IR 05000313/1990042
| ML20024F965 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 12/19/1990 |
| From: | Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024F920 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-90-42, 50-368-90-42, NUDOCS 9012270186 | |
| Download: ML20024F965 (18) | |
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APPENDIX B U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-313/90-42 Licenses:
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Dockets:
50-313
50-368 l
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Route 3 Box '.J7G Russellville, Arkansas 72801 Facility Name:
Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
AN0 Site, Russellville, Arkansas Inspection Conducted:
October 16 through December 7, 1990 Inspectors:
C. C, Warren, Senior Resident inspector Project Section A, Division of Reactor Projects L. J. Smith, Resident Inspector Project Section A, Division of Reactor Projects A. Singh, Reactor Inspector Test Programs Section, Division of Reactor Safety N. Terc, Emergency Preparedness Analyst Facilities Radiological Protection Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Approved:
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'f. F. Wasterman, Chief, Proj'ect Section A Date Division of Reactor Projects Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted October 16 through December 7, 1990 (Report 50-313/90-42; 50-368/90-42)
Areas Inspected:
Onsite event followup, operational safety verification, modification installation, surveillance, maintenance, outage activities, review
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of previous inspection findings, and followup of licensee action on LERs, Results:
The result of the Unit 1 resin fine spill documented in NRC Inspection
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Report 50-313/90-30; 50-368/90-30 as Unresolved Item 313/9030-02, has been determined to be in violation of NRC requirements (Section 8.1).
012270186 901220 pDR ADOCK 0SC00323 g
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-2-j Compliance to TS 3.7.1.2, which requires that'"two emergency feedwater
(EFW) pumps shall-be operable," is still being evaluated.
This item will-
-l be carried as Unresolved Item 368/9042-01 pending the outcome of
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' troubleshooting and our review of your corrective action activities (Section 4.1).
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Leakage from the lube oil system to aux cooling water system caused the
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oil spill to the lake which was estimated to be 10-15 gallons.
Prompt R
operator identification mitigated the consequences of the spill.
The
' licensee's corrective actions were' prompt and' thorough (Section 3.1).
Weak Health' Physics Practices were identified-(Section 4.10).
- Once-through steam generator (OTSG) cleaning and service water (SW)
cleaning were both effective initiatives (Section 7.1 and 7.2).
Refueling was well controlled (Section 7.3);
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The valve overhaul initiative should lead to improved system reliability.
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-Even though the licensee was not able to accomplish all-work originally planned for the outage, safety significant activities were prioritized.
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I-3-DETAILS
' 1.
PERSONS CONTACTED
N. Carns, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- J. Yelverton, Director, Nuclear Operations D. Boyd, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Specialist M. Chisum, Unit.2 Assistant Operations Manager K. Coates, Unit 2 Maintenance Manager
'A.-Cox, Unit 1 Assistant Plant Manager
- - M. Cooper, Licensing Specialist M. Durst, Modification Engineering Superintendent
- R. Edington, Unit 2 Operations Manager
- R. Fenech, Unit 2 Plant Manager
- J. Fisicaro, Licensing Manager L. Humphrey, General Manager, Nuclear Quality A. Jacobs, Supervisor, Surveillance Testing J. Jacks,-Nuclear Safety and Licensing Specialist G. Jones, General Manager, Engineering
- R. King, Plant Licensing Supervisor
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- D. Mims, Unit 2 System Engineering Superintendent
- D, Moss, Radiation Protection and Radwaste Manager J. Mueller, Unit 1= Maintenance Manager
- T. Nickels,.-Radiati:n Protection and Radwaste Superintendent
- R. Sessoms, Plant Manager, Central
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- 0. Snellings, Health. Physics Technical Assistant
- J, Swailes, Training Manager
- J. -Taylor-Brown, Quality Control / Quality Engineering Manager
- J. Vandergrif t, Unit 1 Plant Manager
- H. Williams, Security Manager C. Zimmerman, Unit 1 Operations Manager
- Present at exit interview.
- Present at Supplemental exit interview.
The inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including operators,.
engineers,-technicians, and administrative personnel.
2.
PLANT, STATUS (UNITS 1 and 2)'
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Unit 1.. conducted a-refueling outage during this inspection period.
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- Unit.2 operated at 100 percent _ power during this inspection period except for a-P i
. power descent requ red due to loss.of both-core operating. limit supervisory
- systems (COLSS) (Section 3.3).
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ONSITE EVENT FOLLOWUP (UNITS I and 2) (93702)
3.1 Unit 1 - Declaration of a Notice of Unusual Event (NOVE) Due to Turbine Lube Oil Spill On Ncvember 29, 1990, during a tur'>ine lube oil flush,_ a Unit 1 operator
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noticed a falling lube oil tank level.
The f alling-tank level was= determined to be _a result of a leaking -oil cooler.
The control room secured the lube oil pump at 4:35 a.m. (CST).
The oil boom used for containment at the discharge canal was in place by 5:18 a.m.
An.NOVE_ was declared at 6:15 a.m.
The licensee notified the Environmental Protection Agency, the' Army Corp of Engineers, U.S. Coast Guard,. Arkansas Department-of Health, State of Arkansas Hazardous Materials Division, and local officials.
Aux cooling water (ACW) was not in service at the time the event took p' ace.
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Oil leaked from the iube oil system to the ACW via a failure in one of the turbine lube oil coolers.
Due to the piping arrangement, the oil filled the-
-cooler and gravity fed to the discharge canal.
The licensee estimated the total. spill to the lake to be 10-15 gallons. The licensee exited the NOUE at 8:05 a.m.
Members of the resident staff were on site throughout the N0UE and closely followed the licensees actions.
Operator response was rapid and the licensee's corrective actions were prompt and thorough.
3.2... Unit 1 - Diesel Generator Piston Failure
'On November 5, 19.90, during postmaintenance testing, UnitL1 Diesel Generator B tripped automatically on high crank case-pressure.-
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Following a 6 year inspection and minor tear down, the diesel successfully completed the low speed rolls and injector adjustments.
The diesel was then started'and fully loaded.
Twenty minutes into the run, an unusual noise-occurred.. The engine tripped automatically-before it could be manually.
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tripped.
The licensee disassembled the engine to determine the extent and cause of the' failure.
The licensee determined that a rupture to the No. 16 piston caused the trip..
They discovered _a'1/4-inch nut inside of the inlet air _ box.-
The No. 16 cylinder had a' hole punched in it.
The-valve for.this cylinder was shattered.
The licensee'
,eorizes that the nut wedged between the valve inlet and the valve' seat preventing it from retracting during the piston exhaust ' stroke.
The connecting rods and adjacent cylinders were examined and no other damage was detected.
The licensee reassembled the diesel and completed surveillance testing with no further problems noted.
The unit was'in_a refueling outage and the. unit was defueled while the diesel was being repaired.
The licensee's review of the event focused on potential weaknesses in the work control process that'could have allowed foreign material to enter sensitive equipment.
No generic weaknesses in the work control were identified.
The t.
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5-inspector attended the corrective action review board for this event and concluded that the licensee's efforts in review of this event was adequate.
3.3 Unit 2 - Power Descent Due to Loss of Both Core Operating Limit Supervisory Systems (COLSS)
On December the power supply for both COLSS's was lost due a card failure.
The licensee was unable to make repairs within the 15 minutes allowed by TS 3.2.1.
A power descent was initiated to 92 percent.
At that time both COLSS were returned to service and the licensee returned to full power.
The' inspectors observed that the licensee complied fully with the applicable TS action statements.
4.
OPERATIONAL SAFETY VERIFICATION (UNITS 1 and 2) (71707)
Th9 inspectors routinely toured the facility during normal and backshift hours to assess general plant and equipment' conditions, housekeeping, and adherence to fire protection, security, and radiological control measures.
Ongoing work activities were monitored to verify that they were_ being conducted in accordance with-approved administrative and techni-11 procedures and that proper communications with the control room staff oad been established.
The inspector observed valve, instrument, and electrical equipment lineups in the field to ensure that they-were consistent with system operability requirements and' operating procedures.
During tours of the control room, the inspectors verified proper staffing, access control, and operator attentiveness.
Adherence to-procedures-and limiting conditions for operation were evaluated.
The inspectors examined equipment lineup and operability, instrument traces, and status of control room
- annunciators.
Various control room logs and other available licensee
' documentation were reviewed.
t 4.1 Unit 2 - Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump Turbine Overspeed Trips The licensee has experienced unexpected overspeed trips of their EFW' pump turbine during this inspection period.
The_ licensee has not been able-to.cause the_ failures to repeat and has not determined the cause of the overspeed trips.
-The licensee's approach to troubleshooting and determining pump operability has.
been discussed with NRC management and found to be acceptable pending final resolution on the technical-issue.
-Compliance to'TS 3.7.1.2, "which requires that "two EFW pumps shall be operable,".is still-being evaluated. This item will be carried as Unresolved ~
Item 368/9042-01 pending the outcome of troubleshooting and corrective action.
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4l2 ' Unit 1 - Startup Transformer 1 Cooling Circuit Failure-On October 29 a control relay for Startup Transformer 1, the dnit 1 normal,
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offsite power-supply cooling circuit failed.
The transformer was taken out of service for repairs.
Startup Transformern2 was used as the normal supply with
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-6-a temporary modification installed.
The temporary modification bypassed the load shed logic so that two condenser circulating water (CCW) pumps could be run.
A release was in progress and both CCW pumps were needed for dilution'.
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Operations stated that Startup Transformer 1 could have been returned to service without the cooling fans, if necessary, with appropriate temperature monitoring.
A temporary diesel generator was also in place to support the critical safety-related loads; the temporary fire pump, the spent fuel pool coo' ling pump, and the intermediate cooling water pump.
The inspector observed that the licensee effectively ensured that there was adequate spent fuel pool cooling and that there was adequate fire protection t
while the cooling circuit was being repaired.
4.3 Units 1 and 2 - Fire Pump Operability Impact Due to Service Water Bay Draindown During the Unit 1 refueling outage the licensee chemically cleaned the service water and aux cooling water systems.
They also implemented modifications to'
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the service water system and drained the intake bays for inspection and maintenance.
The inspector evaluated.the various. service water lineups and their impact on safety-and found that the licensee's compensatory action were acceptable.
The licensee effectively ensured cooling to the spent fuel pool, and provided for adequate fire protection throughout the evolutions.
4.4 Unit 2 - Hold Order Review The inspector' reviewed the Unit 2 hold tag book to ensure that status was
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accurately being. tracked.
It was observed that the weekly check of Hold Card
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Authorization Forms for all hold cards that have been installed for greater than 1 week was being documented on yellow'stickies, rather than in the remarks-
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section as required by. 1000.027, " Hold and Caution Card Control." - This -action was necessitated by the!1ack of adequate documentation space on the-required-form.
This was brought to the I"it 2 Operations Manager's attention.
The Operations Manager has ialtiated a revision to Procedure 1000.27.
The revision will provide additional space for documenting the review of-extended
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The' inspector also otserved the-review and installation of Hold Order-No. 90-2-1786.
This hold order was written to isolate Valve 2 ABS-13B for i
. disassembly.and repai". :It.was necessary to isolate 2T69B and turn the
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associated pump off.
The boundary was identified by a qualified waste control operator and independently reviewed by a licensed operator.
The boundary was technically. correct.
The licenser ?erator performed an independent review, in that he independently determined fw himself what the boundary should be and
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then compared that to the specified boundary.
A qualified waste control
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-7-operator was assigned the task of installing the hold card.
The inspector observed that he correctly completed the hold order, 4.5 Units 1 and 2 - Audit Review The inspector observed portions of the performance of Audit QAP-18F, " Emergency Core Cooling System (Unit 2)."
The portions observed were acceptably performed.
Interviews with the auditor indicate that audits of this type are-focused on microfilmed records (i.e. events that were at least 6-months old).
If anomalies are identified, more current records are reviewed.
Real time aspects of the_ quality verification program are addressed in'the licensee's Quality Assurance. Surveillance Report system.
The inspector also reviewed QAP-10-90, "1st Half, Corrective Action."
QAP-10-90, "1st Half" was a performance-based audit and addressed the effectiveness of three corrective action systems:
LER's, Plant Safety Committee (PSC) action _ tracking, and Safety Review Committee _(SRC) action tracking.
The inspector found that the audit was thorough and presented well-defined conclusions and recommendations.
4.6 Units 1 and 2 - Posting Requirements The inspector verified the. posting requirements of 10 CFR Part 19.11 and-Part 21.6 were being implemented by the licensee.
4.7 Units 1 and 2-- Freeze Protection Logs The inspector reviewed the daily _ logs being maintained by operations on both units.
These logs are used to ensure that adequate freeze protection for safety-related equipment is in place.
4.8 Unit 1 - Once Through-Steam Generator (OSTG) Missed Emergency Feedwater Nozzle Inspection
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On November 14, 1990, the licensee filed'a 10 CFR 50.72 report due to-missed inspections on the once-through steam generator emergency feedwater-
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nozzles / thermal sleeves.and potential excessive thermal cycling of the riser
. flanges.
In 1982 the licensee completed-temporary repairs for possible cracking of the-emergency feedwater nozzies based on Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) identification of cracked emergency feedwater nozzles-at Oconee.
The-temporary repair was only-qualified by_B&W for one cycle.
Plans to qualify the temporary repair for
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extended operation required a sleeve inspection every 2 years, maximum, with
'one inspection required per year preferred.
These inspections, and the
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a'ssociated qualification for extended service, had not-been performed. _In
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addition, a problem concerning thermal cycles and qualification of the. vessel-nozzle flanges (EFW riser nozzles at the thermal sleeves) was thought to exist.
EFW thermal cycling beyond the B&W recommended thermal cycle qualification was also a concern.
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The licensee discovered this condition during a review of a B&W EFW reliability proposal by the systems engineer.
The licensee contracted with B&W for additional analysis and it was determined that the current condition was qualified for previous operations and operations in the near future.
It was-determined that this event had no potential saf ety significance and the licensee withdrew the 10 CFR 50.72 report.
The inspector reviewed this issue with the cognizant licensee design engineering personnel and had no further questions.
4.9 Unit 2 - Switchgear Cooler Seismic Evaluation On October 19, 1990, the licensee reported a -condition where two of the service water room coolers for redundant switchgear rooms were degraded seismically.
The potential.nonseismic condition of the coolers was due to missing bolts used for attachment of the cooler mounting brackets.
At the time of discovery on September 27, 1990, the two coolers were declared inoperable, immediately repaired, and returned to service.
There is a total of four coolers-(two per room) available.
One in each room was operable, as required by TS; therefore, the condition at the time of original discovery was not considered reportable.
It appears that this condition existed since 1985, when all bolts were not reinstalled following maintenance activities.
The licensee initiated an engineering evaluation, completed on October 18, 1990, to determine if the potential nonseismic condition of the coolers affected the flooding analysis performed for the switchgear rooms.
The licensee's evaluation concluded that flooding was a potential problem in the event a design basis seismic event occurred.
The licensee performed sampling inspection of all cooling coils replaced prior to Notember 1985 and found no additional seismic bolting deficiencies.
A 100~ percent inspection of all coils replaced will be performed in Refueling Outage 2R8.
Initial qualification of the cooling coils was performed using-a shaker table test.
No previous seismic. calculation were performed on.the as'clesigned unit.
A detailed seismic analysis was performed taking into consideration actual as found-condition of the effected cooling coils. -Using current seismic analysis methodologies the licensee was able to' prove that the coils were seisnically
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TheElicensee's corrective action was determined to be prompt and thorough. The-inspector had no further questions.
4.10 Units 1 and 2 - Health' Physics Practices j
During the inspection period ceveral weak health physics practices were observed.
A step-off pad was not installed next to a contamination zone that had to be entered to perform a routine surveillance.
Step-off pads at all-
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contaminated areas are not required by licensee procedures.
The licensee has. indicated that they consider step-off pads a good practice and that they plan to~walkdown contaminated areas routinely visited by operations.
'to ensure step-off pads are in place.
A waste control operator believed the requirement to maintain control of
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the keys for Category E valves superseded the requirement to give materials used in the radiologica'l controls area (RCA) to health physics for frisking when leaving the RCA.
The operator did perform a whole body frisk using a PCM18.
The Operations Manager has stated that Health Physics requirements supersede the key control requirements and plans to discuss this with his staff.
Friskers were not readily available in Unit 2.
The inspector was informed that more friskers have been received on site.
They are of a different model than the type currently in use.
The procedure to use them is in the review process.
Workers were observed to be working across the boundary for a radiological materials area on the Unit 1 turbine deck.
The -licensee Health Physics
. procedure allows work to be performed across radiological material control boundaries; however the licensee in response to the_ inspector has-suspended this practice'and now initiates a radiation work' permit.(RWP)
for all radiological materials areas outside of the radiologically controlled area.
These RWPs preclude work across the boundary.
Workers were observed to be tossing plastic bags containing low level radwaste rather than carrying them.
The licensee management agrees that this is an unacceptable practice and has communicated this position with
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responsible personnel.
In contrast, the prejob As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) briefing for the-fuel ~ recaging effort was very effective.
Further, when dif ficulties were
encountered with-the refueling bridge during preparations for fuel recaging,
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the inspector observed that:the health physics technician took, control and-stopped the work.
All personnel were asked to leave the refuel-floor.
The RWP was then-revised to address the changed activity prior to resuming work.
Inspectors feel that Health Physics practices on high-visibility hig-risk jobs-l
.are good. ^However, some of the work practices observed by the inspectors on-site for routine day-to-day Health Physics activities appeared weak.
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.S.
MONTHLY SURVEILLANCE OBSERVATION (UNITS 1.and 2) (61726)
~The inspectors observed the TS-required surveillance testing on the various~-
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components listed below and. verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures,' test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions -for operation were met, removal and restoration of 'the affected components were accomplished, test results conformed with TS and procedure
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-10-requirements, test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and any deficiencies identified-during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspectors witnessed portions of the following test activities:
" Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning and Ventilation,"
Procedure 2104.007, Supplement 1, Procedure Change 2, Revision 30, J0 826785
" Containment. Spray System," Procedure 2104.005, Supplement 1, Revision 27, J0 826789
" Reactor Building Atmosphere Control," Procedure 2104.033, Supplemer.t 2,
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Revision 28, J0 826779-
"High Pressure-Safety Injection System Operation,"_ Procedure 2104.039.,
Supplement 1, Revision 26, J0 826782
" Auxiliary. System Operating Eberline Radiation Monitoring System,"
Procedure 1104.021, Supplement 2, Revision 7, Procedure Change 1,
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J0.826792 5.1 Observations The licensee performed a Unit 2 noble gas monitor source check on t
November 16, 1990, using Procedure 1104.21, Supplement 2.
The containment purge Super Particulate Iodine-and Noble Gas Monitor (SPING) No 5 would not return to its normal reading on Channels 5 and 7 after being placed in source cneck.
The licensee.i_nitiated Condition Report 2-90-513 to document-the condition and declared the SPING inoperable.
The containment purge pathway was
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not in use at the time.
All of the Unit 2 SPINGs were source checked.
The SPINGs provide input to the-radiological dose assessment calculator (RDAC). -The ROAC software is used-during the-performance of the surveillance; The ROAC system is relatively new.
The personnel using the system and making the_ operability calls were not fully familiar with the applicable procedure or the-RDAC software.
However, all actions observed were correct.
A minor procedure error was identified.
The corrective action respon:,e procedure-(1104.21) for Annunciator E4 on 2K09 annunciator panel refers to the same flow switch and Fan Identifiers E4 on 2K08 annunciator panel.
This co'nflicts with _ Drawing E-2367, Operations initiated a procedure' improvement Identification-Form 1015.11B to track the correction.
A minor tagging discrepancy was ' identified.
Procedure 2104.07, Supplement 1,
, instructs the operator to obtain the differential pressure across Filters VFA-3 and VFC-2.
The associated pressure differential indicator tags refer to Filters VFP-3 and VFP-2 respectively.
Operations indicated they would initiate a plant change request to correct the tag _. _ _ _ _ _ _. _ - _.. _ _ _ _ -. _ _ _ _. _.. _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _. _ _ _... _ _. _. _..
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5.2 Conclusions
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The licensee successfully completed the surveillances observed and the TS l
requirements were adequately addressed.
Technician compliance with procedures and performance was generally good.
No violations or deviations were noted.
6.
MONTHLY MAINTENANCE / MODIFICATION INbTALLATION REVIEW (UNITS 1 and 2)
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[6T103,60705)
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Station maintenance activities for the safety related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards,
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and in conformance-with the TS.
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The following items were considered during tnis review:
the limitin0 conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work, activities were
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accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable,
. functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service, quality control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, parts end materials used
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were properly certified, and radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to
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ensure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment' maintenance which may affect system performance.
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6.1 Observations Tha-following maintenance and modification installation activities were observed:
ANO-1 Fuel Assembly Component Inspection and Modification (Reconstitution), 1409,26, Revision 0
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Unie l - Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Modifications, DCP 87-1127 Unit 1 - High Pressure Injection (HPI) Modifications, DCP 89-10128
- Unit-1 - Service Water Modifications, JO 777905 Unit 1-- Main and Pump Turbine Modification's, J0 822001
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-Unit'l - Main Turbine Overhaul, J0.822001
~n Vnit 1
. Main Generator Rotor Disassembly, JO 822001
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6.2 Conclusions The work instructions were uniformly complete and accurate.
Overview by
quality assurance personnel was commensurate with the safety significance of the tasks being performed.
Initial installation was not always in accordance
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with the design.
The licensee's quality program detected these errors and the final product was acceptable.
However; numerous field changes to design
documents were necessary to ensure that the as-built configuration was accurately depicted and acceptable.
7.
UNIT 1 - OUTAGE ACTIVITIES (62703, 60705)
7.1 OTSG Cleaning
The licensee chemically cleaned both OTSG's during this outage.
Tho secondary side was cleaned using an iron removal step, followed by a copper removal step and passivation.
Additional-secondary side cleaning was also performed using sludge lancing Both evolutions were well planned, coordinated, and executed.
The following L
deposits were_ removed:
OSTG - A OSTG - B Iron 5122 pounds 4307 pounds Copper 165 pounds 100 pounds
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Sludge Lance 330 pounds-200-pounds-7.2 SW and ACW Cleaning The licensee chemically cleaned the SW and the associated nonsafety-related ACW system during this outage.
First the_ deposits _were softened, then iron was removed, and, lastly, a rinse and passivation step was taken.
The process
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removed over 18,000. pounds of deposits.
The licensee expected leaks during the process, but experienced more than anticipated especially in the ACW.
The response and cleanup was quick.
Over all the. initiative was very effective and fshould_ lead to significant system performance improvements.-
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L7.3 Refueling
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The inspector monitored _a portion of the refueling. activities.
Licensee refueling' floor-senior. reactor operator (SRO) performance.was effective to ensure fuel movement was performed in accordance with approved procedures.
The
'i licensee's_ refueling contractor performed well.
Health abysics practices _ were good. - The evolution was well planned and-controlled ana was completed ahead of
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schedule.
Prior to fuel movement extensive _ modification and upgrade to_ fuel handling equipment were performed.
Although some minor equipment problems delayed the core of f-load, refueling equipment performance during reload was-highly reliable.
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-13-7.4 Main Feedwater Line High Energy Line Break (HELB)
The licensee discovered that a portion of the Unit 1 "A" Train main feedwater
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(MFW) line is routed in close proximity to the service water return line from the intermediate cooling water (ICW) coolers located in the turbine auxiliary building.
Piping restraints, and or impingment protection, were not provided for this section of the MFW line.
The condition was discovered during a walkdown of the service water system in response to Generic Letter 89-13.
Resolution of this issue is considered a restart item for Unit 1, which is currently in a refueling outage.
The inspector attended the corrective action review board (CARB) for Condition Report C-90-115.
The licensee moved the SW-9 (service water valve which was the potential target) below Elevation 354.
This provides separation from the MFW line in the event of a high energy line break (HELB) and addresses this issue.
7. 5 Valve Overhauls The licensee initiated a new program during Refueling Outage 1R9 to routinely overhaul both safety-related and balance-of-plant valves on a preplanned schedule.
This program is in addition to valves that will receive maintenance as a result of identified deficiencies.
This work was performed by a valve maintenance contractor.
The inspector observed portions of numerous overhauls.
The technicians appeared to be highly skilled.
All work was conducted in accordance with procedures.
The initiative should lead to improved system
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reliability.
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7.6 Conclusions The licensee effectively controlled contractor activities on site.
The OTSG and the 5W/ACW initiatives were effective.
System performance improved significantly.
Refueling was well controlled.
The valve overhaul initiative should lead to improved system reliability.
Even though the licensee was not able to accomplish all work originally planned for the outage, safety significant activities were prioritized well.
8.
REVIEW 0F PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS (92701)
8.1 (Update) Unresolved Item 313/9030-02:
Safety Evaluation for Conducting Transfer Cask Dewatering Activities in Train Bay.
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.As a result of the Unit I resin fine spill documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-313/90-30; 50-368/90-30 tne inspector requested the licensee to
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provide documentation of their safety evaluation for conducting transfer dewatering activities in the train bay.
The licensee had a safety analysis for the cask dewatering process, but the l
potential impact of conducting the activity in the train bay rather than in a
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radiologically controlled area had not been considered.
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This unresolved item has been determined to be in violation of NRC requirements.
Unit 1 TS 6.5.1.6.d requires that the Plant Safety Committee
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shall be responsible for " review of all proposed changes or modifications to plant systems or equipment that affect nuclear safety."
i Contrary to the above, an inadequate review of the safety analysis for conducting resin transfer cask dewateri g activities in'the train tcy rather than in a radiologically controlled area was performed.
The dewaterlng process was reviewed, but the location for conducting the activities had not been considered.
This is a Severity Level IV violation.
(Supplemer.t I) (313/9030-02)
8.2 (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 313/9030-03:
Control Rod Drive
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Mechanism (CRDM) Cable This item involved the failed inner mast cable of the control rod mast, located on the refueling bridge, during disassembly.
The inspector reviewed the condition report and attended the CARB meeting.
Although tne licensee believed the mast cable failure was due to technician
error, the licensee took the conservative approach of replacing all cables on
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refueling handling equipment prior to moving fuel.
Based on this review the licensee corrective action was determined by the inspector to be effective, and this item is considered closed.
8.3 (0 pen): Inspector Followup Item; 368/9030-01:
Generic Terry Turbine
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Vendor Drawing i
This item involved the use of a generic Terry Turbine vendor drawing which did not conform to the field-installation, during performance of Unit 2 emergency
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feedwater pump turbine overspeed tappet replacement.
The licensee is reviewing their practices related to the-use of generic vendor drawings. -This item will' remain open pending the-outcome of that review.
8.4 (Closed) Unresolved Item (368/8714-06):
High/ Low Pressure Interface
'This item involved the methods for control of pressurizer vent valves and ' low temperature over pressure (LTOP) relief isolation valves to prevent spurious operation of the high/ low pressure interface.
The interface is susceptible to'
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spurious operation for the control room, cable spreading room, and the lower south electrical penetration room fire-induced short circuits for these valves.
During a previous 1987 inspection (50-368/87-14) inspection, the licensee did not provide sufficient information to conclude that the method of control for these valves was effective.
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-15-By letter dated November 23, 1990, the licensee provided the additional information and the proposed corrective actions to preve:.t the spurious operation of these valves in case of fire in the above mentioned concerned areas.
The inspector reviewed the information and the propose. corrective actions and found it acceptable.
Therefore, this item is consit ed to be closed.
8.5 (Closed) Deficiency Items 313/8122-13; 368/8121-13 This item involved the development of Quality Assurance (QA) procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of emergency planning training.
Based on the performance of this inspection, the inspector found that adequate QA procedures have been implemented, therefore, this item is considered closed.
8.6 (Closed) Daficiency Items 313/8122-74; 368/8121-74
.This. item involved developing and implementing instructions for taking badge records to the Emergency Control Center (ECC) in the event of Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) being evacuated.
Based on the performance of this inspection, the inspector found that the appropriate Emergency Plan and Security Plan procedures have been revised to provide the necessary accountability instructions. -This item is considered closed.
9.
FOLLOWUP OF LICENSEE ACTION ON LERs (UNIT 1 and 2)
(92700)
9.1 (Closed) LER 50-368/81-009:
Refueling Water Tank (RWT)
Frozen RWT level transmitter sensing lines caused Channel A (2LI-5636-1) to indicate greater than 100 percent.
The licensee now has incorporated a routine check of the freeze protection into Log 1015.038-14.
Interviews with operations personnel indicate that their program has been effective preventing frozen RWT level transmitters.
' Based on the results of this review, this item is closed.
9. 2 (Closed) LER 50-368/80-083:
Plant Computer Failure Due to Improperly Placed Welding Lead Grounds Improperly placed grounds for welding activities creeted voltage spikes which rendered the plant _ computer inoperable.
The licensee now has instructions (1025.13, Revision.5, " Conduct of Maintenance-Welding," and 4001.01, Revision 2, " Control of Plant Modification Welding")
' describing the proper placement of welding lead' grounds.
Interviews with-operations personnel indicate that, although the plant computer has failed several times over the last few years, none of the failures have been attributed to placement of welding lead grounds.
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9.3 (Closed) LER 50-368/85-029:
Inadequate Quality Control by the Vendor Resulted in Improper Installation of Service Water Pump Motor Bearings Improper orientation and installation of upper motor bearings on service water pump motors (2PM4A and 2PM48) by the vendor, caused the motor bearings to be degraded.
The licensee has revised Procedure 2403.004, "2PM-4A, B&C Service Water Pump Motor Maintenance and Testing," to reflect the proper orientation for bearings in both service water pump motors.
The licensee has properly installed new motor bearings on both service water pumps and they were declared operable.
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9.4 (Closed) LER 50-313/90-010:
Inoperable Control Room Habitability Systems i
This item involved the the operability of the control room ventilation system in the: event of a loss of instrument air.
This event was also addressed in Violation 313/9038-01; 368/9038-01, therefore, the necessary corrective actions
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will-be reviewed in conjunction with closure of the violation.- This LER in
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considered closed.
10.
ONSITE MEETING WITH LICENSEE MANAGEMENT
' On November 20,>1990, members of NRC Region IV management met with licensee management onsite to discuss the results of the licensee's improvement programs and recent plant events. -An outline of that meeting and the associated attendance list is provided as. Appendix C to the letter forwarding-this
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inspection report.-
11.
EXIT INTERVIEW The inspectors met with members of the Entergy Operations staff, on'
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. November. 30, 1990.
The list of attendees is provided in paragra)h 1 of this inspection-report.
At this meeting,-the inspectors summarized tie scope of the inspection and the findi_ngs.
The inspection period was extended to address the-emergency feedwater pump turbine overspeed trips.. The inspectors met again with members of the Entergy Operations on December'7,1990, to discuss this issue.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary, any of the material provided to, or-reviewed by, the inspectors during this inspection.
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APPENDIX C Page 1 of 2 QUARTERLY PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW OUTLINE ANO UNITS 1 AND 2 1.-
ATTENDEES A. ENTERGY OPERATIONS D. HINTZ, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT N. CARNS, VICE PRESIDENT OPERATIONS J. YELVERTON, DIRECTOR OPERATIONS J. VANDEGRIFT, PLANT MANAGER, UNIT 1 R. FENECH, PLANT MANAGER, UNIT 2 W. CRADDOCK, GENERAL MANAGER, SUPPORT l
L. HUMPHREY, GENERAL MANAGER, QUALITY G. JONES, GENERAL MANAGER, ENGINEERING J. FISICAR0, MANAGER LICENSING l
R. SESSOMS, PLANT MANAGER, CENTRAL R. KING, SUPERVISOR LICENSING D. BOYD, LICENSING SPECIALIST W. EATON, MANAGER OF MECH / CIVIL /STRUCT. DESIGN B. NUCLEAR REGULATOR COMMISSION R. MARTIN, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, RIV M. VIRGILIO, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, PROJECTS, NRR
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S. COLLINS, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF REACTOR PROJECTS, RIV
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T. QUAY, PROJECT DIRECTORATE IV, NRR T. WESTERMAN, CHIEF, REACTOR PROJECTS A, RIV T. ALEXION, PROJECT MANAGER, UNIT 1,.NRR S. PETERSON, PROJECT MANAGER, UNIT 2, NRR C. WARREN, SENIOR RESIDENT INSPECTOR, RIV L. SMITH, RESIDENT INSPECTOR, RIV II.
OPENING REMARKS
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A.
STAFFING B.
PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS-III.
ANO OPERATIONS OVERVIEW A.
MAJOR ACTIVITIES SINCE THE AUGUST 23, 1990 PERFORMANCE MEETING H
B.
CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE-1:
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C.
UNIT 1 PERFORMANCE
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-UNIT 2 PERFORMANCE IV.. ENGINEERING ACTIVITIES A.
RELOCATION OF DESIGN ENGINEERING
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NEW CORPORATE ENGINEERING STRUCTURE
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V.
DET/ SLAP A.
BUSINESS PLAN STATUS
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B.
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS UPDATE VI.
SPECIAL TOPICS-A.
COMMITMENT TRACKING B.
ESF SWITCHGEAR ROOM COOLERS
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.HELB i
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OUTAGE MODIFICATION DEFERRAL j
VII.
CLOSING REMARKS
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