IR 05000206/1979007
| ML13323A598 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 06/01/1979 |
| From: | Canter H, Faulkenberry B, Haist D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13323A597 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-79-07, 50-206-79-7, NUDOCS 7907270015 | |
| Download: ML13323A598 (8) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report No. 50-206/79-07 Docket N License N DPR-l3 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Facility Name: San Onofre Unit 1 Inspection at: San Onofre Unit 1 Inspection conducted:
May 1-3, 1979 Inspectors:
. H. L. Canter, Reactor Inspector Date Signed D. Haist, Reactor Inspector (in-office only)
Date Signed Date Signed Approved By:
TV-
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B. H. Faulkenberry, ChiEf7Reat r Project Section 2 Date Sfgned Reactor Operations and K Nuclear S upport Branch Summary:
Inspection on May 1-3, 1979 (Report No. 50-206/79-07)
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection to review actions taken in response to IE Bulletin 79-06A; inservice inspection data review and evaluation; LER followup; and independent inspection effort. The in spection involved 29 inspector-hours by two NRC inspector Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie RV Form 219 (2)
9 0
DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted
- H. Ottosan, Manager, Nuclear Generation
- D. Nunn, Manager, Quality Assurance
- J. Curran, Plant Manager
- R. Brunet, Superintendent, Unit 1
- H. Morgan, Superintendent, Unit 2
- D. Dunn, Project Quality Assurance Supervisor
- W. Moody, Supervisor, Licensing and Safety
- G. McDonald, Site QA Supervisor
- W. Frick, Nuclear Engineer
- D. Howard,' Engineer
- J. Tate, Watch Engineer M. Bruns, Watch Engineer J. Reeder, Watch Engineer A. Schramm, Watch Engineer J. Cummings, Control Operator G. Tilton, Control Operator M. Kirby, Control Operator D. Flomerfelt, Assistant Control Operator J. Pierson, Assistant Control Operator J. Moore, Assistant Control Operator E. Echevarria, Assistant Control Operator R. Kuhns, Assistant Control Operator The inspector also interviewed several other licensee employees including maintenance and security personne *Denotes those attending exit intervie. Review of Licensee Actions Taken in Response to IE Bulletins 79-06, 06A, and 06A Revision 1 a. Onsite Review of Operator Training On April 10-11, 1979 (IE Report.50-206/79-06) the inspector briefed SONGS personnel on the evbnts that took place at Three Mile Island (TMI)
on March 28, 197 On April 20, 1979, direct training discussions with licensed operators were conducted by an IE and NRR task group for the purpose of updating licensee personnel on the TMI incident and discussing the generic implications of the incident on Westinghouse plant Licensed operators have also received other informal training in the form of temporary operating memo reviews, management memo reviews, and management.discussion The inspector determined by discussions with at least two licensed operators on each shift that the above training had been effective and that the operators were knowledgeable of the items of concern identified in IE Bulletin 79-0 The licensee stated that, in addition to the above, formal, documented training will be conducted prior to May 23, 1979, for all licensed operators (79-07-1).
This training will cover the following material:
(1) Review of the procedure changes initiated as a result of IE Bulletins 79-06, 06A and 06A Revision (2) Instruction on the specific measures which provide assur ance that engineered safety features will be available if required. Emphasis will be. on measures for returning such systems to operable status following maintenance and testin (3) Instruction on the specific and detailed measures.to assure that automatic actuations of emergency safety features are not overridden except as permitted in the bulletin (4) Review of plant automatic actions initiated by reset of engineered safety features that could effect the control of radioactive liquids and gase (5) Instruction (to operators and supervisory personnel) in the provisions and directives for early NRC notification of serious events. This will include instructions on the use of a continuous communication channel to the NR The inspector noted and commented on the lack of a permanent Training Administrator (see Figure 6.2.2.2 of the Technical Specifications). Currently, a Watch Engineer is temporarily assigned to this position. By having a temporarily assigned Training Administrator, the licensee's ability to develop a formal, effective, and up-to-date training program appears to be limited. The licensee stated that the.hiring of a permanent Training Administrator is imminen Finally, in discussions with plant personnel, it is evident that no simulator training has been given to operators. There is no requirement for this training, but a licensee repre sentative stated that plans are being made to provide simulator training for SONGS 1 operators at the Zion simulato No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie Onsite Inspection of Engineered Safety Features (ESF)
The inspector verified by independent examination of records, procedures and equipment that the ESF systems are operable according to Technical Specification requirements and that licensee procedures and administrative controls appear to be adequate. To provide this verification, the inspector did the following:
(1) Reviewed valve/breaker/switch alignment procedures for all ESF systems against current P&ID's and verified the accuracy of the procedure (2) Verified valve/breaker/switch alignments for all accessible ESF system component *(3)
Reviewed the administrative controls imposed by the licensee to assure proper "return to service" of ESF components following test and maintenance activitie *(4)
Reviewed surveillance test and maintenance procedures and verified they contain provisions to assure systems are returned to an operable condition upon completion of the wor (5) Reviewed the last surveillance test on each ESF system and verified that the acceptance criteria were me (6) Verified that the pressurizer low level bistables that feed the safety injection circuitry for the coincident low level, low pressure safety injection had been placed in the tripped conditio *(7)
Reviewed administrative controls and verified these controls appear to be sufficient to assure ESF systems are returned to operability-after extended outage *The licensee is performing further reviews in these areas and will respond with a schedule for completion of these reviews by May 23,
.1979. (See 79-07-8 in Paragraph 2.d)
-4 (8) Verified the licensee has a system for independent verification of correct valve/breaker/switch alignments following extended outages and maintenance/test activitie This independent verification is provided through an independent review of the completed work or the completed paper work by a Watch Engineer or Supervisor. The licensee does not provide for an independent visual verification of valve/breaker/switch alignments by someone other than the person performing the wor (9) Verified that valves in the auxiliary feedwater system identified by the licensee as requiring locking or similar positive position control were actually locked or controlle The inspector determined, while verifying that the pressurizer low level bistables had been tripped (Item 6 above), that the licensee is currently studying the effects which the jumpered signals have on the SIS sequencer. This item is open pending review of the analysis on the SIS sequencer (.79-07-2).
In reviewing ESF lineups, there were some anomalies noticed in the P&ID's. Some valves were locked shut but not shown as such on the P&ID's or the "Locking of Critical Valves" pro cedure S-0-108. Also, the control room index of P&ID's did not agree with the P&ID's in the controlled stock file. Feed pump discharge valves HV852A and HV852B receive SIS signals but P&ID 568779-21 did not show the SIS inputs to the valve P&ID 568769-14 had an SIS signal missing from HV851B (feed pump loop discharge valve) and the diagram also showed a flow comparator system to be in place, even though it was removed from the plant. The licensee stated that as part of their response to Item 8 in IE Bulletin 79-06A in which positioning requirements of all safety-related valves are being reviewed, they will review S-0-108 and appropriate P&ID's for necessary changes and will implement those changes as appropriate. In addition, the licensee will revise their procedures to include the basis for required valve positions (79-07-3).
During the performance on the onsite inspection of engineered safety features, the inspector reviewed the following operating instructions (01), procedures, ad P&I diagrams:
01 S-3-3.3. Rev. 11 Hot Operational Test of the SIS and CS Spray System 01 S-3.2.21, Rev. 7 Cold Shutdown Arrangements of the SIS 01 S-2-1, Rev. 6 MFP Operation
-5 01 S-3-1.1, Rev. 19 Plant S/U from Cold Condition to Min. Load 01 S-3-3.10, Rev. 4 SIS Venting 01 S-3-2.21, Rev. 7 Checkoff Sheet (PSSO 113)
01 S-3-1.1, Rev. 19 Checkoff Sheet (PSSO 136)
01 S-3-1.1, Rev. 19 Checkoff Sheet (PSSO 137)
01 S-3-1.1, Rev. 19 Checkoff Sheet (PSSO 138)
P&I 568766-16 RCS P&I 568767-19 CVCS P&I 568767-15 Auxiliary Coolant System P&I 568779-21 Feed and Condensate P&I 568769-14 SIS No items of noncompliance or. deviations were identifie Onsite Assessment of Operating Procedures There has been no case where partial actuation of a safety injection system was necessary to assist in level control of the pressurizer during routine operation event induced pres surizer level transients. It is also noted that a-second charging pump will automatically start at a 2200 psig discharge header pressure (normal is 2500.psig). This automatic start feature has not had to function on any normal transien The licensee's position on the operation of reactor coolant pumps in the event of a safety injection high pressure SI pump initiation is to restart the reactor coolant pump Temporary Operating Memorandum (TOM) 213, Rev. 3 describes these operator actions. The licensee response t6 IE Bulletin 79-06A, Item 7c, however, states that the licensee does not plan to alter operating instructions to specify continued operation of reactor coolant pumps in all cases following safety injection actuation. The licensee will issue a TOM which will be in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-06A, Paragraph 7c, in that one RCP will remain operating in each loop as long as the pump(s)
is providing forced flow and continued operation shall not result in an unsafe plant condition, e.g., loss of seal in tegrity may result in system failure of greater consequence than the benefit derived from forced flo Discussions with reactor operators indicates an awareness of the criteria for operation of reactor coolant pumps and how to determine the 50 degrees subcooling specified in Item 7.b(2)
in IE Bulletin 79-06A. The licensee plans to install a three pin chart recorder which will help in determining the amount of subcooling. This item is open pending review to verify that proper temperature. indications exist to verify subcooling for the core flow occurring during the accident (79-07-4).
There are no procedures for feeding dry steam generators and therefore the operators have received no training in this are There is the potential for obscuring status indicators on control panels in the control room. The licensee is aware of this potential and is looking into alternative tagging systems (79-07-5).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie d. Other Comments Besides items already discussed as requiring followup, the response to Paragraphs 2 and 10b to IE Bulletin 79-06A require followu Paragraph 2 deals with coping with void formation in the reactor coolant system (79-07-6),
and Paragraph 10b deals with a review of plant administrative controls on returning systems to operable status following maintenance or testing (79-07-7).
Finally, the licensee stated that the schedule for completion of all items left open in the response to IE Bulletins 79-06, 06A and 06A Revision 1, will be submitted with the May 23, 1979 response to Item 13 of the same bulletin (79-07-8).
3. Inservice Inspection The licensee's summary report of the refueling outage No. 6 inservice inspection was reviewed in the NRC regional office for compliance with Facility Technical Specification and ASME code requirement (Inspection of refueling outage No. 6 ISI activities are also discussed in IE Report 50-206/78-14.)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Licensee Event Followup (Closed) LER 78-12:
This LER dealt with class 2 pipe cracks. The licensee reported cracks in portions of the reactor coolant pump seal water return line and an elbow in the charging pump discharge lin The inspector reviewed a followup report and LER 78-012, Revision 1, dated April 19, 1978 describing additional indications discovered and corrective action take The inspector had no further questions on this matte No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Followup Items Various followup items appear in this report. They are identified below by item number, subject, and applicable paragraph from IE Bulletin 79-06, 06A, or 06A Revision Item N Subject Related Bulletin Paragraph 79-07-1 Formal Training Sessions
79-07-2 SIS Sequencer "Low Level" 06A, Rev. 1 Jumpers 79-07-3 Valve Positioning and P&I
Updates 79-07-4 Subcooling
79-07-5 Obscuring of Indications
79-07-6 Void Formation Analysis
79-07-7 Verification of Operability
79-07-8 Schedule of Completion all 6. Independent Inspection Effort The inspector witnessed a demonstration and training session on a live fire. Live fire training for the fire brigade is expected to be completed during the month of Ma. Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee repreentatives (denoted in Para graph 1) on May 3, 1979 at the conclusion of the inspection. He summarized the purpose, scope and findings of the inspectio A licensee representative stated that a formal training program on the subject of the TMI incident and its relationship to SONGS 1 will be developed, implemented and completed by May 23, 1979 (79 07-1).
(See Paragraph 2a.)
A licensee representative stated that a.schedule for completion of the various open items mentioned in the response to IE Bulletin 79 06A will be submitted by May 23, 1979 (79-07-8).
(See Paragraphs 2b and 2d.)