IR 05000346/1981018
| ML20039C561 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 12/15/1981 |
| From: | Mcgregor L, Reyes L, Rogers W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039C548 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-81-18, NUDOCS 8112290463 | |
| Download: ML20039C561 (8) | |
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t U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-346/81-18 Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Ccepany Edisen Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Davis-Besse Site, Oak Harbor, OH Inspection Conducted: October 1-30, 1981 Inspectors:
L. A. Reyes lMS/Gt Y
%.G. Rogers %y
\\ ~1AS/s\\
W
_W cGregor,Acthrg Chief g YlI[8 I Approved By:
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Reactor Projects 2B Inspection Summary Inspection on October-1-30, 1981, (Report No. 50-346/81-18)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of followup on previous inspection findings, operational safety verification, monthly maintenance observation, monthly surveillance observation, LER followup, IE Circular followup, plant trips on October 16 and 22, 1981, calibration of RPS trip, off-shift fire brigade drill, station procedures and requalification adminis-trative procedure. The inspection involved a total of 228 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 87 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: Of the ten areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or devia-tions were identified in eight areas, one apparent item of noncompliance was identified in one are,a (failure to calibrate the RPS trip setpoint with allowance for total string errors, Paragraph 9).
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8112290463 811*J15 PDR ADOCK 05000346 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- T. Murray, Station Superintendent B. Beyer, Assistant Station Superintendent S. Quennoz, Assistant Station Superintendent
- P. Carr, Maintenance Engineer
- J. Werner, Administrative Coordinator D. Miller, Operations Engineer D. Briden, Chemist and Health Physicist J. Hickey, Training Manager L. Simon,. Operations Supervisor G. Daft, Operations QA Manager J.-Greer, QA Supervisor
- Denotes those attending-the exit. interview on October 30, 1981.
The ic.spectors also interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training and health physics staff.
2.
Followup from Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliance (50-346/80-15-01): Failure to notify the NRC Operations Center as per requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. Revision 7 to Procedure AD 1839.00 was issued. This revision consolidates the inr'truc-tions to shift personnel on the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72.
(Closed) Open Item (50-346/80-25-02): Flooding curbs on mechanical penetrations.
Installation of the flooding curbs was completed under Facility Change 80-215.
(Open) Open Item (50-346/80-27-03):
Identification tags for safety-related valves. While conducting a valve lineup of the containment spray system trains 1 and 2, the inspector found seven valves with no identification tags.
(Closed) Open Item (50-346/81-18-02): On September 25, 1981, while conducting a routine tour, the inspector found door 108 open and unattended. This is a negative pressure boundary door which is required to be closed. The door was again found open and unattended on October 1,1981, by the Shift Supervisor.
On October 6, 1981, the licensee issued a memo to the station super-vision to review with all personnel the station requirements on negative pressure boundary doors. Facility Change 81-265 was issued
.to correct the door latching mechanism failures. LER 81-55 was sub-
'mitted on October 23, 1981. The inspector has no further questions
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concerning this item. This matter was identified by the inspectors during an earlier inspection period; however, it was inadvertently omitted from the inspection report covering that period, and is therefore included in this report for_ documentation purposes.
3.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of October. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of auxiliary reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct inter-view verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the month of October, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of both trains of the Containment Spray and Emergency Diesel Generator systems to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste ship-ments and barreling.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation
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Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were
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performed prior to returning' components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by quali-fied personnel;_ parts and materials used were properly certified;
. radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls
'were implemented.
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Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Repairs to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump No. 1 Governor Coupling.
Following completion of maintenance on the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1, the inspector verified that the system had been returned to service properly.
During the conduct of repairs to the No. I auxiliary feedwater pump the inspector noticed a cracked gear in the governor coupling. The licensee removed the gear and relocated the set screw to a location 180' apart from the crack. Replacement gears have been on order but were not available at the site. This failure is similar to the one experienced in Auxiliary Feedwater Pump No. 2 (see Inspection Report No. 50-346/81-13, Paragraph 8.d).
The licensee is investigating the possibility of replacing the existing hydraulic governors with elec-tronic governors. Due to the failure of the same component on both trains of the Auxiliary Feedwater System the inspector has concerns for the possibility of a common mode failure due to the design of the governor coupling. This item will remain unresolved pending the cor-rective actions of the licensee regarding improvement of the auxiliary feedwater governor coupling.
(50-346/81-18-03)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump No. 2 (ST 5071.01) and Service Water Pump No. 3 (ST 5075.01) and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that re-moval and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by rppropriate management personnel.
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The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Moderator Temperature Coefficient Measurement (ST 501.02) and SFAS monthly Functional Test for Channel 1.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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6.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with l'icensee personnel, and 4-review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled,~immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in'accordance with technical specifications.
81-38 Control Rod 5-8 could not be withdrawn following the reactor trip on June 24, 1981. The licensee will conduct an engineer-ing evaluation to determine the failure mechanism of the leaf spring that prevented the control rod from being withdrawn.
l The inspector will followup on the results of the evaluation (50-346/81-18-04).
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81-43 Containment Post-Accident Radiation Monitor 5030 Inoperable Due to a pump failure.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
IE Circular Followup a-For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the
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Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for
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applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applicable to the facility, appropriate corrective actions was taken or were
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scheduled to be taken.
80-15 Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Cooling and Natural Circulation
Cooldown.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Plant Trips
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Following the plant trips on October 16 and 22, 1981, the inspector
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ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observa-tion of control room indicators and discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant chemistry. The inspector verified the establishment of proper communi-cations and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee.
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All systems responded as expected, during the October 16 trip and the plant was returned to operation on October 18, 1981.
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During the October 22 trip _the licensee experienced problems with the control of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump No.1.
Repairs were completed and e
the plant was returned to operation on October 23, 1981.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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9.
Reactor Protection System Setpoints for Temperature and Variable Pressure-Temperature Trips While reviewing Surveillance Procedure ST 5030.06 "RCS Temperature Input to RPS Refueling Period Calibration," the inspector determined that the acceptance criteria for the RID calibration was modified. The inspector questioned the licensee in relation to the instrument string error allowed in the procedure and the instrument string error used in the FSAR Safety Analysis. The licensee requested this information from Babcock & Wilcox, the NSSS supplier. The information was provided to the licensee and it was determined that the FSAR Safety Analysis assumed'
a 1*F instrument string error. The licensee proceeded to calculate this instrument error based on the method used by the calibration procedure and determined that an instrument string error of up to 1.52*F existed.
The licensee reviewed the margin for the RPS high temperature and variable pressure-temperature trip and concluded that enough margin existed in the trip setpoint used.
In order to restore.the margin that existed in the trip setpoint with the previous error tolerance the licensee implemented Facility Change 81-266 which adjusted the setpoint on the variable pressure-temperature trip. The adjusted setpoint provided a margin 1.65*F.
During the review of Facility Change 81-266 the inspector noticed an error in the calculations performed. The instrument string error based on the method used by the calibration procedure can be up to 2.51*F.
Using data from the calibration conducted on April 17, 1981, it was determined by the licensee that an instrument string error of 1.63*F existed. A review of the calibration data indicates that during the period of April 17.through October 14, 1981; two RPS variable pressure-temperature trips setpoints were not as per the requirement of Technical-Specification 2.2.1.
This is an item of noncompliance.
(50-346/81-18-06)
On Octo6er 30, 1981, the licensee submitted LER 81-60 to satisfy the reporting requirements on this event. The LER includes information supplied by the NSSS vendor that documents that enough margin exists in the variable pressure-temperature trip to offset the instrument string error of the calibration conducted on April 17, 1981.
No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Offshift Fire Brigade Drill On October 27, 1981, at approximately 7:00 p.m., the licensee conducted an unannounced fire drill The drill included offsite assistance from the Carroll Township. The inspectors observed the drill and verified that the licensee has a program for correcting identified discrepancies
.and that equipment disrupted was returned to its proper location after
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the drill.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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11.
Station Procedures The inspector reviewed selected licensee procedures for compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.33 and ANSI 18.7-1976. The procedures reviewed are listed below.
EP 1202.29 PZR Systems Failure EP 1202.17 Component Cooling Water Failure EP 1202.19 Service Water EP 1202.11 High Activity in Reactor Coolant System EP 1202.02 Station Blackout SP 1104.06 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Operating Procedure SP 1104.02 Makeup and Purification System Operating Procedure SP 1106.06 Auxiliary Feed System SP 1104.11 Service Water System SP 1104.01 Core Flood System Operating Procedure AP 3011.26 Service Water Pump 3 Strainer DP AP 3011.23 CC Hx 1 Out Temp Hi AP 3003.13 Spent Fuel Pool Demin DP AP 3012.07 SGI AFW Iso Valve Not Open AP 3012.08 SG2 AFW Iso Valve Not Open AP 3003.15 Core Flood Tank 1 Iso Valve Not Open AP 3003.17 Core Flood Tank 2 Iso Valve Not Open AP 3002.21 RC Letdown Activity Hi PP 1102.01 Pre Startup Checklist PP 1102.02 Plant Startup AD 1838.00 Surveillance and Periodic Test Program AD 1838.01 Surveillance and Periodic Test Scheduling AD 1838.02 Performance of Surveillance and Periodic Tests AD 1823.00 Jumper and Lifted Wire Control AD 1828.15 Requalification MP 1402.15 Spent Fuel Pool Demineralizer 1-1 Resin Removal and Replacement MP 1402.10-Mixed Bed Purification Demineralizer Resin Removal and Replacement MP 1401.33 Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Radial Bearing Removal and Replacement MP 1402.01 Core Flood Tank Relief Valve Removal and Replacement The inspection identified incorrect information in EP 1202.11 Step 4.4.
The step required HOT STANDBY with "Tave 550*F within four hours." The step should require HOT STANDBY with "Tave 530*F within six hours."
SP 1104.11 had conflicting valve lineup information with regard to the ECCS cooling coil drain valves. Also SP 1104.06 directed the normal status of the spent pool cooling system to be with both spent fuel pool pumps and heat exchangers operating. Due to the low heat load in the spent fuel pool one inuq) and heat exchanger is actually used.
Overall the format and content of the procedures reviewed were,in
.' accord with regulatory requirements. NUREG/CR-2005 SANDI 81-7074,
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" Checklist for Evaluating Emergency Procedures Used in Nuclear Power
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Plants," was suggested be used in'the licensee's procedure pre-paration. The inspector will followup the procedure revisions to correct the above mentioned discrepancies.
(50-346/81-18-05)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
12.
Requalification Training Procedure The inspector reviewed Revision 2 of Administrative Procedure A01828.15, Requalification, and verified that there was no reduction in the scope, time allotment or frequency of the licensee's requalification program.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
13.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of non-compliance, or deviations. The unresolved item = disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 4.
14.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on October 30, 1981, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
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