IR 05000317/1979006
| ML19208B914 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 07/27/1979 |
| From: | Feil R, Andrea Johnson, Keimig R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19208B908 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-317-79-06, 50-317-79-6, NUDOCS 7909240146 | |
| Download: ML19208B914 (5) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 79-06 Docket No. 50-317 License No. DPR-53 Priority: --
Category:
C Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Charles Center P.O. Box 1475 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Facility Name:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Inspection at:
Lusby, Maryland Inspection conducted:
Ma 1-4, 1979 7/77 7G Inspectors A
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A.H.Jcynson,R2 (ate sYgned b
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.e R. A. Feil, R1 date signed Approved by:
/d7[79 R. R.
g, Ch eactor Projects 4/te figned Sec No. 1
&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on May 1-4,1979 (Report No. 50-317/79-06)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of refueling activities, modifications, review of Quality Control records, pro-cedures and tests. The inspection involved 56 hours6.481481e-4 days <br />0.0156 hours <br />9.259259e-5 weeks <br />2.1308e-5 months <br /> on site by two inspectors.
Resul ts : No items of noncompliance were identified.
SE13Ws IVG 7 909240gj
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- L. B. Russell, Chief Engineer
- W. J. Lippold, Nuclear Engineer
- T. Forgette, Quality Assarance C. L. Dunkerly, Shift Supervisor L. C. White, Shift Supervisor
- A. Baith, Quality Assurance Specialist
- M. Bowman, Supervisor, Operations Quality Assurance
- W. Gibson, General Supervisor, Operations Quality Assurance D. Latham, Perfonnance Engineer NRC Personnel
- D.
F. Johnson, Project Inspector Other licensee employees contacted included operators, techni-cians, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview on May 4, 1979 at 10:00 a.m.
- Attended exit interview on May 4,1979 at 8:00 a.m.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were sunmarized on May 4,1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
At these meet-ings, the inspector discussed the areas inspected and sunmarized the inspection findings as discussed in this report.
With regard to the unresolved item in Paragraph 6 below, the licensee committed to take appropriate corrective action prior to the next temporary change of refueling procedure FH-6.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
One unresolved item dis-closed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 6 of this report.
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5.
Refueling Activities From review of fuel handling procedure FH-6, " Core Reloading Procedure," the inspector concluded that the reqairements of Technical Specifications 3/4.9 were met at the beginning of core alterations and beginning of fuel movement.
By review of com-pleted sections of FP-6, the inspector concluded that the surveil-lances that were required during refueling operations and speci-fied in Technical Specifications 3/4.9 were current during the period reviewed.
Proper crew composition in accordance with Technical Specification 6.2-1 was confirmed on several occasions by direct observation and discussions with persons involved in fuel handling. Other limiting conditions for refueling operations such as comunications, vessel water level, and refueling machine cperability were also confirmed by direct observation.
Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Findings The inspector noted that temporary changes were being made to FH-6, " Core Reloading" with Combustion Engineering (C-E) Engineers signing as one of the two required members of the plant management staff.
Further review by the inspector revealed that on April 27, 1979, a letter entitled " Temporary Nuclear Fuel Management Organi-
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zation for Supporting Core Refueling and Startup Testing, U-1 Refueling" was initiated by the Plant Nuclear Engineer, giving approval for specific C-E engineers the authority to initiate on-the-spot changes to FH (Fuel Handling) procedures and PST (Startup Testing) procedures in accordance with CCI-500 and CCI-101.
Further review by the inspector revealed that CCI-500 and CCI-101 requires, in part, that a change to a fuel handling procedure which was reviewed by POSRC, shall M approved by two members of the Plant Management Staff, at least one of whom holds a Senior Reactor Operator's license on the unit affected.
Whenever such changes would alter a step in which a QC hold was inserted, the concurrence of the SQCS shall be obtained.
This will be indicated in writing and may be signed by either the SQCS or his representa-tive. All changes shall be documented and subsequently reviewed by the POSRC and the Chief Engineer within 14 days of implementa-tion.
Plant Management Staff is defined as EPD personnel permanently assigned to Calvert Cliffs from the supervisory level of foreman /
Senior Control Room Operator through the Chief Engineer.
In addi-tion, it includes those non-supervisory engineers assigned to the various group heads and authorized by that group head to approve changes.
The inspector verified that the CE engineer was removed S83247
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from the approval chain and replaced by the shift supervisor. All further changes will be in accordance with the above administrative controls.
This item will remain unresolved pending further review by NRC Region I (317/79-06-01).
7.
Facility Modifications Some modifications to the facility were reviewed by the inspector during the present refueling outage.
The modifications selected for review did not require prior commission review and approval pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.
The following modifications were reviewed.
a.
Steam Generator Feed Pump Control Circuit Oscillations in the steam generator feed pump control circuit to the feedwater regulating system were attributed to the first stage pressure signal from the steam generator feed pump turbine speed control.
The signal was removed and the results indicated that there was very little effect on the steam generator level control during either a fast or slow transient.
However, some positive effects have been seen during nonnal steady state operation.
The positive effects were primarily due to the removal of the noise or pulsations coming from the pressure transmitter.
b.
Control Element Drive Backup Power Supplies Failures in the 15 volt Coil Power Prograniner power supplies have caused drops in the Control Element Assemblies during operation and testing.
Control Power Programmer redundant logic power supply circuits were installed with the existing 15 volt DC power supply and provide redundant logic power for all 57 tripping Control Element Drive Mechanism programmers.
Power supply indicating status was also provided.
c.
Power Supply Source Change Power to various feedwater and condensate control devices was lost on failure of the normal 500 kV power supply from Unit 2.
A change in the power supply source was made to preclude the tripping of Unit 1 on loss of normal power supply from Unit 2.
The affected controls were the Steam Generator Feed Pump speed governors, the hotwell makeup and dump valves and components of the Condensate Booster Pumps minimum flow control loop.
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Steam Generator Feedwater Distribution Ring The steam generator feedwater ring was modified by adding elbows to the top of the ring to minimize waterhammer.
Feedwater entering the steam generator was. distributed via a feedwater distributor ring having bottom aperatures which directed the flow into the downcomer.
The modification consisted of installing 36 90*-elbows on the top of distribu-tion ring and welding plugs in the 72 discharge nozzles on the bottom of the distribution ring.
The 'lbows will act as e
a stand pipe and retain liquid, thereby reducing the possi-bility that waterhammer will be caused by feedwater injection into the distribution ring.
The inspector reviewed the available records for the modifi-cations including installation procedures, facility change requests, maintenance requests, Plant Operations Safety Review Committee meeting minutes and safety evaluations.
A minor discrepancy in a safety evaluation was found in that a FSAR reference was omitted.
Tne licensee is taking correc-tive action to ensure that changes to the FSAR will be made.
No other anomalies were found in the records.
No items of nomcompliance were identified.
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