IR 05000341/1979003
| ML19281A636 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1979 |
| From: | Naidu K, Spessard R, Suermann J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19281A634 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-79-03, 50-341-79-3, NUDOCS 7903260119 | |
| Download: ML19281A636 (14) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-341/79-03 Docket No. 50-341 License No. CPPR-87 Licensee:
Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48226 Facility Name: Enrico Fermi 2 Inspection At:
Enrico Fermi Site Inspection Conduct _,ed:
January 24-26, 1979
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Inspectors:
K.
R.' 'aidu
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J. F.' Suermann 2 - /,2-7 7
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944'n2 Approved By:
R. L. Spessa, Chief
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Engineering Support Section 1 Inspection Summary Inspection on January 24-26, 1979 (Report No. 50-341/79-03)
Areas Inspected: Observation of hanger installation and review of related hanger procedures; safety-related structures work observation and record review.
The inspection involved 54 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors.
Results: Two items of noncompliance were identified in two of the eight areas inspected.
(Infractions - failure to control purchased material, Section 1, Paragraph 1; failure to follow procedures, Section 1, Paragraph 3b.
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DETAILS
Persons Contacted Pri.2ipal Licensee Enployees
- L. Bertani, Assistant Project Engineer Mechanical / Civil
- T. A. Alessi, Quality Assurance Director
- A. Alexiou, Assistant Project Superintendent
- R.
W. Barr, Project Quality Assurance Director
- W.
F. Colbert, Project Engineer
- C.
R. Bacon, Field Project Engineer
- C.
J. Miller, Senior QA Engineer
- M. G. Sigetich, Supervising Engineer, Mechanical
- J.
H. Casiglia, Engineering Work Leader Other Personnel A. L. Walworth, Assistant Construction Manager, Daniel International Corporation, (DI)
- C.
B. Bliesener, Adminstrative Assistant to Project Manager, DI
- T.
Blixt, QC Manager, DI M. Goedecke, Welding Engineer, DI
- C. Crouse, QA Engineer, DI
- K. Dempsey, Mechanical Superintendent, DI R. O. Donnel, QA Engineer, D1 J. Rotunda, QC Welding, DI C. Keller, Field QA Manager, Wismer-Becker J. Reed, Welding Engineer, General Electric Company (GE) (I&SE)
E. Baker, Lead Engineer, GE (I&SE)
T. Dykes, Supervisor, Quality Control, GE (I&SE)
- H. Konkle, Site Manager, GE (NED)
J. E. Norton, QA Engineer, Stone and Webster, (S&W)
The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee and contractor employees, including nembers of the quality, technical and engineering staffs.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
- Denotes those who attended the hanger design discussion at DECO, Troy office on January 25, 1979.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (341/78-18-08):
Nonconforming welds.
It was previously reported that during a reinspection of two beams associated with the Steam Tunnel Lower Pipewhip Restraints (STLPR), some nonconforming welds were identified and that though the licensee agreed to reinspect the welds on other beams in the STLPR supplied by the same vendor, Schreiber Manufacturing Company (Schreiber).
During the current inspection, it was determined that only four beams were reinspected, and even though adverse findings were identified, these beams were temporarily installed in place in the steam tunnel. Nonconformance tags were attached to the beams.
The inspector informed the licensee that the control of purchased safety-related material was inadequate and this was contrary to the requirement of Criterion VII, of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
The inspector stated that this item, which was previously identified as an unresolved item, would be escalated to an item of noncompliance.
Further details are furnished in Section 1, Paragraph 1.
(341/79-03-01)
(Closed) Unresolved Item (341/78-14-01): DECO Specification 3071-528,
" Mechanical Seismic Shock Suppressors," did not include requirements for lockup, acceleration, and load relief rate.
The inspector reviewed Addendum A of the specification dated October 1978, and had no further questions.
Functional or Program Areas Inspected Details of functional or program areas inspected are documented in Sections I, II, and III.
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Secticn I Prepared by K. R. Naidu Reviewed by R. L. Spessard, Chief Engineering Support Section 1 1.
Inadequate Control of Purchased Material The NRC inspector, during a previous inspection (Inspection Report No. 50-341/78-18) requested a reinspection of the shopwelds on beams A-3109 and A-3107. At that time, these beams, which formed part of the Steam Tunnel Lower Pipewhip Restraints (STLPR), were being stored outside the Reactor Building. During the licensee's reinspection, it was identified that certain areas on the shop welds on beams A-3109 and A-3107 did not meet the applicable drawings and the AWS D1.1-75 code.
Inspection of other beams, which had been installed, could not be performed because the welds were not readily accessible.
However, the installation of the main steam and feedwater isolation valves and the associated piping had not commenced. The DECO Project Manager agreed to reinspect the remaining beams furnished by Schreiber and take suitable corrective action.
This matter was considered unresolved at that time.
Deviation Disposition Request (DDR) No. (W)2323, dated November 30, 1978, was initiated to document the results of the visual reinspection of shopwelds on beams identified as A-3106, A-3107, A-3109 and A-3112.
Schreiber Procedure No. OP90.2, Revision 0, dated November 30, 1977, titled " Visual Inspection of Welds," which reflected the AWS D1.1-75 requirements, and the relevant drawings were used during the reinspec-tions. The following findings highlight the reinspection:
a.
Three welds not specified on Drawing SS.721.3106 were added on beam A-3106.
b.
Three 1 1/4" fillet welds not specified on Drawing SS.721-3107, Section 1-1 were added on beam A-3107; there were two areas of undercut, one area of undersized weld and one area of oversize weld.
c.
Two welds not specified on Drawing SS. 721-3109, Section 1-1 were added or. beam A-3109; there were two areas of undercut, and one area of undersi:e.
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d.
Two welds not specified on Drawing SS.721-3112, Section 1-1, were added to beam A-3312; there was one area of undercut and one area of oversize.
Corrective action specified was to repair the areas of undercut.
The unauthorized additional welds were to remain as is.
The inspector observed hold tags on the four beams.
Installation of the main feedwater and steam isolation valves including the associated piping has commenced, and the area is currently very congested.
The inspector informed the licensee that the control of the purchase of safety related beams forming the STLPR structure was inadequate in that adequate inspections were not performed to verify conformance with applicable drawings and AWS DI.1-75 code.
The inspector stated that this matter, which was previously identified as an unresolved item, was being escalated to an item of noncompliance with the requirements of Criterion VII of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
(341/
79-03-01)
One item of noncompliance was identified in the above area.
2.
Review of Installation of Control Rod Drive System The installation of Control Rod Drive (CRD) Units and associated piping to the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) was performed by the Installation and Service Engineering (I&SE) division of General Electric Company (GE).
The inspector verified the installation of the insert and withdrawal lines identified as 4631, starting from the bottom of the RPV towards the CRD units and reviewed the welding records, a.
The installation of the insert and withdrawal lines identified as 4631I and 4631W, respectively conformed to layout sketch SK442-73B-01 sheets 304 and 305.
The physical appearance of the shop welds (which were performed at a facility in Monroe, Michigan)
and field welds was acceptable.
b.
Review of the Joint Process Control Sheet (JPCS) No. EWO-G058, page 21 of 79 covering the history of the welds indicates the following:
(1)
The routing of the insert and withdrawal lines is in accordance with layout sheet No. SK442-73B-01 sheets 304 and 305.
(2) Welds 4631-18A and 4631-18B on either side of the socket are the field and shop welds respectively on the insert line.
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(3) Welds 4631-W5A and 4631-WSB on either side of the socket
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are the field and shop welds, respectively on the withdrawal line.
(4) The field and shop weldors who performed the welding were identified.
(5) The heat numbers of the 3/32" diameter ER-308 type weld wire which was used in the field and shop welds were indicated.
(6) The following attributes are required to be checked:
(a) Postweld cleanliness.
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(b) Socket weld-retract 1/16".
(c)
Interpass temperature (random check).
(d) Liquid Penetration Examination.
(e) Fillet size.
(f) Postweld cleanliness.
Through the heat numbers of the weld wire, sockets and pipe c.
indicated on the JPCS, the Certified Material Test Reports (CMTR)
were retrieved and reviewed.
(1) CMTR dated April 23, 1978, from Sandvik Incorporated indicates that 3/32" diameter weld wire type ER 308 identified with heat number 462 317 met the requirements of ASME Section II; SFA 5-9 end ASME Section III, Paragraph NB 2400.
(2) CMTR dated Janaury 20, 1975, from Camco Fittings, Hamden, Connecticut, indicates that 3/4" sockets type SW 3MSF304 met the applicable requirements of SA 182 of ASME Section II.
(3) CMTR dated August 23, 1978, from Sandvik indicates that 3/4" diameter schedule 80 pipe with heat number 454 765 met the requirements of SA 376 of ASME Section II.
Stencil marks on the pipe indicate that the pipe successfully withstood 3000 psi hydrostatic pressure. The pipes were subjected to Ultrasonic Testing and no unacceptable indica-tions were identified.
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d.
Review of the qualifications of the weldors who performed the welding indicates that the weldors were qualified.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Review of Non-Destructive Examination Activities a.
The inspector observed NDT Services Incorporated perform Liquid Penetrant examinations on the incore to vessel welds identified as X-40,Y41; X-40,Y45; and X-40,Y49 inside the RPV.
Approved pene-trant developer and cleaner manufactured by Magnaflux were being used. The inspector observed what appeared to be inclusions on the welds and the GE QC Supervisor concurred with the inspector's observations.
Paragraph 6.2 of GE Liquid Penetrant Examination Procedure No. NDE-PT-1002, Revision 3 states " Prior to liquid penetrant examination, the surface to be examined and all adjacent areas within 1" shall be dry and free of any dirt, grease
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weld spatter oil or other extranious matter that could obscure openings or otherwise interfere with the examination." The QC supervisor concurred with the NRC inspector that the wcld surface did not meet the above requirement. He stated that this PT examination was for information only and not the final PT.
He assured the NRC inspector that he would issue necessary instruc-tions to clean the weld surface to meet the above requirement in the future both for information and final PT examinations.
The inspector has no further questions on this matter at this time.
b.
The inspector observed a completed field weld identified as No. SB Top on the flued steel No. 3 attaching a 3/4" x 10" x 2" shim plate. This is a seismic class 1 structure adjacent to Penetration X-13A, and it was welded by Wismer-Becker personnel.
All inspections including Magnetic Particle (MT) examinations had been completed.
An Operation Process Traveller (OPT) was initiated to repair the flued steel No. 3 as per Design Change Request (DCR) No. P 1309 B.
The repair concerned the addition of a 3/4" x 10" x 2" shim plate to reduce the gap between the curved section of the base plates for struts M2996 and V2996 with A-2996 and bring the gap within the permissible limits of AWS D1.1-75.
Weld Procedure Specification (WPS) 7002 was used to weld the materials type A-588 grade A; 1/8" and 3/32" diameters type E-7018 electrodes were used. Visual inspection and Magnetic Particle (MT) examination of the weld identified no unacceptable indications, even though the physical appearance of the weld exhibited surface irregularities such as weld spatter and slag inclusions.
Item 8 on page 15 of relevant W-B procedure No. WB-C-114, Revison 6, states, in part " Pressure boundaries, machined surface and threaded surfaces shall be free of weld spatter. All other surfaces shall be as welded-7-
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with regard to weld spatter." The Daniel Welding engineer concurred with the NRC inspector that "All other surfaces shall be as welded.
spatter" was misleading and initiated corrective
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action to delete the sentence "All other surfaces shall be as welded with regard to weld spatter."
The licensee agreed that the cleanliness of the weld prior to the MT did not meet the requirements of Paragraph 9.1 of W-B general procedure WB-Q-108, Revision 4, (which is used for MT) which states " cleaning - All surfaces to receive magnetic particle examination shall be dry and free.
. for at least 1" on either side of the area to be
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examined of mill scale, rust, oil, grease, lint, welding flux spatter or any other surface irregularities that would interfere with the interpretation." The inspector informed the licensee that the contractor NDE personnel failed to follow an established MT procedure and that this was an item of noncompliance with the requirements of Criterion V of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B.
(341/79-03-02)
One item of noncompliance was identified in the above area.
4.
Review of Penetration Welding Activities The inspector observed welding activities in progress on penetration X-13A to the nozzle. Wismer-Becker (WB) is the responsible contractor.
The inspector determined the following:
a.
The weld was identified as E-Il-2327-1VW2 on the traveller.
b.
The physical appearance of the weld was acceptable.
Welding Procedure Specification (WPS) No. 103 was specified; c.
Weld rod E-7018 which was specified in WPS No. 103 was being used.
d.
Records indicate that the weldor who was performing the welding was qualified to WPS No. 103.
Withdrawal slips for the weldrod and backing ring used were e.
available.
f.
Insgection requirements included vgrification of fitup, preheat (60 F), interpass temperature (350 F), final visual, Ultrasonic Testing and Liquid Penetrant examination.
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g.
The inspector reviewed Deviation Disposition Request (DDR) No.
(W)2324 listed in the weld history records. DDR (W)2324, dated December 1, 1978, identifies that the root gap at penetration X-13A between the bellows to nozzle measured 5/32" to 3/16" at the quadrant 0 -120 ; the gap exceeded the permissible gap specified in WPS No. 103 by 1/32".
Also it exceeded the 1/4T mismatch permitted in the ASME Section VIII, 1971, Division 1, Paragraph UW-33 which is referenced in ASME Section III.
Corrective action taken was to butter the bellow to reduce the mismatch and then complete the weld.
The inspector has no questions concerning the licensee's disposition of this DDR.
h.
A Design Change Request No. P-0874 dated June 2, 1978, was initiated to request relief from DECO Specification 3071-31 relative to radiographic examination of weld E-11-2327-1VW2 and requested approval to utilize PT and UT techniques to examine the weld.
The DCR was approved.
The inspector has no questions concerning this DCR.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Section II Prepared by I. T. Yin Reviewed by D. H. Danielson, Chief Engineering Support Section 2 1.
Inspection Program for Installed Hangers The inspector observed several problems on installed hangers with Mark Nos. E41-3167-G10, G11 and G12 for HPCI pump discharge piping. The hangers were installed by the previous contractor, Ralph M. Parsons Company (Parsons), a few years ago.
The Daniel International (DI) hanger verification program established in November, 1978, also identified many deficiencies relating to the 375 Parsons installed hangers.
The licensee stated that the re-analysis of the safety related pipe systems and re-design of the existing installations are on-going activities.
The inspector noted that a systematic program to identify all nonconformance and to rework or replace existing hardware in a timely manner was not available at the time of visit.
This is an unresolved matter.
(341/79-03-03)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified within the areas reviewed.
2.
Review Hanger Design Calculations The inspector reviewed the subject calculations made by Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation (S&W) at DECO engineering head-quarters in Troy, Michigan.
The sample calculations provided by DECO included (1) No. ZN 22-003 for Hanger No. N22-3397-G06, dated September 22,1978, and (2) No. ZN 30-001 for Hanger No. N30-3635-G026, G027, G028 and G029, dated September 22, 1978. Although no adverse comments resulted from the review, the inspector stated that he would not draw conclusion based on the sample calculations provided for him, and that he would select specific S&W and Parsons hanger calculations for review in the future.
This is an unresolved matter.
(341/79-03-04)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified within the areas reviewed.
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3.
Review Hanger Installation Procedure The Wismer Becker welding procedure, WP5 -7001, "GTAW and/or SMAU of P1 Material," Revision 8, dateu January 5, 1979, was reviewed by the inspector and was considered in order. However, the Procedure Qualification Records (PQR's), No. 103C and 103D, dated June 12, 1978, for the WPS, did not document the type of gas, composition of gas mixture, and the gas flow rate for GTAW process. The licensee stated that the PQR's would be updated.
This is an unresolved matter.
(341/79-03-05)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Review Snubber Qualifications The inspector reviewed the test report for Power Piping Company hydraulic snubbers to be installed outside the primary reactor building. The document reviewed was Teledyne Engineering Services Technical Report No. TR-2905-1, " Performance Tests of Power Piping Company Hydraulic Shock Suppressors," dated April 5, 1978.
Snubber sizes tested included 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 4 and 5-inch bores.
The inspector considered the test results acceptable.
The licen-see stated that, although no tests were conducted for the adverse environmental conditions, the snubber will be operable because the installation locations will be in absence of high temperature and humidity. The inspector concurred.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified as a result of the review.
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Section III
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Prepared by J. F. Suermann Reviewed by R. L.
Spessard, Chief Engineering Support Section 1 1.
Review of Quality Records on Spent Fuel Storage Racks, Control Rod Storage Racks and New Fuel Storage Racks The inspector reviewed the documentation on the Spent Fuel Storage Racks (SFSR), Control Rod Storage Racks (CRSR), and New Fuel Storage Racks (NFSR) supplied by General Electric Company (GE).
All three types of racks were manufactured at the GE plant in Wilmington, North Carolina, to meet the requirements of GE Specifications 22A2553 (SFSR), 22A2554 (CRSR) and 22A2541 (NFSR). Although two GE drawings (105D4781 P001 and 105D5084) were referenced in the specification only drawing 105D4781 P001,which did not provide details on the welds,was available on site.
The following documents were reviewed and determined acceptable:
a.
SFSR's No. 87, 91, 92, 102, 113 and 115 (1) Receiving Inspection Report (RIR) No. 870-42, dated November 14, 1973, indicates that six Spent Fuel Storage Racks (SFSR) were received, accepted, and stored in the compound.
The RIR identifies no visible damage on these racks.
(2) Certificate of Conformance (COC) No. 321, dated November 13, 1973, signed by a GE Quality Records Supervisor, certifies the above SFSR's met the applicable requirements.
b.
IFSR's No. 58, 59, 60, 62, 66, 75, 80, 83, 84, 90, 105 and 106 (1) RIR No. 808-39 and 40, dated November 14, 1973, indicates that twelve SFSR's were received, accepted, and stored in the compound.
The RIR identifies no visible damage on these racks.
(2) COC No. 323, dated November 13, 1973, signed by a GE Quality Records Supervisor, certifies the above SFSR's met the applicable requirements.
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c.
SFSR's No. 53, 55, 63, 70, 71, 74, 76, 78, 81, 82, 85, 86, 88, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 107, 110, 112 and 114 (1) RIR No. 809-18, 19, 20 and 21, dated hovember 14, 1973, indicates that twenty-four SFSR's were received, accepted, and stored in the compound. ine RIR identifies no visible damage on these racks.
(2) COC No. 322 and 323, dated November 13, 1973, signed by a GE Quality Records Supervisor, certifies the above SFSR's met the applicable requirements.
d.
SFSR's No. 56, 67, 72, 73, 89, 104, 109 and 111 s
(1) RIR No. 810-3 and 26, dated November 15, 1973, indicates that eight SFSR's were received, accepted, and stored in the compound.
The RIR identifies no visible damage on these racks.
(2) COC No. 323, dated November 13, 1973,and No. 330, dated November 29, 1973, signed by a GE Quality Records Super-visor, certifies the above SFSR's met the applicable requirements.
e.
CRSR's No. 13. 14 and 15 (1) RIR No. 810-26, dated November 15, 1973, indicates that three CRSR's were received, accepted and stored in the compound. The RIR identifies no visible damage on these racks.
(2) C0C No. 331, dated November 29, 1973, signed by a GE Quality Records Supervisor, certifies the above CRSR's met the applicable requirements.
f.
NFSR's No. 2, 3, 4 (two each), 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 20 and 12 each non-serialized racks (1) RIR No. 809-17 and 34, dated November 14, 1973, indicates that twenty-three NFSR's were received, accepted and stored in the compound. The RIR identifies no visible damage on these racks.
(2) COC No. 324, dated November 14, 1973, signed by a GE Quality Records Supervisor, certifies the above NFSR's met the applicable requirements.
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f The inspector, accompanied by representatives of the licensee, inspected some of the SFSR's and CRSR's which are stored in the compound on dunnage and uncovered.
The inspector expressed concern on the size and quality of some of the fillet welds and groove welds on the bottom of the racks. Approximately 40% of the welds inspected appeared questionable due to undercutting, porosity, or excessive huild up.
Due to the unavailability of GE shop drawings, the size of the welds could not be verified.
The inspector also questioned the existing storage conditions of the racks since they were classified as " essential to the safety of the plant."
The RIR's documented above indicated storage requirements for the racks of: (a) 0-1 year outside (covered); (b) 1-5 years inside (unhea t ed).
The licensee agreed to obtain additional information on the welds during an audit at the Wilmington plant during the week of January 29-February 2 and to review the storage condition of the racks.
The inspector informed the licensee that this matter is considered an unresolved item.
(341/79-03-06)
No items of noncompliance were identified in the above areas.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain, whether they are acceptable items, items of noncom-pliance or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Section II, Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 and Section III, Paragraph 1.f.
Exit Interview, The NRC inspectors met with the principal site staff representatives at the conclusion of the inspection on January 26, 1979.
The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection, including apparent items of noncompliance identified in the Details Sections of this report.
The licensee acknowledged the findings.
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