IR 05000318/1979016

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
IE Insp Rept 50-318/79-16 on 791015-17 & 23-26.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Refueling Activities,Refueling Outage Related Maint & Surveillance Activities & Surveillance of Pipe Support & Restraint Sys
ML19256G325
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 11/07/1979
From: Caphton D, Kalman G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML19256G324 List:
References
50-318-79-16, NUDOCS 7912310047
Download: ML19256G325 (5)


Text

.

.

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION I

Report No. 50-318/79-16 Docket No.

50-318 License No.

OPR-69 Priority Category C

--

Licensee:

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company P.O. Box 1475 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Facility Name:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 Inspection At:

Lusby, Maryland Inspection Conducted:

October 15-17 and 23-26, 1979 Inspectors:

//- f-79 Kalman, acto tor date date

'

)?

-

date G/'

+/

M 7f Approved by:

/,

(

D'.~L. Cahnt6n, Chief, Nuclear Support-

' d' ate'

Section No. 1, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:

Inspection on October 15-17 and 23-26, 1979 (Report No. 50-318/79-16)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection of refueling preparations, refueling activities, refueling outage related maintenance and surveillance activities, and surveillance of pipe support and restraint systems.

The inspec-tion involved 50 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC regional based inspector.

Results:

No items of noncompliance were identified.

1660 294

Region I Form 167 7 912310 d (August 1979)

.

,

.

OETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Mr. E. Baur, Performance Engineer, Electrical Mr. R. Denton, Nuclear Plant Engineer, Operations Mr. J. Lemons, General Foreman, Nuclear Mr. S. Lippold, Nuclear Engineer Mr. W. Mendell, Quality Control Representative Mr. M. Miernicki, Performance Engineer

  • Mr. L. Russell, Chief Engineer The inspector also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel including members of the operations, maintenance, health physics, and engineering staffs.
  • Present at exit interview.

2.

Review of Licensee Event Report (LER), 79-43/IT (Unit 1)

On September 11, 1979, the fuel supplier informed the licensee that Figure 3.2-4 in the Technical Specifications was incorrect and depicted nonconser-vative Axial Shape Index (ASI) limits.

The licensee had been operating with the nonconservative curve since Unit 1 Cycle 4 operations commenced.

The licensee immediately promulgated the corrected curve to the operations personnel and initiated a review of computer generated incore flux records to determine whether the more conservative ASI limits had been exceeded during Cycle 4 operations.

The licensee concluded that the more conser-vative ASI limits had not been exceeded.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's tabulation of computer generated ASI figures and for selected periods of maximum offset, confirmed through review of operator logs, that the ASI did remain within the more conserva-tive limits.

As stated in the LER, the licensee plans to continue using the revised, more conservative ASI parameters until a Technical Specification change is issued.

The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.

3.

Refueling Preparation a.

Scope The receipt records and inspection reports for the 64 new fuel assem-blies were reviewed.

The fuel handling and core verification proce-dures were reviewed and it was ascertained that refueling related Technical Specification requirements were included in the refueling procedures.

The containment polar crane inspection procedure and report were reviewed.

The fuel handling equipment alignment checks were witnessed.

I660 295

.

.

A fuel vendor document addressing the nuclear parameters of the new core was reviewed by the inspector.

This submittal by the fuel ven-dor was made in anticipation of a licensee safety evaluation to sup-port the position that operations with the new core will not require a change in the Technical Specifications and will not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

The licensee safety evaluation is required by 10 CFR 50.59 and should be completed prior to reactor startup.

This matter is unresolved pending review of the safety evaluation dur-ing a future inspection (318/79-16/01).

4.

Document Reviewed FH-1, Rev. 14, New Fuel Assembly and Control Element Assembly

--

Handling, Inspection, and Storage

--

FH-1B, Rev. 1, Detwisting and Straightening of Fuel Bundles FH-6, Rev. 4, Core Refueling Procedure

--

--

HE-4, Rev. 3, 10/25 Ton Polar Crane Shift and Daily Chec.kout HE-5, Rev. 1, 180/25 Ton Polar Crance Periodic Checkout Procedure

--

Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 Cycle 3 Design Report by Combustion Engi-

--

neering dated September 10, 1979.

c.

Findings The inspector noted that the containment polar crane inspection proce-dure, HE-5, Rev. 1, was extemely general and provided very little guid-ance to the crane inspector.

In addition, crane inspector qualifica-tions were not specified.

These two concerns combined, result in a crane inspection of unknown thoroughness and quality.

Crane inspection records indicate that, in preparation for the 1979 refueling, the inspection was completed in two hours.

A standard industry crane inspection, as described in ANSI B 30.2.0, would require considerably more than two hours to complete.

Licensee representatives acknowledged these findings and agreed to revise the crane inspection procedure to conform to industry standards.

This item is unresolved and will be reviewed prior to the next refueling (318/79-16-02).

5.

Refueling Activities a.

Scope The inspector verified that refueling prerequisite plant conditions, tests, and inspections were satisfied during the course of the refuel-ing operations.

Refueling activities were witnessed and compliance to Technical Specifications and applicable procedures was ascertained.

1660 296

,

As part of the above inspection, fuel status boards were checked for accuracy and manning in the control room the refueling floor, and the spent fuel pool was compared to procedural requirements.

Housekeeping and health physics practices on the refueling bridge and the refuel-ing floor in general were inspected.

b.

Findings No items of noncompliance were identified.

6.

Outage Maintenance and Surveillance a.

Scope The procedures for maintenance and surveillance activities scheduled during the refueling outage were reviewed on a sampling basis to verify that the procedure format complied with the facility adminis-trative requirements and that safety precautions, quality assurance and testing requirements were included.

Where applicable, the main-tenance related safety evaluation was reviewed to determine whether an unreviewed safety question was involved.

Maintenance and surveillance activities were observed 7d maintenance workers were interviewed.

Where applicable, material certification and welder qualification records were reviewed.

b.

Cocument Reviewed MR M-79-6036, Steam Generator Special Inspection Nozzle Fabrication

--

MR M-79-6043, #228 Reactor Coolant Pump Vent Line

--

--

Technical Support Procedure 27, Rev. 0, Reserve Battery Inspec-tion and Service Test in Temporary Location MR M-79-6021, Install 3/4" Mark 110 M3H Isolation Valve as Per

--

FCR-78-126, Including Hanger Modification c.

Findings No inadequacies were identified.

7.

Pipe Supports and Restraints a.

Scope The licensee snubber inspection procedures were reviewed and an inspection of containment snubbers was performed.

b.

Documents Reviewed

--

STP M-13-2, Rev. 0, Snubber Inspection (Inaccessible)

1660 297

,

--

STP M-12-2, Rev. O, Snubber Inspection (Accessible)

STP M-11-2, Rev. 1, Snubber Functional Test

--

c.

Findings The inspector noted that the licensee had not revised the snubber functional test procedure to include temperature compensation fac-tors (previous unresolved item 318/79-09-01).

The snubber functional tests during the current outage will be performed without compensa-tion for temperature differences at the test stand and the operating environment.

The licensee has committed to include temperature com-pensation by January 1980.

A snubber visual inspection by the licensee is not scheduled during this refueling outage.

A visual inspection by the inspector of containment snubbers and hangers did not identify any deficiencies.

8.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items are those items for which further information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or items of noncompliance.

Unresolved items are contained in Paragraphs 4.a. and 4.c. of this report.

9.

Exit The inspector met with the licensee representative denoted in paragraph 1 on October 25, 1979 to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection.

The two unresolved items were discussed at this time.

1660 298