IR 05000346/1978016
| ML19291D200 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 07/19/1978 |
| From: | Charles Brown, Knop R, Menning J, Tambling T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19291D198 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-78-16, NUDOCS 8102060283 | |
| Download: ML19291D200 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR RESULATORY COMMISSION f
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0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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REGION III
Report No. 50-346/78-16 Doche t No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, Ohio 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power tation, Unit 1 Inspection At: Davis-Besse Site, Oak llaroc r, Ohio L
,s etion Conducted: May 23-25 and June 20-23, 1978 fic Lyte Q !y I
Increctors:
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J. E. Men R. C. Knop (6/21/78)
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Approved By:
R. C. Knop, Chief Reactor Projects Section 1 Inc:pect ion Summary Inspection on May 23-25 and June 20-23, 1978 (Report No. 50-346/78-16)
Areas Inspected:
Rout.ne, announced inspection of records, organization and administration, review and audit, licensee plans for coping with strikes, and participation in the NRR fire protection evaluation team onsite inspection, and followup on the removal of BPRA's and ORA's.
The inspection involved 95.5 inspector-hours onsite by four NRC inspectors.
Results: Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or devia-tions were found in five areas; the NRR fire protection evaluation team initially identified seven plant areas that are to receive f urther evalua-tion; two apparent items of noncompliance were identified in one area (infractions - f ailure to respond to audit findings in the required time and to report the status of corrective action to the audit group and failure of CNRB to review audit findings in a timely manner - paragraph 3).
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Persons Contacted J. Grant, Vice President, Energy Supply
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- T. Murray, Station Superintendent
_r L. Roe, Vice President, Facilities Development
- B. Beyer, Assistant Station Superintendent
- W. Green, Administrative Coordinator P. Carr, Maintenance Engineer L.
Stalter. Technical Engineer
- J. Buck, Operating QA Supervisor G. Grime, Security Supervisor J. Lenardson, Manager Quality Assurance J. Troknya, Office Supervisor J. Hickey, Training Supervisor L. Grime, Reliability Engineer M. Derivan, Operations Supervisor
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Domeck, Nuclear Project Engineer The inspector also talked with and interviewed other licensee employees, including members of technical and engineering, operations and mainte-nancc staff.
- denotes those attending the exit interviews. Attendees at the exit interview conducted by the NRR Fire Protection Evaluation Team are not included.
Fire Protection / Prevention a.
Tour The inspector accompanied the NRR " Fire EvaltrJ'on Team" as they toured the f acility to observe equipment, vii controls, etc.
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required f or fire detection, fire fighting and f or the remote safe shutdown and cooldown of the plant.
Seven areas were iden-tified as requiring further review and are as follows:
1.
Cable Spreading Room.
2.
Service Water Pump Room.
3.
Remote Shutdown Panel.
4.
Several areas with safety-related redundant trains.
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Component Cooling Water Pump Room.
6.
Diesel day tank room with 6000 gallons fuel.
7.
Power supplies for the fire detection and communication system.
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These items were informally discussed with representatives of the licensee before the team left the facility.
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Fire Hazard Analysis Report The licensee's fire hazard analysis report (January 11, 1978)
was reviewed in conjunction with the physical layout of the plant. The teams' comments and position are to be given in a letter to the licensee. The report stressed protection of equipment necessar" for a shutdown and cooldown of the reactor plant.
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Plant Co.ditions The dant housekeeping was noted to be satisf actory with transient flamn able material storage held to a minimum. The unit was in a shutd own condition during the inspection and new cable pulls were in progress. The procedures appeared to be followed. The mineral
" wool" used to cover the cables in the trays was noted to be in place.
The wool is held in place by stainless steel straps which can be cut to allow access to the cabling if necessary.
The licen-see determined from the evaluation that the wool batting should not be used in containment or the fuel pool area.
The work of instal-ling the wool batts has been completed and accepted. The penetra-tion seal foam was used to fill in the bottom of the cabinets in the control room and this job is also completed. The review of selected administrative procedures indicated that these are satis-factory.
3.
Review And Audit The inspector revie-d the minutes of Safety Review Board (SRB) and Company Nuclear Review Board (CNRB) meetings conducted during the previous year and verified that technical specification quorum and meeting f requency requirements had been satisfied and that proposed changes to the Technical Specifications had been reviewed as required.
The inspector noted that SRB meeting #492 was conducted with one more voting alternate than allowed by the Technical Specifications. The licensee identified this problem and rereviewed matters considered in meeting #492 in another SRB meeting.
The inspector reviewed records of audits conducted under the cogni-zance of the CNRB during the previous year in conformance with Tech-nical Specification 6.5.2.8.
The inspector verified that these audits were conducted in accordance with written procedures / checklists and by trained personnel not having direct responsibility in audited areas, that audit results were documented and reviewed by management having responsibility in audited areas and by corporate management, and that audit f requencies conf ormed with technical specification requirements.
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The following apparent items of noncompliance were identified is in review of audit finding followup actions.
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The licensee conducted audit no. 328 during the period April
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24-May 1,1978, to assess compliance with and implementation of procedures QAP 2150, QAP 2160, QAP 2180, and AD 1807.00.4.
This audit resulted in the issuance of Audit Finding Reports (ATR's) 528-1-4 and Corrective Action Report (CAR) 78-02.
Step 7.71 of licensee procedure QAP 2180, " Audits", requires the management of audited organizations to respond to audit reports in writing within 30 days of receipt. Audited organi-zations did not respond to ATR's 1-4 within the required 30-day period.
It is noted that ATR's 1 and 2 were issued because other AFR's (from previous audits) had not been responded to in a timely manner.
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Step 7.3.2 of licensee procedure QAP 2160, " Corrective Action",
requires that the status of corrective action related to issued CAR's be reported to the Quality Assurance Manager within 30 days, and every 30- days until corrective action is completed.
The status of corrective action related to CAR 78-02 (generated 528) was not reported within the required 30 day in audit no.
period. It is noted that CAR 77-03 had not been properly reported.
CAR 77-03, in turn, was issued because the status of corrective action related to other CAR's had not been properly reported.
A review of the minutes of all CNRB meetings conducted to date c.
revealed that the CNRB has not reviewed reports of audits con-ducted under the cognizance of that group.
Section 5.5 of ANSI 18.7-1972 " Administrative Controls for Nuclear Power Plants",
requires the independent review and audit group to review written reports of audits perf ormed under its cognizance at a scheduled meeting.
Step 7.1 of Licensee's procedure QAP 2021, " Application of NRC Regulatory Guides and ANSI Standards", requires that the licensee conform to the requirements of ANSI 18.7-1972.
The above three items are considered to be in noncompliance with 10 CTR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 11, which requires the licensee to conduct the quality assurance program in accordance with the related written policies, procedures or instructions.
During the review of CNRB minutes and audit reports, the inspector determined the extent of consultant involvement in CNRB activities.
In addition, the inspectos discussed the SRB review of f acility operations to detect potential saf ety hazards with licensee repre-sentatives. The licensee's representatives related that the review of f acility operations to detect potential saf ety hazards was an integral part of the SRB's consideration of proposed procedures and changes, deviation reports, reportable occurrences, etc. following discussions with the inspector.
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In the exit interview the inspector stated while these reviews performed by the SRB were an integral part of detecting +otential safety hazards, the reviews should be explauded and f ormalized to include reviews of trends in operation (i.e., type and fre-
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quency of personnel errors and their causes, repetitive equip-ment failure and causes, repetitive breakdown in management controls and causes, delays in resolving problems and their impact, adverse trends in operating parameters, etc.) that would indicate problem; of a longer range or more subtle nature.
The licensee stated that they would reevaluate their method and scope to satisfy the review requirement.
4.
Licensee Plans for Copine With Strikes The inspector discussed the licensee's plans for coping with a potential strike with several representatives and determined how many peopic and what skills would be affected. In addition, the inspector verified that the licensee's plans for plant staffing are consistent with regulatory requirements, that adequate con-sideration had been given to potential problems with the deli-veries of crit i nal items, that plans exist for coordination with law enforcement agencies, that emergency communication equipment is availabic and operable, and that sufficient onsite and offsite personnel are available to implement the licensee's plans. A licensee representative stated the arrangements with the local fire department, hospital, and ambulance service had not yet been verified, but would be.
It was also stated that the licensee has plans to provide special ref resher training for those indivi-no duals who would be involved in plant operations. The licensee considers this training to be unwarranted since the involved per-sonnel are normally involved in plant operations.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's contingency plans (EOP 78)
and determined the extent to which this document addresses the items delineated above.
5.
Organization and Administration on June 12, 1978, the licensee submitted an application to amend the administrative organization of the f acility as described in the license.
The inspector reviewed the licensee organization structure to verify that the structure was as described, personnel qualifica-tion of the new maintenance engineer, authorities and responsibilities and minimum shif t crew composition.
The inspector also reviewed the current staf fing of plant by depart-ment to determine how it compared with staffing levels of other single unit stations.
It was determined that the staffing levels equaled or exceeded the average of other plants except in the area of the Technical Staff (approximately two less than the average).
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No it ems of noncompliance were identified.
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The inspectors met with the Vice President, Energy Supply and Station Superintendent on June 21, 1978 to discuss their program to reassess
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management controls at the station.
The inspectors stated that the licensee should include in their assessment:
The relationship between corporation, power engineer and the station to insure the proper setting of priorities.
Loss of key personnel.
Strengthening of core physics overview.
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Selection of key personnel.
Time to resolve problems at the plant and corporate levels.
6.
Burnable Poison Rod and Orifice Rod Assembides The licensee notified Region 111 on April 6 and May 20, 197&2/ by
telephone of potential and observed wear in the hold down latch mechanism for the burnable poison rod assembles (BPRA) and orifice rod assemblies (ORA). The inspection and decision to remove the BPRA's was previously reviewed (1&E Inspection Report 50-346/78-10).
While removing the BPRA'c from the core an attempt was made to remove an ORA.
Because of the dif ficulty in removing the ORA, an inspection was begun that showed that the same type wear found in fuel assemblies containing BPRA's.
Based upon the results of this inspection, all the orifice rods were removed f rom the core.
Two modified OEA's were built and installed to provide the hold down f or the two source rods.
The licensee submitted proposed licensee amendment to cover the re-moval of the BPRA's and ORA's to NRR on May 18, 1978 and May 26, 1978.
Amendment #11 to the license was issued June 23, 1978 to cover the removal of the BPRA's and ORA's including the required low power physics and power ascension testing associated with the core modifi-cation.
7.
Records The inspector reviewed selected licensee records and drawings to verify that the program for control, storage, retention and retrieval of records and documents is in conf ormance with the Technical Specifications 1/ Followup report: LER 78-29 transmitted to Region III 4/13/78.
2/ Followup report: LER 78-49 transmitted to Region III 5/30/78.
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and licensee's administrative procedures.
Discussions were held with selected licensee personnel to determine the methods and plans
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f or surveillance of plant and equipment performance to detect long-
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term equipment degradation or adverse trends. Records reviewed included:
Reactivity control, power distribution, fuel inventories, fuel transfers, and fuel assembly burnup histories (per AD 1848.09).
Changes to SFAS procedure SP 1105.03.
1ransient of operating cycles.
Preventative maintenance program f or containment air coolers (per AD 1847.07).
Effluent releases (per AD 1848.10 and AD 1804.00).
Drawing changes associated with f acility changes (FCR)77-307 and 77-342 (per AD 1848.05).
No items of noncompliance were identified.
In the exit interview the inspector stated that AD 1848.05 should be revised if the Technical Engineer is no longer directly responsible for control of drawings. The licensee stated that although drawing changes are being administered by the office personnel, the work is still under the cognizance of the Technical Engineer. The inspector also stated that AD 1848.09 needs be revised to make it consist-tent with the report numbers in A.
4604.00.
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Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection (the findings of the NRR Fire Protection Evaluation Team are not included here since these vill be a subject of a separate report to be issued by the team).
The licensee representative made the following remarks in response to certain of the items discussed by the inspectors.
Acknowledged the apparent items of noncompliance (paragraph 3).
Stated that although the work for control of drawings was being handled throughout the Office Supervisor it was still under the cognizance of the Technical Engineer (paragraph 7).
Stated that AD 1848.09 would be revised to maks the report numbers censistent with AD 1804.00 (paragraph 7).
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Stated that they would keep the inspector informed if th.ere should be any changes in the status of the contract negotiations (paragraph
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Stated they would reevaluate the method and scope of the SRB review t o detect potential safety hazards (paragraph 3).
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