IR 05000361/1979029
| ML19322E658 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 02/04/1980 |
| From: | Dodds R, Elin J, Hernandez G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322E642 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-79-29, 50-362-79-27, NUDOCS 8004020062 | |
| Download: ML19322E658 (9) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REcULAToRY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFoRCEMEffr
.0-361/79-29 Repcrt No. 50-362/79-27 Docket No.
50-361, 50-362 License No. CPPR 47, CPPR-98 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Southern California Fdison Company 64mai 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Pnternad. California 0177n Facility Narne:
San Onofre Unit 2 and 3 Inspection at:
Construction Site, San Dieno County, California Inspection conducted; flovember 13-16 and December 11-14, 1979 I
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Inspectors:
.11. Eckhardt, Reactor Inspector
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/J.O.Elin,Reacto[ Inspector
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//8/ /80 Gf/icrnandez, Reacelr Inspector Date' Signed
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Approved By:
N If, I. Dodds, Chief, Engineering Support Section
/Datef Signed Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch
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Surrrna ry :
Inspection on flovember 13-16 and December 11-14, 1979 (Report Nos.
50-3Tl/79-29 and 50-362/79-27)
Areas inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of construction activities including: previous open items,
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electrical components and systems, instrumentation components and systems, main coolant pump seismic restraints, safety related pipe welding, weld crack allegation, and safety related components and supports.
The inspection involved 129 on site inspector hourc by three NRC inspectors.
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Results: Of the areas inspected, three items of noncompliance in the areas of temporary cleanliness caps on instrumentation lines, electrical cable bending radius, and weld rod control were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Individuals Contacted a.
Southern California Edison Company (SCE)
D. E. Nunn, Manager, Quality Assurance
P. A. Croy, Site Project Quality Assurance Supervisor
R. R. Hart, Construction Manager
D. B. Schone, Lead Engineering Site Representative
W. L. Rossfeld, Construction Lead QA Engineer
D. A. Erdman, Project Construction Engineer
J. Huey, QA Engineer J. J. Pantaleo, QA Engineer S. S. Dziewit, QA Engineer V. A. Gow, QA Engineer G. Egan, QA Engineer b.
Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
R. H. Cutler, Project Field Engineer
C. A. Blum, Quality Control Manager
J. E. Geiger, Project QA Supervisor
L. W. Hurst, Project Field QA Supervisor
W. D. Nichols,' Assistant Project Field Engineer
A. L. Erickson, Project Field QC Engineer
M. Boyer, Engineer A. Lang, Start-up Engineer M. W. Sibley, Senior QC Uelding Engineer S. J. Duncan, QC Engineer E. B. Luder, QA Engineer H. Devries, Field Engineer R. Ash-Everest, Field Engineer W. J. Futrell, Civil Engineer
- Denotes those attending exit interviews.
2.
Status of Previous Inspection Items a.
{0 pen)UnresolvedItem(50-361/79-23/02) short circuit protection of medium voltage electrical containment penetrations.
The FSAR in Table 8.1-1 states that the 6900 volt penetrations can withstand a fault current of 62,900 amps (symetrical) for 0.5 seconds (30 cycles).
It was previously noted that the qualification test report for medium voltage penetrations (S023-304-1-48-4) does not support this statement in that it shows leakage of a penetration after 56,700 amps symetrical for 10 cycles. The inspector reviewed with the licensee the questions he had concerning the qualification testing of these penetrations to meet FSAR requirements. The licensee will review t..is area to insure the adequacy of these penetrations during short circuit conditions.
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(0 pen) A11ecation (50-361/79-27, 50-362/79-25) Splicing of Electrical Cable Results of a trip by SCE and Cechtel representatives to two suppliers of Class IE electrical cable were discussed. The licensee indicated that environmental qualification tests of cable splices are planned by the suppliers.
3.
Plant Tour.
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a.
The inspector noted that in Unit 2 containment, below electrical penetration 2AC3RP08 there were approximately 20 Class IE cables resting on the edge of their supporting cable tray tray 45}duetomisalignmentbetweenthepenetrationandthe (BPAWA6 elbow.
It did not appear that the cable outer jackets had been deformed or that minimum bend radius of the cable had i
been exceeded, but the installation did not appear to meet good construction practice. The licensee agreed to review the installation and modify as necessary.
b.
Anunrestrainedmechanicalshockarrestor(snubber), Pacific
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Scientific SN 3304, installed on Unit 2 pipe restraint assembly 52-SI-065-H-009 was stroked to determine smoothness of operation since the protective wrapping was loose. The snubber did not i
operate smoothly. The licnesee agreed to inspect this snubber for damage. Other installed snubbers examined appeared to be adequately wrapped and sealed to prevent contamination by construction dirt.
4.
Electrical Components and Systems a.
Observation of Work and Work Activities (1) 125 Volt D.C. Power System The inspector reviewed the installation of the D.C. power system associated with Unit 2 125 volt battery 2B007, 125 volt distribution switchboard 201 and battery charger 2B001 to insure compliance with installation requirements and purchase specifications.
It was noted that the 125 volt battery is to be replaced by the licensee due to a notice from the manufacturer that the 40 year service life cannot be met with the equipment presently installed.
This had previously been reported to the NRC through a 10 CFR Part 21 Report by Exide, the manufacturer.
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Theinspectornoteda3 conductor (3/c)14AWG,ClagsIE cable, which had been doubled back on itself (2-180 bends) and stuffed into a 24 inch conduit (ICAT09) in order to take up excess cable length. This cable was connected to the 125 volt distribution switchboard 201 in battery charging room 310A.
Bechtel Construction Specification CS-301, " Installation of Electrical Cables in Conduit and Duct Banks" specifies requirements for minimum bend radius for various electrical cable. Table 9.3 of CS-301 specifies a minimum bend radius of 1.5 inches for 3/c 14 AWG cable. Measurements taken by the inspector showed the conduit (1 CAT 09) to have an inner diameter of 21/8 inches and a bushing through which the cable had also beenpassedtohaveaninnerdiameterof17/8fnches, both less than the required dimension for a 180 bend.
This is an apparent item of noncompliance.
(50-361/79-29/01)
(2) Safety Related Electric Motors The inspector reviewed the installation of the Class IE electric motors associated with high pressure safety injection pumps and component cooling water pumps of Unit 2.
The inspector, also examined the quality control documentation pertaining to these motors.
It was noted that component cooling water pump MP025 and high pressure safety injection pump MP018 were designated as " third of a kind loads" by the FSAR and as such were supplied via a manual transfer switch from either bus 2A04 or 2A06, two independent safety divisions. The inspector examined the installation of these transfer switches to assure compliance to IEEE 308.
The transfer switches for the " third of a kind load" high pressure safety injection pump and component ccoling water pump are essentially a pair of circuit disconnects which are ganged so that when one is closed the other is opened. They cannot be operated under load.
Each transfer switch is provided with two " kirk key" locks which, when used in conjunction with locks on the pump feeder breakers from the 2A04 and 2A06 busses, permit operation of the transfer switch only when both circuit breakers serving the incoming feeders to the transfer switch are locked open and the corresponding " kirk keys" are each inserted
'in their respective transfer switch locks. The " kirk key" system insures that only one of the two breakers is racked in and that the transfer switch is lined up to that breaker. This system is described in purchase specification
.S023-302-9 and SCE drawing 30186.
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A letter from Gould-Brown Boveri to Bechtel dated August 8,1979 (File #302-2) states that the " kirk key interlock system operates in a predetermined sequence" to provide it's safety function, and " duplicate keys provide a means to defeat this sequential operation." The inspector noted that several kirk keys were supplied with each lock with warning instructions attached to destroy all but one key after construction. The review of Bechtel's key log showed only one key in existance for several locks, however, the inspector found two additional keys in the field (RE12306 and RE12280) for these locks.
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i It did not appear that controls had been established to insure that after the construction phase there would be
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one and only one key for each kirk key system.
This item will remain an open item and will be examined during future inspections (50-361/79-29/02).
b.
Review of Ouality Records Receipt inspection and installation inspection records for 125 volt battery 2B007,125 volt distribution switchboard 2Dl, battery charger 2B001, and transfer switches 20004 and 20005
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were reviewed.
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Instrumentation Components and Systems a.
Observation of Work and Work Activities (1) liigh/ Low Pressurizer Pressure Trip g
The inspector reviewed the installation of the reactor protective system functions of high pressurizer pressure trip and low pressurizer pressure trip to verify compliance with the requirements of IEEE 279 and the FSAR. These
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systems were examined in both IInit 2 and Unit 3.
A total of 16 pressure transmitters associated with these systems were examined.
It was noted that in Unit 2, four of the pressure transmitters had inlet or sensing line caps or plugs missing (2PT-101-3, 2PT-101-2, 2PT-102-2, and 2PT-101-1). Although the transmitters were protected from adjacent construction activities by wood covers they had accumulated a heavy coat of dust.
Bechtel WPP/QCI-008 states in paragraph 4.5.6 " care of items in storage shall be exercised in accordance with the following:
(1) items in storage shall have all
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covers, caps, plugs or other closures intact."
This is an apparent item of noncompliance.
(50-361/79-29/03)-
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(2) Loss of Trubine Load Trip The inspector reviewed the installation of the plant protection system function loss of turbine load trip for compliance with IEEE-279 as detailed in the FSAR (Figure 032.10-1).
It was noted that the FSAR specified that in compliance with IEEE 279, Section 4.22, the electrical cable and raceway associated with this trip should be " Class IE, color-coded, (with) raceway and cable supported by seismic category 1 raceway supports." The adequacy of raceway supports was confirmed in the control building but work had not progressed sufficiently to allow examination of the cable or raceway installation in the trubine building.
This will remain an open item for future inspections.
(50-361/79-29/04)
6.
Main Coolant Pump Seismic Restraints During a tour of Unit 3 containment (for the flRC inspection of November 13-16, 1979) the inspectors noticed the lack of full thread engagement on a number of nuts (on 21/4 inch studs) for the Reactor Coolant Pump Stops (seismic restraints). The nuts were observed to lack full thread engagement by approximately 1/4 inch or more.
In response to the inspectors questions, the licensee produced FCR 24310-C which allowed the nuts to lack full thread engagement by up to a maximum of 1/4 inch.
Further discussions with the licensee indicated that in the event that the nuts lacked full thread engagement by more than 1/4", the nuts would be welded
to the stud as described in FCR C-256. This FCR is applicable only for Unit 2, since work in Unit 3 was still in progress.
On reviewing FCR C-256 the inspector noted that the FCR did not specify a minimum limit for thread engagement.
During the inspection of December 11-14, 1979 the inspector was informed that the cognizant engineer had performed calculations showing that under these particular conditions, welding the nut to the stud would allow the component to function as intended. These calculations were reviewed by the NRC resident inspector.
The FCR was also revised to clarify the intent of the engineer.
The inspector
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had no further questions on this subject.
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7.
Safety Related Piping (Welding)
a.
Observation of Work and Work Activities
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Field welding of safety related piping outside the reactor i
coolant pressure boundary at various stages of weld ccmpletion was visually observed by the inspector. The welds were examined to ascertain compliance with licensee commitments and appropriate ASME Code requirements including, welder identification, physical appearance of the weld, use of specified weld material, and evidence of QC verification. Welds examined and their
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status were as follows:
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Drawing No.
Pipe Size, inches Weld No.,
Status S3-1203-ML-080
B Fitup/ tack S3-1203-ML-084
K Complete S3-1203-ML-275
CJ Root pass
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53-1204-ML-001
BC Fitup/ tack S3-1204-ML-033
U Intermediate Pass S3-1204-ML-152
B Intermediate Pass S3-1204-ML-152
MC Intermediate Pass 53-1219-ML-025
B Intermediate Pass Additionally, field welding check lists and filler metal withdrawal forms associated with the above welds were reviewed, as well as, welder nualification records for welders performing the welds.
Rod Control Rooms Nos. 2, 3, 5 were toured and examined against the requirements WPP/QCI 200, " Control of Welding Filler Material".
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in any of the areas mentioned above.
b.
Review of Quality Records The following rece:ds were reviewed to ascertain compliance with established procedures and whether the records reflected work accomplishment consistent with NRC and SAR requirements:
Drawing No.
Weld No.
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S3-1203-ML-275 CJ Component Cooli g
'S3-1203-ML-084 K
Component Cooling S3-1203-ML277 B
Component Cooling S2-1203-ML-366 W
Component Cooling
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Drawing flo.
Weld flo.
System S3-1204-ML-056 C
Safety Injection S2-1204-ML-046
Safety Injection S3-1204-ML-001 3C Safety Injection S3-1208-ML-007 H
Chemical and Volume Control 52-1208-ML-106 K
Chemical and Volume Control S3-1219-ML-057 SHA Fuel Storage and Refueling S2-1219-MI-107 C
Fuel Storage and Refueling S3-1219-ML-025 B
Fuel Storage and Refueling fio items of noncompliance of deviations were identified.
8.
Allegation Regarding Weld Cracks An anonymous letter was received by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region V, on December 10, 1979 alleging that a tield no.12 at the San Onofre 2/3 site contained a number of cracks.
The alleger provided no additional information as to what unit was involved or what system contained the alleged weld.
NRC Finding: The allegation could not be substantiated.
Discussions with the licensee disclosed that neither the NSSS or the other safety related systems have welds that are numerically coded. All welds in safety related systems have an alphabetic designation.
The licensee did acknowledge that some of the non-safety related systems have welds that are coded numerically.
Several possible areas were investigated including, a weld repair on line 52-1201-012-BE, completed weld seams on two safety related tanks and a weld repair on line S3-1201-ML-010.
On line S3-1201-ML-010 during an RT examination of a field weld
"B", linear indications were found 2 1/4" back from the field weld.
The indications were found to be in a vendor (Combustion Engineering)
weld. The area was excavated and a weld repair program started.
After approximately 1" of filler metal was deposited an informational radiographic examination followed by a liquid penetrant test were performed.
Both NDE's revealed both surface and subsurface discontinuities i
in the weld repair area. These findings were documented in various
licensee memos and Bechtel NRC no. N540. At the time that these discontinuities were discovered (on 12/7/79), there was a great deal of discussion concerning the probable cause of the discontinuities.
It is possible that the alleger overheard those discussions.
In summary, since the allegation was so vague and since none of the safety related systems have a weld no.12, it is possible that the alleger was referring to system S3-1201-ML-010 and the associated weld rcpair program. The licensee resolution of this_ weld repair
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will be reviewed during a future NRC inspection.
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9.
Safety Related Components and Supports (Unit 3)
Various installed Unit 3 safety related components and supports associated with the components were examined and compared with installation instructions and drawings. The components examined included:
Containment Spray Pump P-013 Component Cooling Water Pump P-024 Safety Injection Tanks T-007, 008, 009, ac,d 010 Pressurizer Refueling Water Storage Tank Condensate Storage Tank The supports of the following components were examined and included both welding and bolting of the structural steel:
Containment Spray Pumps P-012 and P-013 Low Pressure Safety Injections Pumps P-015 and P-016 High Pressure Safety Injections Pumps P-017, 018, and 019 In addition, cleanliness and maintenance (lubrication and space teaters, where applicable) of the components were examined.
During examination of the Refueling Water Storage Tank, twelve unused uncontrolled weld rods (E7018) were discovered in the outlet
. nozzle of the tank.
No welding was in progress at the time of the finding. The rod appeared to have been uncontrolled for some time as evidenced by corrosion on the tips of the rod.
Bechtel-QCI 100.0 " Weld Filler Material Control" requires that unused filler material be returned to the rod room at the completion of the work shift.
This is an apparent item of noncompliance.
(50-362/79-27/01).
10.
Exit Interviews The inspectors met with licensee representative (denoted in paragraph 1)
on November 16 and December 14, 1979 in conjunction with the Pesident Inspector's weekly meeting. The scope and findings of the inspection as noted in this report were discussed.
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