IR 05000317/1987021
| ML20149D404 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 12/22/1987 |
| From: | Craig Gordon, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149D399 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-317-87-21, 50-318-87-23, NUDOCS 8801120349 | |
| Download: ML20149D404 (6) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Nos. 50-317/87-21 50-318/87-23 Docket Nos.
50-317 and 50-318 Category _C License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69 Priority
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Licensee:
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company P. O. Box 1475 TsEimore, Maryland 21203 Facility Name:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At:
Lusby, Maryland Inspection Conducted:
November 16-18, 1987 Inspectors:
ANk ce 6ER >L Rt*1 C. Z.(Krdon~, Regional Team Leader date
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NRC TEAM MEMBERS:
C. Amato, Region I K. Christopher, Region I T. Foley, Senior Resident Inspector M. Moeller, Battelle, PNL G. Simonds, NRR D. Trimble, Resident Inspector MWa e'
N<,/d? /N Approved by:
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'W.J.La(arup/Th%tdmergency date
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Preparedness Section, EP&RPB, DRSS Inspe_ction Sunnary:
Inspection on November 16-18, 1987 (Report Nos.
50-317/87-21 and 50-318/87-23)
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's full-participation annual emergency preparedness exercise conducted on November 16-18, 1987.
The inspection was performed by a team of seven NRC Region I, NRC Headquarters, and NRC contractor personnel.
Results:
No violations were identified.
The licensee's response actions for this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
8801120349 871230 PDR ADOCK 05000317 G
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on November 18, 1987:
M. E. Bowman, General Supervisor, Technical Services T. E. Forgette, Supervisor, Emergency Planning Um t J. R. Lemors, Manager, Nuclear Operation Dept.
W. J. Lippula, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Service Deptartment J. A. Metzger, Media Relations C. H. Quimay, Jr., Quality Assurnce Dept.
E. H. Roach, Quality Assurance Dept.
G. C. Rudigier, Emergency Planning Analyst L. J. Smialek, Senior Plant Health Physicist A. L. Sundquist, General Supervisor, QC & Support A. M. Vogel, Supervisor, Technical Training J. A. Tiernan, V.P, Nuclear Energy In addition, the inspectors interviewed and observed the actions of numerous licensee emergency response personnel.
2.0 Emergency Exercise The Calvert Cliffs' full participation exercise was conducted on November 17, 1987, from 8:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m. and included the State of Maryland and local counties.
Demonstration and performance of offsite activities were observed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
2.1 Pre-Exercise Activities The exercise objectives submitted to NRC Region I on December 24, 1986 were reviewed and, following revision determined to adequately test the licensee's Emergency Plan.
On September 7, 1987, the licensee submitted the con.plete scenario package for NRC review and evaluatien.
Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario.
As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario and supporting data provided by the licensee. At that time it appeared the revised scenario would provide for the adequate testing of major portions of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP) and also provided the opportunity for licensee personnel to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action.
NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on November 16, 1987 and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the scenario. Suogested NRC changes to the scenario were made by the licensee in the areas of technical support,
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radiological data and contingency messages.
In addition, missing information was provided.
These changes were also discussed during tha briefing.
The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and indicated in the scenario that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviations or disruption of normal plant operations.
The exercise scenario included the following events:
Fuel handling accident; Loss of high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps; Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) with fuel failure; Offsite release of radioactivity to the environment; Declaration of Alert, Site Area Emergency, and general emergency classifications; and Recovery and reentry.
The above events caused the activation of the licensee's onsite and offsite emergency response facilities.
2.2 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operatica of the emargency response facilities.
The following activities were observed.
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Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario events; 2.
Direction and coordination of the emergency response; 3.
Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies; 4.
Assessment and Projection of radiological dose and consideration of protective actions; 5.
Provision of in-plant radiation protection; 6.
Performance of offsite and in-plant radiological surveys; 7.
Maintenance of site security and access control; 8.
Performance of technical support; 9.
Performance of repair and corrective actions; 10.
Assembly and accountability of personnel; 11.
Provision for comrunicating information to the public; and 12.
Management of recovery operations.
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3.0 Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the cmergency organization, activations of the emergency response facilities,
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and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures.
3.1 Exercise Strengths The team also noted the following actions that provided strong, positive indication of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:
Comunications with the State of Maryland was made efficient by
having a State representative present at the E0F to discuss serious matters and offsite response "face-to-face."
Regular EOF briefings and conference calls with the State and counties were beneficial in keeping all parties informed of plant status.
Documentaticn and recordkeeping was observed to be adequately maintained in each of the emergency response facilities.
Implementation of the PASS procedure was much improved.
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Personnel had necessary equipment available and were knowledgeable about the procedure to carry it out efficiently.
Initial dose calculations were performed as soon as information became available and assessment of the radiological release provided an accurate evaluation of projected dose.
3.2 Exercise Weaknesses The NRC identified the following areas where weaknesses were observed which could have degraded the response and should be evaluated by the licensee for corrective action. These items are tracked as Inspector Follow-up Items (IFI).
j On several occasions, the TSC staff was not being effectively utilized to provide thorough accident assessment.
Examples observed were:
turning off containment sprays and not entering a recirculation mode while a radiation release was ongoing; no input into the decision to initiate once-through-cooling; little infonaation in the rate of core uncovery assuming a worst case scenario; no consideration on the impact associated with the hydrogen explosion.
(50-317/87-21-01; 50-318/87-23-01)
Information flow from the offsite monitoring teams to the Assessment Radiological Assessment Director (RAD) to the Directing PAD Ucs ineffective at times since some offsite data was lost during MIDAS evaluations (50-317/87-21-02; 50-318/87-23-02).
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During protective action recommendation meetings with Maryland,
not all State concerns were clearly addressed. Although licensee representatives appeared responsive, on three occasions State representatives indicated that their questions had not been answered (50-317/87-21-03; 50-58/87-23-03).
Early press releases lacked sufficient detail regarding information on notificaticas to offsite support groups, prognosis of emergency information to affected population areas, and status of release.
(50-317/87-21-04; 50-318/87-23-04).
Confusion was observed by security and emergency response personnel regarding when the accountability process is initiated.
(50-317/87-21-05; 50-318/87-23-05).
4.0 Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items During the September 1986 annual exercise several significant weaknesses in the licensee's performance were observed.
In addition, a recurring deficiency was found relating to an inadequate decisionmaking process for Protective Action Recommendations.
Problems were identified in overall direction and control of the accident assessment and dose assessment staffs.
Players had difficulty in determining source terms, release pathways, and calculation of integrated offsite doses.
A Confinnatory Action Letter dated October 1,1986 was issued following the exercise which cutlined the major deficiencies and required the licensee to take corrective measures in weak areas. A remedial drill was held on October 14-17, 1986 to determine how the licensee addressed the areas of protective action recommendations, dose assessment, and inferratien ficw during emergencies.
NRC observation indicated that licensee performance in these areas was found acceptable, but concerns remained in achieving an effective dose assessment program.
The licensee subsequently implemented changes to radiological assessment procedures and staff direction and control assignments for evaluation and co munication of dose projections.
The licensee has emphasized the dose assessrent area after the remedial drill through specialized training and drills.
Based upon discussions with licensee representatives, examination of procedures and records, and observations made by the NRC team during the 1987 exercise, Items 86-14-02, 86-14-03, 86-14-05, and 86-14-06 were not repeated and are :losed.
5.0 Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on November 19, 1987 during which the licensee discussed observations of the exercis E l
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The critique was adequate in that licensee participants highlighted both areas for improvement (which the licensee indicated would be evaluated and appropriate actions taken) and areas in which improvements have been made. Specific improvement areas which were identified by the licensee related to accountability, not focusing on Unit 2 parameters, equipment needs for the TSC, Control Room /0SC interface, and information flow to the State Public Information Office in the Media Center.
6.0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report.
The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise.
The licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately addressed and that no violations were observed.
Although there were areas identified for corrective action, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner that would provide adequate protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that they would evaluate and take appropriate action regarding the items identified for corrective action.
At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.
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