IR 05000338/1986006

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Insp Repts 50-338/86-06 & 50-339/86-06 on 860303-0406.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Ler Review,Esf Walkdown,Operational Safety Verification,Monthly Maint & Monthly Surveillance
ML20203P266
Person / Time
Site: North Anna  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 04/24/1986
From: Branch M, Ignatonis A, King L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203P261 List:
References
50-338-86-06, 50-338-86-6, 50-339-86-06, 50-339-86-6, NUDOCS 8605060469
Download: ML20203P266 (7)


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A Atc UNITED STATES

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. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

. REGION 11

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' Report Nos.: 50-338/86-06 and 50-339/86-0 Licensee: . Virginia Electric & Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.: 50-338 and 50-339 Facility Name: North Anna 1 and 2 Inspection Conda-ted: arp 3 - April ,-1986 Inspectors: hN Vr/L{ f 2i M. W. Brdnch R Seni 7 esident Inspectbr 04te $igned (Lu ukh L . P .' ' dg ~

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3 b Gate Sighed A. J. Igr)ttonis, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: . This routine inspection by the. resident inspactors involved 222 inspector-hours on site in the areas of licensee event report- (LER) review, engincering safety features (ESF) walkdown, operational safety verification, monthly maintenance, monthly surveillance, and observation of ' the Unit 2~

refuelin Results: Of the areas inspected, no violations o'r deviations were: identifie '

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REPORT DETAILS d Licensee Employees Contacted -

E. W. Harrell, Station Manager D. B. Roth, Quality Control (QC) Manager s

G. E. Kane, Assistant Station Manager

.E. R. Smith,' Assistant Station Manager

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  • R. O. Enfinger, Superintendent, Operations
  • M.~R. Kansler, Superintendent, Maintenance A. H._Stafford, Superintendent, Health Physics J. A. Stall, Superintendent, Technical Services  !

J. L. Downs, Supervisor, Administrative Services J. R. Hayes, Operations Coordinator

'D. A. Heacock, Engineering Supervisor D. E. Thomas, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor E. C. Tuttle, Electrical Supervisor R. A. Bergquist, Instrument Supervisor F. T. Terminella,-QA Supervisor R. S. Thomas, Supervisor Engineering G. H. Flowers, Nuclear Specialist J. H.'Leberstein, Licensing Coordinator Other licensee employees contacted include technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne * Attended exit interview Exit Interview The-inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 14, 1986, with those oersons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of t the inspectio material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this 4 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

.(Closed) Violation 338,339/85-18-02: Failure to perform 1-PT-85. The ,

inspectors reviewed and found acceptable the licensee's response to the

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' concerns identified in the inspection report. The missed surveillance was shown to be an isolated cas (Closed) Violation 338,339/84-09-02: Response time tests have unacceptable acceptance criteri The inspectors reviewed and 'found acceptable the

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licensee's response to the concerns identified in the inspection recor All' surveillance documents referenced in 2-PT-36.8 and 2-PT-36.7.1 which

were found to be in violation have been revised and incorporated into the

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surveillance program.

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(Closed) Violation 338/85-22-01: Failure to comply with the RVLIS. Action requirements of TS 3.3.3.6.a. The inspectors reviewed and found acceptable the licensee's response to the concerns identified in the inspection repor (Closed) Violation 339/85-12-04: Failure to properly conduct surveillance requirement of TS 4.8.2.3.2 (Battery Levels). .The inspectors reviewed and found acceptable the licensee's response to the concerns identified in the-inspection repor (Closed) Deviation 338,339/85-12-03: Failure to use Turbine Load Limiter as described in FSAR (excessive loading of the turbine). The inspectors

. reviewed and found acceptable the licensee's response. The licensee's

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response was forwarded to NRR and found acceptabl . Plant Status Unit 1 At 7:52 a.m. on March 26, 1986, there was a reactor trip-turbine trip on high steam line flow coincident with low steam line pressure. The reactor trippad from 100% powe The cause was determined to be an inadvertent cloture of' the "B" steam generator trip valve. The safety injection systems opertted as required and were reset at 8:00 a.m. The "A" charging pump was operating at the time of the trip and should have stopped when the "B" and

"C" charging pumps came on. The cause for this was investigated by the

.licens=e and found to be a burned out relay which normally would have energi;ed the trip coil for the breaker. The burned out relay was replace Unit 1 vas brought critical at 6:53 a.m. on March 27, 198 It is currently at 100% powe Unit 2 Unit 2 was undergoing refueling during the inspection period and was returned to criticality on April 1, 198 The unit is currently at 50%

power for flux mappin . Licensee Event Report (LER) Follow-Up

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The following LERs were reviewed and close The inspector verified that reporting requirements had been met, that causes had been identified, that corrective actions appeared appropriate, that generic applicability had been considered, and that the LER forms were complete. Additionally, the inspectors confirmed that no unreviewed safety questions were involved and that violations of regulations or TS conditions had been identified.

(Closed) LER 338/86-01 Reactor / Turbine Trip, January 19, 1986. The trip was caused - by use of the wrong key in the turbine overspeed protection controller key switc Investigation showed that the steam generator wet layup interlock key was similar to the OPC key and would actuate the switch to the "overspeed test" positio In order to preclude recurrence of this i

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event, the administrative key log book has been revised to list the turbine OPC key _ as having the same administrative key number as the steam generator wet layup key. The key that was previously listed as the turbine OPC key-has been discarde (Closed) LER-338/85-28 Incorrect Information Provided for Employee's Form NRC- The licensee investigated the event and determined that it was caused by a clerical error at the employee's last work locatio (Closed) LER 338/85-27 Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Channels Inoperable. The licensee has replaced the two-inch Rockwell Manufacturing globe stop valve that caused the error in Channel 3 and placed the spare RTD in service for Channel (0 pen) LER 339/86-02 Reactor Trip-Source Range Detector Failur Investigation is currently being carried on into the reason for the source range detector failure (Closed) LER 339/86-03 -Security Breach - Potential for Unauthorized Entry into Vital Area. In order to preclude future occurrence of a similar event, security personnel have been instructed to tag any devices or equipment temporarily used to maintain physical security inside the protected ~ area that could be subject to inadvertent remova (Closed) LER 338/86-02 Reactor / Turbine Trip - Turbine Control System Malfunction. Extensive testing of the EHC system showed no problem that could be attributed to the sporadic trip. Further investigation replaced some components in the EHC system, but no malfunction could be identified as the cause of the tri . Follow-up of Previously Identified Items (Closed) IFI 338,339/85-01-03: Licensee to Provide Basis for TS Channel Check Acceptanc The inspectors reviewed and found acceptable the licensee's response to the concerns identified in the inspection repor The method of determining the channel acceptance criteria changed from high to low compariso (Closed) IFI 338,339/84-41-05: 2-PT-61.3 Working Copies Are Incomplet The inspectors reviewed and found acceptable the licensee's response to the concerns identified in the inspection repor (Closed) IFI 338/84-33-01: Valve Lineup Problems on Auxiliary Feed a~1 Accumulators. The inspectors reviewed and found acceptable the licensae's response to the concerns identified in the inspection report. The labeling-has been correcte '

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(Closed) IFI 338,339/85-03-03: Followup on When Required Testing After Painting and ICP for Reservoir Leve (Instrument Calibration Procedure (ICP) L-RW-103) The inspectors reviewed and found acceptable the licensee's response. Procedures have been generated to ensure that the instrumentation is calibrated on a periodic basi (Closed) IFI 338/85-01-01: Significance of Valve Positions on Drawing FM 96A ~shows 1-SI-312 and 315 open when actually close The inspectors reviewed and found acceptable the licensee's response. The drawings were modified to show the valves close (Closed) IFI 338,339/85-01-02: Update LHSI Lineup to Correct M0V-1890A1B Position. Valve lineup I&2 OP 7.1A does not show correct lineup. The inspectors.revievad and found acceptable the licensee's response. The valve checklists'were revised to correct the concern . Monthly Maintenance Station maintenance activities affecting safety related systems and components were observed / reviewed, to ascertain that the activities were '

conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with TF. See paragraph 12 for diesel generator problem . Monthly Surveillance The inspectors observed and reviewed TS required testing and verified that testing was performed ~ in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation (LCO)

were met and that any deficiencies identified were properly reviewed and resolve . ESF System Walkdown The following selected ESF systems were verified operable by performing a walkdown of the accessible and essential portions of the systems on March 25, 198 The valve lineups were verified for the A, B, and C accumulators on Unit 2. This was prior to Unit 2 restarting from the refueling outag '1 Routine Inspection By observations during the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the control room manning requirements were being met. In addition, the inspectors observed shift turnover to verify that continuity of system status was maintained. The inspectors periodically questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of plant condition Through log review and plant tours, the inspectors verified compliance with selected Technical Specifications (TS) and Limiting Conditions for Operation i

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During the course of the inspection, observations relative to Protected and Vital Area security were made, including . access controls, boundary integrity, search, escort and badgin On a regular basis, Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) were reviewed and the specific work conducted activity per the RWPs. was monitored to assure the activities were being Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked and equipment operability and calibration frequency was'

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The inspectors were kept informed, on a daily basis, of overall status of '

both units and of any significant safety matter relcted to plant operation Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the operati or. staff on a regular basis. Selected portions of operating logs and data sheets were reviewed dail The inspectors conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the Control Room. Observations included: witnessing work activities in progress; verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems and equipment; confirming valve positions, instrument and recorder readings, annunciator alarms, and housekeepin . Refueling Outage During the Unit 2 refueling outage, both emergency diesel generators were overhauled. The 2H emergency diesel generator (EDG) exhibited elongation of the wrist pin bushings. This generator had been run approximately 80 hour9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> The wrist pin bushings were replaced with new bushings. A meeting was held at North Anna and the cause of elongation was discussed. The suspected elongation was attributed to the type of oil used (Gulf XHD40) which caused excessive foaming. Chevron Delo 6000 oil was used after the overhaul. It was agreed that a 120 hour0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> load test would be run. The licensee selected to run the 2H diesel. After the load test, the clearances were checked between the floating bushings and insert bushings on all upper pistons. On March 27, the test was completed and the licensee had taken gap measurements between the bushing elongation. The Results showed no evidence of any significant bushing Region based inspectors and the resident inspectors observed the licensee in performing the bushing gap measurement The licensee was requested to provide a comprehensive engineering evaluation to determine the appropriateness of the floating bushing design and support the theory of improper lobe oil use. On March 21, 1986, the licensee said they will perform the requested study and committed to provide the initial report within 90 days. Also, the licensee was requested to develop a more comprehensive periodic maintenance p'rogram for detection of any further problems. On March 21, 1986, the licensee committed to such a program ~ to take gap measurements between the floating bushing and the insert bushing approximately every six months or every 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> of accumulated EDG runtime, whichever comes first. The oil will be sampled once a month and will be checked for foaming 4ctio !! ^

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The NRC expressed concern that the licensee has not met the intent of Unit 2 TS requirement to perform the 24-hour test run after the 18-month mainte-nance inspection. The licensee acknowledged and committed to perform the

- 24-hour run on each emergency diesel generator after the 18-month mainte-nance. inspectio The resident inspectors witnessed the overhaul and replacement of parts on both the 2H and 2J diesels. This included replacement of liners, pistons, wrist pin bushings, EDG 2H turbo charger, and all of the modified fuel pump The inspectors -witnessed the overspeed of the diesel, the gap readings taken on the blowers and the timing of the fuel pumps using

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a . stroke gage. The 24-hour run in of both the 2H and 2J diesels was observed which included the measurement of bearing clearance . : Refueling Activity (60710)

The inspectors witnessed various refueling evolutions during reloading of fuel assemblies from the spent fuel pool to the reactor vessel for Unit These evolutions included transfer of several fuel asemblies from the spent-fuel pool to the transfer cart, verification of the proper fuel assembly by visual. observation of identification number, prcper operation and control of transfer equipment used during fuel movement and transfer' of several fue assemblies from the transfer cart to the reactor vessel . core area in the reactor building The- inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and Westinghouse personnel performing the fuel assembly handling evolutions to ensure that personnel were properly trained and were following approved procedures. The inspectors verified that adequate housekeeping, radiological and account-ability controls were established and implemente The inspectors visited the Westinghouse trailers and observed the ISI'

testing of a reactor vessel nozzle, and the eddy current testing of the "C" steam generator. Westinghouse personnel were interviewed to determine the type of plugging technique used. Also, the Wyle Laboratories trailer was visited to observe the type of testing used for snubber No violations or deviations were identified during this inspectio ,

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