IR 05000317/1979014
| ML19294B372 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 10/22/1979 |
| From: | Dante Johnson, Kalman G, Keimig R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19294B346 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-317-79-14, 50-318-79-11, NUDOCS 8002280254 | |
| Download: ML19294B372 (15) | |
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-317/79-14 Report No. 50-318/79-11 50-317 Docket No. 50-318 DPR-53 C
License No. DPR-69 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company P.O. Box 1475 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Facility Name:
Calvert Cliffs, Units 1 & 2 Inspection at:
Lusby, Maryland Inspection conducted:
August 27-30 and September 10-13, 1979 Inspectors: M 8,y,,
A /g/py
-
G. Kal-
, R bctor Inspector d6te sii ned b
&
/d 2<' -79 D. F. 8dhnson, Reactor Inspector da te's i g'ned date signed
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,
Approved by:
M/
/d-24-/9
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R. Keimi ef, R or Projects Section date signed No. 1, RO&NS ranch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on August 27-30 and September 10-13, 1979 (Combined Report Nos.
50-517/79-14 and 50-318/79-11)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of plant operations, licensee followup actions regarding previous inspection findings, licensee event reports, Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins and Circulars, and Tours of the Facility.
The inspection involved 64 inspector-hours onsite by two regional based inspectors.
Resul ts: One item of noncompliance was identified (Infraction - failure to follow procedures, Paragraph 6).
Region I Form 12 80022 80 1 %
(Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Mr. E. Bauer, Performance Engineer - Electrical
- Mr. R. Denton, Nuclear Plant Engineer - Operations Mr. S. Davis, Performance Engineer Mr. R. Eherts, Performance Engineer
- Mr. T. Forgette, QA Specialist Ur. J. Lippold, Nuclear Engineer Mr. P. Rizzo, Assistant General Foreman, I&E Mr. M. Roberson, Assistant General Foreman, Maintenance
- Mr. L. Russell, Chief Engineer The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees and contractor pernnnel.
- denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed)
Unresolved Item (317/78-18-02):
The licensee installed a redund-ant 15 volt power supply in the coil programmer to the control element assemblies on December 26, 1978 (Maintenance Request #E-78-220).
Opera-tions to date show no apparent problems associated with dropped rods as a result of loss of power to the holding coils.
During the upcoming outage in October,1979, the licensee intends to install the same redundant power supply in Unit 2.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (317/78-28-01, 318/78-25-01):
The licensee has revised alarm procedures 1C08/2C08, G-02, Check Valve Pressure High, IC03/2003, C-40, Main Steam Isolation Valve Test Close, to include appro-priate corrective actions.
In addition, the entire alarm manual (Revision 12) was reviewed by the licensee and necessary changes were made.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (317/78-34-02, 318/78-31-02):
Calvert Cliffs Instruction, CCI 104D, June 1, 1979 " Surveillance Test Program", has been revised to include a description of the surveillance test program including the Preparation, format, content, review and approval of surveillance test procedures.
(Closed)
Deficiency (317/78-38-01, 318/78-34-01):
Calvert Cliffs Instruc-tion, CCI 200C, June 29,1979, has been revised to include explicit respon-sibilities for the Senior Control Room Operator (SCRO) associated with post operability testing following maintenanc.
3.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletins and Circulars IE Bulletin 79-09, Failures of G.E. Type AK-2 Circuit Breakers in
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Safety Related Systems.
Preventive maintenance of G.E. AK-2 Circuit Breakers is addressed by Procedures PMS 1-58-E-R-1, Revision 1 and PMS 2-58-E-R-1, Revision 1.
A review of these procedures and discussions with licensee personnel indicate that the actions required by the belletin have been completed.
IE Bulletin 79-11, Faulty Overcurrent Trip Device in Circuit Breakers
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for Engineered Safety Systems.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's tabulation of safety related circuit breakers and verified that the circuit breaker type specifically addressed by the bulletin was not used in the facilities' safety sys-tems. As per item 4 of the bulletin, the inspector ascertained that all identified safety related circuit breakers were included on a preventive maintenance schedule.
The circuit breaker functional test procedure, FT-E-54, Revision 0, was reviewed to verify that circuit breaker overcurrent time delay protection was tested in conjunction with the preventive maintenance schedule.
The inspection findings in-dicate that bulletin requirements were completed by the licensee.
IE Circular 79-13, Replacement of Diesel Fire Pump Starting Contactors.
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The diesel fire pump engine models listed in the circular are not used by the licensee. However, a licensee check of the diesel start-ing circuits revealed that the subject starting contactor was in use.
During subsequent communications with the inspector, the diesel manu-facturer stated that the starting circuitry in use by the licensee was satisfacMry and no modifications were recommended.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
4.
In-Office Review of Periodic Reports The inspector reviewed the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Monthly Operation Status Reports for March thru July 1979, in the Region I office.
The inspector verified that the reports included the information required to be reported by Technical Specifications, and that test results and sup-porting information were consistent with performance specifications.
The inspector ascertained that applicable corrective actions taken or planned were adequate for resolution of identified problems and that supporting reports were submitted where necessary.
The monthly status reports were closed out based upon a satisfactory review in the Region I office.
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5.
In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
The inspector reviewed LER's received in the NRC Region I office to verify that details of the event were clearly reported including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action.
The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were present, and whether the event warranted onsite followup.
The following Unit 1 LER's were reviewed:
79-06/3L, dated March 22, 1979.
Reactor Coolant System leakage
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through CVC-515-CV.
79-08/3L, dated April 12, 1979.
Salt water outlet valve from
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service water heat exchanger would not fully open.
79-09/3L, dated April 17, 1979.
Control Element Assembly motion
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inhibit failed to activate at 7 1/2 inches misalignment.
79-10/3L, dated April 12, 1979.
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pump rcom exhaust damper failed shut.
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79-ll/3L, dated April 26, 1979.
Emergency Core Cooling System response time exceeded T.S. requirements due to exces.;ive opening time of Auxiliary High Pressure Safety Injection Header Isolation Valve.
79-12/3L, dated April 20, 1979.
Radioactive liquid waste release
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exceeded 1.25 Curies per quarter.
79-13/3L, dated May 2,1979.
Hydrogen analyzer failed.
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79-14/lT, dated May 14, 1979.
No.12 containment spray header has 89 nozzles vice 90 as listed in the FSAR.
79-15/3L, dated June 4,1979.
Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump
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Trip on spurious recirculation actuation signal.
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79-16/3L, dated May 19, 1979.
No. 12 Steam Generator Safety Valve lifted at 1015 psig vice 1035 psig during test.
79-17/3L, dated June 12, 1979.
No. 12 diesel generator auxiliary
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blower failure.
79-18/4T, dated May 31, 1979.
Ag-110m activity in oyster samples.
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79-19/3L, dated June 25, 1979.
No.11 control room air con-
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ditioning unit breaker trip.
79-20/3L, dated July 19, 1979.
Reactor Coolant System power
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operated relief valve failed to seat after post modification test.
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79-21/3L, dated August 6, 1979.
Containment radiation monitor failure.
- 79-22/3L, dated August 10, 1979.
Reactor Protective System
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Channel B, T-Hot, failed high.
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79-23/3L, dated August 10, 1979.
Control Element Assembly pri-mary position indication failure.
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79-24/4T, dated July 26, 1979.
Inadvertent discharge of demin-eralizer regenerative solution.
79-25/3L, dated August 17, 1979.
Spurious Reactor Protective
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System trips from Channel A.
79-26/3L, dated July 26, 1979.
Leak from charging pump discharge
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drain valve.
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79-27/3L, dated August 17, 1979.
Loss of metrascope CEA position indication.
79-28/3L, dated August 23, 1979.
No.11 diesel exciter trans-
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former failure.
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79-29/4T, dated August 15, 1979.
Ag-110m activity in oyster samples.
79-30/3L, dated August 23, 1979.
Leak from charging pump dis-
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charge valve.
79-33/4T, dated August 16, 1979.
Inadvertent discharge of demin-
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eralizer regenerative solution.
The tollowing Unit 2 LER's were reviewed:
79-09/3L, dated March 22, 1979.
t'o. 21 Service water heat ex-
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changer salt water outlet throttling valve failed to ope.
79-10/3L, dated April 12, 1979.
Pulse counting CEA position
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indications went to zero when CEA lower limit switch generated a spurious signal.
79-11/3L, dated April 12, 1979.
Plant process computer failure.
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79-12/3L, dated April 12, 1979.
Control Element Assembly dropped
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to bottom of core.
79-13/3L, dated April 12, 1979.
Control Element Assembly motion
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inhibit failed to activate at 7 1/2 inches misalignment.
- 79-14/3L, dated April 17, 1979.
Inadvertent decrease in boron
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concentration in No. 21B Safety Injection Tank.
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79-15/3L, dated May 25, 1979.
Containment air lock outer door air leakage excessive.
79-16/3L, dated May 25, 1979.
Control Elenent Assembly dropped
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to bottom of core.
79-18/3L, dated June 21, 1979.
4KV breaker tripped inadvertently
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causing diesel generator No. 21 to start.
79-19/3L, dated June 21, 1979.
Salt water pump and valve failed
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to actuate during ESFAS test.
79-21/3L, dated July 13, 1979.
Containment particulate monitor
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failed.
79-22/3L, dated July 19, 1979.
Containment sampling pump failed
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and rendered gaseous and particulate monitors inoperative.
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79-23/3L, dated July 20, 1979.
Diesel generator failed to start when lubricating oil pressure switch was left isolated following preventive maintenance calibration.
79-24/3L, dated July 16, 1979.
Control Element Assembly dropped
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to bottom of core.
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79-25/3L, dated August 3, 1979.
Control Element Assembly motior, inhibit failed to activate at 7 1/2 inches misalignment.
79-26/3L, dated August 17, 1979.
Reactor Coolant System leakage
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through reactor coolant pump middle seal pressure transmitter.
79-27/3L, dated August 17, 1979.
Numerous channel C trips re-
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ceived due to T-hot oscillations.
79-29/3L, dated August 31, 1979.
Containment gaseous and partic-
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ulate monitors rendered inoperable by blown fuse.
- denotes those LER's selected for onsite followup.
For the above events selected for followup the inspector conducted a record review, discussions with licensee personnel and direct observations to the extent necessary to verify the following:
a.
Corrective Action - Technical (1) That corrective action was appropriate to correct the cause of the event.
(2) That corrective action has been taken.
(3)
For corrective actions not yet complete, responsibility has been assigned for assuring completion thereof.
(4) That generic implications if identified were incorporated in corrective action.
(5) Whether corrective action taken or to be taken is adequate, par-ticularly to prevent rec.urrence.
b.
Safety of Operations - Technical (1) Whether the event involved operation of the facility in a manner which constituted an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59(a)(2); or, for facilities or operations not covered under 10 CFR 50, in such a manner as to represent an unusual hazard to health and safety of the public or environment.
(2) Whether the event involved continued operations in violation of regulatory requirements or license conditions.
c.
Reporting Requirements - Administrative (1) The report accurately describes the actual event.
(2) The safety significance stated in the report is consistent with details of the actual event determined in (1) abov.
(3) The reported cause is accurate and the LER form, if required, reflects the proper cause code.
(4) The report satisfies the reporting requirement with respect to information provided and timeliness of submittal.
d.
Licensee Review - Administrative (1) That the event was reviewed and evaluated as required by approved procedures and administrative controls.
(2) That personnel within the licensee organization were notified of the event as required by Technical Specifications, license conditions, or approved procedures.
(3) That review and evaluation of the event included assessment of generic implications.
(4) That review and evaluation of the event included assessment of personnel error and procedural adequacy.
(5) That the event was reviewed to determine whether it is a recur-rence of past events.
The inspector's findings regarding licensee events were acceptable.
6.
Inadvertent Discharge of Demineralizer Regenerative Solution Inadvertent makeup water demiraralizer regenerative solution discharge (non-radioactive)
from the Waste Neutralizing Tanks to the bay are addressed by the following Unit 1 Licensee Event Reports:
79-33/4T, dated August 16, 1979 79-24/4T, dated July 26, 1979 78-57/4T, dated December 22, 1978 The Environmental Technical Specifications require sampling of regenerative waste to ensure that the pH and total dissolved solids are within pre-scribed limits prior to discharge.
The inadvertent discharges described in the above reports were made prior to sampling.
Two of the events were caused by operator failure to close the drain valve prior to transferring regenerative solution to the Waste Neutralizing Tanks.
Licensee correc-tive action listed in the event reports consisted of procedural changes and reinstruction of personne.
On September 11, 1979, the licensee reported another inadvertent discharge of regenerative solution which resulted from an operator failing to close the drain valve.
The operator was interviewed by the inspector and stated that he had never seen the latest revision of the procedure which addressed the drain valve nor was he reinstructed on use of the drain valve as was reported by the licensee.
The contributing factors associated with this event, i.e., repetitive failure to comply with Section 5.5 of the Environmental Technical Specifi-cations with regard to failure to follow procedures, operator error and failure to take adequate corrective actions, indicate insufficient management attention.
Therefore, the September 11, 1979 inadvertent discharge is classified as an item of noncompliance at the infraction level.
(317/79-14-01)
The above concerns were brought to the attention of licensee personnel and corrective action was initiated during the inspection.
A valve checklist requiring sign-off and date was generated to supplement the regenerative solution transfer procedure.
7.
Review of Plant Operations (Units 1 and 2)
a.
Shift Logs and Operating Records The inspector reviewed the following logs and records on a sampling basis:
Shif t Supervisor's Log, Control Room Operator's Log for the
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period June through August 1979.
Lifted Wire / Temporary Jumper Log for the period June through
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August 1979.
Control Room Operators Surveillance Logs for the period June
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through August 1979.
The logs and records were reviewed to verify the following items:
Log keeping practices and log book reviews are conducted in
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accordance with established administrative controls.
Log entries involving abnormal conditions are sufficiently
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detailed.
Operating orders do not conflict with Technical Specifications.
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Jumper Log and Tagging Log entries do not conflict with TS's.
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Jumper, lifted lead and tagging operations are conducted in
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conformance with established administrative controls.
Problem identification reports confinn compliance with TS re-
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porting and LC0 requirements.
Logbook reviews are being conducted by the staff.
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Surveillance test procedures are being performed, reviewed and
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approved in accordance with established administrative controls.
Acceptance criteria for the above review included inspector judgement, and requirements of applicable Technical Specifications and Limiting Conditions for Operations and the following Administrative Control Procedures:
CCI-106, "Special Orders by the Chief Engineer"
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CCI-ll4, " Plant Logs"
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CCI-il7, " Lifted Wire and Temporary Jumper Log"
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The inspectors' findings regarding shift logs and operating records were acceptable.
b.
Plant Tour During the inspection, tours were conducted in the following areas:
Auxiliary Building
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Turbine Building
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Control Room
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Outside Peripheral Areas.
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The following observations / discussions / determinations were made:
Radiation controls established by the licensee, including posting
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of radiation areas, the condition of step off pads, and the dis-posal of protective clothing were observe.
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Systems and equipment in all areas toured were observed for the
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existence of fluid leaks and abnormal piping vibrations.
Selected component cooling, containment spray, high pressure
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safety injection, low pressure safety injection, piping snubbers /
restraints were c' erved for proper fluid level and condition /
proper hanger succings.
The indicated positions of electrical power supply breakers,
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control board equipment start switches, and control board remote-operated valves and the actual positions of selected manual-operated valves were observed.
Selected app-ratus service tags were observed for proper posting
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and the tagged equipment was observed for proper positioning.
The Control Board was observed for annunciators that normally
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should not be lighted during the existing plant conditions.
The reasons for the lighted annunciators were described by a Control Room Operator.
Control Room manning was observed on several occasions during the
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inspection.
Plant housekeeping conditioris, including general cleanliness con-
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diticns and storage of material and components to prevent safety and fire hazards were observed.
Shift turnovers were observed to verify that continuity of system
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status was maintained.
Acceptance criteria for the above items included:
inspector judge-ment; requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k); Regulatory Guide 1.114; and, applicable Technical Specifications.
Except as noted below, the inspector had no comments regarding the above observations.
Extensive maintenance activities in many areas of the auxiliary build-ing had reduced the quality of housekeeping. The floor near No. 11 Charging Pump was covered with a layer of oil.
Licensee personnel acknowledged these conditions and stated that a labor force had been hired to clean the various work areas.
The inspector had no further questions at this tim.
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8.
Misalignment of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Valves The following are the results of an NRC regional inspector's onsite followup of the above event on August 28-30, 1979 (Reference:
LER 79-037/0lX).
a.
The event was reported to the NRC-Region I via a prompt report (LER 79-037/01X) at 8:00 AM on August 28, 1978 in accordance with Technical Specification Section 6.9.1.8.f.
An NRC inspector who was onsite at the time of the event was also inform?d.
The event was also described and documented in accordance with Calvert Cliffs Instruction CCI-ll8B, "Non-Routine Technical Specification Reports Requiring Timely Reporting," and subsequently, logged in the Shif t Supervisors log and the Control Room log on August 28, 1979 as required by the licensee's administrative controls.
b.
The NRC inspector onsite at the time of the event performed the follow-ing:
(1)
Directly observed startup activities; (2) Verified valve, breaker and switch alignments in the ECCS were in accordance with applicable operating procedures for startup; (3)
Interviewed operators to determine the cause of the mispositioning of ECCS valves and the corrective action-: taken; (4)
Reviewed Surveillance Test Procedures, STP-0-7-2 " Engineered Safety Features Monthly Logic Test" and STP-0-62-2 " Monthly Valve Position Verification";
(5)
Determined through interviews with operations personnel, review of control room logs and applicable procedures that only one train of the ECCS was isolated during this event and that the redundant containment spray and ECCS systems remained operable during this event as reported by the licensee; and, (6)
Directly observed that the mispositioned valves (S1-4145 M0V, 12 Header Containment Spray Valve and Sl-4143 MOV 12 Header RWT Suction Valve) have identical controls and position indication and are physically located in close proximity to each other which resulted in the operator closing the wrong valv.
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Based on review of the above items, this event appears to be an isolated case of personnel error rather than inadequate procedures or lack of administrative controls.
However, the licensee is con-sidering further corrective actions to preclude the recurrence of this event and will include these actions in a followup event report.
This is an Unresolved Item pending additional action by the licensee (317/79-14-02 and 318/79-11-01).
9.
Inspection of Cafety Concerns Reported to the NRC The following allegations were communicated to NRC-Region I on August 18 and August 30, 1979 and were investigated during this inspection (Reference Case File No. NRC:I-0-65).
a.
Contractor employees authorized site access and access to radiation areas without meeting the licensee's requirements.
The inspector verified by review of applicable records and interviews with personnel that the individuals alleged to have not passed the required psychological test administered by Baltimore Gas and Electric Company were further screened on June 12, 1979 by an independent clinical psychologist, verified by the company's Director of Psycholog-ical Services and attested to by site management to meet all requirements for access to the site.
The inspector further verified that the other individual in question, received the required annual refresher training in radiological con-trols and, on June 5, 1979, successfully passed the required test allowing him access to potential radiation areas within the facility.
The inspector had no further questions regarding this matter.
b.
Alleged isolation of both ECCS trains during the event on August 28, 1979, (LER 79-037/0lX - reference Report Details Item 8.b above).
c.
Event of August 28, 1979, "ECCS Valves Mispositioned" not reported to NRC or logged in the Control Room log book, (Reference paragraph 8.a above).
d.
Station is under-manned with regard to licensed operators resulting in overworking of the operator.
.
The minimum shift crew composition required by Technical Specification (TS) Section 6.2, Table 6.2.1, is a total of three licensed operators and two senior reactor operators per shift for both units when in modes 1, 2, 3 and 4.
In addition, IEB 79-06C requires facilities with dual control rooms to have three licensed operators in the con-trol room at all times during operation.
Calvert Cliff's present shift manning is four licensed operators per shift which exceeds the TS requirements.
A total of eighteen licensed operators is the present complement and, therefore, is sufficient for a four shift rotation.
The above concern regarding under-manning does not appear to be valid. However, situations such as vacation, sickness, offshift training requirements, etc. leave only 2 available licensed operators for relief. This is a temporary situation. The licensee has nominated six candidates for reactor operator licensing examina-tiofis in September to supplement the station's manning.
At this time, a five shift rotation is planned to increase the offduty time available to licensed operators.
The inspector had no further questions regarding this matter, e.
Overtime work of licensed operators might have an effect on the safe operation of the facility.
At present, licensed operators are working a four shift rotation consisting of eight hour shifts. The inspector verified by review of applicable records that maximum overtime worked by an individual was 20.8% based on a 40 hour4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> week and that the average was less than 15% for the period from June 24 through the ed of August.
The yearly average to date is 6%.
The above statistics do not indicate excessive overtime that could affect the safe operation of the facility.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
f.
Excessive water leakage from the Unit 2 safety injection tank (SIT)
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which requires frequent makeup could be a potential safety problem in that the level could drop below that required for accident response.
The inspector determined from review of applicable piping and Instru-ment Drawings (P&ID's), operating procedures, Control Room logs, Technical Specification requirements, accident analysis bases in the FSAR, and interviews with operations personnel that the above leak-age does not constitute a safety concern at this time, for the following reason.
,
(1)
Part of the ECCS is comprised of four safety injection tanks (SIT's) one of which (#2 SIT) has slight valve leakage that requires makeup approximately once every four to five hours.
The present leak rate from the drain valves is well within the capa-bility of the control room operator to maintain level in accord-ance with Technical Specification limits without interfering with their normal duties.
In addition, the SIT has associated alarms set at conservative levels to warn the operator of any impending problem.
(2) The licensee has instituted a special log to monitor leakage rate to ensure all shift personnel are aware of the problem and are ready to take corrective action if necessary in the event the leak rate increase beyond a predetermined value.
(3) The present leak rate is being adequately monitored and controlled and therefore does not affect the ability of the SIT to function as designed in the event of an accident.
(4) The plant will be shutdown in October 1979 for a scheduled refueling.
At this time the leaking valves will be repaired.
The matter will be followed closely and is an Unresolved Item pending the licensee's corrective actions (318/79-10-02).
10.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations.
Unresolved items are discussed in Paragraphs 8.b.(6) and 9.f.(4).
11.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on September 13, 1979.
The inspector sumarized the purpose, scope and findings of the inspection.