IR 05000346/1981009
| ML20004E697 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 05/05/1981 |
| From: | Danielson D, Yin I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20004E693 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-81-09, 50-346-81-9, NUDOCS 8106150071 | |
| Download: ML20004E697 (4) | |
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t U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C01 iSSION g
0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-346/81-09 Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Licensee Corporate Office, Toledo, OH Inspection Conducted: April 21, 1981 b
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W Inspector:
1. T. Yin
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Approved By:
D. H. Danielson, Chief 47/
Materials and Processes Section Inspection Summary Inspection on April 21, 1981 (Report No. 50-346/81-09)
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Areas Inspected:
Review of licensee A-E pipe tress analyses. The inspection involved a total of three inspector-hours at the licensee's corporate office by one NRC inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS Persons Contacted
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Toledo Edison Company (TECo)
- C. Domeck, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
- C. Merbel, Civil-structural Systems Engineer Bechtel Power CorpcIation, Gaithersburg Power Division (B-GPD)
- R. Kies, Engineering Supervisor
- N. Lee, Engineering Supervisor
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- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
Functional or Program Areas Inspected In conjunction with IE: Region III Resident Inspector Report No. 50-346/81-01, this report documents the inspector's review and evaluatipn of TECo LER NP-32-81-01, dated April 8, 1981.
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1.
B-GPD Calculation SP-DTK 1-C1, dated December 16, 1981 The calculation was performed to evaluate the primary stresses due to the absense of or the disassembling of three of the seismic restraints on the I " HBC-54-1 line; discharge line for the emergency diesel day tank to the emergency diesel generator KS-1.
The computer printout showed the maximum SSE primary stress to bc 20,354 psi, which is within
.the operability criteria limit of 2.4 S, i.e., 36,000 psi for SA-106B h
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material at operating temperature.
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l No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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2.
_B-GPD Calculation SP-DTK2-C1, dated December 18, 1980 The calculation was performed to evaluate the primary stress effect l
due to three missing seismic rectraints on the 1 " HBC-63-4 line; relief piping to the emergency diesel generator day tank T46-2.
The computer printout showed the maximum SSE primary stress to be 32,769 psi, which is within the operability criteria limit 2.4 S '
i.e., 36,000 psi for SA-106B material at operating temperature. h I
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l No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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3.
B-GPD Calculation SP-DTK3-C2, dated December 18, 1980 The calculation was performed to evaluate the primary stress effect dre to three missing seismic restraints on the 1 " HBC-63-2 line; line from emergency diesel generator (K5-1) to the emergency diesel-2-
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generator day tank (T46-1). The computer printout showed the maximum SSE primary stress to be 12,996 psi, which is within the operability criteria limit 2.4 S, i.e., 36,000 psi for SA-106B material at oper-h ating temperature.
4.
B-GPD Pipe Anchor Calculations The anchor that separates calculations SP-DTK1-C1 (Paragraph 1) and SP-DTK3-C2 (Paragraph 3) was found not to meet the short-term stress allowables during the SSE condition, but was within the material ultimate stress timits.
Short term Max. Calculated Stress Allowable, Ultimate Stress, psi psi Stress, psi
'deldment,
33,000 23,900 60,000 angle iron (1.66xf )
to baseplate Base plate 41,880 32,400 54,000 8x10x3/8 thick (0.9 Sy)
The inspector stated that the licensee's evaluation appeared to be adequate.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
B-CPD Calculation SP-DTK4-C, dated December 18. 1980 The calculation was performed to evaluate the primary stress effect due to four missing seismic restraints on the 1 " HBC-86-2 line; transfer piping from the emergency diesel generator to the storage tank (T153-2) to the emergency generator day tank (T46-2). The computer printout showed the maximum SSE primary stress to be 53,523 psi at the 3/4" nozzle connection to the day tank, which exceeds the 2.4 S stress of 36,000 psi. However, the inspector considers the con'hdition to be acceptable based on the following:
a.
Per earlier discussions with NRR:MEB relative to the IEB evaluations at other operating plants in Region III, the ac-ceptable operability criteria on a case by case basis was determined to be 2 Sy, or 70,000 psi for SA-1069 material at operating temperature.
b.
IEB 79-14 allows a two day initial stress evaluation and a 30 day detailed final determination of the system operability.
In view of the Davis-Besse operation log, the inoperability condi-tion was within the IEB allowabie time frame.
(1) The last refueling outage ended on November 6, 1980, i.e.,
the safety related systems started to operate without the required 13 seismic restraints.
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o (2) Reactor tripped on December 3, 1980.
(3) Problems of disconnected restraints were identified on December 4, 1980, and corrected promptly.
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(4) Reactor returned to operation on December 6, 1980.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Exit Interview The' inspector met with licensee representatives at the conclusion of the inspection on April 21, 1981. The inspector summarized the scope and findir.gs of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings reported herein.
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