IR 05000361/1979019
| ML13309A746 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1979 |
| From: | Dodds R, Elir J, Pate R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13309A745 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-79-19, 50-362-79-19, NUDOCS 7909200105 | |
| Download: ML13309A746 (8) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT R REGION V 50-361/79-19 Report N W79-19 50-361 CPPR-97 Docket N License N CPPR-98 Safeguards Group____
Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Facility Name:
San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Inspection at:
Construction Site, San Diego County, California Inspection conducted:
June 1-30, 1979 Inspectors:
_713111 741 R. J. Pate, Resident Reactor Inspector Signed J. 0. Elin, eactor inspector bate signed bate Aigned W. G 1bert Reactor Inspector Approved By:
R/
R. T. Dod'ds, Chief, Engineering Support Section, Date Signed Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Summary:
Inspection on June 1-30, 1979 (Report Nos. 50-361/79-19 and 50-362/79-19)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of construction activities including: piping storage, handling, welding and grinding; reactor pressure vessel and internals protection; installation; storage of safety related equipment; electrical cables and terminations; containment penetrations; licensee corrective actions on previous inspection findings; and general. work in progress. The inspection involved 65 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspector Results:
Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie RV Form 219 (2)
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DETAILS 1. Individuals'Contacted a. Southern California Edison Company (SCE)
+=*P. A. Croy, Site Quality Assurance/Quality Control Supervisor R. Frick, Quality Assurance Engineer
+*R. R. Hart, Construction Superintendent J. Huey, Quality Assurance Engineer
+*P. R. King, Quality Assurance Engineer
+=*D. E. Nunn, Manager, Quality Assurance J
3. J. Pantaleo, Quality Assurance Engineer F. Pimentel, Quality Assurance Engineer
+H. B. Ray, Project Management L. L. Seyler, Project Quality Assurance Supervisor M. Rodin, Quality Assurance Engineer
+=W. F. Rossfeld, Quality Assurance Engineer D. B. Schone, Lead Engineering Site Representative L. D. Tipton, Nuclear Engineering Site Representative D. Erdman, Project Construction Engineer b. Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
+J. E. Bashore, Division Quality Assurance Manager
+*A. L. Erickson, Project Field Quality Control Engineer
=C. A. Blum, Quality Control Manager
+=R. H. Cutler, Project Field Engineer
+=J. E. Geiger, Project Quality Assurance Supervisor
- W. D. Nichols, Assistant Project Field Engineer
+=*L. W. Hurst, Project Field Quality Assurance Supervisor
- In addition, construction craftsmen, engineers and foremen were contacted during the inspectio *Denotes attendees at management meeting on June 1, 197 =Denotes attendees at management meeting on June 15, 197 +Denotes attendees at management meeting on June 29, 197. Construction Status The licensee reported that site construction work is 67% complete as of June 28, 1979. The licensee's project management personnel estimated that the construction of Units 2 and 3 was 72% and 55% complete respectivel (Note: Last month the licensee reported Unit 3 to be 59% complete. The new estimate is based on more man-hours required to complete the project.)
-2 The licensee has issued a new construction schedule as follows:
S ONG 2 SONGS 3 Fuel Load 8/80 11/81 Initial Criticality 10/80 1/82 Initial Fuel Power 4/81 7/82 Full Firm Operation 10/81 1/83 3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings The inspector examined the action taken by the licensee on the following outstanding item (Closed) Noncompliance (50-361/79-07/01 and 50-362/79-07/01): The post weld heat treatment qualification data did not demonstrate that the inside wall temperature for pipe with wall thickness of 3 inches or greater met the design requirement (i.e., the PWHT temperature range specified in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Paragraph NB-4622.4).
The response to the citation submitted by SCE, dated May 30, 1979, included enclosure 1, "Evaluation of Post-Weld Heat Treatment Processes."
The enclos ure described the qualification tests and analysis that demonstrated that the PWHT process used at San Onofre Units 2 and 3 did meet the minimum requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Cod SCE supplemented this response with a revision to the construction procedure WPP/QCI 209 which requires the quality control engineer to verify that all the quality related activities of the PWHT operator were correctly performe The corrective action taken was satisfactory and the inspector had no additional.question (Closed) Noncompliance (50-361/79-07/04): The AMP hydraulic foot pump number EC-206 relief valve was not calibrated monthly as recommended in the vendor's manua Bechtel issued a Corrective Action Request (CAR) No. F-600. The CAR required the relief valves on all AMP hydraulic foot pumps to be pressure tested to verify all the crimpers operated as required by the vendor's manual. The pump relief valves for all the pumps relieved as required by the vendor (8000 to 8400 psig). *Also, Bechtel revised the construction procedure WPP/QCI-010, Appendix IV, to provide for periodic testing of the foot pump relief valves and documentation of the test. The revised procedure was issued on procedure change Notice PCN No. 1 to the proce dure WPP/QCI-010, Appendix IV, Rev. In addition to the above corrective action, Bechtel committed to review all related vendor manuals to assure that similar testing or calibration ommissions are not present. The corrective action was satisfactor In addition to the above corrective action, Bechtel committed to review all related vendor manuals to assure that similar testing or calibration ommissions are not present. The corrective action was satisfactor (Closed) Enforcement Item (50-361/79-01/02 and 50-362/79-01/02): Twenty items of measuring and test equipment (M&TE). subject to verification in accordance with Appendix VI of construction procedure WPP/QCI 010, were not in the calibration recall syste The licensee's response to the item of enforcement was satisfactory. The inspector verified that the training of personnel and audit to be conducted were completed by both the licensee and Bechtel. The inspector examined the records for the 20 items of M&TE which had been the subject of the enforcement action. All items were accounted fo As a result of the. audits conducted by Bechtel, Corrective Action Request (CAR) Nos. 645 and 646 were issued describing a discrepant condition in which calibration contractors were not reporting the "as received" condi tion of M&TE. Also described in the CARs was the lack of review by the Bechtel QC of the calibration records returned by the calibration contrac tors. The QC Engineers are requiried to write a nonconformance report on any equipment found out of calibration upon receipt by any calibration contractor or agency. Bechtel is currently investigating the impact of these audit findings. Any required corrective action will be completed as required by the Bechtel and SCE QA Program No further items of noncompliance or deviations were found in this are.
Excessive Pressure Drop In Target Rock Safety Injection Valves, 50.55(e) Report The licensee reported that the valves provided by Target Rock to be used in the Safety Injection System potentially had excessive pressure drop across the valve. Similar valves supplied to another nuclear plant were found to have higher than expected pressure drop SCE committed to have the valves tested to assure design adequac Subsequently, one valve of each type to be used for SONGS 2 and 3 were tested by Target Rock. Two of the valves tested, one 2" and one 3",
were modified to improve their performance. Target Rock concluded in the test reports that the flow through the modified valves was adequate to meet the system requirement The tests reports, Report Nos. 2152 and 2245, were reviewed. The test method and results were satisfactor In the final report, SCE stated that the design adequacy of each valve would be verified during the preoperational testing of the Safety Injection Syste The corrective action taken and planned by SCE appears to be adequat.
Reactor Vessel and Internals Installation and Storage Site activities for storage of the Unit 2 and 3 reactor pressure vessels and internals were observe Both Vessels are installed and installation of Unit 2 internals is essentially complet Installation of Unit 3 internals is in progress. The inspector observed the welding of the core support-core shroud assembly to the core support barrel and verified that the work was completed and documented in accordance with the construction procedure WPP/QCI 300, Sequence No. 4, Revision No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Pipin The piping related activities listed below were observed to ascertain compliance with applicable construction specifications and procedure Activity System Identification N Pipe Handling Chilled Water 2S-1513-ML-348, Sh. 2 Pipe Storage Chilled Water 2-CH-450-5A Grinding Component Cooling 3-CC-277-A Pipe Welding Chilled Water 2-CC-043, Welds 1 & 9 Pipe Welding Chilled Water 2-CH-042-H-002 Pipe Storage Safety Injection 3-SI-075-2B No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Safety Related Equipment a.. The storage areas for safety related equipment were toured. The inspector verified that the storage requirements of ANSI N45.2.2 1972 and the construction procedure WPP/QCI 008, Revision 10, were being met. The storage conditions of the following equipment were specifically observe (1.) Valves 3HV-9940-FC, 3HV-9940-BC, 3HV-9336 and 2HV-9950 (2) Diesel Generator Motor for Unit 2 SN-C372143/06 (3) Diesel Generator Fan S2-1503MA274 (4)
Fuel Handling Cranes S3-2203MZ261 and S2-2203MZ261 The motor for valve 3HV-9940-FC was found to have the 120 volt heater leads connected to the motor winding instead of to the heater as required. The motor was very warm to the touch. Bechtel issued a nonconformance report. The damage to the valve motor, if any, had not been determined. This is an unresolved item. (50-362/79-19/01)
No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie b. The areas of installed safety related components and equipment were toured. The inspector verified that the requirements of ANSI N45. and N45.2.3 and the construction procedures WPP/QCI 008 and 009 were being.met. The condition of the following equipment was specifically observed:
(1) Unit 2 and 3 Storage Batteries (2) Unit 2 Containment Spray Pumps (3) Units 2 and 3 Safety Injection Pumps (4) Unit 2 Charging Pumps (5) Unit 3 Diesel Generator Control Panels The following controlled documents were selected at random in the field and verified to be the latest revision:
Drawing N Sheet Revision 33506
1 33506
0 33506
0 33506
0 31632
2 31632
1 31632
1 32703
31549
3 31549
2
-6 In addition, the meggering records for the above electrical equipment were reviewed. The records were completed and were within the limits as specified in construction procedure WPP/QCI 610, Preoperational Maintenance of Electrical Equipmen No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Electrical Cables and Terminations The inspector observed cable tray installation and protection of installed electrical cables. The areas examined in detail included the cable spreading and cable riser rooms for both units; Unit 2 cable penetration room, and the Unit 2 containment building. Installed raceways were inspected for completeness of mounting and lack of damag Protection of installed safety related cable was observed an compared to the requirements of WPP/QCI 009, Appendix II,"Maintaining Cleanli ness in Cable Trays." The inspector noted several instances where tools or construction debris were found in cable trays. Specifically, on the Unit 2 cable riser room, a 3 foot long 4" x 4" board was in.tray IGBSA2; and in the cable spreading room a portable incandescent light fixture and a 2 foot section of 1" conduit were found in trays 1FBSAS and 1ACQA3, respectively. These items were corrected by the licensee, and were in conformance with the referenced procedure which refers to heavy objects or ones which "depressed the outer jacket."
The licensee agreed to include provisions to restrict objects with sharp edges from the cable trays. The licensee's actions to monitor cable tray condi tions were reviewed and found satisfactor This area will be reviewed in a future inspection. (50-361/79-19/02)
Additionally, the inspector reviewed several items of installed cable damage which had been identified by the licensee. One item was a change in color of the jackets of color coded, safety related cable supplied by General Electric. Other items included several cases of weld splatter on installed cables and cuts in cable jackets. The licensee was dispositioning these items in accordance with the require ments of their QA Progra Two cable pulls by two separate crews were observed. The'inspector verified the requirements of Bechtel procedures WPP/QCI 604, Cable Installation, were implemented. The cable pulls were from 2XUl to 2AO6 and from 2XU2 to 2A0 These were non-safety related pulls of 750 MCM cable of approximately 500 feet. One cable was a reactor coolant pump motor supply and the other was an alternate supply to a safety related switchgear. Routing and inspection of the raceway prior to start of the pull was verified. Both crews took adequate care to protect the cables from damage.by monitoring pull tension and bend radius. No areas of deviation or noncompliance were observed in association with these pull. Containment Penetrations The inspector reviewed the installation of the Unit 2 personnel loc The containment liner installation procedure (Bechtel WPP/QCI 111) and drawings for the personnel lock were reviewed. Several specific field welds for these items were selected and their.NDE records reviewed. The physical condition of the containment penetration was observed and main tenance records associated with the access were reviewe The installa tion appeared to be in accordance with the Chicago Bridge and Iron Cor drawings and the records of magnetic particle testing and post weld heat treatment were complet The inspector reviewed action taken with respect to electrical cable damage on the Unit 2 escape lock identified by the licensee. This damage was documented on NCR E-449. Although repairs had not been made at the time of inspection, the corrective actions defined by the licensee were examined. These actions seemed to be consistent with the cable manufac turer's requirements for minimum bend radius and tensio The inspector was satisfied that the planned repair was in accordance with design requirements and work specification. Plant Tour The inspector toured both Units 2 and 3 several times each week during the inspection report perio Particular attention was directed to observing work in progress, availability of supervision and quality control inspectors at the work areas, housekeeping, and preservation of equipmen No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Management Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on June 1, 15 and.29, 1979. The scope of the inspections and inspector's findings as noted in this report were discussed. The licensee representatives had no additional comments.