IR 05000369/2017003
| ML17305B221 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 11/01/2017 |
| From: | Joel Munday Division Reactor Projects II |
| To: | Capps S Duke Energy Carolinas |
| References | |
| EA-17-119 IR 2017003 | |
| Download: ML17305B221 (20) | |
Text
UNITED STATES ber 1, 2017
SUBJECT:
MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2017003 AND 05000370/2017003 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Dear Mr. Capps:
On September 30, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. On October 12, 2017, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff.
The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance.
McGuire Unit 2 operated with reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary leakage from approximately February 20, 2017, until the unit was shut down on February 23, 2017. Contrary to Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, Unit 2 operated with pressure boundary leakage longer than allowed by the required TS action statements. Although a violation of TS occurred, the violation was not attributable to an equipment failure that was avoidable by reasonable licensee quality assurance measures or management controls and therefore, inspectors concluded that there was no performance deficiency associated with the RCS boundary leakage. Using risk-informed tools to assess the condition the NRC concluded that the violation was of very low safety significance and consistent with a Severity Level IV violation. This determination was made because there was no adverse impact on the RCS, given that the leak was stable, well within the capacity of the charging system, and it would not impact other systems used to mitigate a loss of coolant accident.
Based on these facts, and consultation with the Office of Enforcement and the Regional Administrator, I have been authorized to exercise enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 3.10 of the Enforcement Policy, and refrain from issuing enforcement for the violation.
This violation will not be considered in the assessment process or the NRCs Action Matrix. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Joel T. Munday, Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17
Enclosure:
IR 05000369/2017003 and 05000370/2017003 w/Attachment - Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17 Report No.: 05000369/2017003; and 05000370/2017003 Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Huntersville, NC 28078 Dates: July 1, 2017 through September 30, 2017 Inspectors: A. Hutto, Senior Resident Inspector R. Cureton, Resident Inspector J. Reece, Senior Resident Inspector (Summer)
C. Scott, Resident Inspector (Catawba)
M. Toth, Project Engineer (Section 1R05)
Approved by: Frank Ehrhardt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000369/2017003, and 05000370/2017003; July 1, 2017, through September 30, 2017;
McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Integrated Inspection Report The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and one regional inspector. No findings were identified during this inspection period. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operations of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 6.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1: Operated at approximately 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) until September 23, 2017, when the unit was shutdown for a refueling outage.
Unit 2: Operated at approximately 100 percent RTP for the entire inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Impending Adverse Weather Conditions The inspectors reviewed the licensees preparations to protect risk-significant systems from potential adverse effects from hurricane Irma expected during September 11-12, 2017. The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures and compensatory measures, including operator staffing, before the onset of the adverse weather conditions. The inspectors verified that operator actions specified in the licensees adverse weather procedure maintain readiness of essential systems. The inspectors verified that required surveillances were current, or were scheduled and completed, if practical, before the onset of anticipated adverse weather conditions. The inspectors also verified that the licensee implemented periodic equipment and protected area walkdowns to ensure that the condition of plant equipment met operability requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial Walkdown The inspectors verified that critical portions of the selected systems were correctly aligned by performing partial walkdowns. The inspectors selected systems for assessment because they were a redundant or backup system or train, were important for mitigating risk for the current plant conditions, had been recently realigned, or were a single-train system. The inspectors determined the correct system lineup by reviewing plant procedures and drawings. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
The inspectors selected the following three systems or trains to inspect:
- Unit 1, A train auxiliary feedwater (CA) pump while the B train was out of service (OOS) for testing
- Unit 1, B train nuclear service water (RN) pump and strainers while the A train of RN was OOS for crossover piping discharge path isolated for PM
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
.1 Quarterly Inspection
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of selected fire plans by comparing the fire plans to the defined hazards and defense-in-depth features specified in the fire protection program. In evaluating the fire plans, the inspectors assessed the following items:
- control of transient combustibles and ignition sources
- fire detection systems
- fire suppression systems
- manual firefighting equipment and capability
- passive fire protection features
- compensatory measures and fire watches
- issues related to fire protection contained in the licensees corrective action program The inspectors toured the following five fire areas to assess material condition and operational status of fire protection equipment. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- Unit 1/2, control room, (Fire Strategy #24)
- Unit 2, ETA electrical switchgear room, (Fire Strategy #18)
- Unit 2, 750 electrical penetration room, (Fire Strategy #16)
- Unit 2, ETB electrical switchgear room, (Fire Strategy #12)
- Unit 2, 733 electrical penetration room, (Fire Strategy #10)
.2 Annual Inspection
The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire brigade performance during a drill on August 26, 2017, and assessed the brigades capability to meet fire protection licensing basis requirements. The inspectors observed the following aspects of fire brigade performance:
- capability of fire brigade members
- leadership ability of the brigade leader
- use of turnout gear and fire-fighting equipment
- team effectiveness
- compliance with site procedures The inspectors also assessed the ability of control room operators to combat potential fires, including identifying the location of the fire, dispatching the fire brigade, and sounding alarms.
The inspectors also observed the post-drill critique to assess if it was appropriately critical, included discussions of drill observations, and identified any areas requiring corrective actions. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
Annual Review The inspectors verified the readiness and availability of various safety-related heat exchangers to perform their design functions by observing the licensees actions to minimize heat exchanger fouling during fouling season. Fouling season occurs typically in September when lake stratification turnover results in dissolved metals precipitating out of solution in the service water system when exposed to oxygenated conditions. These metal oxides will plate out on the heat exchangers reducing their performance. The inspectors verified that the licensee monitored fouling conditions and performed high velocity flushes when required. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee had entered any significant heat exchanger performance problems into the corrective action program and that the licensees corrective actions were appropriate.
Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification
On July 18, 2017, the inspectors observed two evaluated simulator scenarios administered to an operating crew as part of the annual requalification operating test required by 10 CFR 55.59, Requalification. One scenario included unwarranted rod motion, a feed line break inside containment and an anticipated transient without scram.
The other scenario included a loss of condenser vacuum and a steam generator tube rupture.
The inspectors assessed the following:
- licensed operator performance
- the ability of the licensee to administer the scenario and evaluate the operators
- the quality of the post-scenario critique
- simulator performance Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
.2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual
Plant/Main Control Room On September 23 and 26, 2017, the inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the main control room during Unit 1 shutdown to Mode 5 for a refueling outage, and draining the Unit 1 reactor coolant system to lowered inventory, respectively.
The inspectors assessed the following:
- use of plant procedures
- control board manipulations
- communications between crew members
- use and interpretation of instruments, indications, and alarms
- use of human error prevention techniques
- documentation of activities
- management and supervision Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensees treatment of the two issues listed below to verify the licensee appropriately addressed equipment problems within the scope of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants). The inspectors reviewed procedures and records to evaluate the licensees identification, assessment, and characterization of the problems as well as their corrective actions for returning the equipment to a satisfactory condition. In addition, the inspectors performed a review of the licensees Quality Assurance (QA) Program to ensure the licensee was in compliance with their program requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- Unit 1, Fairchild reversing relay. The reversing relay for 1CA-40B was replaced with a Fairchild model 25432. (QA review)
- Unit 1, reactor trip bypass breaker 1BYB. The 1BYB trip breaker failed to go to test position.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the five maintenance activities listed below to verify that the licensee assessed and managed plant risk as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and licensee procedures. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensees risk assessments and implementation of risk management actions. The inspectors also verified that the licensee was identifying and resolving problems with assessing and managing maintenance-related risk using the corrective action program. Additionally, for maintenance resulting from unforeseen situations, the inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees planning and control of emergent work activities.
Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- Unit 2, July 27, 2017, risk mitigation activities for PM on 2RN-296A (2A train essential header return)
- Unit 1, August 1, 2017, risk mitigation activities for A train decay heat removal PMs
- Unit 2, August 7, 2017, risk mitigation activities for 2B charging pump PMs
- Unit 2, September 5, 2017, risk mitigation activities for 2B diesel generator PMs
- Unit 2, September 5, 2017, risk mitigation activities for 2B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
Operability and Functionality Review The inspectors selected the five operability determinations or functionality evaluations listed below for review based on the risk-significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the determinations to ensure that technical specification operability was properly justified and the components or systems remained capable of performing their design functions. To verify whether components or systems were operable, the inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specification and updated final safety analysis report to the licensees evaluations. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations.
Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- Unit 1, 1B RN pump discharge pressure indicates low, nuclear condition report (NCR) 2136527
- Cask 04 southwest upper screen is pulled loose, NCR 02136253
- Unit 1, 1A diesel generator (DG) governor oil leak, NCR 2140631
- Units 1 and 2, Standby nuclear service water pond temperature measured locally, NCR 2146843
- Unit 2, Turbine drive auxiliary feedwater pump drain line leaking by, NCR 2151417
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified that the plant modification listed below did not affect the safety functions of important safety systems. The inspectors confirmed the modification did not degrade the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk-significant structures, systems and components. The inspectors also verified modifications performed during plant configurations involving increased risk did not place the plant in an unsafe condition. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated whether system operability and availability, configuration control, post-installation test activities, and changes to documents, such as drawings, procedures, and operator training materials, complied with licensee standards and NRC requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with modifications. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- Engineering Change (EC) 408547, Replace Unit 1 Cold Leg Injection Check Valves on Loops A, B, C, D
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for the five maintenance activities listed below to verify the work performed was completed correctly and the test activities were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability.
- Work Order (WO) 20141972, PM-1NVGX0016: Inspect 1B NV Oil Pump Pins, July 11, 2017
- WO 20142499, PM-1NDLP5040: RHR Pump A Min Flow LOOP Calibration, August 1, 2017
- WO 20128479, PM-1EQADE0002: Perform Hot Web Deflections 1B DG, August 15, 2017
- WO 20163469, 1CA-86A Gate Valve Verify Closing Friction and Stem Lubrication, August 30, 2017
- WO 20198373, PM-2VGCP0059-(1Y) 2A2 DG Air Compressor, September 20, 2017 The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following:
- acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness
- effects of testing on the plant were adequately addressed
- test instrumentation was appropriate
- tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures
- equipment was returned to its operational status following testing
- test documentation was properly evaluated Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with post-maintenance testing. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
For the Unit 1 refueling outage from September 23, 2017, through the remainder of the inspection period, the inspectors evaluated the following outage activities:
- outage planning
- shutdown, cooldown, and core off-load
- reactor coolant system instrumentation and electrical power configuration
- reactivity and inventory control
- decay heat removal and spent fuel pool cooling system operation
- containment closure The inspectors verified that the licensee:
- considered risk in developing the outage schedule
- controlled plant configuration per administrative risk reduction methodologies
- developed work schedules to manage fatigue
- developed mitigation strategies for loss of key safety functions
- adhered to operating license and technical specification requirements The inspectors verified that safety-related and risk-significant structures, systems, and components not accessible during power operations were maintained in an operable condition. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with outage activities. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the five surveillance tests listed below and either observed the test or reviewed test results to verify testing adequately demonstrated equipment operability and met technical specification and current licensing basis. The inspectors evaluated the test activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with surveillance testing. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
Routine Surveillance Tests
- PT/0/A/4200/002, Standby Shutdown Facility Operability Test
- PT/2/A/4252/001 B, 2B CA PUMP Performance Test
- PT/2/A/4350/002 A, 2A DG Operability Test
- PT/1/A/4200/009 A, Engineered Safety Features Actuation Periodic Test Train A In-Service Tests (IST)
- PT/2/A/4403/002 D, 2A Nuclear Service Water Valve Stroke Time Test
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the emergency preparedness drill conducted on July 5, 2017.
The inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator and technical support center to evaluate implementation of the emergency plan, including event classification, notification, and protective action recommendations. The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance against criteria established in the licensees procedures.
Additionally, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to assess the licensees effectiveness in identifying emergency preparedness weaknesses and verified the identified weaknesses were entered in the corrective action program. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of the performance indicator (PI) data, submitted by the licensee, for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 PIs listed below. The inspectors reviewed plant records compiled between July 2016, and June 2017, to verify the accuracy and completeness of the data reported for the station. The inspectors verified that the PI data complied with guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, and licensee procedures. The inspectors verified the accuracy of reported data that were used to calculate the value of each PI.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with PI data. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- residual heat removal system
- heat removal system
- cooling water system
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Routine Review
The inspectors screened items entered into the licensees corrective action program to identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for followup.
The inspectors reviewed problem identification program reports, attended screening meetings, or accessed the licensees computerized corrective action database.
.2 Annual Followup of Selected Issues
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of NCR 2102868, 2D Safety Injection Pressure Boundary Leak. The inspectors evaluated the following attributes of the licensees actions:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner
- evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues
- consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences
- classification and prioritization of the problem
- identification of root and contributing causes of the problem
- identification of any additional condition reports
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000370/2017-001-00, -01, Technical Specification (TS) Required Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage
a. Inspection Scope
On February 23, 2017, McGuire Unit 2 was shut down, as required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.13, due to RCS pressure boundary leakage on a Unit 2 safety injection (NI) pipe upstream of the connection to D reactor coolant system (NC) cold leg. The licensee determined that the preliminary cause of the NI pipe leak was thermal fatigue. The inspectors reviewed the LERs for accuracy and completeness and reviewed the associated corrective actions (NCR 2102868) to determine whether they were appropriate. The inspectors also reviewed the LERs and NCRs to identify any licensee performance deficiencies associated with the issue. Licensee Event Reports 05000370/2016-001-00 and -01 are closed. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
Description:
On February 20, 2017, the McGuire Unit 2 RCS unidentified leakage increased from 0.01 gallons per minute (gpm) to 0.09 gpm. Concurrently, containment particulate counts increased from 500 to 30,000 counts per minute (cpm) and humidity increased from 8 percent to 12 percent. The licensee also determined unidentified RCS leakage increased to 0.255 gpm on February 22 (dayshift) and 0.303 gpm on February 23 (nightshift). On February 23, 2017, at 1922 hours0.0222 days <br />0.534 hours <br />0.00318 weeks <br />7.31321e-4 months <br />, operators commenced a Unit 2 shutdown upon positive identification of pressure boundary leakage on the NI pipe upstream of the connection to D NC cold leg. Following shutdown, the licensee also discovered a small pinhole pressure boundary leak on the body of valve 2NC-30, the pressurizer spray bypass valve. The leakage from 2NC-30 was a negligible contributor to the total unidentified leakage measured during unit operation.
The licensee determined that the cause of the NI pipe leak was thermal fatigue damage caused by NC cross-loop flows. The cause of the 2NC-30 valve leak was a casting flaw attributed to a combination of defects during the manufacturing process that resulted in a through wall pinhole leak in the valve body. The inspectors reviewed the licensees analysis and determined that the licensee had appropriately evaluated the issues. Since the causes were not reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct, the inspectors concluded that there was no performance deficiency associated with the issue. For the purpose of closing the associated licensee event reports and categorizing the associated technical specification violation, a detailed risk evaluation of the RCS pressure boundary leakage condition was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst using the NRC McGuire SPAR probabilistic risk assessment model. The evaluation was performed in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix A. The exposure period was 114 hours0.00132 days <br />0.0317 hours <br />1.884921e-4 weeks <br />4.3377e-5 months <br /> and conditional rupture probability values were taken from EPRI report TR111880. The detailed risk evaluation determined that the condition represented an increase in core damage frequency of <1.0E-6/year, a finding of very low safety significance.
McGuire TS 3.4.13 limiting condition for operation (LCO) requires that RCS operational leakage shall be limited to No pressure boundary leakage when in Modes 1 through 4.
Action Statement B of TS 3.4.13 requires the plant to be placed in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The licensee entered Mode 3 on February 24, 2017, at 0041 hours4.74537e-4 days <br />0.0114 hours <br />6.779101e-5 weeks <br />1.56005e-5 months <br /> and entered Mode 5 on February 24, 2017, at 1721 hours0.0199 days <br />0.478 hours <br />0.00285 weeks <br />6.548405e-4 months <br />. The licensee made an event notification (EN) to the NRC on February 23, 2017, at 2201 hours0.0255 days <br />0.611 hours <br />0.00364 weeks <br />8.374805e-4 months <br /> (EN 52573) due to a shutdown of the plant required by TS.
Enforcement:
The McGuire TS 3.4.13 LCO requires that RCS operational leakage shall be limited to No pressure boundary leakage when in Modes 1 through 4. Contrary to the above, McGuire Unit 2 experienced RCS pressure boundary leakage while operating in Mode 1. Although a violation of the TS occurred, the violation was not attributable to equipment failures that were avoidable by reasonable licensee quality assurance measures or management controls, therefore a performance deficiency was not identified. The inspectors utilized the Enforcement Policy examples of Section 6.1, and available risk-informed tools to assess the safety significance of the RCS pressure boundary leakage and related violation. Based on the fact that the leak rate was stable and within the capacity of the charging system and would not impact other systems used to mitigate a loss of coolant accident, the inspectors concluded the safety significance of the violation was very low and consistent with Severity Level IV. Additionally, the risk aspects were discussed and confirmed with a regional senior risk analyst. This issue was documented in the licensees corrective action program as NCR 2102868.
The NRC exercised enforcement discretion in Enforcement Action (EA)-2017-119, in accordance with Section 3.10 of the Enforcement Policy because the violation was not associated with a licensee performance deficiency. Specifically, the violation was not attributable to an equipment failure that was avoidable by reasonable licensee quality assurance measures or management controls and therefore inspectors concluded that there was no performance deficiency associated with the RCS boundary leakage. The violation will not be considered in the assessment process or the NRCs Action Matrix.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On October 12, 2017, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Steven Capps and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- S. Capps, Vice President, McGuire Nuclear
- S. Gibby, Maintenance Manager
- J. Glenn, Organizational Effectiveness Manager
- J. Hussey, Licensing Engineer
- M. Kelly, Training Manager
- K. Kinard, Security Manager
- N. Kunkel, Engineering Manager
- S. Mooneyhan, Radiation Protection Manager
- T. Paglia, Work Control Manager
- E. Pigott, Operations Manager
- S. Snider, Plant Manager
- J. Thomas, Regulatory Affairs Manager
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Closed
- 05000370/2017-001-00 LER Technical Specification (TS) Required Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage (4OA3)
- 05000370/2017-001-01 LER Technical Specification (TS) Required Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage (4OA3)