loading the information into a computer data base. The licensee had inspected a total of 260 doors using the new checklists as a result of routine maintenance a
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-15-requests generated by plant personnel. The inspection of the 260 doors identified a limited number of additional deficiencies which required repairs to be made to the doors.
During this NRC inspection, the licensee determined that, with the exception of twospecialdoors(tornadodoorsNos.268and269),allthedoorshadbeen
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previously(security doors, fire doors, control room doors, etc.)
checked or were checked routinely during a scheduled surveillance activity The licensee inspected the remaining two special doors and noted to the NRC resident inspector that the doors were acceptabic to meet the design requirements.
During this inspection, it was revealed that the NRC identified " condition maintenance program)(safety-related flood doors not included in a preventive adverse to quality" could have been processed in a more prudent manner. The
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matter was originally brought to the attention of the licensee in early 1989.
The licensee did not enter the identified item into their corrective action program through the initiation of one of several possible corrective actior documents. The inspection of the eight watertight / flood doors by the licet see revealedspecifichardwaredeficiencies(fiveoftheeightdoorsrequired repairs). Again, the condition was not entered into the corrective action program through the initiation of a corrective action document. A total of 260 plant doors were inspected against the newly developed door acceptance criteria, and a number of deficiencies were identified which required repair work. The hardware deficiencies identified were not entered into corrective action documents.
The licensee's Procedure V0p-005, " Corrective Action," Revision 3, which addressed the identification and processing of conditions adverse to quality appeared to address the matter adequately, but the licensee had not addressed the identified deficiencies in a comprehensive manner. The actions taken by the licensee were handled outside the formal corrective action system (e.g., specific deficiencies repaired within the maintenance progrem). This action precluded the determination of the root cause and generic implication of the findings. The last two special doors were inspected by the licensee at the time of the inspection which was more than 1 year after the deficiency was originally identified to the licensee.
This concern was discussed with the licensee and is considered an inspector followup item (382/9008-04) and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection to verify that the licensee's program for the routine inspection of safety-related doors has been completed and implemented.
Installed plant Instruments Were Not Consistently Tagged With Current Calibration Stickers (MAP-18)
Interviews revealed that the current calibration status of appropriate installed plant instrumentation was maintained and available in the computer data base. Since calibration stickers were not issued for installed plant instrumentation, the stickers presently affixed to instrumentation scheduled to be removed by the end of the next refueling outage (R4). A licensee
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-16-i representative indicated that the stickers should also be identified and removed during area walldowns as part of the ongoing program.
Incorporation of Vendor Information Received in an Informal Manner into a
Vendor Manual (MAP-23)
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions regarding this matter. The licensee had been involved in the review of the control of vendor information
and had determined the necessary revisions to N0p 010, " Control of Vendor Information," Revision 1, to clarify the handling of all vendor information.
The changes to NOP-010 and the training to be provided should enhance the process associated with vendor information. Licensee representatives stated that the needed revisions to the controlling procedure, NOP-010, and implementing procedures would be completed in the near future.
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EXIT INTERVIEW The inspectors met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
on April 19, 1990. The inspectors summarized the inspection purpose, scope, and findings. The licensee acknowledged the comments and did not identify any specific proprietary information to the inspectors. The NRC resident inspector was present at the exit meeting, i
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ATTACHMENT A Training Procedure / Instructions Administrative Title Revision HTP-001 Preparation and Revision of Nuclear Operations
i,aining Procedures / Instructions / Course Descriptions
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NTP-003 Training Records
NTP-004 Training Requests 3'
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HTP-005 Training Materials
NTP-006 Control and Administration of Exams
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NTP-008-Job Analysis
NTP-011 Training Program Evaluation
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NTP-012 Simulator Configuration Control
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NTP-014 Simulator Modifications-3 i
i NTP-015 Simulator Discrepancy I'
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.NTP-016 Simulator Maintenance Control
NTP-017 Simulator Training Evaluation
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NTP-018 Simulator Certification
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- HTP-020-Training Waiver Request
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Operations and Maintenance Training j
NTP-102 Licensed Reactor Operator Requalification
HTP-106 Instrument and Control Training
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.HTP-109 Maintenance Department Contractors Training and
Qualification
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i NTC-111 Instrument and Control Technician Administrative
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Training l
NTC-112 Basic Electricity and Electronics Training
MTC-113 InstrumentandControlQualification(Analog)
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NTC-114 AdvanceSystemsandTechnicalTraining(Analog)
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. Administrative Title Revision
. Technical Support Training NTP-201-General Employee Training
NTP-204-Instructor Training
NTC-202 General Employee Training Radiation Worker
- Lesson Plans F-200-010-01
- Reactor Regulating Systems-ZPLC-700-00 Pressurizer Level'and Pressure Control-ZCVC-000-00 Chemical and Volume Control System and Boric Acid Makeup Syr.tems
- ZEFW-000-00 Emergency Feedwater System 2000-405-00 Introduction to Technical Specifications L590-300-14 and 24 Simulator Scenarios Nos. 89-06. -07, and -09
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ATTACHMENT B
Calibratipn Procedures
RC IP0101, "Chipmel'.'k' Harrow Range Pressurizer Pressure Loop," WA No. 01040742 (b qusi 18 through Sept eber 29,1989).
RC IP0101, " Channel 'B' Narrow Range Presswizer Pressure Loop," WA No.01040743(October 1-4,1989).
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RCILO110("Y" Loop)."PressurizerlevelCentrolLoop,"WANo. 0104724
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(October 17 through November 11,1989)
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RC ILO110 ("Y" Loop), " Pressurizer Lever Control Loop," WA No. 01040726 (October 28 through November 10,1989).
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RC IP9116 (SMA Loop), "SG No. 1 Reactor Cuolant Differential Pressure Loop Channel
'A'," WA No. 01040873 (August 16 through September 30,1989)
RC IP9126 (SMA Loop), "SG No. 2 Reactor Coolant Differential Pressure Loop Channel
'A'," WA No. 01040881 (August 16 through September 29,1989).
CB~IP6702 (SNB Loop), " Containment Wide Range Pressure Loop CSAS), WA No. 01040025 (August 23 through October 3, 1989).
CB,IP6702 (SMC Loop), " Containment Wide Range Pressure Loop (CSAS)," K'A No. 01040021 (August 26 through October 12,1989).
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RC IP0100 ("X" Loop), " Pressurizer Pressure Loop," WA No. 01040737 (October 6, 1989).
ency Feedwater Header 'B' to Steam Generator No. 2
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EFNIF8330("B" Loop),"Emerg(October 29throughNovember2,1989).
Flow Loop," WA No. 01035725 ESF IP6755 ("A" Loop)), " Containment Wide Range Pressure Loop," WA No.
01044985
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(October 23-27, 1989.
ESF.IP6755("B" Loop),"ContainmentWideRangePressureLoop,"WANo. 01044987 (October 27-28,1989).
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