IR 05000361/1979025

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IE Insp Rept 50-361/79-25 & 50-362/79-24 on 790904-08 & 24-28.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Const Activities,Reactor Pressure Vessel & Internals,Installation & Protection of Stainless Steel Piping
ML13309A790
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre  Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 10/26/1979
From: Dodds R, Pate R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML13309A788 List:
References
50-361-79-25, 50-362-79-24, NUDOCS 7912060025
Download: ML13309A790 (4)


Text

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50-361/79-25

REGION V

Report N /79-24 Docket N,

50-362 License No. CPPR-97, CPPR-98 Safeguards Group Licensee:

Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rn-empad California 91770 Facility Name:

San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Inspection at:

Construction Site, San Diego County, California Inspection conducted:

September 4-8 and 24-28, 1979 Inspectors:

R. J. Pate, Resident Inspector Dite Signed Date Signed I

.

Date Signed Approved By:

1-7e R. T. Dodds, Chief, Engineering Support Section, Dte Signed Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Summary:

Inspection on September 4-8 and 24-28, 1979 (Report Nos. 50-361/79-25 and 50-362/79-24)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident i.nspector of construction activities including:

piping storage, handling and welding; reactor pressure vessel and internals installation and protection; protection of stainless steel piping; licensee corrective actions on previous inspection findings; and general work in progress. The inspection involved 13 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspecto Results:

Of the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identifie RV Form 219 (2)

7 912 0 80C)*7

DETAILS 1. Individuals Contacted a. Southern California Edison Company (SCE)

  • P. A. Croy, Site Project Quality Assurance Supervisor F. Frick, Quality Assurance Engineer J. Huey, Quality Assurance Engineer P. R. King, Operations Lead QA Engineer J. J. Pantaleo, Quality Assurance Engineer
  • W. F. Rossfield, Construction Lead Quality Assurance Engineer
  • D. B. Schone, Lead Engineering Site Representative L. D. Tipton, Nuclear Engineering Site Representative
  • D. Erdmon, Project Construction Engineer b. Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
  • J. E. Bashore, Division Quality Assurance Manager
  • C. A. Blum, Quality Control Manager
  • J. E. Geiger, Project QA Supervisor
  • L. W. Hurst, Project Field QA.Supervisor In addition, construction craftsmen, engineers and foremen were contacted during the inspection *Denotes attendees at management meeting on September 28, 197. Construction Status The licensee reported that site construction work is 72% complete as of September 29, 1979. The licensee's project management personnel estimated that the construction of Units 2 and 3 was 84% and 60%

complete respectivel. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings The inspector examined the action taken by the licensee on the following outstanding items:

a. (Closed) Followup item (50-361/79-12/01): During a previous inspection period (report 50-361/79-12), the storage of control valves at the job site did not meet the requirements of ANSI N45.2.2 because the valves were considered to be in the install ation status. The licensee took immediate action to correct the conditions identifed and corrective action to upgrade the on-site storage condition The Unit 2 and 3 containment, penetration area, and safety equipment building were toured on several occasions during the inspection period. The storage of control valves observed met the stdrage requirements of ANSI N45. b. (Closed) Followup item (50-361/79-22/01): During the inspection period of August 13-31, 1979, the inspector observed that some of the welds for the CEA shroud flow channel extentions contained some undercut. The depth of the undercut could not be measured due to limited acces Combustion Engineering made a measuring device capable of measuring the depth of the weld undercut. The CE QC inspector measured the depth of the undercut for each weld. None of the welds had undercut exceeding the allowed depth of 1/32 inc. Reactor Vessel and Internals Installation and Storage Site activities for storage of the Units 2 and 3 reactor pressure vessels and internals were observed. Both vessels are installed and installation of Unit 2 internals is essentially complet Installation of Unit 3 internals is in progres Installation of Unit 3 internals was observe No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety-Related Piping The piping related activities listed below were observed to ascertain compliance with applicable construction specifications and procedure Activity System Identification N Storage Safety Injection 3-SI-075-2A Storage Safety Injection 2-SI-077-2C, Sh. 2 Pipe Welding Safety Injection S2-1204-ML-080, Sh. 2, Rev. 1, Weld BH Handling Chilled Water S3-CH-063-18 Pipe Welding Component Cool Water S2-CC-007-H-006 No items of noncompliance or deviation were identifie. Stress Corrosion Cracking of Stainless Steel Pipes The inspector reviewed the problem at SONGS Unit 1 of stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel pipe exposed to the marine environment with the SCE QA personne SCE management personnel stated that they were aware of the Unit 1 problem and had initiated a study to determine where similar conditions existed at Units 2 and 3. The results of the study will be discussed with the Resident Inspector when it is available.. The target date for completion of the study is October 12, 197 (50-361/79-25/01)

7. Plant Tour The inspector toured both Units 2 and 3 several times each week during the inspection report period. Particular attention was directed to observing work in progress, availability of supervision and quality control inspectors at the work areas, housekeeping and preservation of equipmen The inspector observed excessive construction debris i the area around the high pressure safety injection pumps for Unit 2. The accumulation of debris appeared to be caused by the high level of construction activity in the area. The licensee was advised and immediate action was taken to remove the debris and establish acceptable conditions. The Bechtel procedure WPP/QCI 009, revision 6, allows temporary accumulation of construction materials as long as this material is removed promptly upon completion of the activity creating the debri No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Management Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on September 28, 1979. The scope of the inspections and the inspector's findings as noted in paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 were discussed. The licensee representatives committed to provide additional information on stress corrosion cracking as noted in paragraph 6.