IR 05000369/1991001
| ML20217B903 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1991 |
| From: | Belisle G, Cooper T, Vandoorn P, Vias S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217B870 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-91-01, 50-369-91-1, 50-370-91-01, 50-370-91-1, NUDOCS 9103120271 | |
| Download: ML20217B903 (16) | |
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pN0 UNITED ST ATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMissl0N 8I'
RE0loN H h-
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- t ATLANTA' EORot A 30323
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Report Nos.'50-369/91-01 and 50-370/91-01 Licensee:-Duke Power-Company P.O. Box 1007 Charlotte, NC 28201-1007 Facility Name: McGuire-Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.
NPF-9 and NPF-17-Inspection Conducted:, Ja uary 6, 991 - February 2, 1991
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Inspectors:
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pector Date figned P. K.
an Do n, Seb.ior d ny&
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T. 14. Co per, s i de'nt--t pec
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Date Signed
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- 5', J. Vias, Asident inspettog
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Date Signed t */I ' U h
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Approved by:~6. A.'BeVisle, Section Chief
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Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects
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SUMMARY
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Scope:
Thisiroutine,-resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant operations safety verification, ESF System Walkdown,--
surveillance testing,-maintenance activities followup on Licensee Eventiand Part 21 Reports, followup en previous inspection findings, evaluation of licensee self-assessment capability, evaluation of Design. Engineering and= evaluation of long term actions regarding loss of decay heat removal.
Results:
In the ~ areas inspected, one non-cited violation was identified involving the failure to initiate corrective actions upon finding discrepancies in operating procedures (Paragraph 2.d.) and one H
violation was cited involving the failue to -implement prompt corrective actions for fuse installation problems- (Paragraph -6).
9103120271 910219 DR ADOCK 050
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees P. Abraham, Design Engineering (DE)/ Engineering Support Division (ESE)
G. Addis, Superintendent of Station Services
- D. Baxter, Support Operations Manager
- J. Boyle, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling
.D. Bumgardner, Unit 1 Operations Manager J. Foster, Station Health Physicist D. Franks, QA Verification Manager T. Geer, DE/McGuire Engineering Division (MEE)
G. Gilbert, Superintendent of Technical Services
- B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Operations
- C. Hendrix, Maintenance Engineering Services Manager T. Mathews, Site Design Engineering Manager T. McConnell, Plant Manager D. McMeekin, Vice President of Design Engineering R. Michael, Station Chemist D. Murdock, McGuire Design Engineering Division Manager
- R. Pierce, Instrumentation and Electrical (IAE) Supervisor W. Reeside, Operations Engineer R. Rider, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer
- M. Sample, Superintendent of Maintenance
- R. Sharpe, Compliance Manager J. Snyder, Performence Engineer J. Silver Unit 2 Operations Manager A. Sipe, McGuire Safety Review Group Chairman-K. Thomas, DE/MED B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations
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T. Wyke, Manager ESD Other licensee employees contacted ircluded craf tsmen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
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2.
Plant 0perations(71707,71710)
a.
Observations The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period to verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements.
Control room logs, shif t supervisors' logs, shif t turnover records and equipment removal and restoration records were routinely reviewed.
Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and performance personnel.
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Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted i
as prescribed in applicable station administrative directives. The
complement of licensed personnel on each shif t met or exceeded the I
minimum required by Technical Specifications (TS). The inspectors also reviewed Problem Investigation Reports to determine whether the licensee was appropriately documenting problems and implementing corrective actions.
Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not
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limited to, the turbine buildings,.the auxiliary building, electrical equipment rooms, cable spreading rooms, and the station yard zone inside the protected area.
During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, fire protection, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.
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The inspector noted that.on the Auxiliary Shutdown Panels (ASP) in the Unit 1 Auxiliery Feedwater (CA) pump room that the ' A' pump steam line pressure gage 1SMP-5081 (A steam generator) and the steam line
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pressure gage 1SMP-5172 (D steam generator) were both pegged high,
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greater than 1300 psig. The other similar gages read around 1000 psig both in the control room and on the ASP.
On the 'B'
CA pump,
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the gage for supply air pressure to valve ICA-44 read 0-100, whereas
all the other similar gages read 3-15.
The licensee was informed and immediately began to investigate the problems.
The steam pressure gages were simply stuck from recent testing.
The licensee iritiated action to correct the air supply gage, b.
Unit 1 Operations Status The unit began the inspection period in Mode 1 at 100% power and continued at full power throughout the inspection period, c.
Unit 2 Operations Status The unit began the inspection period at 100% af ter having just completed start-up testir.g at various power ievels. On January 23, 1991, the unit reduced power to 52% to repair the 2B Busline Motor
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Operated Disconnects (MOD) which were discovered to have broken parts associated with the switching arms. The unit returned to full power the next day and continued at full power throughout the inspection period, except for routine small decreases in reactor power for performance testing and load following.
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d.
Engineering Safety features Walkdowns (71710)
The inspectors conducted a walkdown on the accessible portions of Unit 2 CA System and Nuclear Service Water (RN) System. The walkdown consisted of the following:
confirmed that the system lineup
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procedures matched the plant drawings and the as-built configurations; identified equipment conditions and items that might degrade plant performance; verified that valves in the flowpaths were in the correct positions (as required by licensee's procedures)*,
verified that the local and remote indications were functional and verified the proper breaker position at local electrical boards and indications on control room panels.
The inspectors walked down the systems using plant approved Operating Procedures (ops); OP/2/A/6250/02, Auxiliary Feedwi'er System; j
OP/2/A/6400/06, Nuclear Service Water System; ano plant drawings MC-2592-1.0, MC-2592-1.1, MC-2574-1,1, MC-2574-2.0, and MC-2574-2.1.
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The following is a table showing the discrepancies found during the walkdown of the CA and RN systems, in the areas that were inspected.
This list does not preclude the possibility of other similar discrepancies in these or other ops.
Operating Procedure OP/2/A/6400/06 Enclosure Page Valve No.
Discrepancy 4.10
ORN-3A.C
4.10
ORN-7A.C
4.10
4.10
4.10
Enclosure Page Valve No.
Power Supply Discrepancy 4.10A
ORN-3A.C 1EMXH 3A
4.10A
ORN-7x,C
=1EMXH 3C
4.10A
ORN-150A.C IEMXH SC
4.10A
ORN-4A,C IEMXH-1 2C 3,4,5 4.10A
ORN-10A,C IEMXH-1 1D 4,5 4.10A
ORN-12A.C IEMXH-1 28 -
4,5 4.10A
ORN-147A.C 1EMXH-1 3B 4,5 4.10A
ORN-148A.C IEMXH-1 IE 3,4,5 4.10A
ORN-283A,C 1EMXH-1 3C 4,5 4.10A
ORN-301A C 1EMXH-1 3D 4,5
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Operating Procedure Op/2/A/6250/02
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Enclosure Page Valve No.
Discrepancy 4.6
Discrepancy 1) Control Room (CR) Board valve tag does not match the operating procedure valve number in the enclosure.
(example: ORN-3A.C vs ORN-3A)
2) Nomenclature in the operating procedure enclosure does not match CR board valve tag nomenclature 3) Power supply breaker tag does not match the operating procedure enclosure vein number 4) Breaker location in remdure enclosure is incorrect, 2 ETA should be 1 ETA (This was found to be incorrect on both unit's procedures)
5) Compartment number tags on power supply breakert are missing for entire IEMXH-1 motor control cabinet (MCC)
In addition, the inspectors noted the tag was missing on RN Pump 2A Discharge Check Valve 2RN28; and FCD MC-2574-2.0 indicates that the relief valve 2RN295 is downstream of 2RNFE5360, when it was.found to be upstream of the flow element. These items were brought to the attention of licensee personnel and corrective actions were initiated.
In the same area of Engineering Safety Feature walkdowns, the Cold Leg Accumulator (CLA) System was inspected in September 1990. At that time, operating procedure OP/1/A/6200/09, Accumulator Operation, was used to-verify alignment of the system. During the walkdown of CLA system, the inspector found the following discrepancies, which were similar in nature to the items noted above on the RN and CA
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Unit 1 Control Boar 1 IMC-11, Safety Injection section:
The
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white tag for the aperating procedure was found to be incorrect.
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The tag.showed Oi,1/A/6200/04, the correct procedure is OP/1/A/6200/09 OP/1/A/6200/09, Enclosure 4.7A, page 1/1:
The elevation for the
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power supply 1EMXA-2 3C, for valve 1NI-95A was shown on " Aux 760" instead of " Aux 750" OP/1/A/6200/09, Enclosure 4.7A, page 1/1:
The compartment for
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the power supply for valve 1NI-968 was shown as 1EMXB-13D and the correct location is 1EMXB-1 3B The discrepancies for the CLA system were discussed with the licensee at that time and they were promptly corrected.
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A review of previcusly completed operating procedures for the RN system, Enclosure 4.10A, disclosed two completed enclosures, in the control room files, one for each unit.
Unit 1, Enclosure 4.10A was performed on June 8, 1990, without any notation made or corrective action initiated indicating that the location for 1EMXH-1 was it vrrect. On June 28, 1990, for Unit 2, an operator completed Enclosure 4.10A noting on the enclosure that the procedure was incorrect in that the breaker was in 1 ETA, not 2 ETA.
However, no further action was taken to correct the procedure for this discrepancy. None of the other discrepancies noted by the inspector were identified on the completed enclosures.
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires written procedures to be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.
Station Directive 4.2.1, Handling of Station Procedures, states in part that:
5.3.4.4 The nomenclature used within the procedure to describe equipment (i.e.... equipment type, plant designation,
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etc...), should agree with that on the equipment actually installed.
5.4.2.7 Verify that information contained within the procedure is accurate and complete.
Information which is suspect should be checked.
5.10.3.4 If the discrepancy does not affect the acceptance criteria of the procedure or prevent the completion of the procedure, corrective action shall be initiated but may or may not be completed prior to approval of the completed procedure.
In discussions with the licensee on the above concerns, the licensee conmitted to the NRC Residents to perform a complete review of all 0Ps and any Performance Testing (PT) procedures that are utilized by operations.
Upon completion of the review, a listing of the findings will then be reviewed, categorized for safety significance and priorities, and corrected on a schedule commensurate with the significance. An implementation schedule will be discussed with the NRC Resident Staff. This is the same process that was utilized for the Emergency Procedures (EP) and Abnormal Procedures (AP).
In reviewing the above concern for significance, the inspector concluded that the errors found in the procedures have not led to any systems' misalignments or misconfigurations.
Nor were there any operator errors found to have occurred due to inaccurate procedures in this area.
In discussions with the operations staff, it was
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determined that the signoffs on the enclosures to the ops indicated that the alignment was correct not that the nomenclature or location were correct or accurate.
This item is considered a Non-Cited Violation 369,370/91-01-01:
Failure to Properly Initiate Corrective Actions for Discrepant Operating Procedures.
This NRC identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
One non-cited violation was identified as described above.
3.
Surveillance Testing (61726)
Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the Resident Inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with applicable TS.
Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain that current written approved procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, that system restoration was completed and acceptance criterie were met.
Detailed below are selected tests which were either reviewed or witnessed:
PROCEDURE EQUIPMENT / TEST PT/1/A/4350/04 4 KV Sequencer Under Voltage Detector Actuating Device Operational Test PT/1/A/4600/01 RCCA Movement Test IP/0/A/3214/05 Rosemount Model 1153 Pressure Transmitter Calibration IP/0/A/3090/14 Tripping Inoperable Protective Channels PT/0/A/4350/11 Reactor CoolantLPump (RCP) Under Voltage /Underfrequency Functional Test IP/0/A/3061/12 Charging Station Lead-Calcium Batteries PT/0/A/4350/288 125 Volt Vital Battery Quarterly Inspection No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
Maintenance Observations (62703)
Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with applicable TS.
T'e selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where appliccble, current written approved procedures were available and in use, that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was completed, and maintenance results were adequate.
Work Request / Procedure Ac tivity 06511C Repair Rosemount Transmitter Model 1153 141250 OPS RF Fire Pump 'C' Repair Leaking Seal in Pump 008 07437C PT Perform PM/PT on RCPM 1A, 1B, 1C, and 10 dndervoltage and Underfrequency Relays 06959C Perform PM/PT Pt '.rmance Discharge Test on Battery EVCB No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and 10 CFR Part 21 Report Followup (90712,92700)
a.
LERs Followup The below listed LERs were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements. The determination included:
adequacy of description, verification of compliance with Tecnnical Specifications and regulatory requirements, cor/ective action taken.,
existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each event.
Additional in plant -reviews and discussion with plant-personnel, as-appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an (*).
The following LER, are closed:
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369/90-34 TS 3.0.3 Was. Voluntarny Entered to Perform a-Changeout of Filters on Both Trains of Control Area Ventilation System
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370/89-10,Rev.2 Leak Occurre J on Containment Spray Heat Exchanger ? After Valve Stroke Timing
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- 369/90-29 Pot 2ntial !Tists far the Loss of a Resikial He.t Removal Train Bechuse of a Destca Goriciency.
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Part 21 Followup
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The inspector verified that the licensee had received the 10CFR Part 21 notification, had initiated corrective action as appropriate and was documenting their actions.
The following Part 21s are closed for.
both units:
Number Title (PIR NO.)
89-18 Limitorque SMB Actuators Found to Have Melamine Torque Switches that Undergo Post Hold Shrinkage and Causes Cam Binding (0-M88-0287)
90-04 Rosemount Resistance Bridges Can Exhibit Premature Long Tenn De0radation Under Certain Combinations of Humidity, PowerandDuration(0-M89-0138)
6.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (92701,92702)
The following previously identified items were reviewed to ascertain that the-licensee's responses, where applicable, and licensee actions were in compliance with regulatory requirements and corrective actions have been completed.
Selective verification included record review, observations, and discussions with licensee personnel, a.
(Closed) Violation 369,370/89 24-03:
Failure to implement Adequate Design Controls leading to Inoperable Ventilation Systems Under
.Certain Conditions.
The licensee responded to this item in a letter dated December 15, 1989. Corrective actions have included correction of the specific deficiencies, review of reference point locations, development of design basis-documentation, special inspections of the--
Control-Area Ventilation System (VC), Control Room (CR) sealing, evaluation of upgrading CR doors and-replacement of VC check dampers.
Additional problems with ventilation systems, which surfaced after this violation was issued, prompted the licensee to form a ventilation task force.
In ' addition significant CR sealing was recently accomplished due to a different problem (see NRC Report No.
369,370/90-25) resulting in a significant improvement of VC.
Also new access doors were recently installed for the Annulus which have resulted in improved leak tightness and improved performance of the
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Annulus Ventilation System.
The inspt v will followup additional corrective actions regarding ventilation systems via followup of the task force efforts.
This issue is assigned as Inspector Followup Item 369,370/91-01-02:
Followup of Ventilation Task Force Actions.
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b.
(Closed) Violation 369,370/90-11-02:
Failure to Follow TS 3.0.3 for Control Room Ventilation System. The licensee responded to this violation in a letter dated August 22, 1990. Corrective actions included immediate opening of the intake valves upon discovery that these were closed, specific procedure improvements, review of similar procedures, and 1. proving information given to operators regarding Justifications for Continued Operations and Operability Evaluations, c.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 369,370/90-13-04: Weakness l
Regarding Incomplete Safety Analysis in LERs. The licensee has
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retrained personnel who develop LERs.
In addition, on-site Design Engineering personnel are assisting with the safety ant.'yses and
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corporate personnel are selectively assisting with analyses. No other significant problems have been noticed since this issue was reised.
d, (Closed) Violation 369/90-14-02:
Failure to Follow Operations Procedure for TS Logging.
The licensee responded to this violation in a letter dated September 28, 1990.
Corrective actions included
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discussions with staff and shift Senior Reactor Operators, e.
(Closed) Violation 369, 370/89-14-01:
Inadequate Surveillance Procedures for Main Steam Isolation Valves. The licensee responded to this violation on August 22, 1989 and has completed testing of the i
valves and procedure revisions necessary to bring the system into compliance with requirements. The air supply to the MSIVs has been qualified and changes have been made to testing methods to assure that the valves would isolate, when required, without a source of air, f.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 369, 370/89-32-01: Apparent Weakness in Preventive Maintenance Program - Personnel Not Accomplishing Work Described on Work Requests. The inspectors have noted an improvement in the completion of Work Requests. The ongoing effort to correct errors in the Work Request computer data base has proven effective, e
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(Closed) Violation 369/90-13-02:
Violation of Fuel Handling
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Technical Specification. The licensee responded co this violation on September 10, 1990.
All assnciated refueling procedures have been revised to include sign-offs on TS requirements.
Personnel have been instructed as to the correct implementation of the TS requirements, h.
(Closed) Unresolved item 369,370/89-03-03:
Incorrect Fuse Installation in Class 1E Circuits. This item was identified in March 1989. The licensee, based on this item's identification, generated PIR 2-M89-0064 to resolve this isue.
This PIR identified
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m that incorrect fuse types and sizes were installed at panel 2SMTC-1.
The corrective action for this PIR stated, " Prepare a Work Request and submit SPR for appropriate fuse install, tion during the next refueling outage." Section-6 of the PIR, Proposed Resolution, stated that in order to identify any additional fuse problems, a one time inspection of all fuses within a cabinet should be made by station personnel when a fuse within that cabinet is replaced under the FNA/FNQ replacement fuse program. This would have assured that approximately one-half of the safety-related panels were inspected
and would have given the. licensee an idea of the scope of the problem.
In February 1990, PIR 1-M90-0039, was initiated when additional fuse concerns were identified by I AE technicians. This PIR was written to only address the new fuse concerns identified. However, the corrective action evaluation Section of this PIR stated that design should ensure bills of materials are updated to reflect FNA/FNQ replacement program charaes.
Station IAE and MES should develop a program to inspect all safety-related fuses for proper type and size.
It was decided by the licensee to allow the corrective actions from the March 1989 PIR to satisfy any generic concerns raised by this PIR.
In May 1990, it was discovered that the sequence to verify all fuses within each ATC cabinet to have been covered by the March 1989 PIR were inadvertently omitted during the FNQ fuse changeouts. At that time, PIR 0-M90-0142 was issued by the General Office (GO) to address the generic aspects of the first two PIRs.
This PIR was closed in June 1990, based on the pending corrective actions for the first two PIRs that were still open at that tirie.
In Ja.iuary 1991, the licensee performed a self-audit of the Electrical Distribut h System.
During the self-audit, fuse issues were again raised.
In Nsponse to this concern, a plan has finally been developed to inspect the fuses in all safety-related panels in the near future. The generic aspects of incorrect fuses being installed in Class 1E circuits was iritially identified in hrch 1989.
Several PIR" were genera:id to address this issue but the corrective actions were inadequate, although individual problems were corrected.
It was not until the licensee's self audit again identified the problem that a plan was finally developed. This i approximately two years after the initial discovering of the problem.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, states in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are
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promptly identified and corrected. The failure to promptly correct this generic condition is identified as Violation 369,370/91-01-03:
Inadequate Corrective Actions for Fuse Installation Problems.
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One violation was identified in the area of inadequate corrective actions and one IFl was identified in the area of followup on Ventilation Task Force Actions, 7.
Evaluation of Licensea Self-Assessment Capability (40500)
a.
System Expert Program The inspector held discussions with licensee personnel regarding the most recent plans for improving the System Expert Program (SEP).
Weakresses were previously identified (see NRC Report 369,370/90-18).
The licen ee is planning to establish eight full time engineering positions for the SEP in the Performance Section.
Selected high priority systems will be covered.
Although this is not a complete implementation of the SEP, it is an increased commitment from the previous program which only had one full time position.
Program and compor.ent experts will function unde, guidance from their respective sections rather than being included in the SEP.
b.
Licensee Electrical Distribution Evaluation The inspector attended the exit interview of a licensee contracted audit of the electrical distribution system (EDS). The reviewers appeared to have done an in depth evaluation of selected aspects of the EDS including both mechanical and electrical aspects of the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). While the team indicated that no clearly inoperable conditions were identified, 25 findings were described. These involved a question regarding the need for tornado missile protection for EDG fuel vent lines, debris / dirt found inside electrical cabinets, improper fuses possibly indicating a drawing control problem, commercial grade documentation, and a number of questions regarding design basis documentation, such as EDG dynamir load analysis. The licensee has assigned a team to followup on the findings.
c.-
Station Goals The licensee has established various station goals to assist in evaluating performance. These were p"eviously described in NRC Report 369,370/90-18, paragraph 7.
A total of 15 goals were established under the six general headings of station generat-ion, radiation exposure, outstanding work requests (WRs), maximum outage days, control room indication problems (CRIPs), and quality of
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operations (includes 10 elements).
At the end of 1990, under quality of-operations, four of the ten elemental goals-were met on Unit 1 and six were met on Unit 2.
Of particular note was solid waste generation significantly below the goal (8,806 cubic feet verses g
(vs.) a goal of less than 16,949 cubic feet), procedure compliance problems significantly above the goal (28 vs. a goal of less than 7),
and a significant reduction in the number of catch containments (57 vs. a goal of less than 70). The reactor trip goal was less than two
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with Unit 1 experiencing three and Unit 2 experiencing zero.
Of the other five major goals only radiation exposure was met; however, this was well below the maximum station goal. Outstanding WRs greater than three months old were 526 vs. a goal of 400. Although the CRIPs goal was not met, a steady decline was noted relative to total CRIPs.
The total at year's end was approximately 80. This number has historically stayed over 100. Liceasee management indicated that a large number of unplanned outage days resulted in a number of the goals not being met.
The ruaintenance group also has additional internal goals. These include NRC violations, procedure compliance incidents, past due PIRs or open items, personnel radiation exposure, outstanding WRs greater or equal to one year old, non-outage corrective WR, and CRIPs completed within 30 days. Three of these goals were not met as of December.
Outstanding WRs greater than one year old were 145 vs. a goal of loss or equal to 80.
Past due PIRs or open items were 4% vs.
a goal of less or equal to 3% of the total. Non-outage corrective WRs were 45% vs. a goal of greater or equal to 65% of the total.
Corporate goals in the area of plant safety for 1990 included Unplanned Automatic Reactor Trips, Fuel Reliability, Radiation Doce, Unplanned Safety System Actuations, Solid Radioactive Waste and NRC Compliance-Index. The NRC Compliance goal whs the only goal not met and it was only slightly outside the goal.
In summary, the licensee management places a strong emphasis on meeting performance goals. Most of the goals directly related to plant and personnel safety were met. The majority of the goals not met were influenced by two extended outages during the period.
d.
Safety System Availability Efforts The' licensee has continued, through scheduling and improved maintenance practices, to increase safety system availability. The licensee has historically had high unavailability for the Auxiliary Feedwater and High Pressure Injection systems. The licensee has reached the industry median for these systems and expects to be in
the top quartile in 1991.
e.
Maintei.ance Root Cause Evaluations Previous NRC Report 369,370/90-25 indicated that documentation for root cause analyses could not be located for 1990. The licensee has since discovered-that a number of analyses had been completed but had not been documented in accordance with the optional maintenance procedure. The inspector reviewed documentation of some of these analyses.
The licensee has performed a number of root cause
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evaluations which were documented by various means.
Of particular note were the evaluations of ice condenser bolts and an Auxiliary
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Feedwater Pump thrust bearing failure.
As indicated in the previous report, the licensee is developing improved guidance for evaluation and documentation of root cause analyses.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Design Engineering Evaluation (40500)
The inspector reviewed documentation of activities of corporate Design Engineering (DE) and discussed DE performance with management, The DE group is well staffed with highly qualified individuals.
Over 80%
of the eligible engineers are registered professional engineers.
Individuals are active on the Westinghouse Owner's Group and many industry groups. A project specific division, McGuire Engineering Division (MED)
is established as well as an Engineering Support Division (ESD).
Some experienced personnel were lost through transfers in 1990 but experienced personnel have been hired.
The average experience level is 11 years.
DE management has strongly emphasized quality of work and is actively pursuing methods to measure quality. They have regularly sought feedback from site personnel regarding the quality of DE products.
Improvements have been noted in the modification program regarding documentation and timeliness.
Document revision rate, based on field change requests dropped from 31% in 1989 to 21% through the 3rd quarter of 1990.
Consistency teams were established to evaluate activities ucross division boundaries.
The DE group has improved its guidance for operability evaluations and 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and only minor problems have been identified in these areas by the the inspectors.
Extensive efforts are underway to improve design documentation. A design basis reconstitution is in progress with 12 systems or criteria completed to date.
Instrumentation loop and Logic diagrams are being developed.
DE are heavily involved in computer data basing and other computer aided engineering, such as computerized drawings and 3-dimensional modeling.
These are long term initiatives which are scheduled to require years to complete.
The ESD has provided good support for emergency operating procedures and in the area of systems analysis. They have also taken an industry lead role in evaluating accidents beyond design basis.
A Site Engineering Office has continued to be actively involved in day to day operations, task force efforts and problem resolutions.
This office has been valuable as a coordinator between the site and corporate offices and as a source of information for the NRC inspectors.
Specifically, this office took a lead role relative to NRC concerns regarding analysis of the significance of debris found in containment and in developing improved guidance for scaffold installation when the inspector identified weaknesses.
The MED has taken an active role in addressing design problems with ventilation systems.
A number of improvements have been made.
However, the licensee was slow to elevate these problems to the point of forming a
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task force. The MED has analyzed a lowest expected voltage scenario for motor operated valves. The MED initiated a 5500 man-hour. effort to develop flow diagrams for field routed piping _in the Instrument Air System to assist the station. This effort is nearing completion which is February 1991.
Personnel from MED frequently visit the site.
The DE group fraquently has the lead in responding to NRC initiatives.
The licensee has taken a lead role for Westinghouse plants regarding evaluation of thermally stratified reactor coolant flow described in NRC Bulletin 88-11. McGuire Unit 2 was voluntarily instrumented to collect data.
The licensee aggressively pursued a problem described in NRC Information Notice 90-61 involving parallel operation of Residual Heat Removal Pumps.
DE supported an urgent modification for Unit 2.
In summary, DE has provided valuable and improved engineering support to the station and is continuing to pursue additional improvements.
No v'iolations or deviations were identified.
9.
Loss of Decay Heat Removal - Long Term Review (TI 2515/103)
The inspector reviewed the long-term program for Loss of Decay Heat Removal as stated in Generic Letter 88-17.
Whenever a reduced inventory condition is entered, there are multiple indications of RCS level and audible alarms available in the control room.
The control room operators demonstrated, to the inspector, a detailed knowledge of the various instruments, the alarms associated with the instrumentation, and the procedures associated with the instrumentation.
Multiple independent temperature instruments are used during reduced inventory conditions whenever the vessel head is in place.
Operations personnel are familiar with the instrumentation and the proper response to alarm conditions.
The inspector reviewed various procedures and documentation associated with mid-loop operation. Operating procedures have been revised to provide direction for minimizing operations that could lead to perturbations in the reactor coolant system.
Procedures have been provided that list alternete means and flow paths for adding inventory when needed.
Steps have been added to procedures which assure that all hot legs are not blocked simultaneously by nozzle dams, until the reactor vessel head has been removed.
The operations staff has demonstrated to the inspector a thorough knowledge of all these procedures and their contents.
During the latest Unit 2 Refueling Outage, the inspector reviewed the modification which removed the Residual Heat Removal Auto Closure Interlock (ACI).
This modification is scheduled to be performed on Unit 1
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during the next Refueling Outage. This modification has effectively eliminated the ACI contribution.to the loss of Decay Heat Removal.
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The corrective actions taken by the licensee in this area are complete and i
meet the requirements set forth by the Generic letter.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings identified below were summarized on
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. February 6,1991, with 150se persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The
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following items were discussed in. detail:
J Non-Cited Violation 369,370/91-01-01:
Failure to Droperly Initiate Corrective Actions'for Discrepant Operating Proce tres (paragraph 2.d).
Inspector Followup Item 369,370/91-01-02:
Followup of Ventilation Task Force Actions (paragraph 5).
Violation 369,370/91-01-03:
Inadequate Corrective Actions for Fuse Installation Problems (paragraph 6).
The licensee representatives present offered no. dissenting comments, not did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the inspectors during the course of their inspection.
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