IR 05000327/1982004
| ML20053A880 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 03/25/1982 |
| From: | Butler S, Ford E, Quick D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20053A829 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-82-04, 50-327-82-4, 50-328-82-04, 50-328-82-4, NUDOCS 8205270387 | |
| Download: ML20053A880 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES o
~p 8"
1, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
$
E REGION 11 g[
101 MARIETT A ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 o,
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-327/82-04 and 50-328/82-04 Licersee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name:
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Docket Hos. 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79 Inspection at Sequoy site near Soddy Daisy, Tennessee Inspectors:
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8L E. J." Fo~rd, S(nfor Re' side % Inspector 7 Ca te/ Signed M
3kNfL S. D. Butler, Resident 1(spector
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Bate / Signed Approved by:
M 28 /82.-
D. ~R. Quick,'section Chief, Division 4f
'Da te/ Signed Project and Resident Pfograms SUrlt1ARY Inspection on February 6 - 11 arch 5,1982 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 197 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Operational Safety Verification, Independent Inspection Effort, General Employee Training, Inspection of Tl11 Action Plan Requirements, Unit 2 Startup Testing and Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings.
Results Of the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in five areas; two violations were found in one area (327/82-04-01, 328/82-04-01 Failure to comply with technical specification 3.1.3.3 and 328/82-04-02 Failure to perfona a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation for system modification).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees C. C. Mason, Plant Superintendent J. E. Cross, Assistant Plant Superintendent P. R. Wallace, Assistant Plant Superintendant J. M. ficGriff, Assistant Plant Superinten62nt J. W. Doty, Maintenance Supervisor (!!)
B. M. Patterson, Maintenance Supervisor (I)
W. A. Watson, Maintenance Supervisor (E)
L. H. Nobles,0perations Supervisor W. H. Kinsey, Results Supervisor R. J. Kitts, Health Physics Supervisor J. T. Crittenden, Public Safety Service Supervisor R. L. Hamilton, Quality Assurance Supervisor M. R. Harding, Compliance Supervisor W. M. Halley, Preoperational Test Supervisor J. Robinson, Outage Director Other licensee employees contacted included field services craftsmen, technicians, operators, shift engineers, security force members, engineers, maintenance personnel, contractor personnel and corporate office personnel.
Other Organizations C. R. Stahle, Licensing Project flanager, NRR E. G. Adensam, Chief, Licensing Branch #4, NRR
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized with the Plant Superintendent and/or members of his staff on February 24 and March 5,1982.
The violations against Units 1 and 2 were discussed and the licensee acknowleded. During the reporting period, frequent discussions are held with the Plant Superintendent and his assistants concerning inspection findings.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed)
327/81-07-01, 81-07-02, 81-07-03 The inspector reviewed the licensee's. response to the Notice of Violation dated June 17, 1981 and finds it acceptable.
The implementation of the detailed corrective action was initially verified and the inspector continues to monitor the licensee's performance in these areas periodically.
These items are close.
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(Closed) 327/81-12-01 The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the I
flotice of Violation dated April 17, 1981 and implementation of corrective action and finds them acceptable. This item is closed.
(Closed) 327/81-23-02,328/81-28-02 The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the flotice of Violation and deviation dated September 28, 1981 and implementation of corrective action and finds them acceptable. These
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items are closed.
(Closed) 328/81-38-01, 81-38-02, 81-38-03, 81-38-04, 81-38-05 The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the flotice of Violation dated October 30, 1981 and implementation of corrective action and finds them dcceptable. Violation 328/81-38-03 was withdrawn. These items are closed.
I (Closed) 328/81-42-01, 81-42-02, 81-42-03 The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the flotice of Violation dated fiovember 16, 1981 and
implementation of corrective action and finds them acceptable.
These items are closed.
(Closed) 327/81-39-01, 81-39-02, 328/81-48-01, 81-48-02, 81-48-03 The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the flotice of Violation dated February 19, 1982 and implementation of corrective action and finds them acceptable. These items are closed.
(Closed)
327/81-07-05 The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to this unresolved issue and determined that the licensee has increased emphasis on maintenance of in plant telephones used by operations personnel.
The inspector continues to periodically check the operability of telephones throughout the plant and has not detected any significant problems.
In addition the licensee has obtained additional hand held two-way radios for
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use by operators in communicating with the control room. The inspector discussed the use of radios with various operations personnel and the general consensus is that the ability to communicate with the control room I
has been significantly improved. This unresolved item is closed.
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(Closed)
327/81-07-06 The inspector has reviewed the licensee's response l
to this unresolved issue and determined that the licensee has clarified the operators authority to limit access of nonessential people to the control I
This authority appears to be understood by operations personnel.
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room.
l The inspector observes access control in the control room on a periodic basis. Although there have been instances when an excessive number of
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people were in the control room this appeared to be due to shift turnover l
and craft personnel attempting to get work authorized.
In general, access
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control to the maia control room has significantly improved.
This
l unresolved item is closed.
4.
Unresolved Items
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l Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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5.
Operational Safety Verification
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The inspector toured various areas of the plant on a routine basis throughout the reporting period. The following activities were
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reviewed / verified:
a.
Adherence to limiting conditions for operation which were directly observable from the control room panels.
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b.
Control board instrumentation and recorder traces.
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Proper control room and shift manning.
d.
The use of approved operating procedures.
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Unit operator and shift engineer logs.
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General shif t operating practices.
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Housekeeping practices.
h.
Posting of hold tags, caution tags and temporary alteration tags.
i Personnel, package, and vehicle access control for the plant protected 1.
area.
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General shift security practices on post manning, vital area access
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control and security force response to alarms.
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Surveillance, startup and preoperational testing in progress.
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Maintenance activities in progress.
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Health Physics Practices.
During the reporting period Unit 2 developed significant steam leakage in the West Main Steam Valve room adjacent to the reactor building. The steam leakage did not appear to present an operational problem however the
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l inspector reviewed the situation to detennine if the excessive steam leakage was having any adverse impact on safety-related equipment located in the l
The inspector toured the area, monitored parameters on the main area.
j control panel which are instrumented in the area and questioned various Unit 2 operators to determine if they had experienced any loss of control or indication of equipment or instrumentation located in the steam valve roon.
The inspector did not detect any adverse affect on equipment or instru-mentation.
On February 11, 1982 during a tour outside the Unit 2 reactor building the inspector noted that portable pumps were in place outside the West Main Steam Valve Room and were puaping condensate from the steam leakage out to the yard drainage system.
After questioning various licensee
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personnel, the inspector determined that the floor drains in the valve room had been blanked because the room nonnally drains to the floor drain
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4 collecting tank in the auxiliary building which has to be prcr.eised as contaminated waste water. The licensee determined that the condensing steam leakage from the main steam system was not contaminated and could be discharged directly to the yard drainage system. They considered normal sampling of steam generators and continuous monitoring of steam generator blowdown for radioactivity adequate monitoring of the water to prevent uncontrollable discharge of contaminated waste water. The inspector did not identify any other potential sources of contaminated leakage in the steam
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valva room. The auxiliary building floor drainage system is described in
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the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and 10 CFR 50.59 and a Notice of Violation will be issued (328/82-04-02).
The inspector discussed this matter with Region II management and health physics specialists who did not object to the licensee's action but did concur that a safety evaluation should have been performed as required by 10 CFR 50.59. The health physics specialists also recommended that periodic samples be taken at the point of discharge in addition to the monitoring of the steam generators for radio-
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activity.
i The licensee was informed of this and commenced periodic samples of the waste water aad documented their safety evaluation of the modification to the floor drainage system.
Unit 2 was tripped the same day as part of a startup test and the steam leakage was repaired.
On February 8,1982 Unit I was restarted after repairs to the damaged neutral transformer were completed. The Unit was taken off the line on February 9 to inspect a main generator bearing for damage. During the shut down a problem was identified with the motor for the #2 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP).
The unit was cooled down on February 25 to replace the RCP motor and remains in cold shutdown as of the end of the reporting period.
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On February 11, 1982 the inspector observed the calibration of the Unit 2 Axial Flux Difference (AFD) circuitry of power range neutron instrument N-41.
The calibration was being performed in accordance with Technical Instruction TI-36 and Instrument Maintenance Instruction IMI-99-PR-CAL.
During the calibration, difficulty was encountered in adjusting the instrument to its full span and the instrument mechanics and the cognizant engineer determined the problem to be in a potentiometer in the isolation amplifier. The channel was subsequently repaired and calibrated.
On February 12, 1982, as a result of a construction deficiency report l
submitted by another of the licensee's nuclear plants, the inspector l
reviewed the potential problem with the Waste Gas System at Sequoyah. The problem involved a modification to the waste gas vent header radiation
l monitoring system which created a potential situation where the waste gas decay tank relief valves could be isolated from their relief path to the shield building exhaust stack. When the inspector verified that the deficiency existed at Sequoyah he discussed it with the Operations
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Superintendent who took prompt action to have the vent isolation valves in question locked open and caution tagged.
The valves will remain locked open
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until a final determination of the problem can be made by the licensee's
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engineering and design group. The inspector had no further questions.
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On February 16, 1982 the inspector reviewed the work package of the change out of the rotating element of the 2AA centrifugal charging pump. The element was changed out with one for which they had a nanufacturer's developed performance curve (See IE report 328/82-03). The inspector reviewed Maintenance Request MR #168038, flaintenance Instruction MI-6.4 and 6.10, Post Maintenance Test SI-40. The inspector did not note any discre-pancies.
In addition the inspector compared performance curves for the replacement rotating element and origianl pump rotating element and agreed that they compared adequately enough to provide assurance that the pump could meet technical specification performance requirements. The inspector had no further questions. The inspector observed electrical maintenance personnel trouble shcoting Upper Head Injection (UHI) isolation salve 2-FCV-V-87-23. The valve would not close using the manual control switch in the main control room.
A different closing circuit and solenoid are involved for closing the value following an accident after the contents of the accumulator have been injected into the reactor vessel head. The electricians were using an emergency maintenance request to perform the trouble shooting and the inspector questioned them to determine if they were aware of the limitations on the work they could do with a work authorization which had not had prior quality assurance review and lacked detailed work instructions. They appeared to be knowledgeable in this area. The problem with the valve was subsequently traced to a loose connection which was repaired.
On February 17, 1982 during a routine tour of the main control room the inspector noted that individual rod position indication for Unit 2 shut down control rods did not appear to meet the requirements of technical specifi-cation 3.1.3.3 in that two rods in shutdown bank A did not inc"cate within
+12 steps of the other rods in the bank.
Unit 2 was in mode 3 at approximately 515 F with the shutdown rods withdrawn. A heatup to normal operating temperature was in progress. This apparent violation was discussed with the shift engineer who directed the reactor operator to open the reactor trip breakers to comply with the action requirements of the technical specification.
Subsequent discussion with the operations supervisor about the apparent violation revealed that there was considerable confusion regarding the requirement of technical specification 3.1.3.3.
On February 18, 1982 the inspectors and the licensee contacted the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and discussed the technical specification with the licensing project manager and the standard technical specification specialist. They stated that technical specification 3.1.3.3 requires that individual rod position indication should indicate within +12 steps of actual rod position instead of within +12 steps of other rods in the bank in modes 3, 4 and 5.
Due to the sensitivTty of the position indication to temperature the indice. tion will only meet the requirement at normal operating temperature. The licensee stated that unless at normal operating temperature they would maintain control rods fully inserted until they submit and receive approval for a change to technical specification 3.1.3.3.
Based on the interpretation of NRR, the licensee has been in violation of technical specification 3.1.3.3 on both Units at times when shutdown rods were withdrawn and the plants were not at normal operating temperature.
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notice of violation will be issued against both Units (327/82-04-01, 328/82-04-01).
Region II management was informed of the violation and i
related details.
On February 18, 1982 Region 11 concurred with the licensee's plans to proceed beyond 50% power on Unit 2.
This concurrence was based on periodic i
verification of the implementation and effectiveness of the corrective action outli,ed in LER SQR0-50-328/81104 as a result of the containment j
spray system valve misalignment identified on August 26, 1981.
In addition
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the inspector verified implementation of the corrective action stemming from the violation of the moderator temperature coefficient requirements on December 21 and 22, 1981. The licensee coenitted to have completed
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implementation of these actions prior to proceeding beyond 50% power.
This concurrence was documented in a letter to the licensee dated February 18, 1982 from the Region II Administrator.
On February 24,1982 Unit 2 tripped during startup test S/U 9.3 "Large Load Reduction" from 75% power. The inspector verified that systems operated as
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required following the trip and that operators stabilized and maintained the Unit in accordance with approval procedures.
The NRC was properly notified
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per 10 CFR 50.72. The reactor trip was caused by a turbine trip which i
occurred when both main feed pumps (HFP) tripped due.to low seal water pressure during the transient.
The licensee checked the adjustment of the seal water trip setpoints and reported that they were properly adjusted.
In dddition a problem with response of the HFP speed controller was experienced and the operator took manual control of the pump very early into the l
The licensee reported that the speed controller would be l
re-calibrated.
On February 28, 1981 when Unii; 2 was restarted the individual rod position indicator failed on rod M-4 in control bank D.
The Unit was shut down and had to be cooled down to mode 5 to repair the problem.
Unit 2 was restarted on March 3, 1982.
No other violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Inspection of THI Action Plan Requirements for Unit 2.
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l I.C.1 Requirements - Review and revise procedures used for transients and accidents.
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Findings -Item I.C.1 was previously inspected for Unit 1 and documented in
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I&E report 327/80-29. The emergency procedures inspected are the same procedures used on Unit 2 and no additional inspection is required.
This item is closed for Unit 2.
I.C.7 Requirements - The licensee shall obtain NSSS vendor review of emergency and power ascension test procedures.
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l Findings - The inspector previously reviewed documentation from Westinghouse and the licensee stating that the NSSS vendor had completed review and
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comment on the licensee's power ascension test procedures and emergency
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operating instructions for Unit 1.
The same procedures are in use for Unit 2 and no additional inspection is required. This item is closed for Unit 2.
I.G.1 Requirement - The licensee shall perform low power natural circulation testing to provide operator training.
Findings - The licensee requested and received permission from the NRC to delete low power natural circulation testing on Unit 2.
The Unit 2 license
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l was conditioned to require the licensee to assign an operator with i
experience from the Unit 1 low power test program to each shift on Unit 2 until they reported to the NRC that an acceptable level of operator training and experience has been attained on Unit 2.
The inspector has verified during periodic control room tours that experienced Unit 1 operators are
assigned to Unit 2.
This item will remain open until the licensee submits a
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report of the level of Unit 2 operator training and experience and receives NRC approval.
II.E.1.1 Requirement - Perform Auxilliary Feedwater (AFW) System Evaluation and modify system if necessary.
Findings - The inspector reviewed the summary of the evaluation of Sequoyah's AFW system presented in Supplement 2 of the Safety Evaluation Report. The system was found to be acceptable without modification by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation since it met the guidelines of NUREG i
0737, 0694 and 0578. The inspector verified that the system description l
presented by the licensee was accurate and witnessed endurance testing of AFW pumps performed on both units and AFW water hammer testing performed on Unit 1 as required by license conditions. This item is closed for both Units.
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II.E.3.1 Requirement - Provide emergency diesel generator backed power l
supplies for pressurizer heaters.
Findings - The inspector verified that the pressurizer heaters are supplied from the 6900 VAC Shutdown Boards which are backed by the emergency diesel generators. This item is closed for Unit 2.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Unit 2 Startup Testing The inspectors witnessed the following Unit 2 startup tests:
S/U-9.1 "10% Load Swing Test" (at 30% power)
S/U-8.3 " Static RCCA Drop and RCCA Below Bank Position fleasurement" (at 50% power)
S/U-1.2A " Shutdown From Outside Control Room" (at 50% power)
TVA-23B "Feedwater Thermal Expansion" (at 50% power)
S/U-9.3 "Large Load Reduction Test" (at 75% power)
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In each instance the inspector verified proper staffing, use of current approved procedures, initial conditions, hookup and calibration of test equipment and preliminary test results.
The problems experienced during S/U 9.3 are detailed in section 5.
The inspector periodically reviews S/U 7.1 "NSSS Startup Sequence" to determine if testing is being properly completed ana reviewed and that prerequisites are met and proper authorization is received prior to escalating in power.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Independent Inspection Effort The inspector routinely attended the morning scheduling and staff meetings during the reporting period. These meetings provide a daily status report on the operational and testing activities in progress as well as a discussion of significant problems or incidents associated with the start-up testing and operations effort.
Mr. R. D. Martin, the Region II Deputy Administrator and Mr. D. R. Quick, Chief of Reactor Projects Section 1A toured the Sequoyah facility on February 25 and 26.
They met with the resident inspectors to discuss licensee progress toward resolution of regulatory concerns.
Ms. E. G. Adensam, Chief of NRR Licensing Branch 4 and Mr. C. R. Stahle, Licensing Project Manager for Sequoyah accompanied Messrs. Martin and Quick.
Mr. Martin addressed an assembly of plant supervisors and middle managers on the topic of Quality Assurance in its broadest sense:
quality workmanship and professional performance. He also appraised them of the Regional assessment of the improved performance at Sequoyah.
The plant staff and management gave a presentation to the assembled NRC representatives regarding the resolution of past problem areas.
The meeting concluded with NRC noting that Sequoyah was demonstrating good progress in procedure compliance, increased direct supervision efforts and effective management corrective actions. Caution was urged, however, that these efforts not be relaxed in order that the plant build a long tenn record of achievement.
9.
Genera: Employee Training (GET)
During this reporting period the inspector monitored general employee classes in the areas of " Adverse Conditions and Corrective Actions",
" Initiation and Processing of Work Requests", " Clearance Procedures", and
" Temporary Condi tions". The presentations were appropriate to the subject matter and proctoring was observed at all sessions attended by the inspector.
This topic was the subject of a Hotice of Violation l
(327/81-42-02,328/81-52-03) in the report period ending January 5,1982.
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This item has received timely and adequate management attention and corrective actions appear to have a permanent effect.
This area will continue to be monitored by the inspector, liowever, due to the present conduct of the GET program, the inspector considers this item to be closed (327/81-42-02,328/81-52-03).
fio violations or deviations were noted.