IR 05000327/1982010
| ML20055A215 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 05/21/1982 |
| From: | Butter S, Ford E, Quick D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055A184 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-82-10, 50-328-82-10, NUDOCS 8207150582 | |
| Download: ML20055A215 (7) | |
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uq'o UNITED STATES g
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SulTE 3100 o
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Gg Report tios. 50-327/82-10 and 50-328/82-10 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility flame:
Sequoyah tiuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79 Inspection at Sequo ah site near Soddy Daisy, Tennessee M
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L Inspectors:
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E. E. F d /'
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/Date/ Signed
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S. D. Butler ' ~
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Approved by:
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D. R. Quick, Seftion Chief, Division of Date Signed Project and Resident Programs SUtti1ARY Inspection on April 6 - flay 5,1982 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 144 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Operational Safety Verification, Licensee Event Report Review and Independent Inspection Effort.
Results Of the three areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in two areas; two violations were found in one area (Failure to follow procedure by operator (327/82-10-01) (paragraph 5) and failure to maintain ABGTS operable (327/82-10-02, 328/82-10-02) (paragraph 5).
8207150582 820630 PDR ADOCK 05000327 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees C. C. Mason, Plant Superintendent J. E. Cross, Assistant Plant Superintendent P. R. Wallace, Assistant Plant Superintendent J. II. licGriff, Assistant Plant Superintendent J. W. Doty, itaintenance Supervisor (M)
B. M. Patterson, Maintenance Supervisor (I)
D. C. Craven, liaintenance Supervisor (E)
L. ft. Nobles, Operations Supervisor R. W. Fortenberry, Results Supervisor R. J. Kitts, Health Physics Supervisor J. T. Crittenden, Public Safety Service Supervisor R. L. Hamilton, Quality Assurance Supervisor it. R. Ilarding, Compliance Supervisor W. ft. Halley, Preoperational Test Supervisor J. Robinson, Outage Director Other licensee employees contacted included field services craftsmen, technicians, operators, shift engineers, security force members, engineers, maintenance personnel, contractor personnel and corporate office personnel.
Other Organizations E. V. Imbro, USNRC, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operations Data M. T. flasnik, USNRC, Environmental Engineering Branch C. E. Gaskin, USNRC, Physical Security Licensing Branch T. J. Kenyon, USNRC, Licensing Branch Three Region II Inspectors 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized with the Plant Super-intendent and/or members of his staff on April 23 and 11ay 10,1982.
The violation against Units 1 and 2 were discussed and the licensee acknow-ledged.
During the reporting period, frequent discussions are held with the Plant Superintendent and his assistants concerning inspection findings.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-tions. flew unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 5.
5.
Operational Safety Verification The inspectors toured various areas of the plant on a routine basis throughout the reporting period.
The following activities were reviewed / verified:
a.
Adherence to limiting conditions for operation which were directly observable from the control room panels, b.
Control board instrumentation and recorder traces.
c.
Proper control room and shift manning.
d.
The use of approved operating procedures, e.
Unit operator and shift engineer logs.
f.
General shift operating practices.
g.
}iousekeeping practices.
h.
Posting of hold tags, caution tags and temporary alteration tags.
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Personnel, package, and vehicle access control for the plant protected area.
j.
General shift security practices on post manning, vital area access control and security force response to alarms.
k.
Surveillance and start-up testing in progress.
1.
Itaintenance activities in progress, m.
liealth Physics Practices.
During the reporting period both units have experienced several inadvertant reactor trips.
In each instance the inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding the trips, determined that safety-related equipment performed properly, ensured that plant conditions were stabilized and maintained in accordance with approved operating instructions, ensured that the causes of the trips were determined prior to restart and that the flRC was notified in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72. On April 21, 1982 Unit 1 tripped from approximately 8% power due to a malfunction of the steam generator water level control system.
The Unit 1 generator had been taken off the line
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earlier to make repairs to the main generator metering circuitry.
During restart of the unit it tripped again due to loss of power to the Control Rod Drive flechanisms (CRDit).
The inspector reviewed the circumstances leading to the inadvertant trip and discussed them with the personnel involved.
It was determined that while performing a periodic test on the output breaker of the #1 Rod Drive Motor Generator (f1G) set, the operator attempted to close the breaker without properly syncronizing the machine with the operating MG set.
This caused both output breakers to trip open, deenergizing the CRDM's causing the rods to trip in.
Attempting to parallel CRDM f1G sets without synchronizing the machines is contrary to the requirements of System Operating Instruction S01-85.01.
In that technical specification 6.8.1.a required that written procedures be implemented covering activities referenced in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978, including operation of the Control Rod Drive System, a notice of violation will be issued (327/82-10-01).
The output breaker was subsequently inspected, the f1G sets were returned to service and the unit was restarted.
On April 9,1982 the inspectors were informed by the licensee that the Unit 2 containment purge exhaust noble gas monitors were improperly piped into the purge system duct work. The discrepancy was identified during the preparation of a design change request to modify the purge monitor piping on both units to provide more operational flexibility. The redundant monitors 2-RM-90-130 and 131 are designed to be able to draw a sample from either train of purge exhaust air upstream of the exhaust HEPA filters and return the sample air downstream of the A train HEPA filter.
The Unit 2 monitors had the return and supply lines reversed at the monitors which resulted in both monitors being able to draw a sample from "A" train exhaust only, downstream of the HEPA filter.
Instruments 2-RM-90-130 and 131 monitor purge exhaust air for noble gas and provide alann and purge system isolation when activity reaches the monitor setpoint.
In addition to the purge monitors, the upper and lower containment radiation monitors, 2-RM-90-106 and 112 monitor containment activity and provide alarm and purge system isolation on high activity levels.
The purge system exhausts through the shield building ventilation stack which is also monitored by instrument 2-RM-90-100.
Instrument 2-RM-90-100 provides an alarm in the main control room when activity levels reach the setpoint.
The inspectors verified that the licensee complied with the technical specification action requirements for containment ventilation isolation until the purge monitor piping was temporarily modified to enable the monitors to sample both purge exhaust I
trains.
The inspectors notified Region II management and Health Physics
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specialists and the licensee submitted a Licensee Event Report (SQRO-50-328/82-044) to the f1RC.
The licensee has also prepared a design change I
request to permanently modify the monitor piping.
Until the inspectors can complete a review of the licensee's installation and quality assurance requirements as they relate to these radiation monitors the improper installation of 2-Rf t-90-130 and 131 will be carried as an unresolved item l
(328/82-10-01). The licensee subsequently performed an inspection of other i
gaseous effluent monitors throughout the plant and reported that no other l
discrepancies were identified.
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On April 15, 1982 the inspector noted, by control room log review, that the II vital battery had been declared inoperable due to high teminal resistance on one of the cells. The high terminal resistance was discovered during the performance of Surveillance Instruction SI-100 " Vital Battery Operability". The inspector went to the II vital battery room and observed the perfomance of a portion of SI-100 that was in progress.
The inspector also observed the torquing of the cell terminal connection that had a higher than allowable resistance. The torquing was perfomed by electrical maintenance personnel and observed by the cognizant engineer and a quality assurance inspector.
The inspector verified that the proper documentation was available for surveillance testing and maintenance of safety-related equipment and that test equipment and the torque wrench being used was properly calibrated.
Following the torquing of the o'it of tolerance terminal, the resistance was remeasured and found to be acceptable. The battery was declared operable within the time limit allowed by technical specifications before plant shutdown was required.
On April 26, 1982 during a tour of the Auxiliary Building (AB) the inspector noted that both access doors to elevation.690 of the AB were open. The doors constitute part of the auxiliary building secondary containment enclosure boundary and only one of the doors is allowed to be open at a time to ensure that the Amiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) can perfom its intended function in the event of an accident.
The inspector brought the misalignment of the doors to the attention of the shift engineer who was unaware of the condition.
He immediately ordered the doors shut since both units were in a mode which required operability of the ABGTS.
Apparently maintenance had been authorized on the latching mechanism of the inner door and it was propped open to allow for the work. The outer door was subsequently propped open to allow for personnel access to the AB since operation of a single door in the portal is extremely difficult and hazardous due to the pressure differential between the AB and the service building.
In that both Units 1 and 2 were in modes which required ABGTS to be operable and both elevation 690 doors being open simultaneously would have prevented the ABGTS from performing its intended function in the event of an accident, a notice of violation will be issued (327/82-10-02, 328/82-10-02).
l On April 26, 1982 the inspector observed the release of the Cask Decontamination Collecting Tank.
The inspector review ~l the release package
- 82-363-08-134 and reviewed Surveillance Instruction SI-400.01 "Radwaste and Condensate Demimeralizer Liquid Waste Effluent - Batch Release" and System Operating Instruction 501-77.1C3 " Waste Disposal System (Liquid)" which provided administrative controls, sampling requirements, system alignment, and documentation for the release.
It appeared that the release met regulatory and technical specification requirements.
On April 28, 1982 the inspector observed a purge of Unit I lower containment that was in progress. The inspector reviewed the purge package #82-308-P-260 and reviewed Surveillance Instruction SI-410.2 "Containmnet Purge Waste Gas Decay Tank Release" and System Operating Instruction S01-30.2A
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" Containment Purge System Operating" which provide administrative controls, sampling requirements, system alignment and documentation for the release.
It appeared that the release met regulatory and technical specification requiremen ts.
No other violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review During the reporting period, LER's were reviewed on a routine basis as they were received fran the licensee.
Each LER was reviewed to determine that:
a.
The report accurately described the event.
b.
The reported cause was accurate and the LER fann reflected the proper cause code.
c.
The report satisfied the technical specification reporting requirement with respect to information provided and timing of submittal.
d.
Corrective action appeared appropriate to correct the cause of the event.
e.
Corrective action has been or is being taken.
f.
Generic implications if identified were incorporated in corrective action.
Corrective action taken or to be taken was adequate, particularly to prevent recurrence.
h.
The event did not involve continued operation in violation of regulatory requirements or license conditions.
The following LER's tere reivewed by the inspector and are considered closed: 80184, 81006, 81030, 81037, 81048, 81054, 81056, 81059, 81120 thru 81140, 81143 thru 81147, 81149 thru 81153, 81155 thru 81157, 81160, 82004, 82005, 82007 thru 82009, 82011, 82012, 82014, 82015, 82017 thru 82022, 82025, 82027, 82028, 82030 thru 82032, 82034 and 82035.
The following LER's were reviewed and selected for detailed followup or
tracking of long term design changes:
81141, 81142, 81148, 81154, 81158, 81159, 82001 thru 82003, 82006, 82010, 82013, 82024, 82026, 82029 and 82033.
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The inspector reviewed LER 327/81119 and verified that Surveillance Instruction SI-157 " Containment Penetration Leak Rate Test" had been revised to require a data sheet for each penetration tested and a second verifi-cation signoff for returning the penetration to its normal configuration.
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This LER is closed.
The inspector reviewed LER's 328/82016 and 82023, reviewed instrument environmental qualification requirements and discussed them with a regional specialist. The inspector determined that the pressure
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transmitter that failed due to nearby steam leakage is not required to be environmentally qualified in accordance with NUREG 0588 in that it doesn't perfonn a safety-related function.
These LER's are closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Independent Inspection Effort The inspector routinely attended the morning scheduling and staff meetings during the reporting period.
These meetings provide a daily status report on the operational and testing activities in progress as well as a discussion of significant problems or incidents associated with the start-up testing and operations effort.
On April 7,1982 the licensee was informed by Westinghouse that it had been determined during environmental testing that the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Wide Range Pressure Transmitters displayed ambiguities in their accuracy which could result in inappropriate operator actions following an incident. Westinghouse also notified the NRC of this deficiency as well as other owners of Westinghouse designed facilities.
T% NRC subsequently issued information notice IN 82-11 to all nuclear power reactor facilities to ensure that they were informed of the potential deficiency. The licensee evaluated the deficiency and decided to wait until Westinghouse made recommendations for long tenn corrective action before making any notifi-cation.
In the interim period they have made temporary changes to Emergency Operating Instructions to guide operators in the use of alternate pressure indications to use under various circumstances to ensure appropriate actions are taken in the event of an accident. The licensee reported this deficiency to the NRC in Licensee Event Report SQR0-50-327/82-043.
On April 14, 1982 members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Division of Safeguards and Division of Licensing were at the Sequoyah site to discuss proposed changes to the licensee's Physical Security Plan and review the status of various other matters pertaining to Physical Security at Sequoyah.
On April 28, 1982 members of the NRC office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data and Division of Engineering were at the Sequoyah site to review the licensee's program for dealing with flow blockage of raw cooling
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water systems caused by fresh water shellfish and the recent discovery of j
Asiatic Clams in the 1A Containment Spray heat exchanger.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
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