IR 05000361/1979011
| ML13309A703 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 05/21/1979 |
| From: | Albert W, Haist D, Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13309A702 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-79-11, 50-362-79-11, NUDOCS 7907260649 | |
| Download: ML13309A703 (9) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
50-361/79-11 Report.N /79-11 50-361 CPPR-97
'Docket N License N CPPR-98 Safeguards Group
,Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Creek Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Facility Name:
San Onofre Units 2 and 3
'Inspection at:
Construction Site, San Diego County, California Inspection conducted:
April 9-12, 1970 lInspectors G. Alber eactor InspectorDate Signed D. P./Haist, Reactor Inspector bate Signed UHernan
, Rea or Inspector Date Signed (. E. Vo erbrueg en, MWtor Inspector
/bate/Signed Approved by:
Z2 R. C. Haynes, Projects Section, Reactor Date'Signed Constructio nd Engineering Support Branch Summary:
Inspection on April 9-12, 1,979 (Report Nos. 50-361/79-11 ~and 50-362/79-11)
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection byDregional based inspectors of construction activities, including licensee's corrective action with regard to control of measuring and test equipment, follow up on a 50.55(e) item, installa tion of reactor vessel internals, installation of safety related equipmen;Lm,-pip welding, NDE of welds, containment prestressing, preservice inspection, and tour of plant area The inspection involved 101 inspector-hours-onsite by four NRC inspector Results:
In the eight areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations awere identifie RV Form 219 (2)
'7§07260 G-T S-.-.-.....--Date..S..gned
DETAILS Persons Contacted a. Southern California Edison Company (SCE)
- P. A. Croy, Quality Assurance/Quality Control Supervisor T. D. Garven, Quality Assurance Engineer
- R. R. Hart, Site Construction Manager
- W. L. Rossfeld, Quality Assurance Engineer M. E. Rodin, Quality Assurance Engineer
- L. L. Seyler, Project Quality Assurance Supervisor S. S. Dziewit, Quality Assurance Engineer b. Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
R. Ash-Everest, Mechanical Field Engineer G. Austerman, Deputy Lead Piping Field.Engineer N. Banos, Mechanical Field Engineer
- C. A. Blum, Site Quality Control Supervisor
- J. R. Caldwell, Project Quality Assurance Supervisor N. Dennen, Project Codes Engineer R. Ellis, Deputy Engineering Group Supervisor -Pipe Stress
- J. E. Geiger, Project Field Quality Assurance Supervisor P. G. Koehnert, Quality Control Engineer R. Little, Field Engineer B. Moreton, Deputy Engineering Group Supervisor -Special Tasks A. Nadjar, Lead Piping Field Engineer C. Smith, Nuclear Field Engineer Supervisor R. C. White, Quality Control Engineer K. D. Kaufman, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer L. Hurst, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer C. Combustion Engineering G. Perkins, ISI Supervisor
- Attendees at Exit Intervie. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Follow-Up Item (50-361/79-01-01,) (50-362/79-01-01 )-:---Procedures for control of measuring and test equipment needed to bq-clarifie Bechtel has revised WPP/QCI 010 and Appendice's I to -VA 'to resolve con cerns noted in Paragraph 3 of the reference report. Although no specific guidance had been provided in the revised procedures on the practice of
"updating" (extending calibration interval for unused equipment), th N
-2 inspector was satisfied with the controls in use because the procedures now provide for the calibration and certification of pressure gauges immediately prior to any hydrostatic testing. This item is close b. (Open) Enforcement Item (50-361/79-01-02 and 50-362/79-01-02): Twenty items of measuring and test equipment subject to verification in accord ance with Appendix VI of WPP/QCI 010, were not in the calibration recal system. From interviews with responsible field and quality control engineers and review of procedure revisions, the inspector concluded that the necessary corrective actions had been taken. However, the system was not sampled during this inspection and the item will remain ope c. (Closed) Follow-Up Item (50-361/77-08): "Out-of-focus" regions were observed in the area of interest near the ends of weld radiograph The licensee determined that the so-called "out-of-focus" condition was, in reality, an increase in photographic density across the over lapped edge of the "far-side" film caused by the presence of the additional layers of lead foil screens in the film packet The licensee stated that, in all cases, the increased density was still below the ASME maximum value of Nevertheless, the contractor stopped the practice of making radiographs with overlapped fil To verify that film interpretation had not been compromised by this condition, the licensee performed an audit in the latter part of September 1977. For that audit, 150 radiographs were randomly selected from the 1500 (approximately) that had been turned over by Bechtel at that time. According to the audit report (BPCS-42-77),
the film interpretation, performed by a Level III examiner, disclosed no discrepancies with the previous interpretations by Bechte This item is close.
Follow-Up on 10 CFR 50.55(e) Item Regarding Pipe Support Welds In a letter to the NRC dated January 8, 1979, the licensee submitted their final report pertaining to the previously reported design deficiency asso ciated with fillet welds (field installed) on pipe supports governed by the ASME B&PV Code,Section II The inspector examined the remedial action identified in the final report in order to verify that the actions had been complete Of the 377 support assemblies which had been identified as having undersize fillet welds specified on the drawings, 73 assemblies had been installed and were identified on two nonconformance reports. Thirteen (NCR No. P-783)
were accessible and were scheduled for rework; the inspector verified that approved Field Change Requests (FCRs) or design drawing revisions were on hand showing appropriately increased fillet weld sizes. The other 60 assemblies (NCR No. P-784) were not accessible for rework and it was the licensee's intent to accept the existing fillet weld This acceptance,
-3 however, was based, in part, on a code change in the Winter 1978 Addendum to the 1977 edition of Section II The licensee contends that this change is, in reality, a clarification of the 1974 code edition which is the governing edition for San Onofre Units 2 and 3. The inspector informed the licensee that this interpretation would have to be formally verified by ASME Code officials before the NRC could accept the situation as not constituting a code violatio The licensee's report also stated that the remaining 304 assemblies had not been installed and that their design drawings had been revised to specify the correct fillet weld sizes. To verify that the drawings had been corrected,.the inspector randomly selected the following assemblies for examination:
Pipe Size < 2-inches SA-CH-074-HOOB S3-BM-068-HOAB Pipe Size 5j2 -inches S2-CS-003-H-056 S2-FS-057-H-120 S2-RC-017-H-054 S2 - CC -275-H-001 S2-SI-043-H-014 S3-SC-002-H-005 S3-SI-010-H-006 S3-CC-074-H-013 S3-FW-189-H-013 The cognizant Bechtel site personnel were unable to show that a drawing revision or FCR had been processed for the last two assemblies in the fore going listing. Because of this discrepancy and the necessity for the Code clarification, this item is considered unresolved..(50-361/79-11-01) Reactor Vessel Internals Review of Installation Procedures Installation procedures for Unit 3 reactor vessel internals identified as "Sequences" 1 through 9 were examined for changes from the procedures used for Unit.2. Revisions had been completed for Sequences 1 through 8 and a proposed change for Sequence 9 was discusse Significant changes from the Unit 2 procedures are as follows:
(1) Tool accountability is not maintained until the sequences reach the actual assembly stag (2) A hydraulic leveling device will be used to monitor load changes during handling as opposed to the load cell used during Unit 2 internals installatio (3) A possible change in head alignment procedures which would be adaptable to CE System 80 designs without instrument guide tubes was discusse Other general procedures for cleanliness controls, receipt inspections, storage and records keeping were essentially unchanged from those used at Unit No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie b. Observation of Work and Work Activities The protection of stored internals, including coverings and supports, was examined. Cleanliness controls for reactor internals and reactor vessel, including.control of entry to controlled areas, was verifie Cleanliness under work platform in reactor vessel was examined. The inspector observed the lack of thread engagement between the base of stanchions and the threads in the reactor vessel flange and, therefore, questioned licensee representatives about potential thread damage to vessel flange threads if stanchion threads were not engaged. The situa tion was subsequently corrected although it appeared that threads for the stanchions were somewhat oversize because the stanchions could not be screwed flush with the vessel flange in all case Further, the inspector identified pipe wrench marks on the stanchions which indicated that considerable force had been used in order to achieve the thread engagement that was observed. The licensee stated that they would follow up on this matter to assure that no thread damage had occurre In a phone conversation subsequent to the inspection, the licensee reported that possible damage occurred on the first vessel flange thread. This would be the subject of a nonconformance report and appropriately dispositione The measurement and installation of snubber shims between the core barrel and reactor vessel were examined. At the 2400 position the core barrel snubber lug had been installed out of position by approx imately 1-inches requiring special shim bolting arrangements since the shim on one side of the "H" block (vessel snubber lug) had to be considerably heavier than the shim on the other side. The design change for this condition was examined and discussed. One other
-5 problem, rgsulting 'n two nonconformance reports arose because shims at the 120' and 180 locations had an interference fit with the "H" block on the long axis of the shi This resulted in thread damage by severe galling during assembly and disassembly of the stainless steel bolts to the stainless steel shims. The nonconformance reports were examined and various dispositions were discusse Involvement of the NSSS supplier in the disposition of the nonconformances was verifie The inspector had no further questions on the core internals installation at this tim.
Safety Related Components - Installation of Pressurizers The installation bolting of pressurizers for both units resulted in several questions by the inspectors, including: washer usage, shim stock material, UT examination, drawing classification, size of washers, marking on nuts, and material release controls. All questions were satisfactorily resolved by interviews and examination of documentatio.6. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping Review of Quality Records The inspector examined the quality records pertaining to the following welds in Unit 2 reactor coolant system pressure boundary:
Weld A -
Line ML-005 --
30-inch outlet from Steam Generator No. Weld A -
Line ML-001 --
42-inch Reactor outlet to Steam Generator No. Weld B - Line ML-002 --
42-inch Reactor outlet to Steam Generator No. Weld A -
Line ML-008
--
Pump No. 2A 30-inch outlet to Reactor Vessel Weld A -
Line ML-016 --
Steam Generator No. 2 16-inch hot leg outlet to RHR syste The records examined included weld history and inspection records, heat treatment charts, weld radiographs and interpretation sheet The inspector did not identify any discrepancies with the requirements of Bechtel Welding Standard WD-1, Quality Control and Documentation Procedure for Welding and Nondestructive Examination for ASME Code,Section III Application.
Preservice Inspection a. Review of Program The inspector reviewed selected portions of the licensee's preservice inspection program plan and schedule for completeness and conformance to licensee and code requirements. The inspector also reviewed areas of the licensee's quality assurance program pertaining to surveil lance and auditing of preservice inspection activities. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie The inspector questioned the absence of written qualification requirements for the Inservice Inspection Supervisor whose responsi bilities are defined in Combustion Engineering Procedure 9976-NLE-056, Rev. 2, Program Controls Procedure for Inservice Inspection. Licensee representatives will review the qualification requirements for the Inservice Inspection Supervisor. The preservice inspection program quality assurance requirements and the inservice inspection supervisor qualification requirements will be examined during a subsequent inspection. (50-361/79-11-02)
The inspector noted that the licensee has committed to submit the preservice inspection program plan and schedule to NRC for licensing review in June 1979. The licensee acknowledged that deviations from or exceptions to NRC accepted Code and regulatory requirements are subject to NRC approva b. Review of Procedures The inspector reviewed the following examination procedures for conformance with licensee and ASME Code Sections V and XI requirements:
(1) Visual Examination Procedure No. ESS-066, Rev. 2 (2) Liquid Penetrant Examination Procedure No. ESS-064, Rev. 2 (3) Magnetic Particle Examination Procedure No. ESS-065, Rev. 1 (4) Ultrasonic Examination of Class I and Class II Austenitic Piping and CEDM Upper Pressure Housing Welds, Procedure No. NIP-754, Rev. 2 No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie The inspector observed that Procedure No. NIP-754 is based upon the requirements of ASME Section XI Mandatory Appendix III (Winter 1975 Addenda) which has not yet received formal endorsement from NRC
-7 Office of Standards Development. Approval of Appendix III is expected shortly when the 1977 edition through Summer 1978 Addenda of ASME Section XI receive approval by reference in 10 CFR 50.55(a). Observation of Work and Work Activities The inspector visually observed ultrasonic examination of the following welds in 8-inch stainless steel shutdown cooling piping:
(1) Weld Nos. 02-074-010 and 012 - circumferential pipe to elbow (2)
Weld Nos. 02-074-011A and B - longitudinal elbow body welds (3) Weld Nos. 02-074-005A and B -
longitudinal elbow body welds (4) Weld No. 02-074-014 and 016 - circumferential pipe to elbow welds It was found that the examinations were performed by certified examiners in accordance with Procedure No. NIP-754, Rev. 5, Ultra sonic Examination of Class 1 and Class 2 Austenitic Piping and CEDM Upper Pressure Housing Weld No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Containment (Prestressing System) Review of Quality Assurance Manual The changes to the Quality Assurance program for the VSL Post Tensioning System were reviewed for conformance with Section 5.0 of the PSAR and Specification SO-23-204-No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie b. Observation of Work and Work Activities During a tour of Unit 3 containment, the inspector observed four horizontal tendon sheaths that did not appear to be protected as required by Specification S023-204-3, Section 4.08.5, "Tendon Sheathing and Trumpet Extensions." The inspector was informed that the licensee had issued a C.A.R. (No. S023 F-749) for a similar finding on March 9, 1979, with corrective action to in clude monthly inspections for turned or missing covers. The inspector did not identify any significant safety problems with the situation and the licensee took immediate action to correct this deviation from the procedur a-8 c. Review of Quality Records Record packages for three tendon shipments were reviewed. The records reviewed included Vendor Inspection Reports, Material Conform ance Tests, Tendon Material Reports, Mill Test Records and Product Verification Test Reports. The records appeared to be complete and in compliance with VSL's QA progra.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection. The areas covered during the inspection and observations and conclusions of the inspectors were discussed.