IR 05000361/1979023
| ML13309A824 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 10/23/1979 |
| From: | Dodds R, Eckhardt J, Elin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13309A819 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-79-23, 50-362-79-22, NUDOCS 8001020163 | |
| Download: ML13309A824 (6) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
50-361/79-23 Report No. 50-362/79-22 Docket No. 50-361, 50-362 License No. CPPR-97, CPPR-98 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company P. 0. Box 800, 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue RosemPad, California 91770 Facility Name:
San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Enspection at:
Construction Site, San Diego County, California Inspection conducted:
August 20-24, 1979 Inspectors:
,
/
J. H. Eckha dt, Reactor Inspector Date Signed J. 0. Elir
, Reactor Inspector Date Signed Date Signed Approved By:
/1
_
____^
1, R. T. Dodd, Chief, Reactor Engineering Date Signed Support Section Summary:
Inspection on August 20-24, 1979 (Report Nos. 50-361/79-23 and 50 362/79-22)
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of construction activities involving electrical equipment installation, electri cal cable installation, and pipe installation and weldin The inspection involved 60 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspector Results:
Of the three areas inspected, one item of noncompliance was identifie RV Form 219 (2)
8 001 020
DETAILS 1. Individuals Contacted Southern California Edison Company (SCE)
- D. E. Nunn, Manager, Quality Assurance
- H. B. Ray, Project Manager
- P. A. Croy, Project Quality Assurance Supervisor
- P. R. King, Operations Lead QA Engineer F. Pimentel, QA Engineer R., P. Frick, QA Engineer T. Garven, QA Engineer
. Parent, Electrical Electrical Engineer G. F. Egan, QAEngineer
- R. R. Hart, Construction Superintendent E. Scherda, QA Engineer b. Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
- R. H. Cutler, Project Field Engineer
- C. A. Blum, Quality Control Manager
- L. W. Hurst, Project Field Quality Assurance Supervisor A. Q. Howard, Field Engineer
- Denotes those attending exit meeting 2. Electrical Cable Installation a. Observatio of Work and Work Activities One control/instrument cable placement of Class IE Cable was observed to insure compliance with Bechtel Instruction WPP/QCI 604, "Cable Installation," IEEE Standard 336-1971, and construction specification SONGS 2 & 3, CS-E02 "Installation of Electrical Cables in Cable Tray."
Other than the area noted in the discussion of protection of installed cable infraction, the inspector had no areas of concern with this activit b. Protection of Installed Safety Related Cables A tour of Units 2 and 3 was conducted to observe the protection of installed Class IE cables and to insure that the requirements of Bechtel Instruction WPP/QCI 009 Appendix II, "Maintaining Cleanliness in Cable Trays," were being me Nearby, in cable tray section 1DCWAl a metal air hose fitting and a wood handled wire brush were found. The previously mentioned Bechtel instruction in paragraph 4.2.3 prohibits use of cable trays for material storage and in paragraph 4.2.5 places restric tions on the placement of metal objects in cable tray Additionally, in the Unit 3 cable spreading room it was noted that wood tray covers in use to provide temporary protection for installed cable were actually resting on cable entering the trays. These cables were "pinned" between the wood tray covers and the metal cable tray edge. This had caused some deformation of the outer cable jacke Bechtel instruction WPP/QCI 009, Appendix II in paragraph 4.2.8 requires that no heavy objects rest on the cables so as to "depress their outer jackets."
This is an infractio (50-361/79-23/01).
3. Electrical Equipment, Observation of Installation and Documentation The inspector reviewed the installation and documentation of the Class IE electrical equipment associated with 4160 volt switchgear 3AO4, 480 volt switchgear 3BO4, and motor control centers 3BE and 3BY. The inspector examined the switchgear mounting features and compared them to the applicable construction drawings. Also inspected were the protection and cleanliness of the installed equipment along with the quality control documentation of installatio The inspector noted the.serial numbers of medium voltage breakers installed in switchgear 3AO4. A subsequent review of the breaker purchase specification revealed that although Class IE and Non-Class IE breakers were physically interchangeable they were quali fied to different seismic conditions. The inspector reviewed the documentation that traces the specific breakers noted in switch gear 3AO4 (Class IE) to the appropriate seismic qualificatio. Review of Short Circuit Protection for Medium and Low Voltage Penetrations The inspector examined the method of protecting the penetrations supplying 6900 volt power to reactor coolant pumps from short cir cuits. It was noted that the FSAR in paragraph 8.1.4.3.12 states that the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.63, "Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants", are met and the electric penetration assemblies conform to IEEE standard 317-197 Regulatory Guide 1.63 in paragraph C-1 states "The electi'ic penetration assembly should be designed to withstand, without loss of mechanical integrity, the maximum short-circuit vs. time conditions that could occur given single random failures of circuit overload protection devices."
-3 The licensee in the FSAR (again paragraph 8.1.4.3.12) and in his response to NRC questions 040.39, 040.40, and 040.49 states that this requirement is met by having two non-class IE-breakers in series providing short-circuit protection for the penetration assemblies for 6900 volt and 480 volt power circuits. The "load breaker" is backed up by the "main bus feeder breaker."
As these breakers have been classified Non-IE they are not covered by the quality assurance program for safety-related equipmen Specifically, as explained to the inspector by the licensee, the work activity is inspected by field engineering personnel but not quality control personne Thus, the inspector questioned that the review of required trip point settings and testing of these breakers would not be performed by an organization with sufficient independence from cost and schedule when opposed to safety considerations in accordance with 1OCFR5O Appendix B. The inspector was concerned that without this quality assurance/control coverage, the installation might not meet its performance requirements defined in the FSAR with respect to penetration short circuit protection, thereby precipitating a loss of containment integrit Additionally, as Non-class IE breakers, these penetration protection devices are purchased for a maximum seismic loading of 0.20 g horizontal and 0.13 g vertical. These levels are below the safe shutdown earthquake requirements for safety related equipment at SONGS 2 & 3. Therefore, the breakers may not afford the required short circuit protection after such an event for the penetration assemblies, again potentially causing a loss of containment integrit The FSAR in table 8.1-1 states that the 6900 volt penetrations can withstand a fault current of 62,900 amps (symmetrical) for seconds (30 cycles). The short circuit current test data.for 6900 volt penetrations appeared to indicate leakage after 56,700 amps (symmetrical) for 10 cycles. The licensee was unable to.clarify this discrepency at the time of the inspectio These concerns will remain unresolved until a future inspection (50-361/79-23/02).
5. Review of the Preferred Power Supply The inspector toured the switchyard area of Units 2 & 3 to confirm that the installation conformed to the FSAR description (FSAR Section 8.1.4.1) and the Regulatory requirements of 10CFR 50 Appendix It was noted that the power lines for the Unit No. 2 reserve auxiliary transformer and the power lines for the Unit No. 2 main transformer are supported by a common tower both in the switchyard and at the Unit 2 reserve auxiliary transformer. Additionally, it was observed that the power lines for the Unit 2 main and auxiliary transformers, at the location of the Unit 2 reserve auxiliary transformer tower, pass directly above the feeder bus bars for the reserve auxiliary transformers and reactor coolant pump transformer Figure 8.2-3 of the FSAR appears to show two separate towers in the
.;vicinity of the Unit 2 reserve auxiliary transformers; one for the Unit 2 Reserve Auxiliary transformers, and one for the Unit 2 main transformer. Moreover, this figure shows horizontal separation between these power lines and does not detail the reserve auxiliary bus which passes directly below the main transformer power lin The detailing of tower locations in the switchyard by this figure from the FSAR does not clearly correspond to the actual installatio The installation of Unit 3 is similar to that of Unit 2 and similar comments apply. It was additionally noted that when the station switchyard is completed, the Unit 1 preferred power supplies, (supplying the Unit 1 main transformer and the Unit 1 reserve auxiliary transformer) will be supported by a common tower in the switchyard. At the present time, these power lines are routed to Unit 1 via two separate tower/transmission line systems from two different direction The inspector identified the following potential problems with this arrangement:
(1) The failure of a power line to the main transformer of Unit 2 or 3, could cause a loss of both reserve auxiliary transformers by falling on their common bus or on the transformers themselves which are located in.relatively close proximity to each othe (2) That a failure of.a common supporting tower for Unit 2 or 3 reserve auxiliary supply and main supply could cause a loss of both preferred power supplie (3) That the physically independent preferred power supplies to Unit 1 could be tied to a common tower in the Unit 2 and 3 switchyar The licensee agreed to review these items with respect to 10CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria. These items will be examined during future inspection (50-361/79-28/03) Piping Installation and Welding a. Observation of Work and Work Activities Piping installation and welding activities for Unit 2 were examine Specifically, installed component cooling pipe spool 2-CC-072-005, valves S2-1203-MU-048 and 049, and pipe spool 2-CC-091.-7 were examined and compared with the appropriate isometric drawing Installation of pipe spools 2-CC-277-7, 8, and 9 was observe The following welds/welding activities of component cooling and safety injection piping were examined:
-5 Time Pipe Size, i Weld N Activity/Weld Status S2-1203-ML-075
E(C)
Tacked S2-1203-ML-072
C, D, and E Complete S2-1203-ML-091
H and J Complete S2-1204-ML-060 12 Prepped/purge S2-1204-ML-062
C Root complete S2-1204-ML-002
EF, EE, and EB Complete No deviations or items of non compliance with either piping or welding activities were identifie b. Review of Quality Records Receipt inspection records including material test reports for spools 2-CC-072-S and 2-CC-091-7 were reviewed. Also, weld records for welds D, E, and J of these spools were reviewe No deviations or items of noncompliance were identifie. Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on June 1, 1979 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as stated in this repor This exit interview was held in conjunction with the NRC Resident Inspector's regularly scheduled weekly meeting. The licensee agreed to examine the question raised by the inspectors regarding the Non-Class IE breakers discussed in paragraph 4.