IR 05000382/1990007
| ML20043B488 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/1990 |
| From: | Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043B483 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-90-07, 50-382-90-7, NUDOCS 9005300096 | |
| Download: ML20043B488 (12) | |
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E APPENDIX
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U,5. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION IV
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-382/90-07 Operating License: NPF-38 Docket:
50-382 Lice,'.3ee :
Louisiana Power & Light Company (LP&L)
P.O. Box 60340 New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3)
Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana Inspection Conducted: April 1-30, 1990 Inspectors:
W. F. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector Project Section A, Division of Reactor Projects S. D. Butler, Resident Inspector Project Section A, Division of Reactor Projects
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Approved:
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h/MN T. F. Westerman, Chief, Project Section A Date i
i Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted April 1-30,1990 (Report 50-382/90-07)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unan.iounced inspection of plant status, onsite followup of events, monthly maintenance observation, monthly surveillance observation, operational safety verification, followup of previously identified items, licens9 event report followup, and engineered safety feature system walkdown.
Results:
Two reportable events occurred (paragraph 3) involving an inadvertent engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation of the emergency feedwater pumps and discovery of an improper alarm setting on a safety-related radiation monitor.
The licensee's actions to report the incidents to the NRC, investigate the causes, and take corrective actions were timely and appropriate. The inspectors will be following up on final actions.
9005300096 90cis v >
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{DR ADOCK 05006582 PDC
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During the inspection, two areas of concern were identified.
Paragraph 4 l
describes miscommunications between operations and maintenance personnel
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performing work on safety-related equipment. Although a violation of Technical i
Specification (TS) did not result, the miscommunication resulted in the Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitor being inoperable for about 3 1/2 hours without the knowledge of the control room staff, however, no action was
required until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> had passed. T515 placed the plant in a TS action statement.
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The use of a surveillance procedure containing insufficient instructions is discussed in paragraph 5.
The Containment Persoiinel Airlock Leak Test could i
not be successfully completed on April 19, 1990, because the tiedowns were not i
properly installed on the inner airlock door.
The procedure did not provide any instructions for 1r. stalling the tiedowns not did it reference the technic 61
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manual for. the airlock.. The inspectors will review the licensee's corrective
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cetion when it is completed, j
The ESF walkdown inspection of the containment isolation system (paragraph 9),
which was started in March 1990, was essentially completed during this inspection period, with no safety-significant findings. The inspectors are currently resolving a list of minor documentation and equipment labeling
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distrepancies. The final results will be reported in the next monthly inspection report.
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The inspectors noted continued professionalism on the part of operators as the p164t continued steady state operation at full power. Housekeeping and
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equipment condition was excellent and had improved since the last inspection period.
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L DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees R. P. Barkhurst, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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- J. R. McGaha, Plant Manager, Nuclear
- P. V. Prasankumar, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Support
- D. F. Packer, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations and Maintenance j
- A. S. Lockhart, Quality Assurance Manager
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D. E. Baker, Manager of Nuclear Operations Support.ind Assessments
- R. G. Azzarello, Manager of Nuclear Operations Engineering W. T. Labonte, Radiation Protection Superintendent
- G. M. Davis, Manager of Events Analysis-Reporting & Responses L. W. Laughlin, Onsite Licensing Coordinator
- T. J. Gaudet, Engineer-Site Licensing Support T. R. Leonard, Maintenance Superintendent A. G. Larsen, Assistant Maintenance Superintendent, Electrical D. T. Dormady, Assistant Maintenance Superintendent, Mechanical D. C. Matheny, Assistant Maiatenance Superintendent, Instrumentation and Controls R. F. Burski, Manager of Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs R. S. Starkey, Operations Superintendent i
- Present at exit interview.
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In addition to the above personnel, the inspectors held discussions with-various operations, engineering, technical support, maintenance, and administrative members of the licensee's staff.
2.
plant Status (717071 During the reporting period, the unit operated at full power.
Reactor
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coolant system (RCS) pressure was maintained at a reduced value
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(2150 psia) to minimize pressurizer safety valve leakage to the quench tank.- Followup on problems experienced during the period are discussed in paragraph 3.
3.
O_nsite Followup of Events (93702)
a.
Inadvertent Start of Emergency Feed Water (EFW) Pumps On April 8, 1990, at 4:44 a.m., an inadvertent start of EFW Pumps A, A/B, and B occurred while the licensee was conducting surveillance testing of the plant protection system matrix relays in accordance
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with Surveillance Test Procedure OP-903-107, Revision 8, " Plant
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Protection System Channel A Functional Test." The plant was at full power; however, EFW Injection Valves EFW-228A and EFW-229A did not open because of the short duration of the test signal. ihe matrix relay hold button circuitry prevents the EFW pumps from starting when
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the Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal (EFAS) is initiated, Troubleshooting did not reveal any problems with the circuitry.
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EFAS-1 was reset and the test repeated with satisfactory results.
The licensee attributed the cause of the actuation to be an anomaly-in the test circuit, which had no safety function, thus the system
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was not declared inoperable.
The licensee is conducting a root cause
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analysis and is considering, among other things, that the matrix
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relay hold button may have caused an undesirable " relay race." The licensee indicated intent to take corrective action before the monthly test is due. The licensee will report the problem and
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corrective actions in LER 382/90-004. The inspectors will track the resolution of the problem with the closure review of the LER.
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b.
Noble Gas Activity Monitor Improperly Set On April 20, 1990, during routine monthly surveillance checks, the licensee discovered that the main condenser evacuation and turbine gland sealing system noble gas activity monitor was improperly set to
alarm at 4.0 curies per second instead of at 0.17 microcuries per second.
This instrument also had a function of diverting the effluent to the high efficiency filtration which exits at the plant stack. Within 1 1/2 hours, the instrument _was reset so no additional action was required.
The TS required grab samples to be taken once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> while the instrument was inoperable.
The instrument was inoperable while the setpoint was less conservative than the required setpoint.
The licensee promptly entered the problem in their corrective action program by writing a potentially reportable event report (PRE 90-020). The licensee's investigation of the cause revealed that when the surveillance was conducted on March 24, 1990,
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the same condition existed but was not recognized during the data
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reviews. On February 19, 1990, the setpoint was correct.
The licensee was investigating the root causes of this incident at the end of this inspection period and committed to report the problem and corrective actions in LER 382/90-005. The licensee determined that
during the period between February 19, 1990, and discovery of the
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problem on April 20, 1990, the alert alarm, which preceded the high alarm, had not tripped.
The alert was correctly set at 0.13 microcuries per second, thus the alarm condition was not reached.
Therefore, there is no safety significance to this incident.
The inspectors will followup on the investigation and corrective actions taken by the licensee with the closure review of the LER.
i No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The station maintenance activities affecting safety-related systems and components listed below were observed, and documentation was reviewed to ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved work authorizations (WAs), procedures, TS, and appropriate industry codes or standards.
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5-a.
WA 01053273. On April 5, 1990, the inspectors observed a calibration check and readjustment of the overcurrent relay for Phase B of the tie breaker supplying power to Motor Control Center (MCC) 3B317-S.
This MCC supplied power to the Train B containment cooling fans (CFCS). The relay caused the tie breaker to trip during a normal full current condition on April 4,1990,_ just af ter being calibrated, adjusted, and reinstalled. The results of the recheck revealed that the relay was set at full load current, which was equal to exactly half of the required current setpoint. This explained why the tie breaker tripped the previous day, but the technicians could not explain how the setting was at half value. The inspector observed the technician as he followed the detailed procedure step by step.
The procedure was ME-3-316, Revision 4
"G.E. Overcurrent Relay, Model IAC 66T." The technician had to make a major adjustment
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to restore the relay to the proper settings, and he informed the inspector that he had to make a similar adjustment in reverse on
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April 4, 1990.
This appeared to explain how the relay became set at half the required setpoint. The licensee investigated the cause further and found that there had been another relay left installed in the test stand, which caused two holding coils to be in parallel. As a result, when the technician initially tested the overcurrent relay, it took twice the current to obtain satisfactory data.
The licensee installed a warning sign on the test stand cautioning technicians to ensure that only the relay being tested is installed. The incident
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was reviewed with the technicians. The licensee's actions to correct this problem appeared adequate, b.
WA 01056842. On April 17, 1990, the inspector observed work in progress on the Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitor (RE-CA-01005). The instrument was a combination particulate, Iodine, and gaseous (PIG) radioactivity monttor. WA 01056842 was a troubieshooting WA issued the previous week to datermine and correct g
the cause of water collecting in the housing for the gaseous and
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iodine detectors.
The inspector reviewed the WA to determine that it
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was correctly prepared and approved for work.
Since the scope of work had changed since original issue, the WA had been subsequently
.uodated to provide additional work instructions. During the course
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of the troubleshooting, it was determined on April 16 that the gaseous detector was damaged and needed replacement. Work instructions for replacement of the detector had been added to the WA and approved for performance by the shift supervisor on the morning of April 17. After replacement of the gaseous detector, the instrument and control (I&C) personnel restored power to the monitor skid to allow the detector to " burn in" for at least 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> before calibration of the detector could commence.
The inspector proceeded to the control room to determine what impact having the monitor deenergized for detector replacement had on TS.
The shift supervisor and control room supervisor were questioned about the work and were not aware that the monitor had been deenergized for approximately 3 1/2 hours.
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The shift supervisor took prompt action to determine what had taken place and what actions, if any, were necessary to ensure TS compliance.
It was determined that the particulate detector had been
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inoperable since the monitor was deenergized approximately 3 1/2 hours earlier.
It was also determined that the gaseous detector should have been considered inoperable since it was discovered to be damaged on the previous day.
Since the monitor had been reenergized, the particulate detector was operable but the i
gaseous monitor was considered inoperable because it had not yet been
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-The particulate and gaseous radioactivity detectors were covered by
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two different limiting conditions for operatten (LC05) in TS.
LCO 3.4.5.1, " Reactor Coolant System Leakage," required that the particulate detector be operable and that the gaseous detector be operable if the condensate flow switches for the containment air
coolers were not operable.
LLO 3.3.3.1, " Radiation Monitoring
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Instrumentation," required that both the particulate and gaseous detectors be operable.
The action statement for LCO 3.4.5.1 applied for both LCOs and allowed continued operation for up to 30 days but required that containment atmosphere grab samples be taken and
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analyzed once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This was required when the particulate
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detector was inoperable and also when the gaseous detector was inoperable (unless the containment air cooler condensate flow switches were operable).
Since the particulate detector was only inoperable for approximately 31/2 hours and the containment air cooler condensate flow switches
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were operable, the LCOs for the detectors were met, but the inspector was concerned about the miscommunication that occurred between operations personnel and the I&C personnel performing the work. The event was discussed with the operations superintendent and the I&C assistant superintendent to determine what corrective action was taken to prevent future occurrences of this type. The inspector was
informed that the problem had been discussed with the individuals
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involved to stress the importance of communicating the implications of work being performed on plant equipment to ensure that operations
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personnel could assess the affect of the work on TS.
This was
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particularly important when troubleshonting was taking place since the scope of the work was not always well defined. The operations superintendent indicated that a quality notice (QN) was written to document the incident and ensure that corrective action was completed. The licensee indicated that corrective action will include additional training regarding the incident with operations and maintenance personnel to heighten their awareness of the importance of good communication during maintenance on plant equipment.
The problem of water collecting in the containment PIG monitor was not resolved and, until the cause can be identified and corrected, operations personnel will periodically drain the accumulated water k
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from the detector housing to ensure proper operation of the monitor.
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The inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's response to
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the problem. No other problems were. identified.
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WA 0105368$. On April 22, 1990, the inspector observed a
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recalibration of the Veritrak thermocouple amplifier which was part
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of the temperature indicating circuit for the component cooling water at the condenser outlet on Essential Chiller B.
The amplifier was
.i found slight 1; out of calibration while performing routine preventive r
maintenance loop calibration checks. The calibration was properly-done in accordance with Maintenance Procedure M1-005-251, Revision 4,
" Westinghouse 7300 In-Place Card Calibration Procedure." The
inspector reviewed the data sheets after the process was completed and found the entries to be correct and clearly written.
No problems were identified.
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No violations or deviations were identified, l
5.
Monthly-Surveillance Observation (61726)
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The inspectors observed the surveillance testing of safety-related systems and components listed below to verify that the activities were being performed in accordance with the TS.
The applicable procedures were reviewed for adequacy, test instrumentation was verified to be in calibration, and test data was reviewed for accuracy and completeness.
The inspectors ascertained that any deficiencies identified were properly reviewed and resolved.
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a.
Procedure OP-903-113 Revision 1, " Containment Airlock Overall s
Leakage Test and Door Interlock Check." On April 19, 1990, the inspector observed the performance of OP-903-113 for the containment personnel airlock which was required to be perforned every 6 months
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to ensure that the combined leakage through the containment personnel airlock and the escape airlock do not exceed the limits allowed by TS. Section 7,1, " Airlock Door Interlock Check," had been performed
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earlier and documented on Attachment 10.1 of the procedure.
The procedure was reviewed and discussed with the shift technical
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advisor (STA) who was performing the test.
Section 7.5, " Air Lock Overall Leakage Test Using the Volumetrics Multi-Range Leak Rate Monitor," was the method chosen to be used.
The installation of the strongbacks on the inner airlock door and the test setup were observed. When questioned by the inspector, the STA indicated that i
the strongbacks were being installed hand-tight.
The STA also indicated that, after pressurization of the airlock had begun and the installed gage on the airlock was verified to be tracking with the
celibrated test gage on the leak rate monitor, he was going to attach the air hose directly to the airlock test connection to permit pressurization of the airlock more rapidly.
The inspector questioned this method since it was not what was called for in the procedure.
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After discussion with the control room supervisor, the STA continued
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to pressurize the airlock through the leak rate monitor as specified in the procedure.
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During subsequent discussions with the STA's supervisor, it was determined that the licensee intends to change Section 7.5 to allow for bypassing the leak rate monitor during pressurization to allow
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for more rapid pressurization of the airlock. This was already
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allowed in other sections of the procedure which described alternate
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leak test methods for the airlock.
After approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> of pressurization, the airlock pressure would not increase to the 44-46 psig required by the procedure to
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begin the leak rate check. At approximately 40 psig, the leak rate was checked and found to be above the allowed rate at full test pressure. The. shift supervisor was notified and he immediately e
declared the airlock inoperable. The TS allowed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to~ return
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the airlock to an operable status or place the unit in hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
By the following day, it was determined that the excessive leakage was caused by improper installation of the strongbacks on the inner airlock door.
The strongbacks were properly installed and the airlock successfully retested within the time
allowed by TS.
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Review of the Technical Manual (#457000266) for the Chicago Bridge and Iron Containment Personnel Airlock indicated that tiedowns
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(strongbacks) were required to be installed any time the airlock was
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to be pressurized more that 2 psig greater than containment pressure
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and the tiedowns tightened until a 1/16-inch clearance existed between the inner airlock door and the airlock door frame.
After discussion with the licensee, it was determined that they would issue a QN to document the procedural deficiency and their corrective
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action to ensure adequate instruction is available for future performances of the surveillance test.
It was also determined that
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OP-903-113 had not undergone the licensee's procedure human-factors upgrade which is still in progress. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's response to the problem was appropriate and timely and t
will review their corrective action in this matter as an inspector followup item when it is completed (382/9007-01).
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The objectives of this inspection were to ensure that this facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements, to
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ensure that the licensee's management controls were effectively discharging the licensee's responsibilities for continued safe operation, to assure that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection programs are implemented in conformance with plant policies and
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procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements, and to inspect
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the licensee's compliance with the approved physical security plan.
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The inspectors conducted control room observations and plant inspection
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tours and reviewed logs and licensee documentation of equipment problems.
Through in plant observations and attendance of the licensee's
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plan-of-the-day meetings, the inspectors maintained cognizance over plant status and TS action statements in effect.
The inspectors continued to monitor the seat leakage on the pressurizer code safety valves. There have been no significant changes with the problem, and the licensee continued to operate with the RCS pressure at a reduced value.to minimize the leakage.. The operators have been maintaining quench tank pressure and temperature within normal operating limits without difficulty.
The leakage was recently estimated by the licensee to be approximately 4 gallons per hour.
The licensee has a tested safety valve available onsite if it becomes necessary to replace the leaking valve.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Followup of Previously Identified Items (92701. 92702)
a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 382/8821-04:
During the replacement of Dry Cooling Tower Fan Motor 6A, the electricians identified undersized fast speed motor leads in the replaced motor.
It appeared to the inspector that the motor failure may have been related to the undersized leads, so this item was opened to track the failure analysis.
On February 8, 1989, Westinghouse Electric Corporation
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transmitted a failure analysis to LP&L.
Briefly, the report stated that the undersized leads were the cause of motor failure. Two of
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the three leads burned through. They were measured to be No. 12
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Am, ican Wire Gage (AVG) when, by design, they should have been No. 8 AWG. Westinghouse investigated the cause of the undersized
leads and the potential for other occurrences on similar motors.
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This motor was produced as a single item on a 1981 shop order.
Thirty-two motors were manufactured under a 1970 shop order and one
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under a 1984 shop order. All the motors were inspected by either Westinghouse or LP&L and no more with undersized leads were found.
Since these motors were manufactured exclusively for the Waterford 3 dry cooling towers, there is no generic concern. Westingbouse concluded that the installation of the undersized motor leads was a random manufacturing error and an isolated occurrence.
The licensee determined that this item was not reportable under 10 CFR 21.
Based on reviews of the licensee's 10 CFR 21 evaluation and the
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Westinghouse failure analysis, the inspector foui.d no problem with this disposition. This item is closed, b.
(Closed) Open Item 382/8903-02:
Followup on licensee's determination
and correction of cause of Pressurizer Spray Valve RC-301A failure on January 27, 1989.
This item was partially closed in NRC Inspection
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f-10-Report 50-382/89-34 but left open pending the licensee's evaluation of a 1984 design change which was not implemented before the failure in 1989. On April 12, 1990, the licensee issued a memorandum (W3B90-1204) which satisfied the inspector that the design change was not intended for implementation until and unless the spray valves did not work properly. At the time the design change was initiated and parts ordered, Combustion Engineering informed the licensee that the valves supplied for Waterford 3 were an improved version over the valves supplied to the St. Lucie plant, however, there was
insufficient operating history to confirm the adequacy of the design.
This response removed the inspector's cause for concern that other
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design changes might be in the warehouse awaiting implementation to solve previously identified problems.
The licensee is considering additional improvements for the spray valves such as providing a more reliable positioner to preclude the repeat of a March 16, 1990, problem described in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/90-05. Those actions are being tracked under Inspector Followup Item 382/9005-01.
This open item is closed.
c.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 382/8922-04:
Resolution of licensee's disposition of past and present concerns with lubrication and vibration on safety-related air handling units.
The licensee contacted the vendor (Buffalo Forge) and obtained the necessary information to properly lubricate bearings and to resolve concerns that previously overgreased units might fail. The inspectors reviewed this information and noted that, for the eight air handling units at Waterford 3 which have this type of bearing, overgreasing would result in a warmer running bearing until it relieves itself of
excess grease.
This would.have already happened on previously l
overgreased units and, thus, there is no safety concern.
The vendor i
pointed out that while overgreasing is a self-correcting problem, the bearings could be more precisely packed by removing the cover and hand packing to about half full. The licensee elected to use this method in the future. All repetitive _ task documents were changed to reflect this method.
There have been no further problems identified in this area since the issue was raised in July 1989.
Regarding vibration, the licensee has been in the process of developing and refining a predictive maintenance program on rotating equipment.
In the recent past, the licensee has demonstrated the value of this program by performing maintenance on a scheduled basis rather than upon failure of components.
The licensee's disposition of this issue was adequate, and no violation of NRC regulations was identified.
This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712)
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(0 pen) LER 382/90-001, " Control Ventilation Area System Inoperable Due to Inadequate Administrative Controls," was reviewed by the i
inspector. The inspector informed the licensee that the LER had been
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incorrectly reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv). There was no ESF j
actuation involved.
The inspector also indicated that the licensee needed to more accurately characterize the impact of the breakdown in J
administrative controls on the operation of the controlled ventilation area system. The licensee agreed to review the LER and submit a revision if appropriate.
This LER will remain open.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown (71710)
i During the reporting period, the inspectors performed an indepth review and walkdown of accessible portions of the containment isolation i
system (CIS). The CIS actually consists of portions of numerous systems which penetrate the reactor containment building and must form part of the leak-tight barrier during an accident.
The licensee's operating
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procedures and system drawings were reviewed and compared with the as-built configuration.
Equipment condition, valve and breaker positions, housekeeping, labeling, permanent instrument indication, and apparent operability of support systems essential to activation of the ESF r.ystem were all noted as appropriate. The scope of this inspection concentrated
on, but was not limited to, the barriers of all fluid penetrations through the reactor containment not serving ESFs and supporting systems.
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barriers are comprised of Safety Class 2, Seismic Category 1, piping systems, both inside and outside the containment vessel, and manual or automatic isolation valves.
Section 6.2.4 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was reviewed to determine the design requirements and description of the CIS that were applicable.
Table 6.2-32 in the FSAR contained a listing of all containment penetrations and isolation valves.
This table was compared to Tables 3.6-1, " Containment Leakage Paths," and 3.6-2, " Containment Isolation Valves," of the plant's TS to ensure that they were complete and
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accurate.
The TS Tables were then used to check plant Surveillance Procedures OP-903-031, Revision 5, " Containment Integrity Check,"
OP-903-114," Revision 2 " Local Leak Rate Test," and OP-903-112, Revision 1, " Containment Purge Valve Leak Test," to ensure that all
appropriate containment isolation valves were included in these plant surveillance procedures.
These procedures were used to fulfill TS 4.6.1.1.a surveillance requirements for containment integrity checks, TS 4.6.1.2.d for containment isolation valve type "C" leak testing, and TS 4.6.1.7.2 for containment purge valve leakage testing.
The inspectors used TS Table 3.6-2 to review the licensee's surveillance test procedures designated to stroke test containment isolation valves.
The procedures reviewed were Surveillance Procedures OP-903-032, Revision 7, " Quarterly ISI (Inservice Test per ASME Code Section XI) Valve Tests," and OP-903-03?, Revision 8, " Cold Shutdown ISI Valve Tests." The inspector verified that all of the containment isolation valves listed in the TS table were covered by a surveillance test procedure. The l
inspectors also reviewed the "Section XI Pump and Valve Reference
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Y A-12-L Data / Acceptance Criteria Notebook, which the STA maintiined in the control room. The book contained acceptance criteria and recent inservice
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testing results for Section IX pumps and valves including the containment h
isolation valves.
I Using OP-903-031 as a guide, the inspectors walked down all accessible containment penetrations to ensure that manual isolation valves were locked closed as required and blank flanges or caps were in plact and to
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observe the condition of the containment penetrations and automatic isolation valves.
The inspectors independently compiled a list of 39 automatic containment isolation valves which, in most cases, by design, would not fail shut upon loss of actuator power. The list was compared with the licensee's applicable operating procedures to ensure that the valves were addressed in the breaker or switch lineup, thus providing administrative controls to ensure that power was available when placing each system in operation.
The inspectors then walked down each breaker or switch to determine whether they were in the correct position, which for this inspection was all energized, because containment integrity was required for the existing plant condition (at full power).
The inspectors generated a list of minor deficiencies ed inconsistencies for the licensee to evaluate.
These items did not appear to affect the operability of the CIS.
The inspectors will continue this inspection into the next inspection period.
No violations or deviations were identified.
i 10.
Exit Intervi_ew The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 4, 1990, with those. persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' findings.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors during.
this inspection.
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