IR 05000327/1982013

IE Insp Repts 50-327/82-13 & 50-328/82-13 on 820706-09.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas inspected:full-scale Emergency Exercise

ML20062J577
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	07/23/1982
From:	Andrews D, Huffman G, Jenkins G, Marston R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20062J301	List: IR 05000327/1982013 ML20062J298
References
50-327-82-13, 50-328-82-13, NUDOCS 8208160406
Download: ML20062J577 (12)

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• UNITED STATES

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o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g e REGION 11 l 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W SUITE 3100 s ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303  !

P Report Nos. 50-327/82-13 and 50-328/82-13 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Tower 11 Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name: Sequoyah 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79 Inspection at the Sequoyah site near Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee l Inspectors: 6 ,[ h<dg m i 7/23 /8 2-D. L. Ar.drews Date Signed j

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DRM R. R. Marston dnkt Date' Signed j A dm . A 7/ 3!81 G. N. flu 1'ftr,a6 Cate S~igned

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Accompanying Personnel: G. E. Simonds, S. C. Hawley, A. L. Robinson, and

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Approved by: /Y / 'l (C/ ) k C G. R. Jenkins, Section Chief Date Signed EPOS Division

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SUMMARY

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Inspection on July 6-9, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 176 inspector-hours on site in the area of a full-scale Radiological Emergency Exercis '

l Results In the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie <

k 8200160406 820727 PDR ADOCK 05000327 '

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• H. J. Green, Director of Nuclear Power

• H. L. Abercrombie, Assistant Manager, Nuclear

• J. W. Hufham, Chief, Emergency Planning and Protection Branch

• J. L. Ingwerson, Radiolgical Health Staff

• E. A. Belvin, Radiological Health Staff

• R. Maxwell, Radiological Health Staff

• R. J. Kitts, Health Physics Superintendent, Sequoyah

• R. A. Beck, Health Physics Supervisor, Watts Bar

• B. K. Marks, Emergency Preparedness Staff

• E. K. Sliger, Emerger.cy Preparedness Staff

• J. E. Gibbs, Field Service Branch, Nuclear Production

• C. Crawford, Power Information

• D. L. Bailey, NSRS

• J. W. Mashburn, NSRS

• R. W. Travis, NSRS

• W. C. Burke, NSRS

• S. Kammer, Nuclear Licensing Staff

• Steverson, Power Information

• R. L. Huskins, Assistant Health Physics Supervisor, Watts Bar

• R. J. Johnson, Nuclear Training Branch

• C. E. Chnielewski, NSRB, Sequoyah

• T. White, Nuclear Production Other licensee employees contacted included several technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne Other Organizations J. Keese, Tennessee Emergency Management Agency G. Woodard, Federal Emergency Management Agency J. Heard, Federal Emergency Management Agency NRC

• E. Ford, Senior Resident Inspector S. Butler, Resident Inspector

• G. Jenkins, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section

• Attended exit interview

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2. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 9,1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte . Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio . Exercise Scenario The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee, State and local emergency plans and organizations as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives on June 24, 1982, and July 7, 198 The scenario appeared to be adequate to test the integrated capability of the licensee, State and local emergency response organizations and provided for exercising the licensee's overall emergency response organization in a full-scale radiological emergency exercise as defined by the above noted regulations. The inspector had no further questions in this are . Assignment of Responsibility This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and l that adequate staff is available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV. A. , and specific l criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.

l The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments had been made for the licensee's emergency response organization a.nd there were adequate staff available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response

, organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives and the l capability for long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was demonstrate The inspector had no further questions in this are . Onsite Emergency Organization The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined, that i

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4 adequate staffing is provided to insure. initial facility accident response l l in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces among various i

onsite response activities and offsite support activities are specified as .

i required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.A, and i specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I !

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! The inspectors observed that the initial and augmented onsite emergency organization was well defined and that adequate staff was available to fill key functional positions as described by Section 4 of the Sequoyah Emergency i Plan and Implementing Procedures IP-6 and IP-7. The interfaces among the

onsite response activities and offsite support activities appeared to be' ,

1 well established and no deficiencies were observed in this area. The '

inspectors had no further questions concerning the onsite organization.

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t j Emergency Response Support and Resources l

This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and  !

effectively using assistance resources have been made, that arrangements to  !

accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations l

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Facility had been made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting

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the planned response had been identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),

10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV. A and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, *

j Section I i

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t Although assistance resources are identified in the Sequoyah Emergancy Plan, I i non-licensee assistance was not utilized to support onsite operations during l

'l this exercise. Arrangements for accommodating State and local representa-  :

tives at the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), the licensee's terminology for the Emergency Operations Facility, were observed. Other .

organizations, such as the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, the  !

Tennessee Department of Health and local governmental agencies including i local law enforcement, were notified and participated during this exerics l The inspector had no further questions in this are '

. I 9. Emergency Classification System This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification [

and action level scheme is in use by the nuclear facility licensee as

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required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.C., and -

specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I l

! The inspectors observed that the emergency classification system was in  !

effect as stated in Section 5 of the Radiological . Emergency Plan and in i Implementing Procedure IP-1. The system appeared to be adequate for the >

classification of the simulated accident and Implementing Procedures IP-2 3

through IP-5 provided guidance for initial and continuing mitigating actions -

i taken during the simulated emergency. The inspectors had no further ques-

tions in this are .

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! 10. Notification Methods and Procedures ,

This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for !

notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and ,

emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages '

to response organizations has been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway have been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, ,

j paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I >

The inspectors observed that notification methods and procedures had been l established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization. The j inspectors had no further questions in this are ,

11. Emergency Communications l l

, This area was observed to determine that provisions exist for prompt i communications among principal response organization and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, t and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I The inspectors verified that primary and alternate means for communications among the various response organizations were provided and that, in general, communications among these organizations and among emergency response personnel were good. A few communication related problems were noted as follows: Communications between the initial offsite monitoring team, dispatched

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from the site, and the Emergency Control Center were very poor, often requiring messages to be relayed by other sections within the plant.

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In addition, the communications link between the Muscle Shoals Emer-gency Center and the Field Coordination Center at Lovell Field failed '

to operate properly during the exercis A licensee representative

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stated that these communications systems will be reviewed and appro-priate corrective actions taken to improve the quality of communication i j in these two areas. (50-327/82-13-01,50-328/82-13-01).

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An electronic blackboard, used to disseminate emergency information from the Division of Nuclear Power Emergency Center to the Central Emergency Control Center and the Muscle Shoals Emergency Center, was i

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posted approximately an hour behind actual events during the initial phase of the exercis Later, the blackboard was kept current with

, events; however, the hard copy of information, which had been posted on

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the blackboard and subsequently erased, lagged approximately 15 minutes t

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behind in the Central Emergency Control Center and about 30 minutes !

behind events at the Muscle Shoals Emergency Center. Licensee repre- l

! sentatives identified this problem during the exercise critique and .

stated that actions will be taken to keep information distributed by !

l the electronic blackboard curren l l

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6 The inspector noted a communications related problem at the Central Emergency Control Center which concerned the lack of data received and ,

displayed on the overall progress of the simulated emergency. This problem is discussed in paragraph 1 . Public Education and Information This area was observed to determine that information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(B)(7),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I Public information concerning the simulated emergency was disseminated

through the News Media Center, located at the YMCA facility in Chattanooga, near the CECC. The inspector observed that news releases appeared to be accurate and contained adequate information to keep the public informed on accident events with the exception that only limited radiological data was available and there were no indications as to whether radiation exposures in the environment were increasing or decreasing. State and local governmental representatives were provided space at the '!ews Center; however, they did not participate in news releases during the exercise. There appeared to be a problem with coordination of news releases between TVA and State repre-sentatives at the State Emergency Center in Nashville. Subsequent to the exercise it was found that the State Center was providing news release information to an unmanned office in the TVA building by telecopier. TVA should coordinate with State representatives concerning telephone and telecopier numbers to be used during an emergency for information exchang This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-327/82-13-02; 50-328/82-13-02).

1 Emergency Facilities and Equipment This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response are provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I Emergency Control Center (ECC) - The ECC is located in the plant control room between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 control panel TVA's concept of operation is that the site Emergency Director and his immediate staff report to the ECC and manage the emergency from that location while the remainder of the emergency response staff report to the Technical Support Center (TSC), adjacent to the Control Room, to provide engineering support to the operating crew. During this exer-l cise the inspectors observed that the ECC did not appear to meet the requirements of an emergency facility noted above in that:

(1) The presence of the management staff and additional personnel in

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the Control Room created unnecessary noise and confusion which j

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tended to detract the operators from concentration on the oper-l ation of the plan '

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(2) Fragmentation of the support staff between the ECC and TSC

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appeared to reduce the effectiveness of the TSC staff in assisting

the Site Emergency Director in making decisions concerning mitigation of the simulated emergenc i s (3) Space limitations in the ECC prevented the display of plant i parameter trends, accident time-sequence historical information, i inplant monitoring and sample analysis data and plant status informatio ;

, (4) ECC limitations prevented the integration of NRC site team

representatives into the analysis and decision making process

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during this exercis '

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In a confirmatory letter to the licensee dated July 20, 1982, a TVA committment to relocate the site Emergency Director and ECC staff to the TSC by November 9, 1982, is documented. This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-327/82-13-03, 50-328/82-13-03).

i r b. Technical Support Center (TSC) - The inspectors observed the activation and operation of the TSC during this exercise and noted that adequate .

staff was available to perform assigned TSC functions; however, the TSC '

appeared to be isolated from onsite management which decreased the effectiveness of this organization. The inspectors noted the following *

problems in the TSC:

(1) There appeared to be a time lag in receiving information from the [

Control Room concerning plant parameters and statu l i (2) The TSC staff was not periodically briefed on accident information ,

by management and the TSC staff was largely unaware of management ~

decisions regarding plant operations and mitigation of the

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i simulated emergenc (3) There appeared to be very little information exchange between th TSC staff and NRC representatives.

l (4) There did not appear to be a chronological log kept of historical accident informatio (5) There were inadequte displays of plant status, parameters, inplant i radiation levels and sample analysis, important plant systems

, trends, offsite radiological monitoring data, meteorological information and time-sequence historical information concerning the simulated emergenc The TSC problems were summarized in a confirmatory letter to the licensee July 20, 1982 and a TVA commitment for correction of the above 1 noted problems is documented in the letter. This area will be reviewed l during a subsequent inspection (50-327/82-13-04; 50-328/82-13-04).

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The inspectors noted that telephone communications in the TSC have been significantly improved since the last full scale exercis The new console type telephone with one-button direct dial feature and the ability to utilize all plant lines has greatly improved communications capability between the TSC and all other TVA emergency facilities; item (IFI C9-327/80-34-04) is closed; however, TVA has not completed the installation of dedicated telephones in the TSC for NRC use, which were committed and documented in a confirmatory letter from Mr. J. P. Stohr, NRC to Mr. J. W. Hufham, TVA, dated October 8,1981. The installation of the NRC telephones is to be completed as part of the TSC upgrade discussed in the confirmatory letter of July 20, 1982 noted above (50-327/82-13-05; 50-328/82-13-05),

c. Operations Support Center (OSC) - The OSC operation was observed to determine the effectiveness of various emergency response teams in carrying out actions to define and mitigate the simulated emergenc Overall, operation of the OSC appeared to be adequate; however, there should be additional consideration given to the number of personnel needed in that facility following a site evacuatio The inspector noted that the space provided for assembly of OSC personnel following a site evacauation was inadequate for the number of individuals assigned to that facility during this exercise. In addition to the overcrowded conditions in the OSC the following specific problems were noted:

(1) There appeared to be a lack of coordination between the Rad / Chem sampling team and Health Physics support team during the initial phase of the simulated emergency resulting in the sampling team entering a potentially high radiation area prior to radiation surveys by health physics personne Provisions for Sample team / health physics coordination will be reviewed during a sub-sequent inspection (50-327/82-13-06; 50-328/82-13-06).

(2) The personnel assigned to per#crm post-accident sampling of the reactor coolant system appeared to be unfamiliar with the sampling procedure, were not able to use the special equipment provided to collect the sample and appeared unfamiliar with contamination control measures to be used to prevent possible spread of contamination into the analytical laborator The lack of expertise in this area appeared to be due to inadequate training in collecting and transporting post-accident samples. This area was addressed in a confirmatory letter to TVA dated July 20, 1982 and the licensee's commitment to provide additional training for the appropriate personnel is documented in that letter. This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-327/82-13-07; 50-328/82-13-07).

During the exercise the inspectors observed that OSC team organization, briefing and dispatch was coordinated by a single

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individual who was in charge of OSC operations. Team briefings were considered complete as to the potential hazards which were

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simulated within the plant and the specific reauirments of each tea Previously identified inspector follow-up items in this  ;

area (IFI 50-327/81-40-01, 50-328/81-49-01 and IFI 50-327/ '

81-40-02,50-328/81-49-02) are close Muscle Shoals Emergency Control Center (MSECC) - the inspector observed the operation of the MSECC functions during this exercise which include offsite dose projections and direction for collection and analysis of environmental samples and offsite radiological monitorin '

The MSECC appeared to operate effectively in providing support to the l TVA Emergency Organization during this exercise. A comunication

problem between MSECC and the Field Coordination Center at Lovell Field in Chattanooga is discussed in paragraph 11. The inspectors had no

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further questions in this are Division of Nuclear Power Emergency Center (DNPEC) - The DNPEC appeared  ;

to be well-organized and functioned smoothly throughout the exercis No problems related to the DNPEC facility or equipment were identifie !

A lag in information transmission from the DNPEC to other TVA emergency centers is discussed in paragr6ph 11. The inspector had no further questions in this area, Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) - The CECC is the primary

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offsite emergency center for the management and coordination of the TVA  :

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emergency response organization and for the dissemination of informa-tion to the news media and the public. This facility was observed to be well-organized with adequate communications systems. Status boards were not utilized and there was apparently no continuing information on

plant status; plant system parameters, offsite radiological information or trending of data important to the simulated accident sequenc Although recommendations for offsite protective actions were made to the State by the CECC Director, these were primarily made on the basis

! of information received from the MSECC and did not appear to be

evaluated on the basis of all available information concerning the plant status, assessments of worsening conditions at the plant nor an engineering assessment of expected or projected damage at the plant during the simulated acciden The inspector was concerned that there was insufficient information flow from the various TVA emergency i

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organizations to the CECC to facilitate management of the overall TVA response to the simulated emergency by the CECC Director. These

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concerns were discussed with licensee representatives following the

! exercis Information flow and data display in the CECC will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-327/82-13-08; 50-328/82-13-08).

g. Field Coordinating Center (FCC) - The FCC is established at the State's Lovell Field facility to provide coordination of TVA collected field j data with State represent'atives and to coordinate assignment of TVA and

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State Radiological Monitoring Teams to provide the most effective ,

cov oge of environmental monitor With the exception of communica- i tions difficulties discussed in paragraph 11, the inspector did not  ;

observe any problems with the TVA portion of the operation of this .

facilit !

t 14. Accident Assessment '

i This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I l The accident assessment program includes an engineering assessment of plant  !

status and potential releases of radiation during an accident, and a  ;

radiological assessment, which consists of offsite dose projections based on  :

actual or potential releases, and field monitoring for airborne and depos- i ited radioactivity in the environmen At the Sequoyah site, engineering assessments are performed by the TSC staff, the DNPEC staff and to some extent by the Knoxville Emergency Control Center (KECC) staff. Radiological assessments are performed by the MSECC, with some assistance from KECC, and  :

by field teams dispatched by the site, from Muscle Shoals and from other i nearby TVA facilities, such as Watts Bar and the Vonore Laborator During this exercise the inspector noted that, with the exception of MSECC, ,

very little assessment information from the various facilities and teams was relayed to the CECC. Since the CECC Director is primarily responsible for ,

the evaluation and coordination of the TVA response organization it appears that more information should be directed to that facility. This problem is 1 addressed in paragraph 1 ,

The offsite monitoring team dispatched from the Sequoyah site was observed during the exercise and the following deficiencies were noted: '

l The team did not appear to be familiar with the environmental moni- ,

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toring procedur ' The team appeared to be unfamiliar with the instruments and equipment [

l' provided for offsite monitorin *

i No preoperational checks of equipment were performed and there was no  !

l check source or other capability of ensuring instrument operability in t l the fiel .

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! Communications with the ECC were very poor and in most cases radio i i transmission had to be relayed to the ECC by other plant components.

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There was no clear indication tc the team when the FCC was activated  !

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and assumed control of dispatching offsite team !

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. Team members had difficulty in reading the supplied maps and accurately [

indicating their position to the EC In fact,.one monitoring point '

was reported to be southwest of the site when the team was northeast of  ;

the sit ; The team did not record the appropriate monitoring data and did not take radiciodine samples to the FCC for further analysis as required by '

procedur Overall the above noted problems were attributed to inadequate training of

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team members in offsite monitoring. This area was addressed in a confirma-tory letter to the licensee dated July 20, 1982, and TVA commitments for corrective action in this area are documented in that letter. This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-327/82-13-09; i 50-328/82-13-09).

t During air sampling procedures the monitoring team demonstrated improved performance in the method of handling filters and in protecting the samplers i from inclement weather; therefore, inspector follow-up items in this area

! (IFI 50-327/81-40-04, 50-328/81-49-04 and IFI 50-327/81-40-05, 50-328/

81-49-05) are closed. The team members did not utilize the monitoring procedure during sampling and the procedure was not reviewed by the inspector during the exercise; therefore, a previous inspector follow-up item, related to radiciodine monitoring (IFI 50-327/81-40-03, 50-328/

81-49-03) remains ope . Prntective Responses This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in i

place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, are implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR

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50.47(b)(10) and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I The inspectors observed that protective responses for emergency workers onsite had been provided and a site evacuation of all non-essential site personnel was conducted during this exercis The site assembly and accountability was performed within 30 minutes and a subsequent evacuation

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of non-essential personnel was conducted effectively. The inspectors had no ,

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furthers questions in this are !

1 Radiological Exposure Control l This area was observed to determine that means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency, are established and implemented for emergency workers and that they include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11) and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I ;

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The inspectors observed that exposure control measures were in place and were utilized during this exercis The inspector noted that although many

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of the site emergency team members were unsure of dose limitations and exposure control measures, supervisory personnel appeared to be thoroughly ,

4 familiar with the procedures in this area and indoctrinated personnel assigned to inplant tasks prior to their dispatc The inspectors had no .

I further questions in this are . Exercise Critique

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The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine

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that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses -

noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally

, presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by i 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appenuix E, paragraph IV.F, and specific '

criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I '

The licensee critique was held on July 9,1982 at the DNPEC in Chattanoog i Many, but not all, of the problems noted in this report were identified by i the TVA observers for the exercise. Licensee actions on items identified at !

the TVA critique will be reviewed during a subsequent inspectio [

t 18. Federal Evaluation Team Report [

I The report of deficiencies noted by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional l Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV (

staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise i will be forwarded by separate correspondenc !

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