IR 05000318/1987015

Insp Rept 50-318/87-15 on 870511-15.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Inservice Insp Data & QA Coverage of Inservice Insp Activities & Licensee Repair Activities Associated W/Socket Weld Near Valve 2-RV-439

ML20215F987
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	06/09/1987
From:	Mcbrearty R, Strosnider J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215F926	List: IR 05000318/1987015 ML20215F923
References
50-318-87-15, NUDOCS 8706230079
Download: ML20215F987 (6)

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i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .f REGION I J

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Report N /87-15 Docket N License N DPR-69 q Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company l

Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Facility Name: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 Inspection At: Lusby, Maryland Inspection Conducted: May 11-15, 1987

Inspectors: #/ W 4 S', / ff'7 R. A. McBrearty, Reactor Engiger datt Approved by: Kd-dA #[ N Z$* /I/87 J. R. Strosnider, Chief, date Materials & Processes Section, EB, DRS Inspection Summary: l Inspection on May 11-15, 1987 (Inspection Report N l 50-318/87-15). i

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Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced inspection was conducted by one- .

regional-based inspector of inservice inspection activities including review of ISI data and QA coverage of ISI activities, licensee repair activities associated with a socket weld near valve number 2-RV-439, and secondary side -

erosion / corrosion examination ,

i Results: No violations were identifie 'l l

l 8706230079 870615 PDR ADOCK 05000318 G PDR:>

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DETAILS

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1. 0 ' Persons Contacted Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (BG&E) 1

• R.' Allen, Principal Engineer - Performance i l, A.- B. Anuje, Supervisor, Quality Audits. Unit - Quality Assurance &' ,

Staff Services Department-

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• S. Cowne, Senior Engineer - Licensing W. Holston, Senior Engineer - Mechanical Design 1

T; Koneith, Associate Engineer  !

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• J. Lemons, Manager - Nuclear 0pe' rations Department 0. Marinari, System Engineer

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l- E. V. Matthias, Senior QA Auditor - QA & Staff-Services Department-

• B. Rudell,. Senior Engineer - Performance  !

.G. S. Wells, Senior'QA Auditor - QA & Staff.' Services Department D. Wright, Engineer. ' ,

A. R. Zimmerman, Engineer - QA & Staff Services Department

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. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissicn l * Trimble, Resident Inspector

• Denotes those present at the exit meetin ;

2.0 Failed Weld in Safety Injection System

A socket weld in a 1/2" line connected to'.the 6": diameter . low pressure .  !

safety iniection header was repaired after the licensee. detected a crack-

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s in-the weld. The repair included relocation of flanges, the installatio of a new half coupling and inlet piping, and .insta11ation'of an additional'

,. support'to reduce vibration in the line. Subsequent toLthe-first. repair, I

the' new weld developed a crack which required a 'second: repair. :The failed'

weld is not isolable from the Residual ' Heat Removal . (RHR)' system which 'i .

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used during reactor shutdown to remove residual-heat ' Both failures: '

occurred during the current refueling outage while the' system was'in.-

operatio j

. 'The-licensee was not'certain of the root cause'of.the fai. lure although-

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existing evidence points to' torsional fatigue.as the; failure mechanism'.  :

The licensee has' contracted Bechte1Lto perform a computer. analysis to determine. loading on the piping in anticipation of. learning'the. root'

!. cause of-the failure. Vibration measurements'were made at 6' locations on-l the pipe line,-'and were provided to Bechte1Lfor. inclusion in.the. analysi ,

The' licensee stated that'it had not yet'.made a decision regarding- th.e; need for' further work on the line. _ Various options--were'unde .

consideration, and the~1icensee anticipated'that.the in progressfcomputer:

analysis would result in a' clearer understanding of the' root cause of-the'

failur '

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The inspector reviewed welding and nondestructive examination (NDE)

records of each repair to ascertain that the repairs were made in compliance with applicable requirements. In addition to the above, the inspector reviewed licensee photographs of each failure, and examined the second failure with the aid of a binocular microscop The first repair was initially made with ER 308 filler metal which was j subsequently removed and replaced with E 316-16 materia NDE records 4 confirmed that liquid penetrant examination of the final surface produced acceptable result Records of the second repair indicate that the required gap was maintained, filler material was correct, and that the

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required NDE (liquid penetrant examination of final surface) was completed with acceptable result .

No violations were identifie .0 Inservice Inspection (PSI) Data Review The inspector reviewed selected data to ascertain its completeness, accuracy and comp'liance with ASME Code and regulatory requirement Data associated with the following welds were included in the inspector's review;

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Reactor Pressure Vessel Weld #2-203A, middle shell longitudinal weld ,

at 30 azimuth; 1

Safety Injection System Weld #18-SI-2003-1, 18" diameter tank to'

pipe weld; and a

Reactor Coolant System Weld #30-RC-21A-1, nozzle to transition piece wel Ultrasonic indications were detected in each of the above listed weld The inspector found that the indications were evaluated and dispositioned based on plots and resolution sheets which were prepared for each wel In the case of RPV weld 2-203A, fabrication radiographs were reviewed and confirmed the presence of slag in the location of the ultrasonic ,

indication '

The ultrasonic examination of reactor pressure vessel welds was performed by Southwest Research Institute (SWRI) personnel. Additionally,l data were simultaneously collected with the Ultrasonic Data Recording and Processing System (UDRPS). The system was used for informational purposes, and to provide baseline data for future RPV weld examinations

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in the puent that the Code permits use of UDRPS. The information collecied by UDlPS was frem the ultrasonic transducer array from which

& SWRI githered the officia' data.

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'. The SWRI Me hanized UT Examination' Record Sheet No. 721117 for RPV weld 2-203A notds that an indication.was found with the 50/70 degree transduce That transducer was used to meet Regulatory Guide 1.150 near surface examination requirement The SWRI Indication Resolution Record Sheet No. 311008 stat d that the indication was not recordable with the 0 , 45 or the 60 trancducers /which comprised the officia! ASME Section XI examinaticn. U0dPS infers.ation from the 45 shear wave transducer showed 2 or 3 ir.dications au the location in which fabrication radiographs showed 3 Code acceptable slag ~ inclusions. The ultrasonic indications were

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evaluated and found to be acceptable in accordance with Section XI acceptance criteri (See Inspection Report 50-318/87-10 for additional 1 details).

The inspector found that the licensee's ISI data met Code requirements, and indications were properly evaluated and dispositioned. The licensee does not have a Level III on its staff who is responsible for reviewing ISI data. The licensee's review is done on a sampling basis, and a

. contractor Level II or Level III is responsible for reviewing all of the data. At the exit meeting the inspector stated that most licensees now rw iew 1009s of ISI data, and have expanded their ISI staff with'the_ l'

addition of a Level III member. He informed the licensee that industry experience inoicates that independently reviewing 100?s of the data, in many cases using in house expertise, is a good practic No violations were identifie .0 Nondestructive Examination (NDE) Personnel Qualification / Certification Recsrds The insp4ctor reviewed records related to th'e qualification / certification ,

of $WRI NDE personnel who were responsible for the performance of inservice examinations at Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 during the current refueling outag The review was done to ascertain that the individuals were qualified and

}1 certified to perform their assigned responsibilities in accordance with

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applicable requirement i

'j The inspector found that the records confirmed each individual'was qualified and certified in accordance with the SWRI procedure for the-qualification and certification of NDE personnel, and with the' require--

ments of SNT-TC-1A, the governing documen Noviolati.>oswereidentifieb.

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,y 5 5.0 Secondary Side Erosion / Corrosion Examination Program The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions with regard to the detection

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Lof erosion / corrosion in plant components. Concern regarding erosion / corrosion

.in balance of plant piping systems has been heightened as a result of the December--9,.1986_feedwater line rupture that occurred at Surry Unit This' event was the subject of NRC Information Notice 86-106 issued on December.16, 1986 and its supplement issued on February 13, 1987. The inspection.was conducted to ascertain the scope.of the licensee's program, and the results to dat The licensee has establish'ed-an inspection program to assess the condition of various components in the plant with regard to erosion / corrosion. The inspection program is a sampling plan in.which the included systems are prioritized into Categories A, B, and C. 'A' being considered the most susceptible to erosion / corrosion, and 'C' being considered the least susceptibl Components are selected for inspection prior to a scheduled outage based on previous inspection results'and/or' system susceptibility. Emphasis is placed on choosing components with geometries which are most susceptible to erosion / corrosion. The selected components are ultrasonically or visually inspected. If ultrasonic examination is used the pipe is marked with a grid pattern, the size of which depends upon the pips size. The lowest reading found is compared to a calculated minimum wall value, and if the component is below the minimum wall _value, or will reach the minimum before the next scheduled outage, the component is rejected. The equation used to calculate the minimum wall value-is from USAS'B31.1, 1967 Edition, Land includes a toleranceLof.1/16". The program is computerized, and the inspection _results are entered into the computer which is programmed to calculate the corrosion rate based on when the item was placed into service, or on the results of'the last inspectio The licensee has established the following threefeategories for the disposition of" inspection findings:

Reject - The component is below the minimum _ wall value, or will-reach the minimum value'before the next-scheduled outag Red Alert- Based on_ corrosion rate, the component will reach the minimum wall within-18 to 36 month Yellow Alert Based on corrosion rate, the. component will reach the minimum wall within 36 to 54 month Red alert items are scheduled for reinspection during:the next refueling; outag Yellow-alert items'are schedule for reinspection no..later than the second refueling outage after'the present outage. The next refueling-outage is currently scheduled for June,198 .

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6 j The inspector found that the licensee has documented inspection results from examinations which were oerformed in 1984, 1985, and during the ongoing refueling outage. A total of 268 piping areas were examined during the present refueling outage. The inspections resulted in 42 areas which were submitted to the System Engineer for replacement with chrom / alloy material, 27 areas were categorized as red-alert, and 34 areas were classified as yellow-alert. The inspection results were found to be clearly documented and readily retrievabl No violations were identifie _i Quality Assurance Involvement in Inservice Inspection Activities The inspector reviewed the licensee's QA audit schedule for the' period from May, 1987 through October, 1987; reviewed QA audit reports, and interviewed QA personnel to ascertain that the licensee's'QA progra provided for evaluation of the licensee's ISI contracto ' Audits of SWRI at San Antonio, Texas, are required by the licensee's QA program to be performed at 3 year intervals. The inspector' reviewed the-report of the last audit that the licensee performed at San _ Antonio-on October 16-18, 1984. The audit was performed to verify the SWRI capability of performing inservice inspection activities for the licensee, and to verify implementation of the licensee's Project Plan and the SWRI QA Program. In addition, the SWRI QA Program was reviewed for compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. By virtue of the audit, SWRI was re-approved to supply inservice inspection services to the Calvert Cliffs facilit QA Audit No. 87-19 of SWRI onsite activities'was still in progress during the time the inspector was at the sit The inspector found that the licensee's au'dit program provided for evaluation of the acceptability of SWRI ISI activities both-onsite and at San Antonio, Texas. _The inspector further found that-_the' licensee has scheduled an audit in.0ctober, 1987, at SWRI in San Antonio, Texas. The :

auditor responsible for performing QA audit 87-19 was 'found to have a i background in welding and NDE, but was not certified.as an ISI audito !

The inspector stated at the exit meeting that QA staff performance would improve if personnel were trained and certified to the extent necessary to perform their assigned responsibilities in the area of ISI audit j No violations were identified.- ,

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. Exit Meeting 'j i

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Th'e inspecter met with licensee representatives, denoted in paragraph l',1 l at the conclusion of the inspection on May 15, 1987. The inspector

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j summarized the purpose 'and scope of the inspection, and the findings.1 -At l no time during this inspection was written material _ provided by the- 1 inspector to the license

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