IR 05000346/1981010
| ML20009B015 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 06/16/1981 |
| From: | Reyes L, Rogers W, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009B013 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-81-10, TAC-11050, NUDOCS 8107140660 | |
| Download: ML20009B015 (8) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- O U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION , OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-346/81-10 Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Davis-Besse site Oak Harbor, OH Inspection Conducted: May 1, 4-8, 11-12, 18-22, 26-29, 1981 [T Inspectors: L. A. Reyes /f [[[ ' l TWpt.
W. G. Rogers [,//[r / 8/ . h.2
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Approved By: R. F. Warnick, Chiei ~ /M[[/ Projects Section 2B Inspection Summary Inspection on May 1, 4-8, 11-12, 18-22, 26-29, 1981 (Report No. 50-346/81-10) Areas Inspected: Routine, Resident Inspection of Followup on previous Inspection Findings, Operational Safety Verification, Monthly Surveillance Observation, Licensee Event Reports Followup, IE Bulletin Followup, IE Circular Followup, May 12 Plant Trip, Implementation of TMI Lessons Learned Type B Local Leak Rate Testing, Station Safety Review Committee, and In-dependent Inspection Effort. The Inspection involved a total of 180 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC irspectors including 44 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
. 8107140660 810619 PDR ADOCK 05000346 O PDR
e a DETAILS g 1.
Persons Contacted +T. Murray, Station Superintendent B. Beyer, Assistant Station Superintendent P. Carr, Maintenance Engineer S. Quennoz, Technical Engineer +D. Huffmen, Administrative Coordinator D. Miller, Operations Engineer D. Briden, Chemist and Health Physicist J. Hickey, Training Supervisor L. Simon, Operations Supervisor C. Daft, Operations QA Manager +J. Byrne, QA Engineer
- R. P. Crouse, Vice President Nuclear
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on May 8, 1981.
+ Denotes those present at the exit interview on May 8 and 29, 1981.
. The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C training and health physics staff.
2.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (Inspection Report 78-29): Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Steam Generator Dual Level Control. During the plant trip on March 11, 1981, train No. 1 of AFW control was at the high level due to a blown fuse in the power source. Sufficient data is available to indicate adequate installation for the high level control. Plant trips on November 8 and December 3, 1980, resulted in the initiation of AFW at the low level.
Sufficient data is available to indicate adequate installation for the low level control. During the monthly functional test of AFW (ST 5071.04) the dual level control is tested by measuring the correct rotation of the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine governor when low and high level signals are applied.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (Inspection Report 78-29): All main steam line code safety valves relief setpoints were verified during the 1980 refueling outage. All the valves were also tested during March 1979. The locations of the 1050 and 1100 psig valves were interchanged per Facility Change 79-139 to minimize flow induced vibration which can cause variations in the relief valve lift pressure. The vendor procedure for the hydroset was revised to ensure proper venting during the calibration check. The vendor identified this potential problem in the procedure which would have not properly bled the air from the hydroset apparatus. During the 1980 refueling outage, the blowdown ring was worked on all the valves to minimize the excessive blowdown and loss of pressurizer level experienced in'several plant trips. A full steam flow test was conducted at Wyle Laboratories to obtain data of valve ring-2-t .- .
- . s settings'effect on blowdown and lift documented in Wyle Report No. 4855-01. A videotape recorder was used during the power load reject test to monitor the valve operation. The data was incon-clusive due to the cloud of steam formed in the area when any of the valves lift. The licensee has installed canvas hoods on all the main steam safety valve vent stacks to control ambient condi-tions that may change the lift setpoint.
Following a trip the number of valves that lif ted can be identified by the number of hoods that were removed due to actuation of the valve. A review of ' the steam header pressure and the number of valves that lifted " - provides the necessary information to determine if the valves served their intended function.
, (Closed) Noncompliance Item (Inspection Report 79-07): Procedure for Disassembly, Inspection,' and Repair of' Main Steam Safety Valves. The i licensee has issued maintenance Procedure MP 1401.28 to perform this maintenance activity. The procedure was prepared and approved as per the requirement of the station administrative procedures.
(Closed) Noncompliance (50-346/80-30): Failure to Calibrate the Brush Recorder Used During the Control Rod Drop Test. ; Procedures ST 5013.02
'"CRD Insertion Time Test" and ST 5030.09 "RPS Response Time Test" have ' been revised to include a prerequisite for calibration of the chart speeds prior to initiating the test. The test results for the rod drop test were adjusted to reflect chart speed calibration.
. (Closed) Noncompliance (50-346/81-05): Surveillance procedure for testing containment spray pump did not have requirements for taking
data on suction pressure and a reference value was not established.
Procedure ST 5062.01 " Containment Spray Monthly Test" has been re-vised to include these requirements.
3.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable , l logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during j the month of May. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of auxiliary building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations . and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct inter- , i view verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in ! accordance with the station security plan.
. ! The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and . verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the ! month of May, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the ! Service Water System to verify operability. The inspector also witnes-sed portions of.the radioactive waste system controls associated with l radwaste shipments and barreling.
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- .- .. These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility . operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Reactor Protection System (ST 5030.02) and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than ! the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate ! management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities-Auxiliary Feedwater System Monthly Test (ST 5071.01).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that.reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical speci-fications.
80-30 Loss of Decay Heat Pump 1-2 due to leakage on valve DH-62 the licensee has initiated maintenance work Orders, 81-2039 and 81-2160 to repair and replace the valve in a future outage. The inspector will followup on this work (50-346/81-10-01).
80-62 Flooding Curbs in Mechanical Penetrations Were Not Installed 80-18 Chlorine Detector Failed, Isolating the Control Room VentilCtion.
81-20 Containment Hydrogen Sample Valve Will Not Close With Motor Operator.
81-24 Loss of Decay Heat due to Deenergization of "J" Bus.
81-26 RPS Channel 1 Trip On a Loss of RCS Flow Signal. The licensee has initiated facility change 78-525 to replace the RCS flow transmitters manufactured by Bailey to-4- _ _ _ _ _ _
a -. transmitters manufactured by Rosemount. The inspector will followup on this work (50-346/81-10-02).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
IE Bulletin Followup For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective ac-tion commitments based on information presented in the bulletin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representa-tives, that information discussed in tha licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.
81-02 Failure of Gate Type Valres to close against Differential Pressure.
s 81-03 Flow Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety System Components by Corbicula SP. (Asiatic Clam) and Thytilus SP. (Mussel).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
IE Circular Followup For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applic-able to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or , were scheduled to be taken.
77-15 Degradation of Fuel Oil Flow to Emergency Diesel Generators.
78-06 Potential Common Mode Floooing of ECCS equipment at BWR Facilities.
80-22 Confirmation of employee qualifications.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Plant Trips Following the plant trip on the May 12, 1981, inspector ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control room indicators and discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant chemistry.
The inspector verified the establishment of proper communications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee.
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-, . All systems responded as expected, and the plant was returned to s operation on May 13, 1981.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Implementation of TMI Lessons Learned Item I.A.I.3(1) Limit Overtime Liceasee Administrative Procedures AD 1829.00, " Station Operations" AD 1239.04, " Shift Technical Advisor Administrative Procedure" AD 1844.00, " Maintenance" and AD 1842.00, " Chemistry and Health Physics, were found in good agreement with criteria in NUREF-0737, pages 3-6 and 3-7.
Reviewed procedure requirements with several licensed operators and determined they were knowledgeable in these procedure requirements. Reviewed the required reading list for the Chemistry and Health Physics personnel and determined that the pro-cedure revision covering limit of overtime was included.
Item I.C.5 Feedback of Operating Experience Licensee Administrative Procedures AD 1839.04, " Shift Technical Advisor Administrative Procedure," and AD 1804.00, " Reports Management" were compared with criteria in NUREG-0736 pages 3-37 and 3-38 and found to be in good agreement. Reviewed procedure requirements with 3 STA's and determined they were knowledgeable in their duties on feedback of operating experience.
Item I.C.6 Verifying Correct Performance of Operating Activities Licensee Administrative Procedures AD 1839.00, " Station Operator," AD 1839.03, " Operation and Control of Capped Valves," and AD 1389.02, " Operation and Control of Locked Valves," AD 1844.00, " Maintenance," AD 1803.00, " Safety Tagging Procedure," AD 1823.00, " Jumper and Lifted Wire Control Procedure," AD 1838.02, " Performance of Surveillance and Periodic Tests," AD 1838.00, " Surveillance and Periodic Test Schedul-ing," were found in good agreement with the criteria of NUREG-0737, pages 3-49 and 3-50.
The inspector reviewed the procedure with several operators and determined they were knowledgeable in the administrative requirements for correct performance of operating activities.
It was noted that at Davis-Besse there is no automatic system status monitoring for all systems.
Some components of safety systems are automatically monitored for status (Emergency Diesel Generators Output Breakers have control room annunciators when breaker is racked out) but the majority of the systems correct performance is verified through human verification.
Item II.E.1.2.(2.C) Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication The licensee has initiated Facility Change 79-430 to install a safety grade flow indication. Work on this change has commenced but completion is not expected before the next refueling outage. At the present time AFW flow indication is available through a control grade system.
(50-346/81-10-03) -6-
. 10.
Type B Local Leak Rate Test t The inspector witnessed the local leak rate test conducted un the Personnel Airlock on May 29, 1981..The inspector determined that Procedure ST 5062.01, "Containaent Vessel Local Leak Rate Test," did not include the acceptance criteria of Technical Specifications 3.6.1.3.b or 3.6.1.2.c.
The test results of the test conducted and all previous tests were reviewed to determine compliance with the Technical Specifications. The test results indicate leak rate values in compliance with the Technical Specifications.
The licensee is currently reviewing the local leak rate test procedure and will in-corporate the Technical Specification acceptance criteria. The inspector will followup the procedure revision. (50-346/8)-10-03) No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
11.
Safety Review Committee On May 29, 1981, the inspector sat in on a safety review committee meeting.
The inspector verified that provisions of Technical Spec-ifications dealing with membership, review process, frequency, and qualifications were met.
The inspector also verified that decisions made were reflected in the meeting minutes and that corrective actions proposed were taken.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
12.
Component Cooling Water System Interlocks Background On March 20, 1981, Consumers Power Company reported to the NRC a deficiency with the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system serving both safety and nonsafety-related equipment.
If adequate isolation of the nonsafety-related equipment is not provided, both trains of CCW can be rendered inoperable due to a rupture in the nonsafety-related piping and a single failure in the redundant train.
Discussion The CCW design at Davis-Besse provides for one train of CCW to supply both safety and nonsafety-related equipment in order to prevent a rupture of nonsafety-related piping to render one train of CCW inoper-able, interlocks on CCW surge tank will isolate the nonsafety-related related piping.
Isolation starts at a surge tank level of 45 inches with the largest diameter piping and complete isolation is achieved at a level of 35 inches. The minimum level of 35 inches provides enough net positive suction head to assure pump operation with no damage.
The closing time of the valves and tank level transmitters are tested periodically. The interlock circuitry is not included in the test schedule at the present time.
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The inspector will followup on this item to verify that it is-included in a test schedule.
(50-346/81-10-05).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
13.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout.the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on May 29, 1981, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
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