IR 05000338/1986010

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Insp Repts 50-338/86-10 & 50-339/86-10 on 860407-0504.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Lers,Esf Walkdown,Operational Safety Verification,Monthly Maint & Surveillance & Safeguards Review
ML20211A345
Person / Time
Site: North Anna  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 05/30/1986
From: Ignatonis A, King L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: 4
Shared Package
ML20211A321 List:
References
50-338-86-10, 50-339-86-10, NUDOCS 8606110139
Download: ML20211A345 (9)


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UNITE 3 STATES

>M fig *'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ , REGION ll y j 101 MARIETTA STREET, * 2 ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-338/86-10 and' 50-339/86-10 -

Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company -~

P. O. Box 26666 .

Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.: 50-338 and 50-339 OcenseNos.: NPF-4 and NPF-7

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Facility Name: -North Anna 1 and 2 ,

Inspection Conducted: April 7 - May 4, 1986 Inspect r: M N, L. P. King (/

mab k34/f4 Date Signed (/.

Approved by: [ e.wNA A. J. Igrgtonis, 5@ tion Chief; ,

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5[36/K4 Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection by the resident inspectors involved 109 inspector-hours on site in the areas of licensee event report (LER) review, engineering safety features (ESF) walkdown, operational safety verification, monthly maintenance, monthly surveillance, and safeguards revie Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Contacted -

  • E. W. Harrell, Station Manager D. B. Roth, Quality Control (QC) Manager G. E. Kane, Assistet Station Manager
  • E. R. Smith, Assistant Station Manager
  • R. O. Enfinger, Superintendent, Operations
  • M. R. Kansler, Superintendent, Maintenance A. H. Stafford, Superintendent, Health Physics J. A. Stall, Superintendent, Technical Services J. L. Downs, Supervisor, Administrative Services J. R. Hayes, Operations Coordinator D. A. Heacock, Engineering Supervisor D. E. Thomas, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor E. C. Tuttle, Electrical Supervisor R. A. Bergquist, Instrument Supervisor F. T. Terminella, QA Supervisor R. S. Thomas, Supervisor Engineering G. H. Flowers, Nuclear Specialist
  • J. H. Leberstein, Licensing Coordinator
  • R. L. Boehling, Engineer
  • P. B. Boulder, Engineer
  • M. G. Pinion, Supervisor Plant Engineering Other licensee employees contacted include technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne * Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 6, 1986, with those ,

t persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the j inspectors findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspec-tio . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation 338/81-16-01 and 339/81-13-01: Two Years Experience' for Technicians in Responsible Positions. Health Physics provides four shifts l (24-hour) coverage. Each shift is assigned a lead health physics represen-tative meeting the requirements established by ANSI N18.1-1771 prior to such j assignment.

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(0 pen) Unresolved Item 338, 339/85-05-03: Battery Inspection Comments. The licensee has satisfactorily addressed the problems identified in items k. m. and n. of paragraph 11 in NRC inspection report numbers 50-338/85-05 and 50-339/85-05. Item o. of this unresolved item, regarding the licensee's commitment to change TS surveillance requirement for the inspection of diesel f're pump battery cells, was not completed and hence remains ope . Plant status Unit 1 The unit operated at or near 100% power during the inspection perio Unit 2 On April 11,1986, at 1:44 a.m., North Anna Unit 2 tripped from 70% power (650 MWe). The trip was caused by a loss of field' signal (relay 40 GF) which actuated the generator differential lockout relay (86-G). The relay actuation was caused by the failure of the permanent magnet generator (PMG).

The PMG was repaired and the unit returned to operatio All major equipment responded as designed with the exception of both intermediate range excore detectors (N35&N36) which were undercompensate The source range detectors (N31&N32) were manually energized and operated properl On April 16, 1986, while starting up from a torced outage requiring repair of the permanent magnet generator, the unit tripped while in Mode The trip was caused when the TV-GV auto button was depressed to transfer the turbine to governor valve control. This caused the first stage impulse pressure to spike over 10% power. The unit was subsequently restarte On April 16, 1986, at 11:30 a.m., with Unit 2 in Mode 2 (less than 5%

i power) commencing restart after a refueling outage, three out of four 125-volt 0.C. station battery banks were declared inoperable. The pilot cells ir. affected battery banks 2-I, 2-II, and 2-III were found to have specific gravities below the Technical Specification (TS) value of 1.20 In two of the battery banks, approximately half of the cells were out of

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specification. The licensee entered a TS Action Statement requiring battery restoration within two hours or be in hot standby within the next six hour At 6:20 p.m. of the same date, Unit 2 went into Mode 3 (hot standby) from Mode The cause of low specific gravity in the pilot cells was attributed to inadequate float voltage. At 8:46 p.m. of the same date, the batteries

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were restored to operable status after application of the equalizing

! charge, and unit restart commenced. Details on inspector followup of this i event are provided in paragraph 12 of this report.

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l 3 License Event Report (LER) Follow-up The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that reporting requirements had been met, that causes had been identified, ,

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that corrective actions appeared appropriate, that generic applicability had been considered, and that the LER forms were complete. Additionally, the inspectors confirmed that no unreviewed safety questions were involved and that violations of regulations or TS conditions had been identifie (Closed) LER 338/81-35, Welds Overstressed on Hangers. The licensee installed field changes to all of the overstressed hangers and snubbers to correct the proble (Closed) LER 339/81-55, Replacement of Transformer. The commitment was made to identify the cause of bistable relay actuators which initiated a spurious safety injection following the shorting of a transformer to ground. The licensee has completed the work recommended by Stone and Webster to prevent reoccurrence of this problem. This entailed lif ting all grounds on the VB neutral leads except in the VB inverters. The work was accomplished by EWR 84-182 and Work Orders 034292 and 03429 (Closed) LER 339/83-44, Recirculation valve on eacn of two casing cooling pumps was found open. The maintenance procedure was revised to ensure that valves are left in the correct position after maintenanc (Closed) LER 339/81-60, Instrument technician misaligned a switch during Unit 2 solid state protection testing causing train B safety injectio Inadvertent SI actuation procedures have been revised to preclude recurrenc . Monthly Maintenance (62703)

Station maintenance activities affecting safety related systems and components were observed / reviewed, to ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifica-tion The inspector reviewed work in progress on EWR 85-548E, IJ emergency diesel generator, entitled " Installation of First Out Capability to Selected Annuciators for Local Diesel Generator Panel", and WR 145932 Unit 2, entitled " Protection Channel IV Auxiliary Service Water Pump Discharge Flow".

A review was made daily of annunciator alarms on Unit 1 to determine which alarms could be cleared during normal operation. The following alarms have outstanding work requests associated with them:

Containment Recirculation Fans 1A, B, C. air operated damper closed; Pressurizer Spray Line Low Temp;

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,4 Charging Pump 1B, 15J6 Lockout;

CO System Trouble 480 or 4KV Emergency Bus Volts HiLo -

Containment Instrument Air Header Low Pressure or Component B Trouble Recirculation Spray HX 1A-1B-1C-1D RM A review was also made of radiation monitors on Unit I that had several outstanding work requests associated with them. The inspectors will follow the progress of work on the radiation monitor . Monthly Surveillance (61726)

The inspectors observed / reviewed TS required testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation (LCO)

were met and that any deficiencies identified were properly reviewed and resolve The inspector witnessed operability test 1-M0P 6.91 on 1H diesel generato This is required every eight hours while emergency diesel generator 1J is down for scheduled maintenanc The inspector witnessed 1-0P 6.6A (Preoperational check on 1H emergency diesel generator).

The inspector reviewed 1-PT-103.1 (Fire protection deluge system, post indicator valves, hydrants and low pressure CO2 tanks).

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The following selected ESF systems were verified operable by performing a walkdown of the accessible and essential portions of the systems on April 15,198 Unit 1 1-0P-6.1A - 1H Diesel Generator Cooling Water 1-0P-6.3A - 1H Diesel Engine Lube Oil System 1-0P-46.4A - Diesel Air (1H)

Unit 2 (May 1, 1986)

2-0P-7.7A - RWST Valve Checkoff 2-0P-7.8A - NaOH Chemical Addition Valve Checkoff

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The following are comments on the valve checkoff:

2-OP-7.8A; Valve 2-QS-40 is not labeled 2-OP-7.7A; Valve 2-QS-66 - is throttled; procedure should note the valve positio QS-59, is not in service but is open 2-QS-94&95, are vents on 2-CD-E-2B not 2-CD-E-2A 2-QS-106, 107, 108, 109 components are not labeled Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Routine Inspection By observations during the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the control room manning requirements were being met. In addition, the inspectors observed shift turnover to verify that continuity of system status was maintained. The inspectors periodically questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of plant condition Through log review and plant tours, the inspectors verified compliance with selected TS and Limiting Conditions for Operation During the course of the inspection, observations relative to Protected and Vital Area security were made, including access controls, boundary integrity, search, escort and badgin On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWP) were reviewed and the specific work activity was monitored to assure the activities were being conducted per the RWPs. Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked and equipment operability and calibration frequency was verifie The inspectors were kept informed, on a daily basis, of overall status of both units and of any significant safety matter elated to plant operation Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the operations staff on a regular basis. Selected portions of operating logs and data sheets were reviewed dail The inspectors conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the Control Room. Observations included: witnessing work activities in progress; verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems and equipment; confirming valve positions, instrument and recorder readings, annunciator alarms, and housekeepin Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . -. . . . .

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10. Safeguards Inspection (71707)-

In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspector included a review of ~ the licensee's physical security progra The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities including: protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and, compensatory post In addition, the resident inspector observed protected area lighting, protected and vital areas barrier integrity and verified an interface between the security organiza-tion and operations or maintenance. Specifically, the resident inspector visited the central alarm station, the security emergency diesel generator room and the security battery and inverter rooms. The replacement of relays for the auto start of the emergency (Onan) diesel generator was observe Within the areas inspected, no violatioas or deviations were identifie . IJ Emergency Diesel Generator At 5:23 a.m., on April 23, 1986, the Unit IJ diesel failed to start. On the second start, it took 15.2 seconds to come up to spee The IJ emergency diesel was started to prove operability before taking the 1H emergency diesel out of service for preventative maintenance. The IJ diesel had undergone preventative maintenance on April 21, 1986, and was started for a performance test on April 22, 1986. At that time, it was run for two hour During the third start, at approximately 9:30 a.m. , the IJ diesel started within seven second The licensee inspected the IJ diesel auxiliary systems and determined that the cause of diesel failure to start was air leakage into the fuel oil filter . Station Battories In following up on the causes that led to the licensee's notification of Unit 2 station battery banks being incperable on April 16, 1986, due to low specific gravity, the inspectors reviewed the design package for battery replacement and the battery performance procedure The Design Control Procedure (DCP) 85 00, which was used for the inspection of the Exide batteries during the February - March 1986 outage, was reviewed in its entiret It was checked for technical content and adherence to Administrative Procedure 3.1, which controls design changes. DCP 85-30 was applied to the change out of batteries 2-I, 2-II, and 2-III. Battery 2-IV is a C-D battery. The follcwing comments were identified as a result of this review: A float voltage of 135 volts was established at the end of testing of the newly installed batterie The vendor's (Exide) manual allows a range of float voltages for the batteries; on April 16, 1986, the "as found" float voltage was 133 volts and it was in that rang _ .

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7 The design change deficiency reports do not presently indicate any disposition required prior to acceptanc The presentation of the design control procedure by the station based design engineer to the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee (SNSOC) was done by telex in this case; normally the design engineer is at the meetin The documentation sent out by the design control engineer, which required the different departments to identify documents that were required to be changed, was not returned in a timely fashion. The responses only indicated the documents that were to be changed but did not make any determination as to whether the change was required prior to operability, After battery installation and prior to operability the final specific gravities of the batteries were low but in the acceptable rang The following logs and performance tests were reviewed to gather background information on the batteries:

2-LOG-6F dated April 5, 10, 15 and 16; 2-PT-85 "DC Distribution Systems" The last four completed procedures were reviewed; 2-PT-86A "DC Distribution Systems-H Bus" The last test was reviewe PT-86A indicates the float charge should be 133 1 5 volts for battery 2-I and 134 1 5 volts for battery 2-II; 2-PT-868 indicates the float charge should be 1331 5 volts for battery 2-III and 133 1 5 volts for battery 2-IV; 2-PT-87-1 " Diesel Generator Battery";

i EMP-C-BY-2 " Main Station Battery Charging";

EMP-C-BY-1 " Station Battery Repairs" Procedures 2-PT-86A and 2-PT-868 do nct appear to have been changed with regard to the required battery float charge following battery change out (i.e. installation of Exide batteries). The inspector discussed this item with the licensee and it was determined that a change in float charge of

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133 volts to 135 volts was not necessarily required because it weald have little affect if any on specific gravity, l

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Exide certified that the licensee has performed battery installation in

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accordance with Exide requirements; however, Exide determined that a l one-time adjustment needs to be made to some of the cells to bring them into l conformance with the operating parameters of the station. The vendor will

[ define the type of adjustment at the later dat Thus, pending receipt of l

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the vendor's recommendation and the licensee's implementation this item will remain an inspector follow-up item (IFI) 338, 339/86-10-0 . Licensee Plans for Coping with Strikes (92709)

On May 2,1986, the inspectors were notified by the licensee that negotia-tions with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) had broken down and a walkout was scheduled for midnight of the 2nd. The inspector returned to the site and reviewed the licensee's Strike Contin-gency Plan and was onsite when the walkout was scheduled. The walkout did not take place, as there was an agreement reached at about 9:00 p.m. on the 2nd to continue with negotiations on the 3rd with the understanding that a walkout would not happen as long as negotiations were ongoing. On the evening of May 3, 1986, a tentative agreement was reached and the strike was averte During review of the licensee Strike Contingency Plan, the inspector raised the following concern: Although most key positions were identified and addressed in the plan, it was unclear as to whether consideration was given to ensuring that sufficient personnel would be available to support plant operations in parallel with the possible need to implement the Radiological Emergency Plan. The licensee committed to address the inspector concern and this item is identified as inspector follow-up item (IFI) 338,339/86-10-0 ,

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