IR 05000341/1982002
| ML20042A334 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 03/03/1982 |
| From: | Axelson W, Oestmann M, Paperiello C, Patricia Pelke, Phillips M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20042A329 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-82-02, 50-341-82-2, NUDOCS 8203230335 | |
| Download: ML20042A334 (12) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-341/82-02(DEPOS)
Decket No. 50-341 License No. CPPR-87 Licensee: Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48226 Facility Name: Fermi Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 Inspection At: Fermi Site, Monroe, MI Inspection Conducted:
February 1-3, 1982
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Inspectors: 41. P. Phillip
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Team Leader
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Approved By: W. L. Axelson," Chief
Emergenc Preparedness Section
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(V ape fello, Chief Emergency reparedness and Program Support Branch Inspection Summary Inspection on February 1-3, 1982 (Report No. 50-341/82-02(DEPOS))
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant emergency exercise involving observations of key functions and locations during the exercise. The inspection involved 189 inspector-hours onsite by six NRC inspectors and three consultants.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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8203230335 820303 PDR ADOCK 05000341
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed P. Pelke; Operational Support Center (OSC), Fire Brigade, and Maintenance Teams
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T. Essig; OSC, Rescue Team, Inplant Health Physics Teams, and Seaway Hospital R. Schuller; Control Room, Fire Brigade, and Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
G. Martin; OSC, Fire Brigade, and Radiation Environmental Menitoring Team F. Kantor; Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
M. J. Gestmann; Rescue Team and Radiation Environmental Monitoring Team B. Little; Control Room, Floater P. Byron; Control Room, TSC, and Floater M. Phillips; Control Room, TSC, and EOF Detroit Edison and Areas Observed W. Jens, Emergency Officer, EOF M. Vermeulen, EOF Coordinator, EOF H. Tauber, Vice President, Engineering and Construction, JPIC E. Griffing, Emergency Director, TSC J. Clark, Nuclear Shift Supervisor, Control Room L. Trapp, OSC Coordinator, OSC E. Preston, Controller, Control Room R. Sorenson, Controller, OSC S. Stadler, Controller, TSC E. Madsen, Controller, EOF
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The above personnel attended the exit interview on February 2, 1982.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items Related to Emergency Preparedness
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(Closed) 341/80-07-02, Audit regarding the operation of the meteorology tower; 341/80-07-05, Emergency planning - Paragraph 8; 341/80-07-07, Emergency Facilities; 341/80-07-08, Emergency Training; 341/80-07-09, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures; 341/80-07-10, Review of Emer-gency Planning Program; and 341/80-07-06, County Emergency Plan. All of the above Open Items were identified prior to the Commission's
enactment of rulemaking related to emergency preparedness in November 1980. These items are considered closed, as the detailed review of the licensee's emergency preparedness program will be examined during the emergency preparedness implementation appraisal. Offsite preparedness will be reviewed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
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3.
General An exercise of the licensee's Radiological Emergency Response Plan was conducted at the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant on February 1-2, 1982, testing the integrated responses of the licensee, State of Michigan, Province of Ontario, and local organizations to a simulated emergency.
The exercise tested the licensee's response to a major noble gas release. Attachment 1 describes the scenario. The exercise was integrated with a test of the State of Michigan, Province of Ontario, Monroe County, Wayne County, and Essex County Plans.
4.
General Observations a.
Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements using the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2 Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP), and.
the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) used by site and corporate personnel.
b.
Coordination The response was coordinated, orderly, and timely.
If the event had been real, the actions of the licensee would have been suf-ficient to permit State, Provincial, and local authorities to take appropriate protective actions.
c.
Observers Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with nine NRC observers and approximately 25 FEMA observers.
FEMA observed and will report on the responses of the State and local governments.
d.
Critique The licensee held a critique immediately following the exercise the evening of February 2, 1982. The NRC and the licensee iden-tified the deficiencies as discussed in the exit interview.
5.
Specific Deficiencies Noted Problems identified by the NRC observers during the exit interview included:
(1) poor turnover of command and control from the Nuclear Shift Supervisor to the Station Superintendent in the Control Room; (2) offsite communicator was unable to make notifications in the event her listed phone number was inaccurate, and appeared to lack knowledge concerning the significance of events; (3) poor preplanning by main-tenance, rescue, and health physics personnel; (4) information flow regarding offsite activities was lacking in that the licensee was not
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kept informed of actions taken by the State; and (5) at the time of General Emergency declaration, no default protective action recommenda-tions were immediately given, rather these recommendations were delayed until offsite dose calculations had been completed.
In addition to the above deficiencies, the observers noted that additional training of emergency personnel with regards to health physics activities is needed. This area will be reviewed during the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal.
6.
Specific Observations a.
Control Room The operators responded well to cues, and made proper and timely classifications. The information flow into and out of the Control Room was adequate, and emergency operating procedures were referenced and followed. The exercise scenario tested the operators' ability to correct plant malfunctions, and provided a good technical test of operations personnel, who performed well.
The actions of the Station Superintendent upon his arrival in the Control Room did not appear realistic.
Although the RERP does not require the Station Superintendent to become the Emergency Director until an Alert is declared, he is still the one individual with overall responsibility for Fermi operations. This is delegated to the Nuclear Shift Supervisor in his absence, but once the Station Superintendent arrives in the Control Room, he should assume the function of Emergency Director regardless of what the emergency classification is.
Requiring the Nuclear Shift Supervisor to continue in this responsibility places an unnecessary restriction on his ability to operate the plant and mitigate the consequences of the event. This is especially necessary when operating with minimum required shift crew.
Events were classified and notifications to the State and local agencies were made in a timely manner; however, the offsite communications caller was unable to reach the NRC Headquarters Operations Center and the Sandwich West Police Department due to incorrect telephone numbers in the emergency phone directory.
Although the licensee's contact with the Sandwich West Police Department in Essex County, Ontario, would have been strictly a one time notification at the Alert level which would not involve protective action recommendations or activation of the prompt public notification system, additional efforts (such as checking with the local directory assistance operator) should have been taken by the of fsite notifications caller. The licensee did contact the NRC through the Regional Office.
Since protective action authorizations and the principal communications flow for Essex County comes through the Provincial authorities in Toronto, who were in contact with the State's On Scene Emergency Operations Center as described in their plan; and since the NRC was notified
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through the Regional Office; the inspectors determined that these notification problems would not affect the public health and safety.
In addition, installation of backup communications equipment such as the dedicated Emergency Notification System (ENS) between the licensee and all necessary offsite agencies has not been completed.
This equipment will be examined during the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal.
The offsite notifications ca:ler did not appear knowledgeable concerning the meaning of events. Once an actual emergency noti-fication has been made with the NRC, the communicator is required to remain on the phone until instructed by NRC to hang up.
During this time the transmission of technical information should be conducted by a licensed operator or some other individual familiar with plant operations, normal parameter readings, and the events taking place.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
Activation of the TSC was orderly and timely, since the TSC was already in the standby mode. Command and control functions performed at the TSC were very good. The TSC was continuously monitored for radiological habitability using a portable particulate, iodine, and noble gas monitor. TSC personnel responded well to cues regarding mechanical, operational, and technical problems posed as part of the scenario.
Interface between the Emergency Director (ED) and other Key TSC staff was excellent. Administrative Support and Security in the TSC were excellent. Trend analysis, espgcially for containment hydrogen concentration, was good; howevci, there was no way to determine parameter trends from the status boards. When parameter values are updated on the status boards, an up or down arrow should be used to indicate whether the value is increasing or decreasing.
The Emergency Director made timely and accurate emergency classi-fications. The assembly / evacuation siren was activated shortly after the declaration of a Site Area Emergency; however, accountability of personnel was not tested during this exercise because the licensee has not implemented their security program.
This must be tested in a drill prior to fuel load.
c.
Operational Support Center (OSC)
The OSC is the assembly area for health physics, damage and rescue, maintenance, and fire fighting teams. The OSC was activated at the Unusual Event Classification by the damage and rescue team, and remained staffed for the duration of the exercise. The transmission of radiation data between the OSC and TSC was excellent. Exposure control measures were excellent.
Teams were efficiently handled, well directed, and coordination between the health physics and maintenance personnel was adequate.
Although some Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P& ids) were
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available at the OSC, teams did not have the appropriate drawing to locate valve T46-F402. A complete set of P& ids should be available in the OSC.
d.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
An interim EOF, located on the turbine floor of Fermi Unit 1, was activated in accordance with the RERP in a timely manner. Admin-istrative support, security, and personnel radiation monitoring at the EOF were excellent. Command and control functions at the EOF were adequate, and it was clear who was in charge.
Briefings of personnel regarding updated plant conditions were frequently held, and all EOF staff were kept informed of events as they occurred.
The interchange of information within the EOF was very good.
Status boards and maps were updated in a timely manner.
Infor-mation was transmitted to the State and NRC in a timely manner; however, the State representative in the EOF could have been better utilized. When the EOF Coordinator had difficulty in reaching the State EOC to inform them of the General Emergency declaration, the State representative was not informed and asked to make this notification. There was no meaningful exchange of protective action information from the State EOC to the EOF. The EOF managers were continually being surprised by State actions, learning about them after the fact. The Radiation Protection Coordinator did not communicate directly with the State Depart-ment of Health dose assessment personnel, instead information was passed through communicators. This could lead to the possible transmission of misinformation.
No default protective action recommendations were given to the State when the General Emergency declaration was transmitted, since no offsite release had occurred. Since a General Emergency by definition means that releases can be reasonably expected to exceed protective action guidelines offsite, the licensee should recommend sheltering for a two mile radius and five miles downwind as a minimum for any General Emergency classification, even if no release is taking place.
e.
Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
The JPIC was established in the student services-administration building at Monroe County Community College. News briefings were well coordinated, and were held in a timely manner. Detroit Edison provided the Vice President for Engineering and Construction as the technical spokesperson. The layout of the facility was very good; however, if this had been a real event some problems with the setup for live radio feeds and television camera hookups would have existed.
In addition, the number of security guards initially present at the JPIC was excessive. On two occasions, the Detroit Edison spokesperson did not appear at the news briefing. Although this had been agreed upon by all the news presenters, the lack of
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the utility spokesperson at the briefing can give a negative impression to members of the press. The rumor control number was not activated until after a Site Area Emergency had been declared.
In a real event, this group should be activated as soon as possible after an emergency condition exists.
f.
Environmental Monitoring Teams
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The environmental monitoring tcans were assembled in a timely manner at the Newport Service Center, and briefed prior to dispatch. Record keeping, data transmission, and radio communi-cations were handled well. Due to the severe snow conditions, team transportation consisted of four-wheel drive vehicles equipped with radios which were not on the same frequency as the EOF base station radio. The licensee implemented a telephone patch connection with another base station, and communications capabilities between the teams and the Radiation Protection Coordinator at the EOF were not compromised. The teams should have been kept better informed of events concerning the plant which could affect them. Teams were not notified of the General Emergency condition. Team members kept track of their own exposure.
Team members demonstrated a lack of consistency in the way offsite surveys were conducted (e.g., probe outside window, probe inside vehicle with window down, probe inside vehicle with window up) and did not make any beta gamma readings to determine whether or not they were in or out of the plume, or whether the plume was overhead.
In addition, no offsite radioiodine analysis was conducted. Since the release was occurring through the standby gas treatment system (SBGTS) which normally filters out iodine, the Radiation Protection Coordinator did not request that any radiciodine samples be col-1ected. This is an erroneous assumption, since the air flowing through the SBGTS contains lots of moisture and is at a flow rate significantly greater than normal.
Both of these conditions will significantly reduce the capability of the SBGTS to remove radio-iodines, and therefore, offsite samples should always be collected to confirm the conclusions reached regarding radioiodines in the release. These problems indicate that more training is needed to enhance the efficiency of the offsite teams.
g.
Onsite Health Physics Teams The health physics teams were assembled in a timely manner and dispatched from the OSC. The personnel monitoring team, which was activated at the time the assembly / evacuation siren was sounded, did a good job of setting up.
However, the overall training of the health physics teams needs to be improved based on the following observations:
(1) poor choice of instruments for surveys; (2) poor noble gas sampling technique; (3) failure to continually provide
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health physics coverage for all teams; and (4) never verifying the source of radiation levels observed.
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Onsite surveys were conducted using an R0-2A rather than a tele-tector. This requires the individual performing the survey to go into a potentially high dose rate area rather than just inserting the probe, and as a result the team member may receive a relatively high unnecessary exposure. One team attempted to collect a noble gas sample by waving a marinelli beaker around in the air.
An evacuated gas marinelli beaker must be used, otherwise the results will be greatly underestimated. On one instance, a maintenance team was dispatched to look at a valve in the SBGT system in the Reactor Building. Since a survey of this area had just been completed, the team decided that they did not need health physics coverage. This assumption can never be made during an accident, as plant conditions are constantly changing. Had this team been present in the area fifteen minutes later, they would have received excessive exposures from the release due to the time delay in being notified by the Control Room. At no time did observed health physics teams take any beta gamma readings to see if the radiation levels detected could be due to the presence of noble gases. This is a very useful technique for determining possible leakage into the reactor building. Training of health
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physics teams will be examined during the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal.
h.
Personnel Injury Drill The damage and rescue team was assembled within five minutes of being notified to activate. The initial actions of most team members were to dress up in protective clothing and proceed to the reported location of the injury; however, one individual doned gloves and. shoe covers only then ran to the injury location without any radiation survey instruments. None of the team members discussed what actions may be necessary, e.g., preplanned activities. Because emergency situations can involve a sudden change in normal radiation or contamination levels, radiation survey equipment must be used by the first individual to arrive at the site of the injury and actions to be taken should be planned prior to entering the area.
Transport and first aid provided to the patient were adequate.
Team members and the patient were monitored for contamination; however, the contamination levels detected on the patient were very low, and did not warrant offsite decontamination.
Contamination and personnel monitoring activities performed at the hospital were good. Decontamination and treatment of the patient was handled well.
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Fire Drill The fire brigade was activated in a very timely manner and reported to the OSC.
They were told the location of the fire, but were not told conditions which could be expected, such as
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general area radiation levels. None of the brigade members referred to the fire pre plans to determine what type of fire may be encountered. Offsite fire assistance was requested, notified by the Control Room, and arrived at the scene in a timely manner. Fire fighters did a fairly good job in exchanging scott air packs; however, communications among brigade members were extremely difficul'.. The plant fire brigade has good equipment, but a chemical foam capability would be particularly useful in combating oil and large electrical fires.
7.
Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview at the conclusion of the licensee's critique with representatives denoted in Paragraph 1.
The licensee agreed to address the inspector's concerns stated in Para-graph 5.
The licensee was asked to conduct a site assembly drill to test personnel accountability and site evacuation procedures prior to licensed operation. This is an Open Item (341/82-02-01).
Attachment: Exercise Scenario
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10.0 EXERCISE SCENARIO 1--
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INITIAL CONDITIONS
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'The reactor has been operating the equivalent of 300 full power
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days since refueling and is carreptly at 50%
power.
The Loose Parts Monitoring System is alarming.- Alarms are indicating an abnormality in the vicinity of the Reactor-Recirculation Pump
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discharge flow element.
The RHR Division I check valve inside the drywell failed a routine test and is suspacted to be jammed against its seat in the closed position (Ell-F05 0A).
The Nuclear Shift Supervisor has declared Division I of RER inoperable and has seven days to repair per the Technical Specifications.
Plant management has decided to bring the plant down for inspection of the RHR piping inside the Drywell.
The Drywell is being deinerted in preparation for the planned shutdown.
Electrical load is being reduced at a controlled rate.
The Nuclear Shift Supervisor has received a call from the System Supervisor requesting that Fermi 2 temporarily remain at 50% load because of frozen coal problems at th& Monroe Power Plant.
The Nuclear Shift Supervisor has ordered the control room operator to continue to deinert, but not to drop any more electrical load until further hotice.
The RCIC is out of service for repair; it is not expected to be returned to service for another 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
The Center Station Air is "ut of service for required maintenance.
The plant Compressor o
is operating with the reactor coolant system specific activity at its Technical Specification limit of 0.2 microcurie /gm dose equivalent I-131.
All other plant systems are considered to be operable.
METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS Initial and subsequent:
As advised by controller.
During radioactive release:
Wind is from 200 at 7 mph.
Stability is class
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SCENARIO
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TIME KEY EVENTS
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12:30 p.m.
Initial conditions.
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12:45 Operator notifies the Control Room that he has slipped and fallen in the Reactor Water Cleanup-Pump
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Room and is unable.to' walk'.
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approx. 1:00 UNUSUAL ENENT declared.
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1:35 Fire alarm for 1st floor tu'rbine
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building area northwest zone.
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1:45 Center and East station air
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i compressors on fire.
Off-site
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assistance required.
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2:45 Reactor feed pump controller fails
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stops.
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2:45 Main turbine trips on high redctor
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vessel ' water level and causes
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reactor scram.
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2:50 Reactor feed pumps trip when. reactor i
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water level is at main steam lines.
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3:35 MSIV's isolate on high area I
temperature.
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3:36 SRV's lift.
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3:40 One SRV ruptures and' continues to
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release steam to drywell atmosphere.
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j 3:50 Reactor water level is stabilized at s
normal operating level with HPCI
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operating.
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ALERT is declared.
approx. 3:55
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l 5:00 Exercise secured for the day.
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DAY 2
7:00 a.m.
Exercise restrnes.
7:15 10CI trips and isolates.
7:30 RIIR system fails to inject water in reactor vessel.
7:35 Reactor core is uncovered.
7:40 Reactor water level is re-established with Core Spray Systes.
8:00 Containment Area High Range Radiation Monitor indicates significant fuci damage has
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occurred, approx. 8:00 SITE AREA D'ERGENCY is declared.
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10:15 Prirary containment isolation valve for SGTS fails and is open.
10:55 SGTS effluent monitor indicates a release of radioactive material to the environment.
approx. 11:00 GDiERAL D'.ERGENCY is declared.
12:00
. Inboard SGTS primary containment isolation valve is shut. Release is
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terminated.
1:25 off-site radiation levels return to background, apprux. 1:30 Emergency is de-escalated.
approx. 1:30 Recovery is initiated.
3:00 Exercise is terminated.