IR 05000338/1986020

Insp Repts 50-338/86-20 & 50-339/86-20 on 860804-0914.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Ler Followup,Monthly Maint & Surveillance Observations,Followup of Reactor Trip Event & ESF Sys Walkdown

ML20214W016
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	09/23/1986
From:	Caldwell J, Ignatonis A, King L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214V995	List: IR 05000338/1986020 ML20214V993
References
50-338-86-20, 50-339-86-20, NUDOCS 8610020471
Download: ML20214W016 (9)

Text

.

a UNITED STATES l' [v Krigb o

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f [T o

REGION 11 l g ,j '

, 101 MARIETTA STREET, * '* ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323 L

• % *...+ ] ^

,

.

Report N6s.: 50-338/86-20 and'50-339/8'6-20

[icensee: ' Virgir.ia Electric' & Power Company

'

Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.: 50-338.and 50-339 -

Facility Name: North Anna 11'and_2

. Inspection' Conducted: August 4 - September 14, 1986 Inspecto s: [d .c[e den 9b3/J'l, Date' Signed J. L. Caldkd11, 'Sgnior Resident Inspector

'

n. n Ah L. P. King,()tesideg In'spector

~

sh3ln Date'Sigried Approved by: M d) _ ab', _ 1/23/ff Oate Signed

' Division A. J. Ig'nat6 hists'e/ ProjectsftiohChief of Reacto SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection by the resident inspectors. involved the following areas plant status, . licensee action on previous enforcement matters, Licensee-Event Report (LER) followup, review of Inspector Followup Items, monthly maintenance observation, monthly surveillance observation, ESF system walkdown, operational safety verification, followup of a reactor trip event, and secondary water chemistry revie Results: No violations or deviations were identifie '724 8 PDR ADOCK 0000 G

.

I

_

.

.

.

REPORT DETAILS i Licensee Employees Contacted

• E. W. Harrell, Station Manager

• R. C. Driscoll, Quality Control (QC) Manager G. E. Kane, Assistant Station Manager

.

• E. R. Smith, Assistant Station Manager R. O. Enfinger, Superintendent, Operations

• M. R. Kansler, Superintendent, Maintenance A. H. Stafford, Superintendent, Health Physics

~

• J. A. Stall, Superintendent, Technical Services J. L. Downs, Superintendent, Administrative Services

• J. R. Hayes, Operations Coordinator D. A. Heacock, Engineering Supervisor D. E. Thomas, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor E. C. Tuttle, Electrical Supervisor R. A. Bergquist, Instrument Supervisor F. T. Termine11a, QA Supervisor R. S. Thomas, Superintendent Engineering -

G. H. Flowers, Nuclear Specialist

• G. Harkness, Licensing Coordinator, NAPS

• W. Craft, Licensing Coordinator, Surry Other licensee employees contacted include technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne * Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 12, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this i inspectio (0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 338,339/86-20-01: Correct the inconsis-tencies in the valve lineup procedures, drawings and actual conditions for the locking of auxiliary feedwater system discharge valves. Paragraph 9.

l (0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 338/86-20-02: Followup on licensee's corrective actions for ensuring that inadvertent safety injection does not recur when performing PT-3 Paragraph (Closed) Inspector Followup Itme 338/81-05-05: Followup Permanent Change To Undersized Pressurized Heater Cabelin (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 338,339/85-03-01: Procedures for Closing Tornado Doors.

l l

l

_ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ __ __ . _ . .

.

l

.

.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 338,339/85-05-01: Auxiliary. Feedwater Valve Lineup Problem . Plant Status

'

Unit 1 began this inspection period operating at 100% power until August 13, i 1986, when the measured unidentified leakage exceeded the Technical Specification limit of 1 gpm (approximately 2.6 gpm). The unit entered the Technical Specification 3.4.6.2b action statement and approximately three hours later, the licensee commenced unit shutdown and declared an. unusual even Entry into the containment revealed the leak was coming from the loop C RTD bypass flow element flange. The leak was isolated, and the unidentified leakage was reduced to 0.27 gpm which allowed securing from the action statement -and the unusual even On August 14, 1986, Unit 1 i commenced a startup, but at approximately 11:34 p.m. , with the shutdown banks fully withdrawn an intermediate range high flux trip signal was received causing the shutdown bank to drop into the core. The cause of the trip signal was due to a faulty jumper installation on an Intermediate Range (IR) instrument terminal block during a replacement of the IR N36 drawer (see paragraph 11 for details). The unit was returned to 100% power on August 16, 1986, with a calculated unidentified leakage of 0.248 gpm.

l On August 18, 1986, the Unit 1 3A feedwater heater developed a large tube leak requiring a power reduction to approximately 88% so that the A feedwater heater train could be isolated. During this power reduction, the oxygen'

level exceeded the action level 2 guidelines of Administrative Procedure 19.22, Secondary System Chemistry, which requires the unit' to reduce power to less than- 30%. The licensee chose not to reduce power based . on an

, evaluation and decision made by the Vice President, station management and the technical staff (see details in paragraph 12). Unit I was returned to 100% power on August 20, 1986.

1 On August 21, 1986, after several unsuccessful attempts to stop a packing

'

leak on 'C' feed regulating valve, the licensee reduced power to less than 30%, so that the 'C' feed regulating valve could be isolated and repacke On August 22, the 'C' feed regulating valve had been repaired, but because of a tear in the boot between the turbine and the main condenser, the i

-

licensee shut the unit down. The boot was repaired and the unit was started up on August 24, 1986, and placed back on line on August 25, 1986.

b On August 27, 1986, the Unit 1 turbine developed significant vibration causing the operators to nanually trip the turbine and the reacto Inspection of the turbine revealed damage to the outer turbine blades of one of the low pressure turbine rotors. The unit is presently shutdown and cooled down *n Mode 5 while one low pressure turbine rotor is being replaced and-the other is being inspected. The licensee is performing other maintenance during this extended outage including replacement of the reactor coolant pump 0-rings which caused leakage problems recently in the Unit 2 reactor coolant pump On September 10, 1986, at 12 : 21 p.m. , the safety , injection system was actuated. It was reset at 12:24 p.m. The pressurizer level increased from 20% to 50%. (An addition of 1200 gallons) The initiation occurred during

'

.- , . _ . . , . . - _- .--_- -. -

. , , - , , - - _ ,. - - . . , -

. . , . _ , , _ _

.

.

the performance of PT 36.1B, Periodic Test " Reactor Protection and ESF Logic-Test Train B". The reactor was in Mode 5 at approximately 190 degrees Fahrenhei During the performance of ' the test, the reactor operator inadvertently reset pressurizer lo-lo pressure on Train The boron injection tank was injected via~the charging pump and the diesel started as required. Two of the charging pumps and the two low head safety injection pumps were in pull to lock as required by the procedure. The inspectors will followup. :This is identified as Inspector Followup Item 338/86-20-0 Unit 2 began the inspection period on August 4,1986, with an unidentified leakage rate of 1.3. gpm exceeding the Technical Specification 3.4.6.2b limits of I gpm. At 1:00 a.m., on August 5,1986, the unit commenced a shutdown and declared an unusual event. Entry into containment revealed three valves with leaks, one of which was a body to bonnet leak on the loop A hot leg stop valve. The unit had to be shut down, cooled down, depressurized, and the level lowered to allow repair of the stop valve. On August 11, 1986, the repairs were completed, the unit was refilled, and a bubble established in the pressurizer in preparation for the unit startu On August 12, 1986, with the unit at approximately 2200 psig, still shutdown, the unidentified leakage was measured at approximately 4.4 gpm. The unit again entered the action statement and approximately three hours later commenced a cooldown and an unusual event was declared. This time the leakage was discovered coming from the A and C reactor coolant pumpt (RCP)

in the area of the seal assembly lower flange connection to the pump ' casing upper flange. The licensee replaced the 0-rings for all three RCPs and returned the unit to operation at approximately 30% power on August 19, 1986. Unit 2 is presently operating at 100% powe On. August 25, 1986, the Commission approved ~ the licensee's request -for a core power upgrade from 2775 megawatts-thermal (MWT) to 2893 MWT for Unit The licensee commenced recalibrating instruments and changing the setpoints of protection and _ control system on September 2, 1986. On September 5, 1986, Unit 2 was raised to a power level of 2893 MWT which now corresponds to 100% powe . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(Closed) Violation 338,339/85-27-01: Failure to Maintain Quality Records for Tracing Qualifications of Personne On April 1, 1986, Administrative Procedure 3.1 was revised to require the signer of steps in the master colored controlled copy to indicate, alongside his signature, the name of the signer of the same steps in the white working copy if different than the individual signing the master colored controlled cop . Licensee Event Repert (LER) Follow-Up (90712 & 92700)

The following LER was reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that reporting requirements had been met, that causes had been identified, that corrective actions appeared appropriate, that generic applicability had been considered, and that the LER forms were complete. Additionally, the inspectors confirmed that no unreviewed safety questions were involved and that violations of regulations or Technical Specification (TS) conditions had been identified.

i

'

,.

. - .

.

.

(Closed) LER 338/86-07, Diesel Driven Fire Pump Out of Service Greater Than

'Seven Day . Review of Inspector Followup Items (92701)

(0 pen) IFI 338,339/84-27-05: " Organization of Offsite Review Committee".

The inspector reviewed this IFI and the inspector comments status for this item is given belo The following response should be closed out:

Inspector Comment The licensee has responded that the Independent Operational Event Review Group is a subsection of the Safety Evaluation and Control Staf Inspector Comments 2, 3, 4 and 5 will be left OPEN pending a further review of the Safety Evaluation and Control Staf (Closed) IFI 338/81-05-05: " Followup Permanent Change To -Undersized Pressurized Heater Cabeling". The work was accomplished in the last outage on Unit (Closed) IFI 338,339/85-03-01: " Procedures for Closing Tornado Doors". The inspectors reviewed 1-AP-41, Severe Weather Conditions. This procedure establishes the necessary requirements for partial and full closing of the plant rolling steel doors during various severe weather condition (Closed) IFI 338,339/85-05-01: " Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Lineup Problems".

The inspectors verified that all the comments concerned with the auxiliary feedwater system had been incorporated in the procedure . Monthly Maintenance (62703)

Station maintenance activities affecting safety related systems and components were observed / reviewed, to ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifications.

[ The inspectors reviewed the procedure and maintenance repair to charging This was accomplished using procedure MMP-C-CH-2. The pump

'

, pump 1-CH-P-1 ran satisfactorily after the repairs,- but was later shutdown due to excessive oil leakag The pump remains inoperabl The inspectets observed packing repairs to Unit 2 main feedwater regulating valves for all three steam. generators. Maintenance procedure MMP-C-GV-1.5, packing control form and engineering work request EWR 85-68 (which installs i live loading washers under packing gland nuts) were all reviewe The licensee has contacted the manufacturer concerning the diagnosis of the failure of 2-CH-P-18. (See inspection report 338,339/86-18, paragraph 8)

The manufacturer states that failures like this have occurred from overfilling of the reservoir on the motor bearings. A condition can be set up where the

!

-- .- _ - - . - _ . . _- . . - - -

.

.

.

oil is lost. Instructions have been incorporated to prevent overfilling of the reservoirs. The inspectors will followup on any failures of charging pumps. Presently, the motor for 1-CH-P-1C is being changed to replace the failed motor on 2-CH-P-1B. 2-CH-P-1B remains inoperabl No violations or deviations were identified. Monthly Surveillance (61726)

The inspectors observed / reviewed Technical Specification required testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation (LCO) were met and that any deficiencies identified were properly reviewed and resolve On August 5, 1986, the inspectors reviewed 2 PT 52.2, procedure used to determine primary leakages. The procedure identified the unidentified leakage to be 1.31 gpm and the unit was. shutdown to make repairs. Also, 2-PT-75.2A, Service Water Pump, 2-SW-P-1A was reviewed by the inspector The inspectors reviei.,ed 1-PT-74.2 A&B for component cooling water pumps. A new baseline curve was generated for Unit 2 B component cooling water pum Also, observed performance of 1-PT-14.3 for 1-CH-P-1C. This was performed to prove operability after maintenance on the pum On August 28, 1986, the inspectors witnessed portions of PT 213.11 " Valve Inservice Inspection Service Water".

The inspectors witnessed 1-PT-82J 31-day test on IJ Emergency Diesels on August 28, 198 No problems were identifie On September 3, 1986, the inspectors observed 2 PT 71.2, 2-FWP-3 No problems were identifie No violations or deviations were identified. ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The following selected ESF systems were verified operable by performing a walkdown of the accessible and essential portions of the systems on September 9, 198 Valve checkoff was performed on Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System 2-0P-31.2 The following are comment Valve 2-FW-194 should be indicated as locked closed on the valve checkoff lis Valve 2-FW-173 is not locked closed, but the drawing shows it locked close Valves 2-FW-281 and 2-FW-280 are located in the motor driven pump room and not in the turbine driven pump room as listed on page 6 of the valve checkoff lis .

..

The inspectors also performed a quick look at the auxiliary feedwater discharge valves for Unit 1 and determined inconsistencies in the locking requirements for those valves als The auxiliary feedwater discharge valves are either open or closed to ensure independence between the three auxiliary feedwater pumps as required by Technical Specification The licensee's corrective action for the inconsistencies in the locking requirement for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater discharge valves will be reviewed by the inspectors and identified as inspector followup item IFI 338,339/86-20-0 No violations or deviations were identified.

.1 Operational Safety Verification (71707)

By observations during the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the control room manning requirements were being met. In addition, the inspectors observed shift turnover to verify that continuity of syste status was maintained. The inspectors periodically questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of plant condition Through log review and plant tours, the inspectors verified compliance with selected Technical Specification (TS) and Limiting Conditions for Operation In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included a review. of the ' licensee's physical security progra The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed .in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access controls, searching of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory post In addition, the resident inspectors observed protected area lighting, protected and vital areas barrier integrity and verified an interface between the security organization and operations or maintenanc On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWP) were reviewed and the specific work activity was monitored to assure the activities were being conducted per the RWP Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked and equipment operability and calibration frequency was verifie The inspectors kept informed, on a daily basis, of overall status of both units and of any significant safety matter related to plant operation Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the operations staff on a regular basi Selected portions of operating logs and data sheets were reviewed dail The inspectors conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the Control Room. Observations included: witnessing work activities in progress; verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems and equipment; confirming valve positions, instrument and recorder readings, annuciator alarms, and housekeepin During a forced outage on Unit 2 in August 1986, the licensee informed the inspectors that several Limitorque Motor Operated Valves (MOVS) would be

'

.

worked replacing the existing wiring with Environmentally Qualified (EQ)

wiring. The reason for this replacement was the licensee's inability to verify the qualification of the existing wirin Discussions between the licensee, Region II Management, and the inspectors on August 12 and 13, 1986, revealed that approximately 160 Limitorque MOVs in both Unit 1 and Unit 2 had wiring which could not be verified as. qualifie The problem with the wiring qualification was discovered in February 1986 by a licensee QA inspector and an internal Justification for Continued Operation (JCO), NE Technical Report No. EQ-5 was issued April 7, 1986. This JC0 concluded that the valves were considered operable and replacement of unqualified wiring should be performed no later than the third refueling outage for each unit subsequent to the 1986 spring outage for Unit On August 13, 1986, the licensee was requested to provide the Region with a formal JC0 and a schedule for completion of the unqualified wire replacemen 'This JC0 was issued on August 15, 1986, for Regional review. In the JCO, the licensee committed to completing the wiring replacement for Unit 2 before commencing a startup-from the present forced outage and the completion of Unit 1 during the next outage of sufficient duration, but no later than the next refueling outag The licensee has informed the inspectors that all wiring replacement for Unit 2 Limitorque MOVs was completed in the August outage as committed, and the Unit I wiring replacement had recently been completed during the present forced outage for Unit I which commenced' August 28, 1986.

J No violations or deviations were identifie . Operating Reactor Events (93702)

The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed reactor events. The review included determination of cause, safety significance, performance of personnel and systems, and corrective action. The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts, operations journal entries, scram reports and had discussions with operations, maintenance and

engineering support personnel as appropriat August 14, 1986, at approximately 11:34 a.m. , Unit 1 experienced a reactor

'

trip. At the time of the trip signal, Unit I was in Mode 3 with the shutdown banks withdrawn and control banks inserted, commencing a reactor startu The trip signal was an Intermediate Range (IR) high flux level trip signal that resulted from an improperly installed jumper on IR M-36 instrument drawe Instrument technicians were in the process of removing power from the drawer far the purpose of replacing i The jumper was installed to prevent a trip signal from being generated when the control power fuses were-removed. Upon removal of the control power fuses, an IR high flux rate trip signal was generated causing the shutdown banks to drop into the cor Investigation by the licensee revealed that the jumper previously installed had fallen off one of the connectors, therefore, allowing the generation of a trip signal when control power was removed from the drawer.

i

, . - - -- , , , - . - , _ -

_

..

.

Discussion. with the technicians involved, and a review of the procedure, revealed a method for verifying that the jumper is installed prior to pulling the control power fuses. The licensee is evaluating this method for incorporation into procedure IMP-C-N1-01, Repair of the Nuclear Instrumentation Syste No violations or~ deviations.were identifie . Chemistry Administrative Procedure 19.22 " Secondary Plant Chemistry" states that "the importance of establishing and maintaining appropriate water chemistry conditions in the secondary plant cannot be over emphasized. A contributin cause of these problems has been the formation of locally corrosive environments as a result of the ingress of impyr' ties during plant operation. It is generally accepted that feedwater 1: ;urities, especially oxygen and acid anions, are the most serious contrixtors to the corrosion process in systems in contact with the feedwater, condensate and steam. These problems have resulted in the loss of availability and have increased total personnel radiation exposure associated with the inspection, maintenance and repair of steam generators."

Chemistry procedures on the secondary plant require the dissolved oxygen to be less than .01 ppm. On August 17, 1986, at 6:15 p.m., the level increased to .014 ppm which required an action level 1 guideline. This requires the problem to be corrected within one week. On August 17, 1986, at 8:50 p.m.,

the level increased to .035 ppm. The chemistry procedure requires greater than .03 ppm to be an action level 2 guideline. This requires shutdown to-less than 30% power until the problem is correcte However, the procedure does allow deviation from the action level guideline The procedure states that " prior to reaching a decision to deviate from a defined specification or action level a technical review should be performed by appropriate chemistry, operational and management to support such a decision."

A decision was made based on this review not to reduce power. The problem was thought to be a tube leak in the 3A feedwater heater, and a reduction in power would place the heaters in a vacuum condition which could possibly -

increase the air leakage. The heater was removed from service and the tube leak repaired. The oxygen level remained above specifications and action was taken that determined there was a leak in the boot from the low pressure turbine to the condenser. The leak was temporarily repaired and the oxygen level began to decreas The oxygen level remained in the action level 2 guidelines from August 17, 1986, at 8:50 p.m. to August 19, 1986, at 2:15 p.m. with the exception that on August 18, 1986, it decreased to .03 ppm at 12:44 a.m. but increased back to .036 ppm at 2:20 a.m. Subsequently, this situation was corrected during the remainder of this inspection perio . - - . .-- . _ . . _- ., - - . . - . _ - - .-