IR 05000346/1981002
| ML20003E346 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1981 |
| From: | Reyes L, Rogers W, Tambling T, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20003E345 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-81-02, 50-346-81-2, TAC-11050, NUDOCS 8104030052 | |
| Download: ML20003E346 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGl'I.ATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-346/81-02 Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
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Inspection At: Davis-Besse Site, Oak Harbor, OH
Inspection Conducted: February 4-6, 9-13, 17-20, 23-27, and March 2, 1981 RFw w Inspectors:
L. A. Reyes
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RFt.0 W W. G. Rogers o//4/p/
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T. N. Tambling 3l('i ( 3 !
Rno u Approved By:
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F. Warnick, Chief J//f,/r/
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Reactor Projects Section 2B Inspection Summary Inspection on Februarv 4-6. 9-13, 17-20, 23-27, and March 2, 1981 (Report No. 50-346/81-02)
Areas Inspected: Routine, Resident Inspection of Followup on Previous Inspection Findings, Operational Safety Verification, Monthly Surveillance
- Observation, LER Followup, IE Bulletin. Followup, IE Circular Followup and
.the RCS Flow Sensing.line Modification. The inspection involved a total of 226 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors including 44 inspector-hours onsite during offshifts.
Resultgi.No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted l
- T. Murray, Station Superintendent B. Beyer, Assistant Station Superintendent P. Carr, Maintenance Engineer S. Quennoz, Technical Engineer
- D.
Huffman, Administrative Coordinator
- D. Miller, Operations Engineer D. Briden, Chemist and Health Physicist
'J. Hickey, Training Supervisor L. Simon, Operations Supervisor C. Daft, Operations QA Manager
- J. Byrne, Operations QA Engineer
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on March 2, 1981.
The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training,and health physics staff.
2.
Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Item (Inspection Report 76-23).
Resolution of concerns
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regarding. receiving storage and handling program covered by the 1847 series of Administrative Procedures. The licensee's resolution of these concerns was covered under the licensee's AIR 1-77-12.
.AD-1847.03 was revised under revision 2 and 3 to change the description
'of the warehouse to storage area and to cover handling of items with limited shelf life during receipt inspection. LI 4782.00 was revised to control safety related chemical shelf life. QA initiated inspections-under' check list AD 1847.07A, B and C.
A QC audit was performed February 23, 1977 of material on hand for repackaging requirments.
(Closed) Open item (Inspection Report 76-23). Controls ~for turnover of equipment from the construction phase to the operating phase. The licensee ' developed controls ' from the turnover of construction phase equipment to the operating phase with revision 2 to AD 1847.07, revision 3 to QAP 2070 and issuance of.QCI.3071.
(Closed)' Unresolved Item (Inspection Report 78-12-01). Raychem shrink tubing on neutron connectors. The. modification was completed under FCR 78-264 and MWO 78-1346. Work was completed June 21, 1979.
(Closed) Unresol'ved Item (Inspection Report-77-06). Failure to modify 13.8 kv-bus loss of voltage. NCR 94-77 was closed out March 25,~1977.
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' Associated drawings were revised and transmitted via ADT-1103, ADT-1104 and DB-9778. The required jumpers were installed per drawings.
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(Closed) Open Item (Inspection Report 76-01).
Licensee to establish acceptance criteria for pseudo ejected rod worth.
TP 800.28 was revised under major modifications 1543 to include an acceptance criteria of 0.15% A k/k.
(0 pen) Open Item (Inspection Report 76-20).
ST 5030.06 not a channel calibration by Technical Specification definition.
The licensee criginally closed out this item under AIR 1-76-S1 with the resolution to replace the RTD's inputs to the RPS during refueling or other outages to maintain a current valid calibration of the RCS het leg RTD's.
The RTD's were last replaced during the December, 1979 outage.
During the exit interview the licensee stated that they would review ST 5030.06 again to determine whether they would continue the RTD replacement policy or perform a calibratira of the installed RID's.
ST 5030.06 will be revised to reflect rF method.
(Closed) Open Item (Inspection Report 76-23). Replacement of sole-noid valves on the MSIV's controls.
The logic and control system modifications were completed under SRN 215 and 245. The MSIV's were then retested under TP 271.09.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (Inspection Report 7S-29).
Auxiliary feed-water (AFW) steam generator dual level control. The licensee in-stalled an automatic AFW steam generator dual level control under
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FCR 78-485 daring the 1980 refueling outage. The modification was made to eliminate manual control by the operator during plant transient. The plans and designs for the dual level control were communicated in letters from the licensee to NRR dated December 11, 1978,~ December 22, 1973, December 2S, 1978 and February 26, 1979.
Post installation testing was performed under procedure MC 7500.31 on
- September -13 to October 2,1980. MC 7500.31 tested the new circuitry by -simulating steam generator level inputs and determining whether the outputs were correct. The test procedure did not test the AFV level control under actual operating conditions as a final test.
During the exit interview the licensee stated that they would review the testing to determine why the test procedure did not include a test under actual operating conditions.
Further review showed that operating, emergency and alarm procedures had been revised to reflect the modification to the AFW level control.
Discussions with operators indicated that they were familiar with the modification and had received training on the new system.
In the exit interview the licensee stated that thcy would review surveillance procedures such as the integrated SFAS and ~STRCS to determine whether these procedures should be revised also as a result of the modifica-tion.
This item remains unresolved pending a reso'lution on the post in-sta11ation test procedure.
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(Closed) Open Items (Inspection Report 76-23).
Design changes, modifications, tests and experiments. The following changes were noted:
a.
In revision 1 to AD 1845.00 policy was clarified on the handling of NSR and non NSR design changes.
b.
Revisions 11 and 13 to AD 1805.00 addressed 50.59 reviews of procedures.
c.
Revision 1 to AD 1845.00 addressed changes to work packages and supplements to FCR's and assigned the responsibility for procedure revisions to the Technical Engineer.
d.
Revision to-PEI-DB1-321 defined design interface with outside organization.
e.
PEI-323, later reissued as PEI-S-023, was issued to cover dis-
.tribution design documents. During the exit interview the licensee stated that QA was auditing this procedure and other document control procedures against the requirements of QAP 2070.
f.
AD 1845.00 addresses keeping the training supervisor abreast of
' design changes.
It was also noted that the training supervisor also participates in outage plan.
g.
AD 1823.00 in revision 6 addressed retesting of the system af ter replacing jumpers and lif ted wires.
h.
Revision 1 of AD 1823.01 included the use of FCR's for the control of changes to NSR setpoints.
(Closed) Unresolved ~ Item (Inspection Repor' 50-346/78-17, Pa ragraphs 8 and 15,-and Inspection Report 50-346/79-04, Paragraph 2).
Rod drop test evaluation. NRR reviewed information the licensee submitted on August 2,1979, in response to an NRR letter of July 2,1979.
NRR concluded that (1) the licensee's technique'in extrapolating the LHGR to full power was acceptable, (2) the use of online computer (OLC)
values rather than hand calculations,- for core physics parameters was acceptable, and _(3) although the OLC values. tend to be less conserva-tive than the hand calculations, both methods yielded conservative values with respect to actual core conditions. NRR also. determined that'the. selective loading in Cycle 1 of eight fuel assemblies having a lower LGHR limit than that used in the fuel densification' report (BAW-1420) did not affect-the acceptability rod drop test results.
-(Selective loading of seven of those eight assemblies during Cycle 2
- was addressed in Section 2.3 of'the SER supporting Amendment No. 33.)
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3.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period of February 4 through March 2, 1981. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection cantrols.
During the period of February 4 through March 2,1981, the inspector ' walked down the accessible portions of the high pressure injection systems to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste-shipments and barreling.
Tnese reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility
. operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Montbly Surveillance observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump No. 2 (ST 5071.01) and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for opera-tion were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifica-tions and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump No. 1 (ST 5071 01)
No' items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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5.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records,.the following event reports were reviewed to deter-mine that.reportability requirements were fulfilled, inmediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
80-27 Failure of Power Supply of SFRCS Channel 1/3 80-31 Failure to Perform Surveillance Testing of Offsite AC Sources 80-39-Failure to Perform Surveillance Testing of Offsite AC Sources 80-34 Drif t on AFk? Steam Inlet Pressure Switch Setpoint 80-35 Decay' Heat Cooler Number 2 Outlet Valve Failed to Open 80-36-Failure of RPS Channel 1 to Indicate Trip Condition 80-37 Level Instrumentation of SFRCS Out of Calibration
'80-41 Source' Range Channel 1 out of Tolerance 80-42
. Leakage for Pene:rati:ns Exceeded 80-53 SFAS Sequencer Inoperable 80-54 Source Range Channel Failed during Fuel Move =ent 80-59 Source Range Channel Indication Failed Low 80-70 Diesel Fire. Pump will not Auto Start at 95 psig 80-61 Solenoid SV5005 not Environmentally Qualified 80-63 Damper HV5442 Inoperable due to Blown fuse 80-78 RCS Pressure Signal Failed High 80-80 Control Rod Drive Mechanism Breaker "C" did not Trip 80-37 Electrical Short on CV 5006 81-02 Failure of.RCP Seals 81-03
. Trip of 3reaker HXO2B and Loss of Eus "B" 81-04 Failure of DH Pump to Start 81-05 RCS Chloride Concentration Exceeded TS Limit
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81-06 Loss of Power to SEAS Channel 1-81-07 Door 306 Found (pen,. Rendering Spent Fuel Pool EVS Inoperable No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
IE Bulletin Followup For the ^IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the written-response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported,:that the written response included adequate corrective
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action commitments basedJon information presentation in the bulle-
-tin and.the licensee's response,-that licensee management forwarded
- copies of the written response to' the appropriate onsite management
representatives, that information.df.scussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.
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80-24
. Prevention of Damage Edue to' Water: Leakage Inside Containment (October 17, 1980 Indian Point 2 Event).
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
IE Circular Followup
.For the IE' Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the
, Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applicable to the. facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were
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scheduled to be taken.
80-04 Securing of Threaded locking Devices on Safety-Related Equipment
80-09'
Problems with Plant Internal Communications Systems 80-12 Valve-Shaft-to-Actuator Key may Fall Out of Place When Mounted Below Horizontal Axis No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
f 8.
Redundant Pressure Sensing Lines to RCS Flow Transmitter Condition 2C(3)(e) of the facility license required the licensee to install redundant pressure sensing lines from the first root valve to the. delta pressure transmitters fer the RCS flow indication to the RPS.
The inspector reviewed FCR 79-383 and associated M'a'O's to verify that the pressure sensing lines installed during the 1980 refueling outage meet the required conditions. This license condition was removed under Amendment 33 to the facility license.
No items of' noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Exit Interview.
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The inspector met with licensee representatives. (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on March 2,1981 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
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