IR 05000317/1979011
| ML19254E116 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1979 |
| From: | Cowgill C, Dante Johnson, Keimig R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19254E103 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-317-79-11, NUDOCS 7910310114 | |
| Download: ML19254E116 (11) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I
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Report No.
50-317/79-11 Docket No.
50-317 License No. DPR-53 Priority
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Category C
Licensee:
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company P. O. Box 1475 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Facility Name:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Inspection at: Lusby, Maryland Inspection conduc d; July 9-13,1979 Inspectors:
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Approved by:
R. R. Keiriiig', Chief, Reactor Projects Section date signed No. 1, R0&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on July 9-13, 1979 (Report No. 50-317/79-11)
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection to verify valve / breaker / switch alignments for Engineered Safety Features (ESF); system operability following maintenance; plant surveillance test procedures and test results; ESF operability following an extended outage; licensee utilization of independent verification; auxiliary feedwater system operability; and facility tours.
The inspection involved 94 hours0.00109 days <br />0.0261 hours <br />1.554233e-4 weeks <br />3.5767e-5 months <br /> on site by two regional based inspectors and a reactor inspector Co-op.
Results:
One item of noncompliance was identified (Infraction - failure to follow procedures related to valve positioning and positive control - three examples -Paragraph 4).
1243 191 Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
7910310
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- M. Bowman, Quality Assurance Supervisor J. Carroll, Technical Support Supervisor S. Davis, Performance Engineer, Operations
- R. Denton, Nuclear Plant Engineer, Operations S. Jones, Training Coordinator T. Jones, Control Room Operator
- A. Kaupa, Radiation Safety and Chemistry Engineer J. Lemons, General Foreman, Nuclear M. Miernicki, Performance Engineer, Maintenance
- L. Russell, Chief Engineer J. Rivera, Shift Supervisor J. Speciale, Foreman Radiation Safety D. Thomas, Training Specialist L. White, Shift Supervisor The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the administrative, technical and operations staff.
- denotes those present at exit interview.
2.
Inspection of Engineered Safety Features (ESF)
An on site inspection of ESF was conducted which encompassed the following systems and components:
a.
Safety Injection System:
(1)
safety injection tanks; (2) high pressure safety injection pumps; and, (3)
low pressure safety injection pumps.
b.
Containment Cooling Systems:
(1) containment spray; (2) containment air recirculation and cooling system; (3) containment penetration room ventilation system; and, (4) containment iodine removal.
1243 192
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c.
Hydrogen Control Systems.
d.
Essential Support Systems:
(1) control systems; (2) normal and emergency power systems; (3) component cooling system; (4) service water system; and, (5) salt water system.
3.
Review of Valve / Breaker / Switch Alignment Procedure',, Checkoff Lists and Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&ID's)
a.
The inspector performed a comparison of the valve / breaker / switch alignment procedures and checkoff lists (COL) for the following ESF systems against current P&ID's and single-line diagrams to verify the adequacy of alignment procedures.
The following items were reviewed:
P&ID 60-248-E, Containment, Turbine, Control Room;
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Penetration Room Ventilation Systems, Rev. 11, 3/15/71 (SH-1
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and SH-2);
P&ID 60-236-E, Containment Charcoal Filter Spray System, Rev.
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's, 9/25/72;
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P&ID 62-731-E, Rev. 2, Safety Injection and Containment Spray System; OI-3 Safety Injection, Shutdown Cooling and Containment Spray,
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Rev. 15, 10/25/78; OP-6 Pre-Startup Checkoff, Rev. 10, 10/25/78;
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STP 0-62-2 Monthly Valve Position Verification, Rev. 3, 3/15/78;
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P&ID 62-711-E, Rev. 3, Containment Charcoal Filter Water Spray System;
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P&IO 62-730-E, Rev. 2, Chemical and Volume Control System;
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OI 2A CVCS Volume Control, Rev. 13, 11/25/78; 1243 193
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0I-29 Salt Water System, Rev. 4, 11/1/78;
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P&ID 62-233-E, Circulating Salt Water Cooling System, Rev. 6;
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OI-15 Service Water System, Rev. 7, 4/26/78; P&ID 60-727-E, Rev. 1, Diesel Generator Cooling Water, Starting
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Air, Fuel and Lube Oil Systems;
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P&ID 62-706-E, Rev. O, Service Water Cooling System-Auxiliary Building and Containment (Sheet 1);
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P&ID 60-706-E, Rev. 0, Service Water Cooling System-Auxiliary Building and Containment, Rev. 1, (Sheet 2);
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01-16 Component Cooling System, Rev. 7, 4/26/78;
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P&ID 62
,.0-E, Rev. 2, Component Cooling System;
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0I-32 Auxiliary Feedwater, Res. 10, 10/25/78; P&ID 62-702-E, Rev. 1, Condensate and Feedwater System; and,
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P&ID 60-242-E, Rev. 9, Demineralized Water and Condensate Storage Systems.
b.
Electrical Breaker Alignment for Off-Site and On-Site Power - The breater alignments were reviewed with a control room operator, comparing a single line diagram to actual breaker positions using control room mimic busses.
In addition, the following detailed alignment procedures we.t reviewed by the inspector to determine that electrical power requirements were satisfied.-- 01-27C, a kV System;-- 01-27D, 480 V System;-- 01-278, 13.8 kV System;
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01-28, Operation of 500 kV Switchyard; and,
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1E-1 Electrical Main Single Lirse Diagram, Rev. 4, 1/21/70.
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4.
Verification of Valve / Breaker / Switch Alignments in ESF Systems by Direct Observation and Checkoff List Completion The inspectors, accompanied by licensee representatives, verified ESF systein valve / breaker / switch alignment by conducting the applicable system checkoffs listed below:
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OP-6, Pre-Startup Checkoff Revision 11, June 28, 1979, attachments 1 through 7;
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STP-0-5L-1, Containment Integrity Verification, Revision 3, May 16, 1979;
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STP-0-62-1, Monthly Valve Position Verification, Revision 1, November 23, 1977;
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STP-0-7-1, ESFAS Logic Test, Revision 6, January 3,1979;
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OI-2A, CVCS Volume Control;
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OI-3, Safety Injection;
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OI-16, Component Cooling;
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OI-21, Emergency Diesels;
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OI-5A, Containment Cooling;
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OI-29, Salt Water;
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OI-26A, 125 Volt Vital DC;
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OI-268, 125 Volt Vite! AC; OI-27A, 250 Volt DC;-- -- 01-278, 13.8 kV System;
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OI-27C, 4.16 kV System; OI-270, 480 Volt System;
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01-6, Reactor Protection System; and,
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STP-0-90-1, Breaker Lineup Verification.
1243 195
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The above verifications confire.ed proper valve positioning and control except as indicated below:
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A test connection valve downstream of containment isolation valve 1-SV-6540F at penetration 47-C required to be shut by the valve lineup sheet (STP-055-1) was found to be open.
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Valve CVC-256 required to be locked open by OP-6 valve lineup sheet was found to be locked shut for plant testing.
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Valve CVC-325 was verified to bt in the proper position but was not locked as required by OP-6 valve lineup sheet.
The deviations from the above valve lineu; sheets were neither annotated on the lineup sheet nor on the Locked Va ne Deviation Sheet as required by the Calvert Cliffs Operating Manual (CCOM) CCI-300B.
These examples of failure to follow procedures for valve positioning and positive control taken collectively constitute an infraction level item of noncompliance (79-11-01).
5.
Review of Surveillance Test Procedures Required by OP-6, Pre-Startuo Checkoff The inspector reviewed surveillance test procedures to verify the following:
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operability of ESF systems and components prior to plant startup;
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acceptance criteria was satisfied; and,
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procedures were reviewed and approved in accordance with the licensee's administrative controls and Technical Specification requirements.
The surveillance test procedures reviewed were the following:
Procedure No.
Title Date Performed STP-0-1-1 Main Steam Isolation Valve Test 6/5/79 STP-0-5-1 Auxiliary Feedwater System Test 7/9/79 STP-0-6-1 Reactor Protection System Startup Test 7/9/79 deficiencies were corrected on the spot in the presence of an NRC inspector.
- 1243 196
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STP-0-7-1 Engineered Safety Features Monthly 6/8/79 Logic Test STP-0-8-0 Diesel Generator Weekly Test 7/5,9,10/79 STP-0-28-1 Hydrogen Recombiner Semi-Annual Test 4/9/79 STP-0-33-1 Radiation Monitoring System Test 7/2/79 STP-0-44-1 Containment Sump Inspection 7/7/79 STP-0-55-1 Corstainment Integrity Verification 7/2/79 STP-0-58-1 Hydrogen Recombiner Refueling Test 4/11/79 STP-0-62-1 Monthly Valve Positiert Verification 7/12/79 STP-0-66-1 Quarterly Valve Operability 7/4/79 Verifica'. ion - Shutdowie STP-0-70-1 Staggered Test of "A" Train
.6/27/79 Components STP-0-71-1 Staggered Test of "B" Train
'6/27/79 Components STP-0-73-1 Engineered Safety Features 6/27/79 Performance Test STP-M-380A-0 Hydrogen Analyzer Calibration 4/3/79 0-AE-6519 STP-M-3808-0 Hydrogen Analyzer Calibration 5/30/79 0-AE-6527 STP-M-546-1 ECCS Pump Room Exhaust Filter Test 10/4/78 (HEPA)
STP-M-536-1 Containment Sump Level Calibration 1/6/79 STP-M-573-1 Main Steam Safety Valve Test 4/21/79 STP-M-547-1 ECCS Pump Room Exhaust Filter Test 5/14/79 (CHAR)
STP-M-220-1 ESFAS Functional Test 6/26/79 No items of noncompliance were identified.
1243 197
6.
Auxiliary Feed Water System a.
The inspector verified by direct observation that all valves in the auxiliary feed water system are in the proper position and that all valves in the system identified by the licensee as requiring locking or similar positive position control are actually locked or controlled.
b.
The inspector verified that upon receipt of a plant trip the reactor operator in the control room has been instructed by the Nuclear Plant Engineer - Operations via a " Standing Instruction" to direct his sole attention immediately to the maintenance and/or restoration of feed water flow via the main feed pumps or auxiliary feed pumps, as required by the situation.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
7.
Plant Tour At various times during July 9 through 13, 1979, the inspector conducted tours of the following accessible plant areas.
Auxiliary Building
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Turbine Building
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Spent Fuel Pool Area
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Control Room
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Safeguards Rooms
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Cable Spreading Rooms
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Battery Rooms
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Outside Peripheral Areas
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Computer Rooms
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a.
The following observations / discussions / determinations were made:
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Radiation controls established by the licensee, including posting of radiation areas, the condition of step off pads, and the disposal of protective clothing were observed;
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Systems and equipment in all areas toured were observed for the existence of fluid leaks and abnormal piping vibrations;
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Selected component cooling, containment spray, high pressure safety injection, low pressure safety injection, piping saubbers/
restraints were observed for proper fluid level and condition /
proper hanger settings;
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The indicated positions of electrical power supply breakers, control board equipment start switches, and control board remote-operated valves and the actual positions of selected manual-operated valves was observed; Selected apparatus service tags were observed for proper posting
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and the tagged equipment was observed for proper positioning; The Control Board was observed for annunciators that normally
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should not be lighted during the existing plant conditions.
The reasons for the lighted annunciators were described by control room operators;
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The licensee's policy and practice regarding plant tours was reviewed.
There were no changes in this area since the previous inspection; Controi Room manning was observed on several occasions during
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the inspection;
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Plant housekeeping conditions, including general cleanliness conditions and storage of material and components to prevent safety and fire hazards, were observed; Observed local and remote gauge indications and calibration
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stickers for High Pressure Safety Injection System, Low Pressure Safety Injection System, Core Spray and Charging Pumps; Observed shift turnover and verified continuity of system
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status was maintained; and, Verified that the battery room ventilation system was operable.
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b.
Acceptance criteria for the above items included inspector judgement and requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k), Regulatory Guide 1.114, applicable Technical Specifications and the following procedures.
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CCI-1070, "f.rea and System Cleanliness"
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CCI-112A, " Safety and Safety Tagging"
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CCI-3008, "Calvert Cliffs Operating Manual" CCI-400A, " Radiation Safety Manual"
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CCI-133, "Calvert Cliffs Fire Protection Plcn"
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The inspector's findings regarding the plant tour were acceptable except as described below:
c.
The inspector observed an excessive amount of scaffolding and a large scattering of tools and debris in the following locations:
- 11 ECCS pump room;
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component cooling room at the 5' level;
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- 12 ECCS pumr room;
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west penetration room 27' level; and, west penetration room 5' level.
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The inspector stated that operator access is very limited in certain areas due to the scaffolding, and that the general conditions in the above areas is very poor.
The licensee stated that the scaffolding and debris is a result of the extensive hanger repair program currently in progress and that when completed the scaffolding would be removed and the areas cleaned up.
This is an unresolved item pending action by the licensee and will be reviewed on a subsequent inspection (79-ll-M).
d.
During performance of independent verification of valve lineups in the Refueling Water Tank (RWT) room, the inspector observed that the frisker (Eberline RM-14) was reading approximately 300 to 500 CPM.
This level of background made it necessary to exit the area to obtain a low enough background level for frisking for any possible contamination.
The inspector stated that this was poor health physics practice in that a means for checking for contamination should be piovided at the exit control point to avoid the possibility of spreading contam-ination to other areas, especially to outside areas constantly traversed by many people.
The licensee stated that interim measures had been established making it mandatory to wear two sets of shoe covers upon entry into the RWT room and that the outer shoe covers would be discarded at the control point, and then the second clean shoe covers would be worn and removed at the outer frisking area to avoid the possibility 1243 200
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of spreading any contamination.
The licensee further stated that a permanent long term solution will be to install a lead shielded booth at the control point in the RWT roo;n that would lower the background and allow personnel frisking prior to exiting this area.
This is an unresolved item pending the licensee's actions with regard to providing personnel frisking capabilities at the exit from the RWT room (79-11-03).
8.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items or items of noncompliance.
The items discussed in paragraph 7 remain unresolved.
9.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on July 13, 1979.
The inspector summarized the purpose, scope and findings of the inspection.
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