IR 05000317/1987022

Insp Repts 50-317/87-22 & 50-318/87-24 on 870801-31.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Facility Activities, Routine Insps,Operational Events,Facility Improvements, Radiological Controls,Physical Security & LERs

ML20235F581
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	09/21/1987
From:	Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235F571	List: IR 05000317/1987022 ML20235F570
References
50-317-87-22, 50-318-87-24, NUDOCS 8709290216
Download: ML20235F581 (11)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket / Report Nos.: 50-317/87-22 License No DPR-53 50-318/87-24 DPR-69 Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Facility: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Lusby, Maryla Dates: August 1 - August 31, 1987 Inspectors: T. Foley, Senior Resident Inspector Trim e, Resident Inspector Approved By: #t. E.I Trfl5p, M/)

Chief, Reactor Projects I!87

/ dhte Section 3A, DRP Summary: August 1 - 31, 1987: Inspection Report 50-317/87-22,50-318/87-2 Areas Inspected: (1) facility activities, (2) routine inspections, (3) opera-tional events, (4) facility improvements, (S) radiological controls, (6) physi-cal security, (7) Licensee Event Reports, (8) reports to the NRC, and (9) licensee action on previous inspection finding Inspection hours totalled 8 Results:

Areas were noted within the plant where more attention to detail is required in maintaining plant material condition and maintenance practices (paragraph 2.c). Attempts to improve communication and team building are positive indi-cators of improvement Containment cooler efficiency may impact future operation should further degration of system efficiency occu No violations were foun gDR ADOCK 05000317 PDR

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DETAILS Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with

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various licensee personnel, including reactor operators, maintenance and

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surveillance technicians and the licensee's management staf . Summary of Facility Activities At the beginning of the period Unit I was in a shutdown condition for replacement of the #11A reactor coolant pump (RCP) moto That motor had failed to start following the July 23, 1987 loss of 500KV off site power event. The unit was returned to power operation on August 5 and continued power operation for the remainder of the perio Unit 2 operated at full power for the entire report perio The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sponsored an Operational Safety Review Team (0SART) review of the facility during the period August 10-28, 198 . Review of plant Operation - Routine Inspections Daily Inspection During routine facility tours, the following were checked: manning, access control, adherence to procedures and LCO's, instrumentation, recorder traces, protective systems, control rod positions, contain-ment temperature and pressure, control room annunciators, radiation monitors, effluent monitoring, emergency power source operability, control room logs, shift supervisor logs, tag out logs, and operating crder Control Room Reviews

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Containment Temperature During the previous report period Unit 2 containment temperature had been abnormally high (118-119.5 degrees F), approaching the Technical Specification limit of 120 degrees Outside air temperature had been above 90 degrees F for several day On July 17, Unit 2 shut down to perform several maintenance activ-ities within containment. During this shut down plant personnel scrutinized the general condition of the containment coolers and the piping systems for missing lagging and steam leak No unusual conditinns were noted. However, two small steam leaks were repaired, some insulation was replaced and the fan housing

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T l discharge doors were reset with new fusible links (the doors

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were npen). Subsequently, the unit returned to power on July 19th. Since then, the licensee has performed a heat balance on each unit's coolers and determined that Unit 2 coolers are removing twice the quantity of heat that Unit 1 coolers are removing (18 x 105 BTU /Hr vs 9 x 105 BTU /Hr). The licensee has since been operating all four coolers in fast speed and has been maintaining service water flow at 2200 gpm (8 inch full size, SRW valves full open) in order to maintain containment tempera-ture less than 120 degrees The facility FSAR section 6.5.3 states: Normal Operation Three cooling units are normally in operatio Each unit is sized to remove in excess of one-third of the total normal cooling loa The maximum temperature inside the containment is limited to 120 F by operation of the three cooling unit The maximum expected service water inlet temperature to the coolers is 95 F. During normal opera-tion the full size service water outlet valves, which are used following a LOCI, are closed while the smaller (4" dia) valve is ope Table 6-9 " Single Failure Characteristics" assume only 3 coolers are necessary to perform the cooling function and one cooler may fail to operate as the single failure. These conditions appear to violate the single failure criteri The inspectors discussed this with the licensee's representa-tives noting that the cooler inlet temperatures were (89 F)

substantially less than the design worst case of 95 F and that even with the 8 inch full flow valves open and four coolers in operation, the system only marginally fulfilled its normal non-accident functions. The inspectors requested the licensee to perform an analysis to demonstrate that the system was still capable of performing its intended function under accident ccndition Since the time of the request outside temperatures have decreased and containment temperatures are now down to 117 degrees with only the 4 inch valves open; however, four coolers are still required to maintain temperature less than desig The licensee is currently performing a historic review of bay temperatures, service water heat exchanger differential tempera-tures and containment cooler heat loads and outlet temperature Additional efforts are in progress to recalibrates the tempera-ture instruments and perform a review of the basis for the FSAR stated function _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -

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3 l The inspectors noted however, that the Containment Cooling System is completely redundant to the Containment Spray System which appears fully operationa i Subsequently, on September 2,1987, the inspectors met with the i system engineers and engineering staff who provided engineering calculations demonstrating that the coolers would have suffic-

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ient capacity to remove the design basis heat load under acci-dent conditions. They further emphasized the word " NORMAL" in the FSAR description of the system, and stated that the outside temperature during this period was beyond the design basis for

" NORMAL" operation thereby necessitating the use of four coolers. The design basis for accident conditions has not been exceeded and the coolers are fully functiona The licensee agreed to update the FSAR to indicate the need for four cooler operation during the summer months and use of the 8 inch valves as necessar The inspectors encouraged the licensee to continue te pursue the investigation of abnormal operation of the coolers during

" NORMAL" operation, in that if further system degradation occurs during the summer the Technical Specification limit of 120 F could cause a plant shut down which could be averted by improv-ing system efficiency or reducing the normal heat loa Containment Iodine Removal System During a routine tour of containment while Unit I was shut down it was noted that oil was dripping down the side of the No.12 Iodine Removal Unit. Further investigation revealed that thc oil was dripping from the overhead crane. Oil had accumulated on top of the iodine filter housing around and in the close proximity of the filter discharge. The inspector could not view into the filter discharge due to the radiological controls inhibiting access. The inspector requested the shift supervisor  ;

to have an operator furth2r investigate whether oil had entered the charcoal filter !

a The concerns identified regarded:

(1) filter efficiency for removal of iodine; (2) increased susceptibility for fire; (3) effects on the life of the filter; and (4) housekeepin At the close of this inspection period the inspectors have not been informed of the results of the investigation by the licen-see. This item will be tracked by the inspector No unacceptable conditions were note . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

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' System Alignment Inspection Operating confirmation was made of selected piping system train Accessible valve positions and status were examine Power supply and breaker alignment was checked. Visual inspection of major com-ponents was performe Operability of instruments essential to system performance was assessed. The following systems were checked:

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Unit 1 Auxiliary Feed Water System

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Unit 2 Auxiliary Feed Water System No unacceptable conditions were note c. Biweekly and Other Inspections During plant tours, the inspector observed shift turnovers; boric acid tank samples and tank levels were compared to the Technical Specifications; and the use of radiation work permits and Health Physics procedures sere reviewed. Area radiation and air monitor use and operational status were reviewed. Plant housekeeping and clean-liness were evaluated. Verification of several tag outs indicated the action was properly conducte Plant Material Condition During the period the NRC Regional Administrator (Region I) conducted walk throughs of the plant in the company of licensee management personnel and the resident inspector The Regional Administrator pointed out several deficiencies for the purposes of sharing infor-mation on problems observed at other facilities and achieving general upgrades in material conditio The more significant deficiencies included: apparent improper lubrication of boric acid pump motors leading to accumulation of grease inside bell housings which can obstruct air vent ports and thereby reduce cooling air flow; poten-tial for interference and rubbing between electrical control cabling for diesel generator governor and governor / fuel rack mechanical link-ages which can wear away control cable insulation; and improper ad-justment of a charging system relief valve housing, for the apparent purpose of stopping leakage, which could unintentionally affect valve set poin Additionally, during the period the inspector noted two apparent deficiencies and reported them to the licensee. First, the cooling fins on the air cooled bearing housings for the auxiliary feed water I (AFW) pumps had been recently painted. Since these bearings have some history of operating at temperatures close to their operating limits, the extra paint film could further degrade heat transfe Problems with control of painting have been noted in the past by

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the NRC (e.g. painting of normally energized solenoid valves, paint-ing of position switch rotating shafts, and paint on snubber piston 1 shafts), and the licensee has attempted to provide more direction to painters. The AFW pump bearing painting indicates further controls / l guidance may be necessary. Secondly, insulation was missing on a )

Unit 1 boric acid pump direct feed line in the vicinity of valve 1 j CVC 23 l I

No :olations were note . Operational Events f Operational Safety Review Team (0SART) Visit During the period of August 10-28, 1987, an International Atomic Energy Agercy (IAEA) sponsored Operational Safety Review Team (0SART) conducted a review of the facility. The team was composed of experts and scientific observes from thirteen different countries and examincd the following areas: management / organization, administration, technical support, radi-ation protection, chemistry, and emergency planning. NRC liaison with the team was principally through NRC managers who remained at the site during the team visit The resident inspectors, NRR Project Manager for the site, and selected personnel from the NRR, AE00, and Region I offices provided information as required by the team on NRC regulations, standards / guides, and operations / program The NRC specifically endeavored not to interfere with the OSART review effor The licensee indicated that the team provided accurate and useful assess-ments of areas reviewe Th'e team concluded that the facility had a strong overall program and was above average when compared to other plants visited. The team found the emergency planning area to be particularly strong, and maintenance, while adequate, represented the area with the largest room for improvemen Findings of the team will be formally provided to the NRC and utility by the IAEA at a later dat . Facility Improvements Control Room Habitability During this month the licensee made several improvements to the habita-bility of both Unit I and Unit 2 control rooms and the shif t supervisor's l

offic These modifications are consistent with control room design reviews, required by NUREG 0700/CR-158 The improvements consisted of:

(1) new carpet throughout the office space and control room; (2) humanly

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factored office furniture for each control room operator station, the control room supervisor and shift supervisor stations; (3) each desk includes a computer console, CRT and key board; (4) Safety Parameter Display System inst:lled on several CRT's, however, all are not yet fully operational; (5) replacement of the old PRODAC 250 computer with the new Gould 9750 Plant Computer; and (6) a Data Acquisition System (DAS) which is better, faster and has more capabilitie Improvements to the control board labeling and mimicry were made during the previous outag The licensee is continuing their reviews and upgrades pursuant to NUREG 070 Communication Improvements As part of an effort to improve the organization's performance, plant management has undergone a communications enhancement program titled

" Executive Development Seminar" by Human Equations. The first part of the training has been conducted for the Vice President, Nuclear Energy and his department managers and is currently being administered to the General Supervisors. The training is approximately two weeks long and touches on fundamentals of communications, hostility, collaborative work process, building self-esteem, meetings, and speeche The operations department personnel have recently completed " team building" for each operations sectio Each section consists of the auxiliary operators, control room operators, senior control room opera-tors, control room shift supervisors, and & shif t supervisor as a tea The team training is one effort to alleviate incomplete communications between workers and build team spirit and coordinatio This is viewed as a positive initiative toward improvemen No unacceptable conditions were identifie . Radiological Controls Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis during the report-ing perio Standard industry radiological work practices as well as conformance to radiological control procedures and 10 CFR Part 20 require-ments were observed. Independent surveys of radiological boundaries and random surveys of non-radiological points throughout the f acility were taken by the inspecto No unacceptable conditions were identifie __ _ _ _ _ ___

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6. Observation of Physical Security Checks were made to determine whether security conditions met regulatory requirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures. Those checks - included security staffing, protected and vital' area barriers, vehicle searches and personnel identification, access control, badging, and compensatory measures when require No unacceptable conditions were note . Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

LERs submitted to NRC:RI were reviewed to verify that the details were clearly reported, including accuracy of the description of cause and ade-quacy of corrective - tio The inspector determined whether further information was requi ' from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted on site follow up. The following LER's were reviewed:

LER N Event Date Report Date Subject Unit 1 87-11 07/14/87 08/10/87 Loss of Feed Water Heater and Over Bore. tion Event with Reactor Trip 87-12** 07/23/87 08/20/87 Faulty 500KV Circuit Breaker Operation Leads to Loss of Nonemergency AC Power

• • Details of this event was discussed in Inspection Report 50-317/87-17; 50-318/87-1 No unacceptable conditions were note . Review of Periodic and Special Reports Periodic and special reports submitted to the NRC pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed. The review ascertained:

inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or sup-porting information; consistency with design predictions and performance specifications; adequacy of planned corrective action for resolution of problems; determination whether any information should be classified as an abnormal occurrence; and validity of reported information. The following periodic reports were reviewed:

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June and July Operations Status Reports for Calvert Cliffs No.1 Unit and Calvert Cliffs No. 2 Unit, dated July 13 and August 12, 1987, respectivel Report of Start Up Testing for Cycle 8 for Calvert Cliffs No. 2 Unit, dated August 13, 198 No unacceptable conditions were identifie . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) 50-317/86-13-01; 50-318/86-13-01 - A description of the following emerpncy equipment has not been included in the Emergency Plan and/or ERPIP:

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Post Accident Sampling System

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Plant Parameter Phone System

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Initial and Refined Dose Assessment Computer System and Methodolog The inspector reviewed Rev. 8 of the Emergency Plan and determined that the revisions adequately cover the descriptions of the Post Accident Sampling System (page 5-12) and Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System (MIDAS) for computerized radiological assessment. ERPIP 5.1, " Communications", Rev. 10, Change 3 was revised to describe the plant parameter automatic ring down syste (Closed) 50-317/86-13-02; 50-318/86-13-02 - Duties and responsibilities of the Mechanical Maintenance and Modification Support Manger and the Meteorologist have not been included in the Emergency Pla During a reorganization of the Nuclear Energy Division in January 1986, the responsibilities of the Mechanical Maintenance and Modification Sup-port Manager were transferred outside the division and the Emergency Plan revised accordingly. For the Meteorologist, Rev. 8 of the plan, page 3-5 was changed to add responsibilities for this functio (Closed) 50-317/86-14-03; 50-318/86-14-03 - During the emergency exercise, control room briefings occurrea only once to all personnel, no periodic updates or announcement of significant events were made such as loss of two out of three fission product barriers. Also, empirical data used and assumptions made were not well documented, appeared unorganized and led to imprecise data being transferred. During the remedial drill, communica-tion of significant events was good between key managers. However, docu-mentation of data transmitted and received between facilities had not been formalized and the Emergency Message Form used did not provide for posi-tive evidence that a message was transmitte _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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The inspectors reviewed Attachment 2 to ERPIP 4.1.22.2, " Emergency Message Form" which was implemented to provide for authorization (by signature)

and time of transmission of all incominn utgoing messages at emerg-ency response facilitie (Closed)- 50-317/86-14-05; 50-318/86-14-05 - The Chemistry Director and Radiological Assessment Director. (RAD) discussions were infrequen Information on actual source term determination or total number of curies being released was not discussed or disseminated to off site official The field monitoring team in the helicopter was not able to communicate directly to the field team coordinato Information flow was slow and delayed important decisions, since the release was over the Chesapeake Ba The Security Team Leader relayed radiological data from the Radiation Protection Director which caused some confusion. This is not a planned communication pathwa There was an inadequate flow of information from the CR to EOF between Alternate RAD and RA It was difficult for the RAD (CR) to find an out-side line, no phone was available near the MIDAS terminal in the CR to communicate with EOF. As a result, dose assessroent wasn't turned over to the EOF until two hours after the Alert was declared, and one hour after the EOF was manne During the remedial drill, the discussions between the Chemistry Director and Radiological Assessment Director were irtp roved , however, information and discrepancies on grab sample analysis and dose calculations done in the TSC were not handled in a timely manne The inspectors reviewed a licensee position paper dated December 19, 1986 which identified specialized training of dose assessment and TSC functions to ensure timely handling of dat In addition, an objective has been added to emergency exercises that requires demonstration of the ability of the Chemistry Director to communicate information on actual source term evaluation to the Radiological Assessment Director. This area is expected to be carefully observed during the next full participation annual exercis (Closed) 50-317/86-14-02; 50-318/86-14-02 - During the emergency exercise, the chemistry technician did not have the proper keys to open required valves to initiate taking of a post-accident sampl This delayed the PASS sample and analysi Suitable measurements / surveys for detecting concentration of radioactive materials in air were not made. No breathing zone air samples were taken, nor were there provisions for them during

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I 10 accident situations when the primary coolant samples were degassed and when the boron analysis was don ERPIP 4.1.8.2 requires air sampling during sample degas. An air sample was taken in the lab where the sample was degasse However, it was taken on the floor seven feet from the chemical fume hood and was not representative of radioactive concentra-tions in the breathing zone. This air sample was also never analyzed. No air sample was taken during boron analysi The shielding setup at the gamma analysis station was inadequate in that the setup required the user to bend over the shield in order to see what they were working on and resulted in unnecessary exposur Analysis of post-accident samples were delayed because Ge-Li detectors were not available. Because of all the delays, the source term could not be adequately determine In order to ensure that PASS keys are available, Rev. 12 to ERPIP, 9 1

" Equipment Checklists" ensured that an additional set has been includea in the OSC inventory. To determine breathing zone air sampling, an air sample kit for use in the chemical hood has also been added to ERPIP, B.1, (Attachment 18). A mirror is now installed behind the shielding to help the technician avoid radiation exposure when performing fwne hood

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operation. The inspectors observed the air sample kit and fume hood and found them adequat . Exit Interview Meetings were periodically held with senior facility management to discuss

, the inspection scope and findings. A summary of findings was presented to the licensee at the end of the inspection.

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