IR 05000302/1986031
| ML20215N454 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/1986 |
| From: | Elrod S, Stetka T, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215N435 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-86-31, IEB-86-002, IEB-86-2, NUDOCS 8611050428 | |
| Download: ML20215N454 (16) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
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Report No.:
50-302/86-31 Licensee:
Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Docket No.:
50-302 License No.:
DPR-72 Facility Name:
Crystal River 3 Inspection Conducted:
Sep ember 6 - October.9, 1986 Inspectors:
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T. F. Stetka, enior Resident Insp(ctor Date Signed
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J. E. Tedrow, esident Inspector /
Date Si ned 7sch N Approved by:
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.o 5. A. Elrod, Section Chief Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, review of IE Bulletins, and licensee action on previous inspection items.
Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations observed.
Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshifts.
Results:
One violation was identified (Failure to adhere to plant procedures, paragraphs 5.b(1) and 5.b(8)b).
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L REPORT. DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. Alberdi, Manager, Nuclear Site Support
- W. Bandhauer, Assistant Nuclear Plant Operations Manager
- P. Breedlove, Nuclear Records Management Supervisor
- J. Colby, Manager, Nuclear Mechanical / Structural Engineering Services
- M. Collins, Nuclear Safety & Reliability Superintendent
- J. Cooper Jr., Superintendent Technical Support H. Gelston, Nuclear Electrical /I&C Engineering Supervisor B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- M. Mann, Nuclear Compliance Specialist
- P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations E. Morea, Nuclear Mechanical Engineer
- D. Porter, Assistant Nuclear Shift Supervisor V. Roppel, Manager, Nuclear Plant Technical Support
- W. Rossfeld, Nuclear Compliance Manager P. Skramstad, Nuclear Chemistry / Radiation Protection Superintendent
- P. Small, Maintenance Department Coordinator R. Thompson, Nuclear Mechanical / Structural Engineering Supervisor
- E. Welch, Manager, Nuclear Electrical /I&C Engineering Services
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- K. Wilson, Manager, Site Nuclear Licensing
- R. Wittman, Nuclear Operations Superintendent Other personnel contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on October 9, 1986.
During this meeting, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the Violation ani the Inspector Followup Items (IFI).
The inspectors further stated that t.ie licensee's response to the violation should include a discussion of the activities that the licensee is undertaking to correct the discrepancy between the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) description of the cooling water system lineups that supply cooling water to the makeup pumps (MVPs)
and the cooling water system lineups that are presently in use.
On October 17, 1986, the inspector informed the licensee of the unresolved item concerning Environmental Qualification (EQ) of limitorque motor operators internal wiring.
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The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items (Closed) IFI (302/86-27-04):
The licensee has revised procedure SP-163B (revision 6 dated September 8,1986) to clarify the steps in the procedure.
Action on this item is considered to be complete.
(0 pen) IFI (302/86-12-08):
The licensee has performed an evaluation and determined that the non-safety nuclear services seawater pump (RWP-1) can be run continuously in lieu of the safety nuc'. ear services seawater pumps (RWP-2A or RWP-28).
Presently, the only time RWP-2A or RWP-2B need be run (except when required for emergency situations) is when the decay heat seawater pumps (RWP-3A or RWP-3B) are manually started.
Pumps RWP-2A or 28-are needed because the present backup bearing flushwater flow to pumps RWP-3A and 3B is inadequate.
The licensee has also determined that the normal bearing flushwater flow is less than the flow rates required by the pump manufacturer for all of these pumps (RWP-1, 2A, 2B, 3A, and 3B).
These low flow conditions are being caused by a build up of lime in the piping and in the bearing flushing clearances for these pumps.
Subsequent discussions with the pump manufacturer indicate that the limits proposed by the manufacturer were conservatively high and that as long as their are no other indications of pump degradation (e.g., vibration, flow, temperature, unusual noise, etc. ),
the reduced flow will not affect pump operation.
No evidence of additional pump degradation has been observed by the licensee.
The licensee is presently in the process of cleaning these lines and bearing flushing clearances.
This item remains open pending completion of these activities.
(0 pen) IFI (302/80-39-04):
The licensee has performed modifications on the auxiliary building ventilation system to improve the reliability of the system in accordance with modification (MAR) 78-12-04, however this MAR does not appear to address the problem of the fan blade failure.
The licensee is attempting to locate the evaluation on the fan blade failure and this item remains open pending NRC review of this evaluation.
(Closed) Violation (302/84-09-04):
Following correspondence between the NRC and the licensee (FPC) dated November 13, 1984, December 26, 1984, January 25, 1985, and February 26, 1985, a meeting between the NRC and FPC was held on March 15, 1985, to resolve FPC's continued denial of this violation.
As a result of this meeting the NRC determined that the violation did occur.
These correspondence and the meeting provided sufficient information such that the licensee's actions to prevent recurrence were judged to be complete.
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(Closed) IFI (302/81-01-05):
This item was addressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/82-19 and was left open because it identified four additional IFI's (302/82-19-01, 02, 03, and 04).
These IFI's were subsequently closed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/84-17 and therefore-action on this item is considered to be complete.
(Closed) IFI (302/82-02-07):
The referen::e leg loss problem in the core flood level transmitters was corrected by replacing the original Bailey transmitters with Rosemont transmitters.
This replacement was accomplished
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in accordance with MAR 81-05-43 that was completed on October 14, 1983.
(Closed) IFI (302/82-02-08):
An engineering evaluation dated December 11, 1985, identified the gas binding problem to be caused by nitrogen gas coming from the core flood tanks (CFT's).
This evaluation also stated that a proper valve lineup would prevent this occurrence and that weekly in lieu of daily testing of these pumps was adequate.
As a result of this evaluation the licensee has revised procedure SP-320 to provide for weekly testing of these pumps and revised precedure OP-403B to provide the proper valve lineup.
(Closed) IFI (302/81-23-07):
In an Interoffice Correspondence dated November 25, 1981, the licensee documented a preliminary engineering evaluation that indicated Part 100 limits would not be exceeded when the main steam safety valves (MSSV) lifted with a concurrent tube rupture in a steam generator (OTSG).. Subsequently, the licensee has issued revision 6 to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) which provides the complete engineering analysis for this accident and confirms the results of the earlier preliminary evaluation.
(Closed) IFI (302/86-23-06):
Procedure SP-421, revision 27, was issued on.
September 26, 1986, and procedure OP-103C, revision 1 was issued on September 3,1986.
These revisions corrected the discrepancies in these procedures and action on this item is considered to be complete.
(Closed) IFI (302/82-18-03):
In a memorandum dated August 28, 1985, the licensee documented that the original power supply was still installed.
The licensee attributes the past power supply failures to have been caused by work that was going on in the area at the time and have had no problems with this unit since that work was completed.
(Closed) IFI (302/80-39-06):
The licensee has replaced conta.inment isolation valves CAV-1, 3, and 126 and their Limitorque motor operators in accordance with MAR 80-01-11-01 that was completed on May 30, 1984.
The replacement valves and actuators appear to have resolved the previous failure problems.
(Closed) Violation (302/83-17-04):
In addition to the items discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/86-27, the licensee has completed and the inspector has verified the completion of the following items:
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MAR 83-05-34-01 which was completed on August 8, 1983, added a test
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connection to penetration #339 to allow testing of valve WDV-3 in the proper direction;
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MAR 82-12-12-01 which was completed on August 8,1983, added a test connection to penetration #349 to allow testing of valve WDV-60 in the proper direction;
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Pracedure SP-179 was revised to insure proper testing for valves WDV-94, WDV-406, WSV-5, and WSV-6; Valves WSV-5 and 6 were tested on May 25, 1983, valve WDV-94 was tested
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on May 9,1983, and valve WDV-406 was tested on April 8,1983. The results of these tests were satisfactory.
The ?icensee's actions on this item is considered to be complete.
(Closed) Violation (302/84-30-03):
In addition to the items discussed in NRC. Inspection Report 50-302/86-27, the licensee has completed and the inspector has verified that the chemistry technicians were counseled as stated in the licensee's response letter.
(Closed) Violation (302/82-09-02):
As discussed in the NRC evaluation letter to NRC Inspection Report 50-302/82-09 dated June 27, 1984, the inspector has verified that the changes to the procedure review process are effective and that a review of procedure SP-154 indicates that the procedure is now acceptable. Action on this item is considered to be cornplete.
(0 pen) IFI (302/86-09-06):
The licensee is continuing to evaluate the instrument drift problems.
The licensee is taking the following action:
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Revising the as found tolerances established by channel calibration procedures SP-161A, Reactor Coolant Hot / Leg and Cold / Leg Calibration, and SP-162, Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Calibration, to more closely reflect the accuracy of the instrumentation;
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Revising applicable procedures to direct technicians to leave the as left setpoints as close as possible to the desired setpoint (middle of the specified band, etc.);
Tracking transmitters that are calibrated on a refueling basis to
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determir.e the extent of the drift problem.
The licensee has identified and is tracking these transmitters by a field problem report FPR-86-042.
This FPR will be further evaluated during the next refueling outage when these transmitters will again be calibrated;
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Revising SP-161C, Remote Shutdown Instrumentation Calibration, to add a time requirement for heating instruments to stable temperatures before calibrating; and,
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Evaluating NCOR's 86-92, 86-94, and 86-101 for similar action.
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l This item remains open pending NRC review of these activities.
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Unresolved Items *
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One unresolved item was identified this report period, paragraph 8.
5.
Review of Plant Operations The plant remained in power operation (Mode 1) for the duration of this reporting period.
a.
Shift Logs and Facility Records The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical
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Specifications (TSs) and the licensee s administrative procedures.
The following records were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Equipment Out-0f-Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log; Daily Operating Surveillance Log; Work Request Log; Short Term Instructions (STIs); and Selected Chemistry / Radiation Protection Logs.
j In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently verified clearance order tagouts.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Facility Tours'and Observations Throughout the inspection period,. facility tours were conducted to observe operations and maintenance activities in progress.
Some operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings were attended by the irspector to observe planning and management activities.
The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:.
-l security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator rooms; auxiliary building; intermediate building; battery rooms; and, electrical switchgear rooms.
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"An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
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During these tours, the following observations were made:
(1) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following instrumentation was observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode:
-Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid radiation monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operating parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating parameters.
During a routine tour of the auxiliary building on September 8, 1986, the inspector noticed that all three Makeup and Purification Pumps (MVPs) 1A, 1B, and IC, were aligned to receive cooling water from the Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling (SW) system.
This lineup differed from the normal cooling lineup which has MVP-1A and MVP-1B cooled from the SW system while MUP-1C is normally cooled by the Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling (DC) system.
(MVP-1A and MVP-1C have the ability to be cooled from either SW or DC).
The MVP's are utilized to supply the high pressure injection water for the Emergency Core Cooling (ECCS) system in the event of a loss of coolant accident.
Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 requires two independent ECCS subrystems be operable.
Action statement "a" of this TS allows 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore an inoperable subsystem.
The licensee's safety related SW system is comprised of two redundant emergency pumps and four redundant heat exchangers which share a common supply and return header to the various components which the system cools.
Connecting all three MVP's to this same cooling water source (SW) negates the independence of these pumps and therefore negates the independence of the ECCS subsystems.
This lack of independence between the ECCS subsystems in this cooling configuration was discussed with the Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) and Operations Superintendent on September 8.
In these discussions it was clarified that to maintain the independence of the ECCS subsystems, two separate independent cooling supplies for the MVP s must be provided.
Licensee representatives acknowledged the inspectors concerns and agreed that two separate cooling systems should be aligned to supply cooling water to the MVP's.
The licensee subsequently realigned the cooling water for MVP-1C to receive cooling water from the DC system.
A review of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was conducted to determine the designed cooling water supply to the MVP's.
Section 9.5.2.1 describes the SW system and section 9.5.2.2 describes the DC system.
These descriptions state that the normal cooling water supply to MVP-1A and MVP-1C is the DC system (MUP-1A
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from the "A" train of DC and MVP-1C from the "B" train of DC) and that MUP-1B is normally cooled by the SW system.
From these descriptions in the FSAR it appears that any combination of MVP's utilized for ECCS would have separate cooling water supplies to ensure independence.
Further review of this issue by the inspector indicates that subsequent NRC commitments made-by the licensee in June, 3979, have altered the normal cooling alignment to these pumps such that SW is now normally supplied to MUP-1A and MUP-1B while maintaining DC cooling to MVP-1C, however an FSAR change to reflect this commitment was not made.
In this configuration it-is sometimes necessary to realign either MVP-1A or MVP-1C to an alternate cooling water source (SW or DC) to maintain the independence of the ECCS subsystems.
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During a subsequent review of the operator's logs conducted on September 11, 1986, the inspector noted four cases in which all three MVP's were aligned to the SW system for cooling:
- From 3:10 a.m. on August 27, 1986 until 6:25 p.m. on August 28, 1986;
- From 7:00 a.m. until 7:22 p.m. on September 3, 1986;
- From 6:00 a.m. on September 6, 1986 until 6:11 p.m. on September 8, 1986;
- From 2:25 a.m. until 4:35 a.m. on September 10, 1986.
In all cases the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action statement allowed by TS 3.5.2 was not exceeded for the non independent ECCS. subsystems.
However no entries were noted in the NSS log for entry into the applicable action statements of TS 3.5.2 for these events because the
operators did not recognize that they were in an action statement.
Under these circumstances, the operators should have known that they were in an action statement.
Administrative Instruction AI-500, Conduct of Operations, section 2.1.6 requires all TS action statements entered or exited be noted in the NSS log.
Failure to log entries into TS action statements as required by procedure AI-500 is contrary to the requirements of TS 6.8.1.a and
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is considered to be a violation.
Violation (302/86-31-01):
Failure to adhere to plant procedures as required by TS 6.8.1.
(2) Safety Systems Walkdown - The inspector conducted a walkdown of the Core Flood (CF) system to verify that the lineup was in accordance with license requirements for system operability and that the system drawing and procedure correctly reflect "as-built" plant conditions.
No violations or deviations were identifie '
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(3) Shift Staffing - The inspector verified that operating shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control room operations wf:re being conducted in an orderly and professional manner.
In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant status, operatianal problems, and other pertinent plant information during these turnovers.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and components and cleanliness conditicns of various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(5) Radiation Areas - Radiation Control Areas (RCAs) were observed to verify proper identification and implementation.
These observations included selected licensee-conducted surveys, review of step-off pad conditions, disposal of contaminated clothing, and area posting.
Area postings were independently verified for accuracy by the inspector's.
The inspector also reviewed selected radiation work permits and observed the use of protective clothing, respirators, and personnel monitoring devices to assure that the licensee's radiation monitoring policies were being followed.
No violaticas or deviations were identified.
(6) Security Control - Security controls were observed to verify that security barriers were intact, guard forces were on duty, and access to the Protected Area (PA) was controlled in accordance with the facility security plan.
Personnel within the PA were observed to verify proper display of badges and that personnel requiring escort were properly escorted.
Personnel within vital areas were observed to ensure proper authorization for the area.
During this report period 'special inspections were conducted to verify that security force contingency measures were effective while security systems were secured for, modification.
These inspections verified that contingency measures were adequate.
At present this modification effort is approximately 80% complete and the licensee continues to maintain appropriate contingency measures until the modification is completed.
No violations or deviations were identifie ~
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(7) Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(8) Surveillance - Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment, was utilized; and TS requirements were followed.
The following-tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
SP-140, In-core Neutron Detector System Calibration;
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SP-146, EFIC Monthly Functional Test;
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SP-1608, Functional & Operability Check of the Containment Hydrogen Monitor WS-10-CE;
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SP-317, RC Water Inventory Balance; SP-333, Control Rod Exercises;
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SP-336, Triaxial Time-History Accelograph Channel-Check;
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SP-340B, "B" Train ECCS Pump & Valve Operability, and SP-344C, Nuclear Services Valve & Containment Cooling System
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Supply Operability (a) During observations of the performance of procedure SP-160B the inspector noted that the licensee utilized a hydrogen bottle with a concentration of 1.025% hydrogen.
Step 5.1 of procedure SP-160B specifies the use of a bottle with a concentration of hydrogen that was 1% +/.02%.
Additionally step 5.1 specifies a material tracking number of N MMIS 01-120-109 which was the number on the bottle in use.
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During subsequent discussions with licensee representatives, it was determined that the licensee was aware of the use of this bottle and that the licensee had determined that the additional.005% hydrogen had no affect on the validity of the test.
As a result of these discussions, however, the licensee is reviewing procedures SP-160A and SP-160B to determine if a procedure revision may be necessary to prevent confusion while performing these procedures.
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Inspector Followup Item (302/86-31-02):
Review the licensee's activities to revise procedures SP-160A and SP-160B to account for the use of bottles of different gas concentrations.
(b) The inspector' reviewed procedure SP-344C conducted on October 7, 1986, and noted that signatures denoting independent verification of valve positions following completion of the procedure were missing for valves SW-152, SW-353, SW-354, and SW-355.
Step 1.4 of this procedure requires system valve positions be independently verified, however this was not accomplished as evidenced by only one signature for the valve's positioning.
This matter was discussed with operations personnel and the positions of the valves were subsequently independently verified to be in their correct positions.
A record review conducted by the inspector indicated that during previous performances of procedure SP-344C on August 13, August 27, and September 24, 1986, no independent verification of valve positions was conducted.
Failure to perform the independent verification for valves required by procedure SP-344C is contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 6.8.1.C and is considered to be another example of the procedure adherence violation identified in paragraph 5.b of this report (302/86-31-01).
(9) Maintenance Activities - The inspector observed maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being followed; quality control personnel were available for inspection activities as required; and TS requirements were being followed.
Maintenance was observed and' work packages were reviewed for the following maintenance activities:
Troubleshooting of the reactor coolant system pressure signal
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for Engineered Safeguards Channel #2 in accordance with procedure MP-531;
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Troubleshooting of motor operated valve DHV-7 in accordance with procedure MP-531; Disassembly and refurbishment of Target Rock valves RCV-157,
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158 and CAV-431 in accordance with procedure HP-1990;
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Troubleshooting of the security MAC-540 computer; i
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Troubleshooting of the. reactor coolant systea flow signal for the "A" Reactor Protection System Channel in accordance with procedure MP-531;
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Maintenance on the "B" Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) Channel and post maintenance testing conducted in accordance with procedure SP-146; and,
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Functional test of the Perimeter Intrusion Detection System in accordance with modification (MAR) 80-12-08-02, and test procedure TP#1.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(10) Radioactive Waste Controls - Solid waste compacting and selected liquid and gaseous releases were observed to verify that approved procedures were utilized, that appropriate release approvals were obtained, and that required surveys were taken.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(11) Pipe Hangers and Seismic Restraints - Several pipe hangers and seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related systems were observed to insure that fluid levels were adequate and no leakage was evident, that restraint settings were appropriate, and that anchoring point: were not binding.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Review of Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic a.
impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported immediately were reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were-satisfied.
LERs 83-42, 83-47, 83-57, 83-64, 84-02, 84-04, 84-13, 85-11, 85-18, 86-12, 86-13, and 86-15 were reviewed in accordance with current NRC policy.
LEP, 86-15 will remain open.
This LER reported the failure to adequately test the 480 volt engineered safeguards bus load shedding capability.
The licensee plans to revise procedure SP-417 to test this feature properly.
This LER remains open pending completion of the revision to SP-417.
LER 86-13 is closed.
LERs 83-42, 83-47, 83-57, 83-64, 84-02, 84-04, 84-13, 85-11, 85-18, and 86-12 are considered closed for the following reasons:
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s (1). LERs 83-42 and 83-57 reported the failure of the steam supply
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' valve (ASV-5) for the emergency feedwater pump. The licensee has
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motor starter contact failure.
The licensee found a sticky
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substance (which they believe to be. cable pulling lubricant)
present on the contacts which resulted in periodic sticking of the contacts.
The licensee has subsequently checked other motor operated valves to determine if this was a generic problem or an isolated occurrence.
The licensee has not found any evidence of similar problems in other valves.
(2) LER 83-47 reported the failure of seismic instrumentation recorders due to the use of old tapes.
The licensee has revised
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surveillance procedure SP-336, Triaxial Time-History Accelograph Channel Check (revision 7 dated November 21, 1984), to require steplacement of these tapes monthly.
(3) LER 83-64 reported tha failure of radiation monitor RM-A6.
The licensee has completed an engineering investigation of this event and has determined that the control circuitry operated as required and that no further actions were needed.
(4) LER 84-02 reported the improper monitoring of a liquid radioactive release.
The licensee issued a Short Term Instruction (STI 84-10)
to inform 1 operations personnel of this event and has revised operating p'rocedure OP-407N (revision 11) to require the operators to verify that -the chart recorder is operating satisfactory prior to startup of' the release.
The licensee has also created a new preventive maintenance procedure (PM-249) for plant recorders to ensure they are maintained properly.
(5) LER 84-04 reported the finding that manual isolation valves in the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) were inadvertently left shut.
The licensee has revised procedures OP-301, Filling and Venting the Reactor Coolant System, (revision 25 dated March 22, 1984) and OP-403, Chemical Addition System, (revision 3 dated May 25,1984)
to include the manual isolation valves in the applicable system valve lineups.
The licensee has also revised the methodology for the turnover of modified systems set forth in procedure CP-114, Procedure for Handling Permanent Modifications, Temporary Modifications, Modification Revisions, Field Change Notices, and Advanced Field Change Notices, (revision 40 dated July 19,1984)
to designate a person responsible for' ensuring that appropriate procedure changes are initiated as required.
(6) LER 84-13 reported inadequate Engineered Safeguards (ES) testing.
The licensee has reviseo the following ES surveillance test l
procedures to ensure adequate testing:
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SP-130, Engineered Safeguards Monthly Functional Test, was
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revised (revision 19 dated November 1,1984) to include checking of alarms actuated during performance of the procedure.
SP-135, Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Response Time
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Test, was revised (revision 16 dated July 19,1985) to include checking the response time for containment isolation.
SP-358, Operations ES Monthly Automatic Functional Tests,
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was revised (revision 2 dated October 17, 1985) to include checking of alarms actuated during performance of the procedure.
SP-417, Refueling Interval Plant Response to Engineered
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Safeguards Actuation, was revised (revision 19 dated Septemoer 28, 1984) to require the testing of the "B" High Pressure Injection Pump (MVP-18).
(7) LER 85-11 reported the failure to verify the. operability of the cable tunnel sump pumps when an emergency diesel generator is out of service.
The licensee has critiqued this event with operations personnel.
Also the licensee has revised surveillance procedures SP-442, Special Conditions Surveillance Plan (revision 30 dated October 16,1985) and SP-443, Master Surveillance Plan (revision 68 dated October 24, 1985) to require the review of special-condition surveillances every four hours.
(8) LER 85-18 reported the failure to identify out of cervice seismic monitoring instrumentation.
The licensee has completed.the counseling of the personnel involved.
(9) LER 86-12 reported that procedure SP-312 had not been performed as required.
The inspector has verified that all shift s'upervisors have reviewed this LER.
b.
The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to verify the following:
compliance with the TS, corrective actions as identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are reported as required by TS.
All NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Policy.
(1) NCOR 86-157 reported a non-conformance with the electrical separation requirements for the emergency feedwater initiation and control (EFIC) cabinets.
Durirg periodic testing of this system the licensee determined that four non-safety related cables were running in a cable tray with safety related cables.
Subsequent
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investigation indicates that these cables are electrically isolated from non-safety related equiament and that these cables only carry computer communication signals.
The licensee is presently investigating the cause of the incorrectly installed cables and making plans to correct the non-conformance.
Inspector Followup Item (302/86-31-03):
Review the licensee's activities to correct the non-conforming separation criteria in the EFIC cabinets.
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(2) NCOR 86-164 reported that the heat exchanger heads on the nuclear services closed cycle pump (SWP) gear oil coolers were of the incorrect dimension.
As the result of the use of these heads, the licensee has had instances of water contamination in the oil of these gear cases.
Investigation by the licensee has determined that the heads were shipped from the vendor with the. incorrect dimensions which resulted in damage to the tube to tube sheet integrity when new
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i coolers were installed.
To resolve the problem the licensee, with direction from the vendor, has machined the heads to the proper dimension and replaced the coolers on SWP 18.
Replacement of the coolers on SWP 1A remains to be done and the licensee is reviewing this issue for 10 CFR Part 21 reportability.
Inspector Followup Item (302/86-31-04):
Review the licensee's activities to replace the gear oil coolers on SWP-1A and to report the event in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.
7.
Review of IE BJlletins (IEB)
(Closed) IEB 8f.,-02:
The ' inspector and Region II reviewer reviewed the licensee's response dated July 29,1986, to IEB 86-02, Static "0" Ri'ng Differential Pressure Switches.
The licensee does not use these switches in systems where the switch operation would be subject to limiting conditions for operation in the technical specifications.
Licensee action on this bulletin is considered to be complete.
8.
Environmental Qualification (10 CFR 50.49) of Limitorque Motor-0perated Valves On August 21, 1986, Region II's Atlanta-based personnel contacted Florida Power Corporation (FPC) and the site concerning their 10 CFR 50.49 Limitorque motor-operated valves (MOVs) with regard to IEN 86-03, Potential Deficiencies in Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring.
A similar deficiency was discussed on page 15 of IEN 83-72.
The licensee stated that Crystal River Unit 3 was shut down_ the first part
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of the year as a result of a repair outage, notably reactor coolant pump shaft problems.
FPC received IEN 86-03 the latter part of January 1986 and
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made the decision to inspect their 10 CFR 50.49 Limitorque motor operators.
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i Any questionable wiring was replaced with known qualified wire as an -
expeditious means of resolving any concerns and did not imply that wiring
was unqualified or that the valves were inoperable.
The wiring replacement was completed in June before recovery from the repair outage.
This information was reported to the NRC in a voluntary LER No. 86-007-00 dated June 20, 1986.
Since thare is some questions involving interpretation of 10
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CFR 50.49 and its 1985 deadline, this is an unresolved item identified as
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(302/86-31-05), Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Operators.
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