IR 05000309/1988099
| ML20006F665 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 02/20/1990 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20006F661 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-88-99, NUDOCS 9002280279 | |
| Download: ML20006F665 (31) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
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SALP BOARD REPORT 50-309/88-99 MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY MAINE YANKEE
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ASSESSMENT PERIOD: AUGUST 1, 1988 - OCTOBER 31, 1989,,
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BOARD MEETING DATES: DECEMBER 13, 1989 AND JANUARY 25, 1990
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SUMMARY OF RESULTS II.A Overview
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Management oversight and involvement in plant activities continued to be pro
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. active and aggressive, promoting a high level of safety consciousness. The
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Morning Managers' Meetings provided a strong basis for constructive inter-departmental communication and effective teamwork.
Plant transicats and opera-tional occurrences attributed to personnel error or improperly performed main-tenance or surveillance remained low.
Aggressive response to the occupational radiation protection program weaknesses identified by the NRC during the previous SALP period resulted in improved per-formance.
There was an increased level of management attention to and involve-ment in the program. A Radiation Protection Improvement Plan was implemented to continue the overall improvement of the quality and implementation of the radiation protection program.
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Security showed deterioration during approximately the first third of the assessment period. Escalated NRC enforcement action after a November 1988 in-spection was followEd by significant management attention which continued throughout the period.
There was noteworthy equipment upgrading and a great deal of work on the part of licenseo management and staff.
A good emergency response capability was demonstrated; however, emergency pre-paredness coordination staffing problems resulted in aspects of the program not being effectively implemented. Also, some emergency response staff was not adequately trained. These weaknesses were identified early in the period.
Effective corrective actions resulted in an improving trend.
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Overall, the LALP Board assessed the licensee's responsiveness to NRC initi-ative as consistently strong.
Training was assessed as somewhat inconsistent among functional areas.
Radiation Protection, Security, and Emergency Pre-paredness programs have shown improvement.
II.B Facility Performance Tabulation MAINE YANKEE Rating Trend Rating Last Last This Functional _ Area feriod*
Period Period ** Trend A.
Plant Operations
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B.
Radiological Controls
Improving
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Maintenance / Surveillance
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D.
2 Improving
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Security
2
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F.
Engineering / Technical Support
2
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G.
Safety Assessment / Quality
2
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Verification February 1,1987 to July 31, 1988
August 1, 1988 to October 31,1989
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III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS III.A Plant Operations (1902 hrs., 38.5%)
III.A.I. Analysis This area was previeusly rated Category I based on the lack of operating errors and events, strong senior management involvement, good daily overview and co-ordination, and initiatives which contributed to good operation.
This SALP is based on resident and region-based inspection, licensed operator candidate and requalification examinations, an NRC Safety System Functional In-
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spection, and an Emergency Operating Procedures Team inspection.
I Comprehensive oversight of daily activities was evident in the Morning Man-agers' Meetings. These meetings detailed operational issues, critical plant parameters, upcoming activities, and plant issues. All plant disciplines were represented.
Discussions were concise and encouraged professional dialogue.
Issues were well developed. Ownership responsibilities were clearly defined.
The meetings were very effective in assuring general awareness, inter-ciepart-mental communications, and early resolution of potential problems.
Operational response to the four plant trips during the SALP period was profes-sional. An example was the trip due to a fault on one of the two main output transformers.
The grid disturbance prevented the reserye station power sources from energizing.
The operators restored offsite power in accordance with the emergency oparating procedures.
A Root Cause Evaluation detailed causes for numerous discrepancies identified by this complex occurrence.
Cause determina-tions were appropriately evaluated prior to plant restart.
During cooldown to replace reactor coolant pump seals in December 1988, an operator error resulted in two Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) actu-ations. An Operations Department review and an Event Review Board were con-ducted to identify the root cause, understand contributing circumstances, and ensure effective corrective actions were developed.
Implemented corrective
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actions included emphasis on control room supervisory oversight of evolutions.
Prior to the SIAS actuations, an Operations Control Center (OCC) was estab-(
lished during long outages to reduce the control room staff administrative workload. OCC activities included interfaces for safety tagging and work
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I authorization. OCC operation significantly reduced traffic to the control room vestibule, allowing improved on-shift operator oversight of evolutions.
The OCC was not manned during the error-induced SIASs.
Since then, during outages
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without the OCC m6nned, extra personnel have been provided in the control room to improve oversight. This was an instance of effective self-assessment.
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No plant trips due to operator error occurred during this SALP period.
During the post-refueling startup, procedure inadequacy resulted in a turbine and plant trip due to improper alignment of control air to a secondary system valve.
There were three unscheduled, controlled shutdowns. Operationally, these were performed conservatively to replace reactor coolant pump seals and address en-vironmental qualification (EQ) concerns.
For the two reactor coolent pump seal shutdowns, the plant was shut down prior to exceeding the administrative limits on seal parameters.
For the EQ shutdown, the licensee conservatively chose to shut down fer maintenance on several containment penetration cable connector seals as opposed to further testing to qualify the "as-installed" configura-tion.
Effective operator training was evidrmt in fave.rable NRC results on operator candidate and requalification examinations, and in the excellent results of the emergency operating procedure tcam in>pection. Operator candidate, included two for senior rea: tor operator ($RO) and five for reactor operators. All ex-l cept one SRO candidate passed.
(The candidate who failed was a Shift Technical Advisor who had not previously btea licensed.) All operators examined passed
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both the written and operating portions of the requalification examination.
Training Department Management was closely involved in the implementation of the revised requalification examination, Operations Department Manigement par-ticipated in the examination process, and the Operations Vice-President was active in ascertaining NRC input during the exit meeting.
The E0P inspection,
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. concluded that the procedures were well written and the operators were fully capable of using them.
Also, the site specific simulator was reviewed and cer-tified, further showing management commitment to quality training.
There was one Operations violation.
Af ter an overfill of the spent resin stor-age tank in August 1909, Operations identified numerous corrective actions, most of which were long term.
Spent resin handling continued, and the incident recurred. This was assessed as an isolated failure to take adequate corrective action.
Only degreed individuals have been hired into the Operations Department for the past several years. All operators, with the exception of a few non-licensed i
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operators, had degrees or were attenting courses to obtain them. The presence of degreed operators enabled the department to implement a " system expert" con-cept. Operators were assigned responsibility for specific plant systems.
Re-sponsibilities of the " system expert" were simfler to those that would be assigned to a " system engineer." As well as providing a system-based review of the maintenance backlog from an operator's perspective, the " system expert" concept enhanced the operators' feeling of ownership and responsibility for the material condition of the facility.
The Operations Department utilized a six crew rotation.
To supplement normal shift turnover, prewatch briefings were conducted for crews that were away from daily operations for more than a few days. Operator staffing levels were suf-i l
ficient to allow minimal use of overtime.
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j Overall, the licensee demonstrated a strong orientation toward safe operation, with good management involvement and oversight. The Operations Department ex-L hibited professionalism and technical and operational competence.
III.A.2 Performance Rating: Category 1
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III.A.3 Recommendations:
None.
L III.B Radiological Controls (412 hrs., 8.3%)
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e III.B.I. Analysis e
This area was rated Category 3 improving, duri:y; the previous SALP. During j
that SALP, weaknesses were identifico in the management and supervisory over-sight of the occupational radiation protection program, in the acequacy and implementation of program procedures, and in self-identification and cocrective
action for radiological concerns.
The licensee initiateo corr 6ctive actions, and overall performance-improved toward the end of the period.
Performance in effluent,nonitoring and control and radwaste handling and transportation was r
good during-the previous SALP period.
i There were four inspections by specialist inspectors during the current SALF period. The resident inspectors reviewed this area on an ongoing basis.
This area was also reviewed during the NRC's maintenance team inspection.
Radiation Protection
NRC review found improved performance in radiation protection since the last
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SALP. The improvements included: the rewriting and upgrading of significant program procedures; increasing the number of contractor radiation protection
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personnel brought onsite to support the outage;-improving the planning, sched-
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uling, and control of work; and increasing the supervisory oversight of ongoing work in the field.
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Problems continued to be noted, however, particularly in the implementation of radiation protection procedures. These problems included workers and radiation
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protection personnel not adhering to radiation work permits, weaknesses in high
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radiation area access control, and weaknesses in resolving self-identified con-cerns. Problems with procedure adherence were also identified in the 11cen-see's self-assessment of radiation protection during the outage. The implemen-
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.tation problems involved various station groups and contractors, indicating a continuing general lack of appreciation for the need to strictly adhere to radiation protection requirements.
These problems also indicate a need to im-prove training on procedure adherence and a need for more management attention
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to procedure adherence.
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Based on self-identified and NRC-identified concerns, the licensee concluded that additional actions were necessary and implemented a Radiation Protection
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Improvement Plan which was reviewed and approved by the President of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company. That plan commits to improved management support and oversight of radiation protection, to an in-depth independent audit of the program, to improved quality and implementation of the radiation protection program, to improved training of personnel, and to additional attention to i
Action was taken to improve the experience level, technical capabilities, and overall management of personnei in the radiation protection department.
For example, a new dosimetry suparvisor with considerable experience was hired.
Also, the radiation protection department was reorganized at the end of the assessment period to improve the day-to-day management of operational and tech-s r;ical support activities, lhe efies tiveness of the P.adiclogical Controls Im-
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provement Plap and of the new crguitatioa has net been evaluat.ed by the NRC.
Occupational radiation protection wdits were upgraded to make them more per-fcrmance-based. All members of the QA group attended trainir,g on performance-based a Wits. Audit procedures were revised to highlight the nted M thoroughly review rtcurrent items and determine root causes.
The licensee also increated
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the frequency of audits of problem areat and established a program to solicit
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worker concerns and ensure timely review and resoi tion.
t NRC review continued to reveal problems being identified by the licensee
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without appropriate review and evaluation by management.
For example, problems with adherence to radiation work permits continued to be identified with no apparent follow-up by management.
However, a program to track the specific programmatic and technical concerns identified by the NRC was established by
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the licensee to ensure that the concerns were reviewed and corrected.
The licensee was responsive to the NRC's ALARA concerns identified during the last SALP and took action to reduce both individual and collective exposures.
Actions included the development and close monitoring of radiation exposure goals for station departments, the reduction of general area dose rates by de-contamination of radioactive hot spots in piping, and the evaluation and revi-sion of the route of operator rounds to minimize exposures during routine duties.
Planning for major exposure tasks (e.g., recent reactor coolant pump
impeller and seal work) was improved.
Exposure goals for work were challeng-
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ing.
A three year ALARA plan was developed and implemented. The plan includes steps to reduce the overall source term at the station, and thereby reduce the aggregate exposure.
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A defined external and internal exposure control program was established, but implementation problems were noted during outages and routine operations. Of particular concern was the training of radiation protection technicians in pro-gram requirements.
NRC inspector questioning of technicians during the outage
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indicated inconsistent understanding of radiological job coverage requirements and the reed for continued attention to adherence to external and internal ex-posure control procedures.
Housekeeping showed improvement during this assessment period.
Effective con-trol of contamination minimized the intake of radioactive material by persen-nel. Aggressive decontamination resulted in only 7*4 of the routinely access-Ible areas being contaminated.
The licensee has continued to reduce the number of contaminated areas and maintain them clean.
Radiological Effluent Monitoring
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During the first half of the assessment period, the radioactive liquid and gaseous effluents monitoring program was inspected.
Audits, documentation of releases, semiannual effluent release reports, and documentation of air hand-ling system terts were found complete, timely and thorough. A notable strergth was the program for the primary calibration of process and effluent :oonito's.
Radiological Environmental Monitoring program (REMP}
j During the first half of the SALP period, twe inspections of the licensee's fiEMP were conducted.
These reviewed REMP data for 1988, previous annual REMP reports, procedures, audits, quality contiol and meteorological monitoring.
All programs and procedures were determined to be well stated, con. trolled and explicit.
Direct radiation measurements taken by the NRC, the State of Maine, and the licensee showed good agreement. Comparison of the licensee's measure-ments with EPA cross check data indicated effective quality control.
Transportation and Solid Radioactive Waste During the first half of the assessment period, the transportation and radwaste program was inspected.
Errors were found by NRC in the manifests for two rad-waste shipments. A licensee Quality Assurance audit had previously noted errors in radwaste manifests. No audit findings were written since the licen-l see did not consider the errors significant. This represents a lack of under-
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standing of the significance of the issues with a resultant failure to correct an identified problem.
After further review, the licensee concluded that other errors in radwaste manifest calculations had occurred. Also, it was routine practice for management to review shipping documentation several weeks or months after a shipment had been made. That practice was eventually changed in response to an internal licensee audit finding. Overall, transportation and I
solid radioactive waste functions were adequately performed, however the prob-l 1 ems that occurred were a reflection of weaknesses in management's oversight of f.
the program.
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Summary NRC review identified an increased level of management attention and involve-ment. The licensee aggressively responded to the problems in the occupational radiation protection program.
A Radiation Protection Improvement Plan was im-plemented to improve the overall quality and implementation of the program.
The plan had substantial management support. The licensee's efforts to date are commendable, but the response to self-identified problems needs additional management attention.
The licensee *s ref. antration of the radiation protection department and hiring of experienced tect,oical personnel were good initiatives.
However, the noted problems iti procedure and EWP adheren:e, in high radiation area access cont al, and in ractati n protection technician knowledge of program requirements illu-strate the aced to continue to improve performance anc the related tri.1ning.
The radiologic 61 effluent monitoring and control r.nd the -adiological environ-mental me. tit.oring programs continued to be ef fectively implemented.
Licensee's
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evaluations cf certatnination in the back yard areas indicated a good under-standing of the technical issues involved in reuc;vir.g this problem.
The ob-servations in the radwaste transportation area incicate the need for impreve-n'ent in the oversight of this area..
III.B.2.
Performance Rating: Category 2 III.B.3.
Recommendations:
Licensee: None.
NRC:
Conduct preoutage and mid-outage inspections to obtain tangible meas-ures of the effectiveness of the implementation of the Radiological Controls Improvement Plan by the reorganized department.
III.C.
Maintenance / Surveillance (1498 hrs., 30.3%)
III.C.I. Analysis Maintenance and Surveillance were combined into a single area during the pre-vious SALP and were rated Category 1.
Emphasis on the coordination between operations and maintenance resulted in maintenance and surveillance activities having minimal impact on plant operations. There were no inadvertent ESF actu-h ations or plant trips caused by inadequate surveillance control.
The current assessment is based on resident inspection, NRC regional specialist inspections of the Inservice Testing (IST) and Inservice Inspection (ISI) pro-grams, an NRC team Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI), and an NRC Main-tenance Team Inspection.
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Maintenance was controlled well during normal operation, unplanned outages, and the scheduled refueling outage. Two week, six week, and special project sched-ules were routinely prepared to enable coordination of resources. Outage schedules were developed for unplanned outages of sufficient duration and for scheduled refueling outages.
Critical path activities were identified and co-ordinated with corrective and preventive activities not possible to be accomp-lished during normal operation. When the maintenance backlog reached predeter-mined levels, extended workdays and/or contractors were utilized to reduce the backlog. Generally, conservative attitudes were displayed by licensee person-nel. An experienced, dedicated, stable workforce continued to be an asset to the licensee.
No maintenance activities resulted in a plant trip or inadvertent ESF actu-ation.
However, a control rod dropped due to ir. adequate control of trouble-shooting. Appropriate corrective action was taken. A second contrcl rod dropped during maintenance, but the decision to work on the Control Elemant Drive System in this cast was made with kncwledge of the rfsk of droppirg the rod. Had the work rot been accomplished, damage to eovipment located in a high radiction area in the upper head assembly of the reactor vessel may have occurred. Actions were taken to minimite the risk of dropping the rod, utiliz-ing lessens learned frnm the prenous dropped rod and input from a vendor rep-resentative onsite.
This demonstrates the maintenance department was perform-ing self-assessment and implementing appropriate corrective actioni.
Routine maintenance was generally well-controlled and there were few errors by,
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. maintenance personnel.
However, some errors were noted.
The licensee identi-fied that maintenance supervisors removed a packing nut on the wrong reactor coolant system pressure boundary valve, resulting in that work being accomp-lished with the valve unisolated from full reactor coolant system pressure.
Two examples of maintenance workers failing to adhere to Radiation Work Permit requirements were identified by the Maintenance Team Inspection.
Increased attention to detail in accomplishing such tasks is therefore warranted.
Management was found to be fully dedicated to a strong maintenance program.
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Senior management monitored personnel and performance indicators and initiated action when necessary. Adequate allocation of resources was noted.
Generally, intergroup communications were good, and engineering involvement and support were evident. Weaknesses were noted in monitoring rework, failure trending analysis, and engineering input to corrective and preventive maintenance proce-dures.
A strong refueling outage work control program was established, with adequate procedures.
Improvements were noted in the maintenance history and in guidance for post-maintenance testing. A considerable ef fort was made to in-(
prove housekeeping.
(See Radiological Controls Analysis.) A maintenance or-
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ganization has been established with competent supervision, low turnover rate, and a well-established training program which resulted in providing high qual-I ity workmanship. Although some weaknesses were identified, the maintenance program and its implementation were considered good.
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One plant trip was caused by faulty surveillance. While performing non-Tech-
nical Specification 345 Kilovolt breaker failure relay testing, an offsite
utility worker improperly returned the relay to service and isolated the plant from the grid, causing a plant trip. The licensee implemented improved coordi-natir. with the local utility. At the end of the SALP period, the licensee was pursuing additional corrective action to increase the control of local utility activities which may impact plant operation.
No Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) actuations were attributed to faulty sur-ve111ance.
There were no missed surveillances identified during the assessment
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period.
Routine preventive maintenance was coordinated with surveillance to reduce the time equipment was out of service. Major surveillance such as the containment integrated leak rate test and the eddy current inspection of the
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steam generator, both of which were performed during the refueling outage, re-ceived good oversight. The Iriservice Testing (IST) Program was performed by a knowledgeable and canable staff, using state of the art vibratica monitoring and computerized pump data trending, Quelity Assurancr. Audits, Evaluations, Quslity Control Inspections and Noncon-formances generally reflected a good working knowledge cf the maintenance, sur-veillance and installation processes. Well documented findings reflected de-tailed reviews. Emphasis was placed on conducting performance-based audits.
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In 'ummary, maintenant.e and surveillance activities were well coordinated and controlled, resulting in minimal adverse 19 pact on operations. Management was dediccted to a strong maintenance program. Although some weaknesses were iden-tified, a major strength of the organization was a stable, dedicated staff with competent supervision, a low turnover rate, and a well established training program which generally resulted in high quality work.
III.C.2 Performance Rating: Category 1 III,C.3 Recommendations:
None.
III.D.
Emergency Preparedness (129 hrs., 2.6%)
III.D.1 Analysis During the previous SALP, this area was rated Category 1.
That rating was based on very good performance during the partial participation exercise and on the high level of support provided to off-site state and local agencies, i
During the current SALP period, a partial participation exercise was observed, a routine inspection was conducted, and changes to the emergency plan and im-piementing procedures were reviewed.
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II Emergency Response Facilities were maintained ready and the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) were current.
The EPIPs are subject to review
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by senior site and corporate managers. The status of corrective actions was
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distributed to senior. management for review and approval.
Senior management
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was kept appraised of emergency preparedness activities by both formal and in-formal processes.
However, in at least one instance, senior management did not adequately account for the extent of emergency preparedness activities and
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allowed the Emergency Prepartdness Coordinator to be reassigned to the Security l
department for two months. As a result, portions of the program either were not performed or were untimely.
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The emergency preparedness program was maintained by the Emergency Preparedness l
Coordinator (EPC), who was responsible for all on-site and off-site activities.
The EPC was supported by the Training Department, Technical Support Department, and Simulator Department.
In addition to his two month assignment to the Securfty Department, the EPC had no staff of his own.
Despite cooperation and
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support from other departments, he was ur able to accomplish ali reauired tasks.
That adversely affected corrective action implementation, documentation com-pleteness and consistency, and distributien of the required annual revicw to appropriate off-site officials.
In response, the licerisee authori?ed incress-ing the LPC staff.
Late in the period an on-stte EN was nited.
This indivi-
dual has extensive reactor operations experter.ce. An additional position we.s identified with the responsibility to perform emergency preparedness training.
That position was icitially filled but was vscent at the end of the SALP period.
The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) demon.trated a strong emergency re-sponse capability during the partial participation exercise. Command tnd con-trol were evident at all key locations. The licensee performed its drt115 and exercises using the simulator in order to provide better training for opera-tions personnel.
This resulted in good performance in the exercises from an operational viewpoint. However, some program weaknesses were identified con-cerning the lack of definition of responsibilities of the Recovery Manager and recurring radio communications problems between in plant teams and the Opera-tions Support Center.
Emergency preparedncss training was performed by Training Department special-ists as well as the EPC.
Lesson plans and training methods were reviewed by the Epc. The ERO was fully staffed and trained, Although all staff received emergency preparedness training, it was noted to be informal in many cases, and was often combined with other training such as general employee training.
Walk-throughs with licensee staff indicated that personnel were unfamiliar with some basic responsibilities and had dif ficulty performing some required tasks, such as the use of the dose assessment computer.
The licensee nintained a close relationship with local communities and the State of Maine.
In support of the State and local emergency response effort, the licensee conducted training for the communities within the Emergency Plan-ning Zone.
Late in the period, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
issued the final report for the 1987 full participation exercise. This report i
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identified several deficiencies concerning the off-site alert and notification j
system and communications.
FEMA withdrew their interim findings of reasonable i
assurance based upon these concerns. The most significant deficiency concerned the use of route alerting as the primary means of notification of the public.
In response to these findings, the licensee, working closely with the State of Maine and the local communities, instituted corrective action to replace route alerting with fixed sirens and tone alert radios.
They will continue to uti-lize route alert teams as a primary alerting method only in very remote, low population areas. Corrective actions were scheduled for completion in June 1990. At the end of this assessment period, the licensee was approximately six months ahead of that schedule.
The licensee has shown a good ability to resolve technical issues.
In response to the FEMA finding regarding the alert and notification system, the licensee
instituted a program to accurately map existing siren coverage, and developed a plan to extend coverage by adding sirens and tone alert radios.
In response *o NRC and FEMA findings, the licensee instituted an Emergency Prc-paredness Irnprovement Plan. This plan delineates tasks, establishes due dates and responsibilities, and provides statut tracking and rewards.
It is main-tained by management and routed to all applicable parties sneluding senior rnar.-
agement.
This plan was a positive effort to improve emergency preparedness.
In summary, a good emergency response capability was shown during exercise per-formance and routine ir,rpections.
However, staffing problems resultea in areas of the program not be'ng effectively implemented. Additionaliy, some emergency response staff was not being properly trained, Resporse to FEMA concerns with respect to the alert and notification system have been technically sound and thorough.
Positive staffing initiatives and response to FEMA findings resulted in an overall improving trend.
III.D.2 Performance Rating: Category 2, Improving III.D.3 Recommendations:
None.
III.E.
Security (241 hrs., 4.9%)
l III.E.1 Analysis
During the previous SALP, the licensee's performance was rated as Category 2.
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Management was found insensitive to the need for an unambiguous security plan
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and implementing procedures. There was an apparent lack of clear understanding of and commitment to the NRC's security objectives, as well as an overall com-
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placent attitude.
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During this SALP period, there were three region-based physical security in-spections.
Routine resident inspections continued throughout the period.
Violations identified during a November 1988 inspection (two were recurrent from the previous assessment period), resulted in a civil penalty in February 1989. Two of the violations were identified during the last half of the
period.
Plant and corporate management attention to and support for the security pro-gram increased significantly after November 1988 and continued to be strong throughout the period. That involvement was evident in improvements such as inclusion of the security program into the weekly management inspection pro-gram; weekly meetings among security contractor, plant, and corporate per-sonnel; quarterly meetings with the NRC to discuss program improvements, com-missioning a security consultant to revise and update program plans and pro-cedures, upgrading security force training, refocusing the security audit pro-t gram to increase its effectiveness, purchasing and installing state-of-the-art hardware, and making modifications to alleviate several long-standing security
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weaknesses.
In addition, the licensee effected several personnel end orgarifza-tional changet including int,ta11ation of a new Security Director, hiring an*
other proprietary supervisor, placing two contract supervisors en each shif t, replacing about 40% of the previous contract supervisors with more N gressive
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individuals, and increasing the training staff from one f al}.-time ir.rtructcr to two full-time instructors and a part-time coordinator.
Improved responsivenets to NRC concerns and potential weaknesses was tvident by
. prompt, thorough and technically sound corrective actions curing recent NRC security inspections and by more effective resolution of outstar. ding issues
from the 1987 Regulatory Effectiveness Review.
There also were indications that the compliance-oriented and complacent attitude has been turned around by the efforts of senior level corporate and plant management and the new Security
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Director. However, some continued compliance orientation was perceived. This was apparent in the licensee's physical security plan which was revised in early 1989. Much of the revision contained vague commitments to NRC require-ments to allow flexibility in implementing the plan.
Such flexibility was assessed in the last SALP as a detriment to performance.
Current licensee staffing under the new Security Director consists of an Opera-l tions Supervisor, who has been with the program for some time, and a new Ad-ministrative Support Supervisor with extensive law enforcement experience. The
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security management group still needs, however, to increase its knowledge of nuclear plant security systems and program requirements.
The licensee authorized increased contractor staffing during the latter half of this SALP period. The contractor assigned a Pro.iect Manager to the plant to i
relieve the security force chief of some administrative duties.
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hiring nine additional security officers, another supervisor was added to each shift to improve oversight.
Further, the licensee added security program im-plementation and security force performance to its weekly management inspection program. However, a weakness exists in the licensee's program for monitoring the day-to-day contractor operation and personnel performance, and in identify-ing potential problems before they become issues. This weakness was recognized by the licensee and late in the period authorization was being sought to hire an individual with prior nuclear power plant security experience for the licen-see's on-site security management group.
The licensee has restructured and expanded its security force initial and re-qualification training programs for both officers and supervisors, and revised the Training and Qualification (T&Q) Plan in response to NRC concerns. While the NRC observed a more cohesive and smoother program implementation toward the end of the period, concerns remain regarding the security officers' depth of understanding of the NRC's sacurity requirements.
For example, late in the
.
period, a remote switch for a frequently used security door was found in:en-I tional!y n t in the open position to avoid ha nng to operate the switch for individual authorized entries.
While this breach was apparently well-known to members of the security force and some superviset s, the sigr.if kance of the ac-tion was not undert,tood. That Odicates that training of the secarity force in NRC requirements was weat.
,,
The licosee weds to address mancatory overcimes Daring the Oct4ber 1988 to January 1989 mtage, see.urity personnal were 'equirea to work twelve hour
'
$hif ts five days Der week and, in some cases, bevord that. 'this resuhed in a decrease in oora~e. Actios has since been taan to inrease the staffing level of the contractor security force and its supervision.
M so, plans were developed to utilize unarmed " watchmen" to supplement the security force during future plant outages. Morale in the security force showed improvement toward the end of the period as a result of licensee efforts.
The mandatory overtime issue should be alleviated by the licensee's authorization for increased con-tractor staffing.
On several occasions late in the period, the NRC observed plant employees dis-play a disrespectful attitude toward security force members who were carrying out their routine duties.
This made it difficult for the security personnel to carry out those duties properly. These incidents showed a poor plant staff attitude toward the security program. When the NRC discussed this with plant management, the licensee's Acting Plant Manager indicated that such attitudes would not be tolerated. He promptly counseled the involved employees, took l
disciplinary action, and widely disseminated his intolerance toward that
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attitude.
The effectiveness of these corrective actions has not yet been
)
assessed by the NRC.
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During the latter portion of the period, increased support from other plant functional groups was evidenced by increased interface between those groups and the security force and the development of more effective communications chan-nels. As an example of better interfaces and communications, the NRC observed that maintenance support for security-related equipment increased later in the period and that a preventive maintenance program for that equipment was being developed. Additionally, the licensee dedicated an Instrumentation and Con-trols technician to the maintenance of security equipment.
These actions have benefitted the licensee by reducing out-of-service time for equipment and thereby decreasing the need for compensatory measures which reduce the need for mandatory overtime.
During NRC interviews with security force members, the security force members expressed frustration over the absence of an effective mechanism to communicate security incidents to either their management or the licensee in order to effect corrective actions.
They were aware that the licensee's Security Direc-tor maintained an "open door" policy, however, they were reluctant to bypass their chain of command.
Mid-why through the period, the licensee initiated weekly meetings between its security management (corporate and site) and the contractor's management.
These taeetings have proven te be effective in opening
..
lines of communication beiveen the licensee and the contractor, as indicated by the improvements and enhancements mentioned elsewhere in this assessment.
How-ever, similar open communications within the contractor's security" force itself still appear to be hampered by the effects of the licensee managements' in-attention to the program.
,
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I During this SALP period, the licer.see submitted four security event reports.
Two of the events were not reported to the NRC in the required time. All four of the events involved personnel errors. Two of the events also involved mul-tiple errors by security force members. While the licensee's corrective ac-tions for each event were timely and proper, these events (involving personnel error and late reporting) contribute to the NRC's concern over security per-formance.
However, the NRC recognizes the licensee's efforts in improving im-piementation of 10 CFR 73.31 that were not apparent in previous assessment periods.
In summary, during approximately the first third of this assessment period, the licensee's security program showed deterioration.
Escalated NRC enforcement action, as a result of findings from a November 1988 inspection, was followed by significant management attention to improving the security program which continued throughout the period.
There was a sizeable expenditure of capital resources and a great deal of work accomplished on the part of licensee man-agement and staff to improve the program.
Continued attention to the program
)
is needed to ensure that weaknesses in the program and its implementation are identified and correcte =
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i III.E.2 Performance Rating: Category 2.
)
I III.E.3 Recommendations:
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Licensee: (1) Continue quarterly security management meetings with the NRC.
i
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(2) Evaluate the adequacy of training of security managers.
!
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N_RC:
(1)
Inspect security performance during the next refueling outage.
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III.F Engineering and Technical Support (492 hrs., 10.0%)
<
III.F.1 Analysis The previous $ ALP marked the first time that Engineering and Technical Support was assessed as a separate area.
In that SALF, the board rated this area as
.
Category 2.
In general, er.gineering and technical support were good, with
several licensee initiatives noted. Deficiencies were identified in electrical arid environmental qualificaticr.. Other deficienc hs were found in procurement
.
activities. Senior licensee management attention was recommended for the elec-
!
tricci concerns and the procurement problems.
'
During this SALP pericd, responsiveness to NRC initiatives was evident in tirrely resolution of equipnent qualification and electrical open issucs and by the following: (1) %FI follow-up issues were scheduled to be completed by December 31,1991;(2) NRC Information Notien IN 38-66, Operating with Crounds in Direct Current (DC) Distribution Systems -IN 88-98, Electrical Relay Degra-dation from Contact 0xidation, and IN 88-7!,, Disabling DG Output Breakers by Anti pump Circuitry, were scheduled to be addressed and completed before the end of the 1990 refuelfng outage; and (3) a report responding to NRC Bulletin 88-04, Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss, was scheduled to be completed by December 31, 1989.
A review of the corrective actions and changes made to the procurement program found upgrading of the process for commercial grade items. However, the pro-gram was still evolving and additional work was needed to incorporate and verify critical performance characteristics into the dedication process. In addition, corrective actions performed in a five year "look back" review in-cluded little or no performance testing of commercial grade items procured for safety-related applications. A re-review was initiated to provide for testing of components where necessary. The licensee has since committed to include performance testing in the dedication process. Overall, good progress was made on resolving procurement concerns.
Maine Yankee received engineering support from the Corporate Engineering staff of Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) in Bolton, Massachussets, from the Corporate Engineering staff at Augusta, Maine, and from the Plant Engineering
,
Department (PED) at the site, Contractor personnel were used on an as-needed J
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basis, and.each contract engineer was supervised by the cognizant Maine Yankee engineering supervisor. During refueling outages, contractor employces were extensively used and were supervised by either Maine Yankee PED personnel or Yankee Atomic Electric Company engineering personnel. Oversight of contractor personnel by the YAEC engineers needs to be strengthened, however.
For in-stance, during the Cycle 10/11 refueling outage, an unauthorized modification to the supports for instrument tubing which was part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary resulted in a violation. The unauthorized modification was caused by contractor personnel working beyond the scope of the installation instructions and inadequate supervision by the YAEC Engineer.
During routine operations, on-site support of operations by the Plant Engineer-ing Department was coordinated with other plant departments through attendance i
at the Morning Managers' Meeting.
The technical portions of issues identified at these meetings were routinely assigned to PED for resolution.
In general, the resolutions were technically correct, conservative and consistent with cur-rent nuclear safety practices. Good communication between the PED and other departments was evident in the successful completion of 12 of the 14 actions assigned to support the 1988 corporate objectives. Also, special tests per-formed under the cognizance of PED received good oversight.
As an example, the
-
oversight of the Cor,tainment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT) and of the Steam
'
Generator Eddy Current Inspections was assessed as good.
or Management involvement in routine activities was evident in presence and i
+ ve participation in the Morning Managers' Meeting.
Support for improved
!
aneering effectiveness and resolving technical and safety issues was evident i
the decision to relocate Project Engineering from the corporate office in i
gusta, Maine, to the plant site.
Management support of Fire Protection re-l J1ted in program improvements and increased awareness of fire protection re-
"
quirements by the plant staff.
Two forced outages occurred due to reactor coolant pump seal difficulties.
,
Flushing of the seal water system, installation of improved filters and in-
!
sta11ation of an updated seal design were being pursued as corrective actions
'
by the licensee at the end of the SALP period.
,
An NRC 3afety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) conducted during the SALP l
period resulted in an overall positive conclusion as to the licensee's tech-i nical competence, attitude toward safety, and approach to design basis re-
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constitution. Despite this positive conclusion, a generally fragmented
!
approach to safety evaluations and uncertainties in the design bases prevented
!
confirmation of the safety-related Component Cooling Water System's capability i
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to perform all of its intended design basis safety functions.
Further, weak-
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nesses were identified in the reliability of the direct current power busses, in useful application of probabilistic risk assessm.
, in effective corrective action in resolving residual heat removal (RHR) hea -:xchanger inlet valve reach rod design issues, and in nonconservative use component replacement procedures when the design change process would have Deen more appropriate.
Actions were underway to address these issues but the NRC had not reviewed the corrective action during the SALP period.
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PORC and NSARC oversight and review, resulted in multi-disciplinary management involvement in correction of precursors prior to their becoming programmatic problems.
Ongoing management improvement initiatives indicated a continued proactive man-agement philosophy. These included an ongoing Design Basis Summary review, completion of a level I Probabilistic Risk Assessment, and expansion of the
!
Performance Assessment Program (PAP).
The Design Basis Summary review examined systems to recover and document the system design basis.
Systems completed to date include the emergency / auxiliary feedwater systems and the control room ventilation system. Reviews underway include the service water, component cooling water, and emergency core cooling systems. The licensee recently com-pleted a plant specific Level 1 PRA but has not yet implemented a formal pro-gram to utilize the PRA insights in plant activities. The Performance Assess-ment Program was a self-assessment tool used by the operations department to improve performance of department activities.
Because of the success of the program in the operations department, plant management recently expanded the
'
program to other plant departments including maintenance and radiological con-trols. The program consists of peer review of the performance of specialized tasks. Overall, the licensee's improvement programs showed active management involvement and were.a positive contribution to plant safety.
Analysis of plant events and of issues identified during routine operations were timely. Generally effective action was taken to address the problems identified. Depending on the nature of the issue to be reviewed, the licensee generally used Plant Root Cause Evaluations (PCREs) for equipment or hardware related issues and the Human Performance Evaluation System (HPES) process for human issues. After the main transformer fault and failure to transfer to off-site power in August 1988, a Plant Root Cause Evaluation provided a strong basis for determining appropriate corrective action.
Human performance evalu-ation techniques were utilized in the review of the inadvertent Safety Injec-tion Actuation Signals (SIAS) generated during a plant cooldown in December of 1988. Appropriate actions to alleviate identified deficiencies were pursued.
Management attention to weaknesses identified by the NRC in the emergency pre-paredness and physical security areas is warranted.
In regard to emergency preparedness, although a good emergency response capability was maintained, staffing issues and training weaknesses necessitate attention.
In regard to security, although a sizable expenditure of resources has improved plant secur-ity, :atinued attention is needed to identify and correct weaknesses in the program and its implementation.
The Quality Programs (QP) Department implemented several initiatives which en-hanced the ability to measure and assess plant performance. The Quality Assur-ance (QA) and Quality Control (QC) functions were part of the QP Department.
Audits of plant activities were also conducted by Yankee Atomic, which supple-ments the QP department's function and provides audits for the Offsite Commit-tee.
In an effort to increase the effectiveness of QC inspections, the Man-
-ager-Quality Programs initiated a program in which a maintenance technician and
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Licensee initiatives to improve safety and performance were evident in a self-
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initiated SSFI program and in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) development.
Other examples of a commitment to long term strong performance in engineering and technical support included: (1) development of a Comprehensive Equipment Performance program to monitor and improve the reliability and performance of key equipment; (2) establishment of comprehensive design basis documents in-
!
cluding verification of safety system operation to design criteria; (3) pre-paration of safeguard instrument loop drawings, loop accuracy calculations and set point analyses; (4) implementation of a configuration management procedure to control and maintain the management control systems and documents reflecting the plant configuration; and (5) conversion of the ten year In-Service Inspec-tion (ISI) program to computer-based control.
The licensee controls engineering workload and schedules by plans covering five refueling cycles. All engineering activities during the subsequent five cycles are scheduled and assigned a priority.
Priorities are established through a
'
set of weighting factors. All priority 1, safety significant projects are on schedule.
The licensee recognizes the need for effective training and has established a
,
l well staffed training department, with the resources and authority to conduct an effective program.
l-The licensee's staff involved in the In-Service Testing of pumps and valves was found to be knowledgeable and generally capable. Technical resolution of Inser-
'
vice Inspection issues was good, with results ccmpletely and clearly docu-mented. Engineering evaluations and dispositions of nonconforming examination results exhibited knowledge of requirements.
Concerns identified during the previous SALP in the electrical and equipment qualification areas were adequatelv resolved.
However, several deficiencies l
were r.oted during this SALP period.
These included one case of inadequate supervision of contractor personnel, inadequate root cause analysis, and newly identified equipment qualification concerns. While these deficiencies were not major, licensee attention is warranted to preclude similar problems.
In summary, engineering and technical support were generally good, with manage-ment initiative and involvement in routine plant activities evident.
The lic-ensee's responsiveness to NRC initiatives was, for the most part, timely. Good licensee initiatives to improve performance were noted. The procurement and dedication of commercial grade items showed marked improvement during this SALP period. Better oversight of contractors, safety evaluations, PRA utilization,
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design change application, design bases definitions, and direct current bus
)
reliability assurance would improve performance.
III.F.2 P_erformance Rating: Category 2
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III.F.3 Recommendations:
Licensee: None.
.NRC:
Conduct SSFI follow-up inspection.
III.G Safety Assessment / Quality Verification (266 hrs., 5.4%)
III.G.1 Analysis This section evaluates the licensee's performance in activities such as safety reviews, responses to NRC generated initiatives such as generic letters, bul-letins, information notices, and resolution of TMI items, and provides a broad assessment of the licensee's ability to identify and correct problems related to nuclear safety. This includes the effectiveness of the licensee's quality
. verification function in identifying and correcting substandard or anomalous
. performance and'in monitoring the overall performance of the plant.
In the previous SALP, Safety Assessment / Quality Verification was rated Category
- 2.
Strengths identified included licensee initiatives in self-assessment and j
root cause analysis.
However, weaknesses in the radiation protection program and in certain procurement practices were not identified by 1--
mal audits.
During this SALP period, management oversight and involvem-tnt activi-
.
ties continued to be aggressive.
Management presence in t:
fncluded routine inspection and observance of work.
Senior. plant mac <
..c began a
!
concerted effort to upgrade the radiological controls performance.
The Vice
. President, Operations was relieved of his plant manager duties and is heading
!
the effort to. improve radiological controls. A new Technical Support Depart-ment Manager was appointed and'is assisting in-the radiological controls im-provement effort.
The plant safety committees and Morning Managers' meetings were particularly effective and promoted a high level of safety-consciousness. The Morning Man-l agers' Meeting was oriented towards problem solving, and emphasis was placed on
!
learning from past mistakes. The issues discussed indicated an appropriate
threshold for n nagement attention. Discussions were candid and constructive, i
and resulted in effective communications and teamwork. The meetings identified
!
improvemeri opportunities which were formally tracked and reviewed by the Plant
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Operations Review Committee (PORC). PORC continued to maintain a strong over-view-of' plant activities by routinely reviewing items identified during the Morning Managers' Meetings. Good oversight of plant activities was maintained
.
by the Nuclear Safety Audit and Review Committee (NSARC).
Membership from Yankee Atomic Electric Company provided industry experience and input.
Meeting
.
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discussions were of sufficient detail to allow proper consideration of issues.
i The issues identified for resolution at the managers' meetings, coupled with
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two senicr QC inspectors reviewed all maintenance procedures for adequacy of hold points and other QC involvement.
The department also incorporated per-formance-based inspection techniques into both QA audits and QC inspections.
The licensee's QP Department provided generally active and technically sound audit and surveillance programs. A comprehensive review of QA/QC audits and inspections conducted by an NRC Safety System Functional Inspection team found that these reports contained well documented findings which reflected detailed reviews. The issues raised in audit reports were generally significant and enhanced plant operations.
For example, a QP review of the shock suppressor test procedures identified a discrepancy between the operability requirements and the directions for setting the bleed rate of shock suppressors on the steam generators and main steam lines. The qualification requirements imposed on contractors and the QA evaluations of vendor onsite activities are considered a QP department strength.
Some significant weaknesses in the QP department's role in identification of certain repetitive deficiencies remain.
During the previous SALP period, the NRC identified radiation protection concerns involving in process work activi-ties. That such deficiencies continue to occur was identified during an NRC maintenance team inspection, indicating tht.t corrective actions were not suf-ficient.
In addition, the NRC identified the failure to resolve several long standing problems such as the root cause of the failures associated with valves PCC-M-43 and SCC-M-165, the lack of control of instrument setpoints, and the lack of a formal program to address instruments found out of calibration.
Towards the end of the SALP period, additional licensee attention to these problems produced performance improvements.
In general, the engineering and technical analyses submitted to the NRC in re-gard to licensing activities were sound, thorough, and of good quality.
Lic-ensee initiated licensing submittals were typically of exceptional quality; safety evaluations were thorough, technical content was excellent, and sub-mittals were well organized. Examples of high quality submittals included the request to increase rated thermal power to 2700 MWt, an application to modify the reactor pressure-temperature limits and the request for in place disposal of contaminated soil.
However, several of the licensee's submittals made in response to NRC initiated activities were not of the same high quality and were not timely.
For example, the licensee's response to Generic Letter 88-17, addressing loss of decay heat removal during nonpower operation, lacked a number of the details addressed in the generic letter.
Licensee responses to requests for additional information for both the Station Blackout Rule and the ATWS (anticipated transient without scram) Rule have not been timely.
In summary, management oversight and involvement in plant activities continued to be proactive and aggressive, promoting a high level of safety-consciousness.
Plant safety committees and managers' meetings were effective and promoted a high level of safety consciousness. Management improvement initiatives demon-strated the licensee's commitment to the pursuit of performance excellence.
The QP Department provided technically sound audit and surveillance programs,
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L but weaknesses in-the identification of certain repetitive deficiencies (i.e.,
radiation protection concerns) remain.
The licensee's submittals in regard to licensing actions were generally sound and of good quality, although a noted.
disparity between the quality of licensee-initiated licensing submittals and NRC-initiated licensing activities warrants management attention. Management attention to weaknesses identified by the NRC in emergency preparedness and.
physical -security is warranted.
III.G.2 Performance Rating: Category 2'
)
III.G.3 Recommendations:
None.
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- o REFERENCE INFORMATION/ APPENDICES APPENDIX A A.
CRITERIA Licensee performance was assessed in areas significant to nuclear safety and the environment. -The following criteria were used, as applicable, to assess each area.
1.
Assurance of qu lity, including management involvement and control.
2.
Approach to the resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint.
3.
Responsiveness to NRC initiatives.
4.
Enforcement history.
.
.
5.
Operational and construction events (including response to, analyses of, reporting of, and correctivo actions for).
6.
Staffing (includingmanagement)
7.
Effectiveness of training and qualification.
Each functional area was rated as being one of the following.
1.
Category 1.
Licensee management attention and involvement are readily evident and place emphasis on superior performance of nuclear safety or safeguards-activities, with the resulting performance substantially ex-ceeding regulatory requirements.
Licensee resources are ample and effec-tively used so that a high level of plant and personnel performance is being achieved.
Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate.
2.
Category 2.
Licensee management attention and involvement in the perform-ance of nuclear safety or safeguards activities are good.
The licensee attained a level of performance above that needed to meet regulatory re-quirements.
Licensee resources are adequate and reasonably allocated so that good plant and personnel performance is being achieved.
NRC atten-tion may be maintained at normal levels.
(_
3.
Category 3.
Licensee management attention and involvement in the perform-l ance of nuclear safety or safeguards activities are not sufficient.
The i
licensee's performance does not significantly exceed that needed to meet
!
minimal regulatory requirements.
Licensee resources appear to be strained or not effectively used.
NRC attention should be increased above normal levels.
A performance trend was assigned as necessary to focus NRC and licensee atten-L tion on an area with a declining performance trend, or to acknowledge an im-
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proving trend in licensee performance. The SALP trend definitions are:
l Improving:
Licensee performance was determined to be improving during the assessment period.
Declining:
Licensee performance was determined to be declining during the assessment period and the licensee had not taken meaningful steps to address this pattern.
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Reference Information APPENDIX B B.
Licensee Activities The plant was at full power at the beginning of the period. On August 13, the plant tripped due to a fault on one of the two main output transformers.
The plant was restarted on August 18, and operated at a reduced power level using the undamaged main output transformer until-a shutdown was initiated on October 15 for the Cycle 10/11 refueling outage.
Cycle 11 startup commenced on December 15. The plant attained 96% power by December 20. On December 22 the plant was taken offline in order to replace all three reactor coolant pump seals.
Full power was achieved on January 2.
On January 10, the plant tripped due to a loss of electro-hydraulic control power.
The plant _ returned to 100 percent power on January 13.
After identification of discrepancies in the environmental qualification of containment penetration connectors, the plant was shut down on February 14.
After repairing the connections and replacing three cracked feedwater regulat-ing valve stems, the plant was returned to full power on February 23.
A plant trip occurred on April 5 due to an actuation of the fault relaying associated with a 345 Kilovolt breaker during breaker testing in the 345 KV switchyard.
The plant was returned to power operation later the same day.
On July 20 the licensee implemented Technical Specification Amendment 113 authorizing operation at a steady state power of 2700 megawatts thermal (MWt).
On August 3 the plant dropped control rod 62 and performed a down power maneu-ver. The plant returned to full power on August 5.
During a routine power reduction on September 1, difficulty with the Steam Gene-rator #2 Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Controller resulted in a power reduc-tion to approximately twelve (12) percent power for repair.
The valve controls were repaired the same day and the plant was returned to full power.
On_0ctober_10, the plant was shut down to replace the number 2 reactor coolant pump seal.
Power Operation resumed on October 16 and continued to the end of the SALP period.
APPENDIX C C.
Direct Inspection and Review Activities One NRC senior resident and one resident inspector were assigned to the Maine Yankee site throughout the assessment period.
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Reference Information f
Several team inspections were conducted. A Maintenance team inspection (Octo-ber 31 to November.10, and December 5 to 9, 1988) was conducted during the re-fueling outage to assess the maintenance program and its implementation. A Safety System Functional Inspection was conducted from January 9 through February 10, 1989. A team review of the Emergency Operating Procedures and their implementation occurred from July 17, 1989 through July 28, 1989.
'
Total NRC inspection effort was 4940 hours0.0572 days <br />1.372 hours <br />0.00817 weeks <br />0.00188 months <br /> (3952 hours0.0457 days <br />1.098 hours <br />0.00653 weeks <br />0.0015 months <br /> on an annual basis).
This represented an increase of 15.6 percent over the previous SALP period.
APPENDIX D D.
Unplanned Trips and Forced Shutdcwns Power Root Functional Date Level Description Cause Area 8/13/88-98%
Turbine trip due to fault Random in main output transformer.
Component Failure I
.,
i 12/16/88 18%
Turbine trip due to improper Inadequate Operations i
alignment of a secondary Procedure j
plant system during initial startup from a refueling
,,
outage.
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i 12/22/88 100%
Controlled shutdown due to Design Engineering /-
failure of all three reactor Deficiency Technical Support coolant pump seals as a re-sult of a seal water system i
filter failure.
l 1/10/89 100%
Turbine trip due to a Random spurious low voltage condi-Component tion on a EHC control power Failure
bus.
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2/14/89 100%
Controlled shutdown due to Design Engineering /
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questionable environmental Deficiency Technical Suppcrt qualification of containment
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penetration connector seals.
4/5/89 100%
Turbine trip due to inadver-Inadequate Maintenance /
l tent actuation of generator Procedure Surveillance
!
protective relays during testing.
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10/10/89 98%
Controlled Shutdown due to Random type C containment leakage Component in excess of TS limits.
Failure RI-3
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Reference Information APPENDIX E E.
, Management Conferences On December 20, 1988, an Enforcement Conference was held in the NRC Region I Office to discuss security plan violations.
On March 29, 1989, an Enforcement Conference was held in the NRC Region I Office to discuss violations associated with the procurement program.
On June 1, 1989, a meeting was held in the NRC Region 1 Office to discuss off-site emergency notification issues.
The State of Maine, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the licensee, and the NRC participated.
On October 18, 1989, a meeting to discuss power distribution issues was con-ducted in the NRC Region I Office.
On September 27, 1989, a meeting was held in the NRC Region I Office to discuss the findings of the Safety System Functional Inspection.
On a quarterly basis, since approximately January of 1989, licensee management has met with NRC management in the NRC Regional Office to discuss the status of the security program.
APPENDIX F F.
Licensee Event Reports
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F.1. Report Quality Licensee Event Reports (LERs) adequately described the associated events in thorough and-clear detail.
Narrative sections typically included event details such as valve identification numbers, model numbers, and operable redundant systems, which enabled the reader to develop a good understanding of the event.
>
Root causes were clearly identified and previous similar events were appro-priately referenced.
F.2. Causal Analysis Eleven LERs were sLbmitted.
No trends in event causes were found.
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' Reference Information
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i APPENDIX G TABLE'1 MAINE YANKEE ENFORCEMENT / SEVERITY LEVEL AREA.
2
4
DEV TOTAL-Plant Operations
1 Radiological Controls
3 Maintenance / Surveillance
1 L-Emergency Preparedness
'
Security
3 5-Engineering / Technical Support
1
Safety Assessment / Quality Verification
_
_
Totals:
_
_
1_0
13
APPENDIX H
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TABLE 2
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MAINE YANKEE INSPECTION HOURS SUMMARY
,.
.' Area:
Hours
% of Time Plant Operations 1902 38.5 Radiological Controls 412 8.3
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. Maintenance / Surveillance 1498 30.3 Emergency Preparedness
~129 2,6
.-
Security 241 4.9-
Engineering / Technical Support 492 10.0
.i Safety Assessment / Quality Verification 226 5.0 l
Totals:
4940 100.0 l
)
These totals do not include NRR site visits for review of issues such as:
Station Blackout
'
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Offsite Power Reliability
--
Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification
--
Pipe Wall' Erosion / Corrosion
--
Simulator Certification
--
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Reference Information
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APPENDIX I TABLE 3 MAINE YANKEE LISTING 0F LERs BY FUNCTIONAL AREA Area A
B C
D E
X_
Totals.
Plant Operations
1
2
Radiological Controls
1 o
Maintenance / Surveillance
1 Emergency Preparedness Security Engineering / Technical Support
3
Safety Assessment / Quality Verification
_
_
_
_
_
_
Totals:
4
3
Cause Codes:
A - Personnel Error B - Design, Manufacturing, Construction or Installation Error C - External Cause E
'O - Defective Procedure E - Component Failure X - Other
- Cause Codes in this table are based on inspector evaluation and may differ from those specified in the LER.
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- 5 Reference Information
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APPENDIX J
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SALP BOARD MEMBERSHIP AND ATTENDANCE s
DECEMBER 13, 1989 Board Chairman p
W. F. Kane, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
l-Board Members J.- Greeves, Acting-Deputy Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards (DRSS)
s W. Hodges,-Director, Division of _ Reactor Safety (DRS)
N.
C, Holden, Senior Resident inspector
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~J.-Johnson, Chief, Projects Branch No. 3, DRP E. Leeds, Licensing Project Manager, NRR E. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B, DRP
.R. Wessman, Director, Project Directorate 1-3, NRR
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OtherAttendees(Non-Voting)
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R. Bores, Chief. Effluents Radiation Protection Section, DRSS (Part-Time)
C. Conklin, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist,' DRSS
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-R. Freudenberger, Resident Inspector L
G. Kelly, Chief, Technical Support Staff, DRP (Part-Time)
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W. Lancaster, Physical Security Inspector, DRSS (Part-Time)
R. Nimitz, Senior Radiation Specialist, DRSS (Part-Time)
W. Pasciak, Chief, Facilities Radiation Protection Section, DRSS (Part-Time)
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-E. Sylvester, Physical Security inspector, DRSS j
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