IR 05000361/1979028
| ML13323A380 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 12/12/1979 |
| From: | Dodds R, Pate R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13323A379 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-79-28, 50-362-79-26, NUDOCS 8001100535 | |
| Download: ML13323A380 (10) | |
Text
U. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report No___ ___
__
Docket No. 50-361, 50-362 License N CPPR-97, CPPR-98 Safeguards Group_
_
Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead. California 91770 Facility Name:
San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Inspection at:
Construction Site, San nipnn Cointy California Inspection conducted:
October 1-31, 1979 Inspectors:
(6/
/
R. J. Pate, resident Inspector Date Signed Date Signed
(Date Signed Approved By:
12i2_
/Dat6 Signed R. T. Dodds, Chief, Engineering Support Section, Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Summary:
Inspection on October 1-31, 1979 (Report Nos. 50-361/79-28 and 50-362/79-26)
Areas Insoected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of construction activities including:
piping storage, grinding, welding and NDE ;
reactor pressure vessel and internals protection; containment prestressing; electrical conduit installation; concrete placement, followup on bulletins; licensee corrective actions on previous inspection findings; and general work in progress. The inspection involved 94 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspecto Results:
Of the eight areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identifie RV Form 219 (2)
8001100535
DETAILS 1. Individuals Contacted a. Southern California Edison Company (SCE)
=+*D. E. Nunn, Manager Quality Assurance
=+*P. A. Croy, Site Project Quality Assurance Supervisor F. Frick, Quality Assurance Engineer J. Huey, Quality Assurance Engineer P. R. King, Operations Lead QA Engineer J. 3. Pantaleo, Quality Assurance Engineer
=+*W. F. Rossfield, Construction Lead Quality Assurance Engineer D. B. Schone, Lead Engineering Site Representative L. D. Tipton, Nuclear Engineering Site Representative
- D. Erdman, Project Construction Engineer
- H. B. Ray, Project Manager
- R. 3. Zwerling, Preservice Inspection Coordinator
- J. A. Parent, Electrical Engineering Site Representative
=H. E. Morgan, Unit 2/3 Superintendent
=C. R. Horton, Startup QA Engineer
=P. R. Belhumeur, Startup QA Engineer 3. G. Haynes, Chief, Nuclear Engineering D. Pilmer, Supervisor, Nuclear Engineering D. Martin, Project Engineer J. Thomas, QA Engineer D. Bertram, Supervising Engineer (Units 2 and 3)
C. Balog, Engineer b. Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
A+* H. Cutler, Project Field Engineer
+.
E. Bashore, Division Quality Assurance Manager H+* A. Blum, Quality Control Manager
+*.
E. Geiger, Project QA Supervisor
- . D. Nichols, Assistant Project Field Engineer
+A. Erickson, Project Field QC Engineer In addition, construction craftsmen, engineers and foremen were B,*
.W. Hr y, Project anaerd Q
up r i o contacted during the inspection *Denotes attendees at management meeting on October 5, 197 +Denotes attendees at management meeting on October 12, 197 Denotes attendees at management meeting on October 26, 197. Construction Status The licensee reported that site construction work is 74% complete as of October 1, 197 The licensee's project management personnel estimated that the construction of Units 2 and 3 was 85% and 61%
complete respectivel. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings The inspector examined the action taken by the licensee on the following outstanding items:
a. (Closed) Noncompliance (50-361/79-20/01): A grinding disc that was not properly marked was used to cut a section of stainless steel pipe contrary to the requirements of procedure WPP/QCI 206, Revision The inspector verified that the procedure was revised and that the craft superintendents were trained in accordance with the licensee's letter of October 11, 1979. Also, the inspector observed the craftsmen doing grinding operations in the plant following the new procedure. The inspector had no additional questions. This also closes followup item 50-361/79-13-0 b. (Closed) Followup Item (50-361/79-25/01): The potential exists at Unit 2 and 3 to have the problem with stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel pipes installed outside exposed to the marine environmen The results of a study conducted by SCE indicated that there will be some pipes installed outside. SCE management personnel stated that all stainless steel piping installed in outside areas would be protected from atmospheric condensation (dew),.
4. Licensee Action on NRC Bulletins The inspector examined the action taken by the licensee on the following bulletins:
78-07 Air Line Respirators This bulletin was not issued for Units 2 and Radiation Levels from Fuel Element Transfer Tubes This bulletin was not issued for Units 2 and 3. However, SCE received this bulletin for Unit 1 and reviewed the Units 2 and 3 design. The design was found inadequate and was changed. The inspector reviewed the revised drawing The new design appears to be satisfactory to reduce the radiation hazar BWR Drywell Leakage This bulletin was not issued for Units 2 and Bergen-Paterson Hydraulic Shock Suppressor Accumulator Spring Coil SCE issued a letter dated 7/27/78 stating that none of the models listed were being used at Units 2 and Exam of Mark I (BWR) Containment Torus Welds This bulletin was not issued for Units 2 and Atypical Weld Material in RPV SCE issued a letter dated 6/18/79 stating that they were satisfied with the Combustion Engineering generic report on atypical weld material in Unit 2 and 3 vessel Failure in Source Heads of Kay-Ray, Inc. Gages This bulletin was not issued for Units 2 and Deterioration of Buna-N Components in ASCO Solenoid Valves A memo was issued by SCE Nuclear Engineering to the Unit 2 and 3 Plant Engineering staff. No action has been taken to date, but the responsible engineer on the Plant Engineering staff stated that the memo had been put in a pending file and had planned to include the recommendation in the memo in the plant maintenance procedures when they were written. No procedure had been established to verify that recommendations by Nuclear Engineering were implemente Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment (Makes IE Circular 78-08 a Bulletin)
The action taken by SCE in response to Circular 78-08 was not reviewe A Deficiencies in Environmental Qualification of ASCO Solenoid Valves The responsible engineer for review of Bulletins, stated that the review of ASCO Solenoid Valves was included in the response to Circular 78-0 Pipe Support Base Plate Design Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolt SCE issued a letter dated 7/8/79 on the use of anchor bolts for pipe support base plates. No deficiencies in the SCE design were identifie Longitudinal Weld Defects in ASME Type 304 SS Pipe Spools Manufactured by Youngstown Welding and Engineering Company This problem was identified by SCE in a 50.55(e) repor The final report was forwarded to the NRC on 12/1/78., The report stated that all the material received was tested and the material rejected was not use Incorrect Weights for Swing Check Valves Manufactured by Velan Engineering Corporatio SCE issued a letter to NRC dated 5/24/79 stating that no Velan Valves had been used in Units 2 and )79-05A Bulletins issued as a result of the TMI 79-05C accident. SCE has established a TMI task 79-05C force to address all TMI issues. The task 79-06 force results have not been issue A)79-06A (Revision 1) )79-06B
)
79-07 Seismic Stress Analysis for Safety Related Piping This bulletin identifies certain computer codes that were deficient for doing seismic analysis. SCE issued a letter to the NRC dated 5/23/79 that stated that the computer codes used for the Unit 2 and 3 seismic analysis were satisfactor TMI Events Relevant to BWR's Not issued for Units 2 and Failure of GE Type AK-2 Circuit Breaker SCE issued a letter to NRC dated 6/13/79 identifying the switchgear using Type AK-2 circuit breakers and stating that the present plans are to replace the circuit breaker Requalification Training Program Statistic This bulletin is only applicable to operating unit Faulty Overcurrent Trip Device in Circuit Breakers for Engineered Safety Systems SCE issued a letter to NRC dated 5/22/79 stating that none of the circuit breakers described by the bulletin were used in Units 2 and Short Period Scrams at BWR Facilities SCE Nuclear Engineering sent a memo to the Unit 2 and 3 Plant Engineering staff. No action was taken to date, but the responsible engineer had the memo in a pending file and planned to ensure that the operating procedures included the necessary steps to prevent errors in estimating the critical position. A procedure has not been established to verify that recommendations by Nuclear Engineering were implemente, 79-13 (Revision 1) Cracking in Feedwater System Piping SCE issued a letter to NRC dated 9/19/79 which described the actions taken in response to this bulletin. SCE was advised by the inspector that their response did not meet all the requirements of the bulleti Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety 79-14 (Revision 1) )
Related Piping Systems 79-14 (Revision 2)
Response from SCE was due November 2, 197 Deep Draft Pump Deficiencie SCE issued a letter to NRC dated 9/5/79 which provided the data requested by the Bulleti Vital Area Access Controls No response for Units 2 and 3 was required. However, this bulletin is applicable to Units 2 and 3 and SCE has initiated action to ensure the problem described by the bulletin does not occur at Units 2 and Pipe Cracks in Stagnant Borated Water Systems at PWR Plants No response for Units 2 and 3 was required. However, this bulletin is applicable to Units 2 and 3 as the plant design includes borated stainless steel lines. SCE's review resulted in a decision that no additional action was necessary as some of the borated lines are included in the inservice inspection progra Audibility Problem Encounter on Evacuation of Personnel from High Noise No response for Units 2 and 3 was required. However, this bulletin is applicable to Units 2 and 3. SCE has initiated action to determine which areas will have high noise level Packaging of Low Level Waste for Transport and Burial This bulletin was not issued to Units 2 and 3. However, it will be applicable when the plant goes into operatio The current plan is for Unit 2 and 3 to package waste in the same manner used by Unit Same asBulletin 79-19 issued for Materials Licensees Not applicable to Units 2 and The need for a system to verify that the recommendations of Nuclear Engineering were being implemented (see Bulletin 78-14 and 79-12)
was discussed with SCE management personne SCE management personnel committed to formalize the existing procedures for handling bulletins and put an integrated verification program in place by February 1, 1980. This item will be reviewed in a future inspectio (50-361/79-28/01)
5. Containment Prestressing The work activities associated with the filling of the tendon sheaths with protective grease was observed. The placement of grease in tendons Number 113 and 102 for Unit 3 was in progress during the observation. The inspector verified that the proper tendons were filled and the temperature of the grease was within the specified range at the pump and at the outlet of the tendon Venting of the sheaths was observed to verify that the tendons were completely fille No items of noncompliance or deviation were identifie. Electrical Conduit Installation Installation of electrical conduit was observed in the Unit 2 containment, cable spreading room and Unit 2 auxiliary buildin Twelve conduits listed below were inspected to verify the require ments of construction procedure WPP/QCI 603, Rev. 7 and Construction specification CS-C8 were me U2 CA BJ13 U2 CA BQ16 U2 CA BJ14 U2 CA BQ17 U2 CA BJ17 U2 CA XFOl U2 CA BQ1O U2 CK AZ14 U2 CA BQll U2 GU XWO6 U2 CA BQ15 U2 GU XZ07
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7.
One exception to the specification was observed. One of the anchor bolts used to support conduit U2 CA XFO1 was not embedded to the depth required by the specification. The support was anchored to the wall with type G expansion anchors, which are 4 1/2 to 5 inches long. The extension beyond the wall was 2 1/8 inches. The required embedment was three inches. Therefore, the embedment was 1/8 to 5/8 inch less than the minimum require SCE management personnel committed to sample all installed conduit support anchor bolts to determine whether this is an isolated occurrence or a general problem. This is an unresolved ite (50-361/79-28/02) Diesel Generator Building Concrete Placement Placement of the concrete for the Unit 3 Diesel Generator Building east wall (Placement #23-2063, 2069, 2071 and 2072) was observe The pre-placement, placement, and post-placement construction inspection data reports (CIDR's) were reviewed. The inspector verified that the material did not separate during placement and that the consolidation activities were in accordance with ACI Standard 301 and construction procedures WPP/QCI 103, Rev. 11; 104, Rev. 4; and 105, Rev. The inspector was advised that slump t-est samples were not being taken from the discharge of the pump in accordance with the require ments of ACI 301-72. However, correllation data had been obtained in the fourth quarter of 1977. Since the correllation data was 2 years old, the licensee -agreed to repeat the correllation tes Subsequently, the test was made the following week and, the results were within the requirements of ACI 301-7 The inspector observed that the trucks used to transport the concrete from the batch plant to the placement did not have revolution counters. Therefore, it was possible for the agitators to revolve more than 300 revolutions without the operator's knowledge. ACI 301, references ASTM C94, which states "Discharge of the concrete shall be completed within 1 1/2 hours or before the drum has revolved 300 revolutions, whichever comes first."
During normal operation of the transport trucks, the agitator rotates at 1 1/2 to 2 rpm (approximately 180 revolutions per 1 1/2 hours).
The trucks have the capability of rotating the agitator faster. However, the inspector found no evidence that the faster speed was used during transi SCE management personnel stated that it had been their intent to meet the requirements of ACI 301 and ASTM C94. They did not believe revolution counters were necessary for the type agitator truck used. SCE personnel stated that they understood the inspector's concern that excessive mixing could cause air loss, water loss through evaporation and higher water requirement through grinding and that all of these will result in loss of slump and difficulty in placemen SCE has had very little placement difficulties in the construction of San Onofre Units 2 and 3 during the past two or three year The few placement problems encountered early in the project were not due to loss of slump during transpor As a result of the record to date, the inspector concluded that the placement activities had not been nonconforming, but did have a potential for nonconformance with the revolution limit of ASTM C9 SCE management stated that the construction specification would be clarified to indicate that they would comply with the 1 1/2 hour time limit of ASTM C94, but not the revolution limi The inspector agreed that the specification could be changed, if a technical justification for removing the time limit could be provided. This area will be reviewed again in a future inspectio (50-361/79-28/03)
8. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety-Related Piping The piping related activities listed below were observed to ascertain compliance with applicable construction specifications and procedure Activity System Identification N Pipe Welding Component Cooling Water S3-1203-ML-084 Sh. 1 Weld D Pipe Welding Chilled Water S3-1513-ML-043 Sh. 1 Weld 2 and 11 Pipe Welding Chilled Water S3-1513-ML-066 Weld 3 and 4 Pipe Storage Chilled Water A-CH-633-5 Pipe Storage Reactor Coolant 3-RC-070-1C S Pipe Storage Cond. and Feedwater S2-1305-ML-222 Pipe Storage Reactor Coolant S2-RC-039-1A Sh. 1 NDE Reactor Protection FGD-J2-0351-1 Containment Pres NDE Reactor Protection FGD-J2-0351-2 Containment Pres NDE Reactor Protection FGD-J2-0351-3 Containment Pres Grinding Reactor Coolant S2-RC-015-H-017 Weld SA and SB No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Reactor Vessel and Internals Installation and Storage Site activities for storage of the Units 2 and 3 reactor pressure vessels and internals were observed. Both vessels are installed and installation of Unit 2 internals is essentially complet Installation of Unit 3 internals is near completio No items of.noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Plant Tour The inspector toured both Units 2 and 3 several times each week during the inspection report period. Particular attention was directed to observing work in progress, availability of supervision and quality control inspectors at the work areas, housekeeping and preservation of equipmen The internals of Unit 3 south steam generator secondary side were inspected. The surface corrosion observed was limited to spots of dark red to black that rubbed off as a very fine powder. No structural damage was observe No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Management Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on October 5, 12 and 26, 1979. The scope of the inspections and the inspector's findings as noted in'paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 were discussed. The licensee's response to the following is noted in the listed paragraph:
Paragraph 3b -
Protection of stainless steel pipe installed outsid Paragraph 4 - An integrated verification program, Paragraph 6 - Sample of installed conduit support anchor bolts.