IR 05000302/1986018
| ML20212A669 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 07/18/1986 |
| From: | Cunningham A, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212A644 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-86-18, NUDOCS 8607290096 | |
| Download: ML20212A669 (12) | |
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k2 Ett UNITED STATES
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o NUCLEAR REGU,LATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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,j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Jllt. i1 m Report No.:
50-302/86-18
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Licensee:
Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Docket No.:
50-302 License No.: DPR-72 Facility Name: Crystal River 3 Inspection Condu
- June 17-20, 1986
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Inspector:
A. L.'Cunningha [ ~
D6te digned Accompanying Personnel:
B. C. Haagensen G. D. Weale M. J. Gaitanis Approved by:
uds 7-/f-5 T. R." Decker, Section Chief Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection involved evaluation of the annual radiological emergency preparedness exercise.
Results: Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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8607290o96 PDR 0721 ADOCK 0500030g G
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j REPORT DETAILS i
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1.
Persons Contacted i
Licensee Employees W. Wilgus, Vice President, Nuclear Operations j
- P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations j
- J. Alberdi, Manager, Nuclear Site Support
- L. Hill, Manager, Site Nuclear Services
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- K. Wilson, Manager, Site Nuclear Licensing i
- P. Skramstad, Nuclear Chemistry and Radiation Protection Superintendent l
- S. Johnson, Radiological Emergency Planning Supervisor
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- E. Renfro, Director, Nuclear Operations j-
- L. Kelley, Nuclear Operations Training
- M. Jacobs, Area Public Information Coordinator
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- M. Laycock, Health Physicist Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, j
operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organizations
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- R. D. Mothena, Emergency Planner - FP&L Company
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- C. Ward, Emergency Planner - FP&L Company i
- E. W. Ford, Drill Implementor - SAIC
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NRC Resident Inspector
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- T. F. Stetka, Senior Resident Inspector i
- Attended exit interview i
2.
Exit Interview
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i The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 20, 1986, with
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those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. -The inspector described the i
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings including
the exercise weakness addressing notification. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensas did not idantify as proprietary
any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this j
exercise.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters No previous enforcement matters were identified.
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4.
Exercise Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements defined in the licensee's emergency plan and organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed in detail with licensee representatives on several occasions.
While no major scenario problems were identified, several inconsistencies became apparent during the exercise.
The inconsistencies, however, failed to detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization.
The scenario developed for this exercise was detailed, and fully exercised the onsite emergency organization.
The scenario provided sufficient information to the State, counties, and local government agencies consistent with their participation in the exercise.
The licensee made a significant commitment to training and personnel through the use of implementors, observers, and specialists participating in the exercise.
It was observed however, that additional training is required in management of medical emergencies and notification, as discussed in Paragraphs 5 and 10, respectively.
The implementors provided adequate
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guidance throughout the exercise; however, some prompting was noted by the inspectors. This item was discussed during the exercise critique.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Medical Drill Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the medical emergency drill was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test specific functions in the licensee's emergency plan pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to i
10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.
The scenario developed for the medical emergency drill was explicit, and provided adequate information to the licensee organization and offsite local support agencies consistent with scope of their participation in the drill.
j Observations conducted by the NRC evaluator were confined to the onsite
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phase of the drill, including transfer of the injured person to the ambulance for transport to the receiving hospital. Observations din.losed
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that the medical emergency team (MET) exhibited poor contamination control
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and health physics practices throughout decontamination and preliminary treatment of the injured person.
The immediate area of the accident was neither posted, restricted nor provided with a stepoff pad.
Uncontrolled entry and exit by attending personnel was permitted throughout this phase of
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The area was cordoned off following removal of the injured j
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Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-302/86-18-01:
Poor contamination control l
and health physics practices attending decontamination and preliminary t
treatment of the injured person.
This item will be reviewed during l
subsequent medical emergency drills.
This item was fully discussed with
licensee representatives prior to and during the exercise critique.
The licensee acknowledged the finding.
Observation of the drill also disclosed that the MET arrived at the accident site without the assigned medical emergency kits required to promptly initiate preliminary treatment and periodically monitor vital signs of the j
injured person. The emergency kits arrived just prior to removal of the injured person from the accident site for transfer to the offsite treatment
facility.
Medical equipment and supplies available to the team were j
confined to those provided in the area wall-mounted first aid kit.
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IFI 50-302/86-18-02: The Medical Emergency Team (MET) should be provided with the assigned emergency kits in response to all personnel accidents and medical emergencies.
This item was fully discussed with licensee
representatives prior to and during the exercise critique. The item will be reviewed. during subsequent medical emergency drills.
The licensee
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acknowledged this finding.
i It was observed that the security officer assigned to the medical emergency
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failed to limit and control access of nonessential personnel to the accident site. This finding was discussed with the licensee prior to and during the exercise critique. The licensee acknowledged this finding.
IFI 50-302/86-18-03:
Improved training of security in required duties
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attending response to onsite medical emergencies and personnel accidents.
This item will be reviewed during subsequent medical emergency drills. This
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j item was fully discussed with licensee representatives prior to and during j
the exercise critique. The licensee acknowledged this finding.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency i
response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate j
staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to j
10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific j
guidance promulgated in 3ection II.A of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
I The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments were made for j
the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff was j
available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial response
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organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives; however, i;
because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous i
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staffing of the emergency response organization was not required.
Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that sufficient numbers of trained technical personnel were available for continuous staffing of the augmented emergency organization, if needed.
The inspectors also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
At each response center, the required staffing and assignment of, responsibility were consistent with the licensee's Emergency Plan and approved Implementing Procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),
Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654, Revision 1:
(1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; (3) specification of onsite and offsite support organizational interactions.
The inspectors observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined and that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the emergency organization. Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift personnel.
The on-duty Shif t Supervisor assumed the duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the Station Manager.
Required interactions between the licensee's emergency response organization I
I and State and local support agencies were adequate and consistent with the scope of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
l This area was observed to assure that the following arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3); Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and guidance promulgated in Section II.C of NUREG 0654, Revision 1, namely:
(1)
accommodation of selected State emergency response representatives at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility; and (2) identification of organizations capable of augmenting the planned response.
Representatives of the State of Florida and designated counties were accommodated in the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and
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Emergency News Center (ENC).
Licensee contact with offsite organizations i
was prompt, effective, and consistent with the scope of the exercise.
Assistance resources from State and local agencies were available to the licensee.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
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This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, specific
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guidance promulgated in Section I.D of NUREG-0654, Revision 1, and guidance
recommended in IE Information Notice 83-28.
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An Emergency Action Level matrix was used to promptly identify and properly classify the emergency and escalate to more severe emergency classifications
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as the simulated accident sequence progressed.
Licensee - actions in this area were timely and effective.
Observations confirmed that the emergency classification system was effectively used and was consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan and
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Implementing Procedures.
The system appeared to be adequate for l
classification of the simulated events.
The emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated
emergency.
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I No violations or deviations were identified.
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Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
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lI This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency I
personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations were established. This area was further
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observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the populace
within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to I
10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.0 of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific
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guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
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I An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were
established and available for use in prnviding information regarding the
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simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response i
organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response
organization.
Notification of the State of Florida, and designated local l
offsite organizations was completed within 15 minutes following declaration j
of the Notification of Unusual Event and Alert.
i The inspectors observed, however, that the required 15 minute notification
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to the State of Florida following declaration of the General Emergency was j
not implemented.
The State was notified 42 minutes following the cited I
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4 emergency classification declaration.
Review of the licensee findings
identified following the previous annual radiological emergency preparedness
I exercise disclosed that notification was documented as an item scheduled for L
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I additional review and followup. This notification issue was fully discussed j
with licensee representatives prior to and during the exercise critique, l
Exercise Weakness 50-302/86-18-04:
Implementation.of notification of the State and offsite support agencies within 15 minutes following declaration of each emergency classification.
This item was fully discussed with
licensee representatives prior to and during the exercise critique, and will i
be reviewed during subsequent exercises.
The licensee acknowledged this finding. The licensee also committed to conduct additional training and i
notification drills to verify and assure their capability to consistently i
implement notification of the State and offsite support agencies following
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declaration of emergencies.
The prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ was actuated during this exercise. Operation of the siren system was consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise. The system was successfully operated as planned.
11. Emergency Communications (82301)
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This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency j
personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to
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10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.F of NUREG-0654, j
Revision 1.
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l The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's
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emergency response facilities (Control Room, TSC, OSC, and E0F), the
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licensee and offsite agencies, and the offsite environmental monitoring teams and the EOF. The inspectors also observed information flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency organization.
Emergency communications, excluding the delay in notifying the State of the General
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i Emergency discussed above, were adequate and consistent with the scope of the exercise.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
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and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.H of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
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The inspectors observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilities, and observed the use of equipment therein. Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise included the
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Control Room (CR), Operations Support Center (OSC), Technical Support Center (TSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
a.
Control Room - The Control Room was used and effectively managed throughout the exercise. The inspector observed that following review and analysis of the sequence of accident events, Control Room operations personnel acted promptly to initiate required responses to the simulated emergency.
Emergency procedures were readily available, routinely followed, and factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercises.
Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those personnel assigned routine and special operational duties. Effective management of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded overcrowding, and maintained an ambient noise level required for orderly conduct of operations under emergency conditions.
The Shift Supervisor and the Control Room operators were cognizant of their duties, responsibilities, and authorities.
These personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and declare the proper emergency classification.
It was cbserved that data and information provided during the course of the exercise sequence and conditions placed no demands upon the Emergency Director and the Control Room staff in implementing appropriate actions in a timely manner.
The Control Room staff demonstrated the capability to effectively assess the initial conditions and implement required mitigating actions.
It was noted that a bound log of the facility Emergency Coordinator's activities was maintained during the exercise.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated and promptly staffed following notification by the Emergency Director of the simulated emergency conditions leading to the Alert classification.
The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their emergency duties, authorities, and responsibilities. Required operations at the facility proceeded in an orderly manner.
The facility was provided with adequate equipment for support of the assigned staff. TSC security was promptly established and maintained.
Security maintained a log or otherwise accounted for all personnel entering and exiting the facility.
During operation of the TSC, radiological habitability was routinely monitored and documented, and personnel dosimetry was distributed as required.
Status boards and related visual aids were strategically located to facilitate viewing by the TSC staff.
Dedicated
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communicators were assigned to the facility.
l Inspection disclosed the following additional findings, namely:
(1) engineering, maintenance, and other technical support j
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exercises; (2) assumption of duties by the Emergency Director was definite and firm; (3) transfer of certain emergency responsibilities
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from the TSC to EOF was firmly declared and announced to the TSC staff;
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(4) briefings of the TSC staff were frequent, and consistent with
changes in plant status and related emergency conditions; and
(5) accountability, including identi fying missing personnel, was
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readily implemented within the accepted time regime and was consistent
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j with the scenario scope.
The OSC was promptly staffed c.
Operations Support Center (OSC)
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i following activation of the emergency plan by the Emergency Coordinator. An inspector observed that teams were promptly assembled, j
briefed, and dispatched. A health physics technician accompanied each
team. The OSC Supervisor appeared to be cognizant of his duties and responsibilities.
During operation of this facility, radiological habitability was routinely monitored.
d.
Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) - The EOF is located in the
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applicant's training center, approximately seven miles from the plant site. The facility was adequately staffed and equipped to support the
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required emergency response consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise.
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j EOF security was promptly established and was' included as a routine t
requirement for preparation and activation of the facility.
Status boards and other related visual aids were strategically located and
I were readily accessible for viewing by the EOF staff.
Dedicated j
communicators were assigned to the facility.
i The EOF principal staff freely interacted with State representatives assigned to the facility.
The State representatives were routinely
1 informed of plant status, and were consistently factored, into the i
decisionmaking process addressing required and proposed protective measures, and recovery / reentry planning.
The Emergency Director
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frequently consulted the E0F technical support staff and ' includad
representatives of the cited offsite agencies, i
i No violations or deviations were identified.
i 13. Accident Assessment (82301)
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i This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.I of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
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The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant
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status, and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident. During the exercise, the engineering
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accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing plant status to provide recommendations to the Emergency Director concerning mitigating
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actions required to reduce damage to plant systems and equipment, prevention
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of releases of radioactive materials, and termination of the emergency l
condition.
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i Radiological assessme'nt activities involved several groups.
An inplant
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group was effective in estimating the radiological impact within the plant
based upon inplant monitoring and onsite measurements. Offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in a
those areas within the influence of the plume.
Radiological effluent data
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i was received in the TSC and E0F.
The E0F dose calculations were computed
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and compared on a timely basis with results received from the TSC and offsite monitoring groups.
The 1.icensee's dose assessment group freely
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interacted with the assigned State dose assessment specialist resident in the E0F. Dose assessments and projections were compared with TSC and State data. All resultant data agreed within acceptable limits.
Operation of offsite radiological monitoring teams was not observed by NRC evaluators
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during this exercise.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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14.
Protective Response i
This area was observed to determine that guidelines established for protective actions consistent with federal guidance, were developed and in
place, and that protective actions for emergency workers including
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i evacuation of non-essential personnel, are promptly implemented pursuant to j
10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654,
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Section II.J.
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i The protective measures decisionmaking process was observed by the inspectors.
Recommendations implemented by the E0F staff were timely, effective, and consistent with the above criteria.
Protective measures recommendations were provided by the licensee to the State of Florida as
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part of the exercise.
It was noted that all protective action responses
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recommended by the EOF staff represented input and concurrence by State representatives assigned to that facility.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15.
Radiological Exposure Control (82301)
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This area was observed to determined that methods for controlling radiological exposures in an emergency were established and implemented for
emergency workers, and that these methods included exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.K of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
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An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout l
the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers and by i
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j conducting periodic radiological surveys in the emergency response facilities. Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of emergency actions.
Adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection was available for use as required.
Consistent with the scope of the q
i exercise, use of respiratory protection equipment by emergency response teams was simulated.
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Health physics control of radiation exposure, contamination control, and radiation area access appeared adequate, except as noted during the onsite medical drill (paragraph 6). Health physics specialists were observed to j
thoroughly brief survey teams prior to their deployment.
Dosimetry was available and was used. High range dosimeters were also available in case they were needed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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16.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to assure that information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.G of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercise.
The information included details on how the public would be notified and the initial actions which should be taken in an emergency. A rumor control program was also in place.
l The licensee activated and fully staffed the Energency News Center (ENC).
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The facility was used by the licensee for preparation, coordination and dissemination of emergency news information. Written press releases were
prepared and issued from the ENC.
Releases issued were timely, and i
adequately reflected plant emergency conditions. A corporate spokesman was designated to conduct periodic press briefings.
The briefings were technically accurate and presented in a manner readily understood by laymen.
Visual aids were provided; however, they were not consistently used.
This item was identified during the previous annual exercise (50-302/85-02-02).
This item remains open, and will be reviewed during subsequent exercise.
Interaction and direct cooperation of the licensee with the State and counties was effective. Representatives of State, and county agencies were accommodated at the ENC. The cited representatives fully participated in the composition of news releases.
In essence, each news release was the product of the integrated activity of the licensee and the above cited support groups.
Similarly, State, and county representatives assigned to the ENC, fully participated in planning and presentation of periodic press briefings held during the exercise. Operation and management of the ENC was effectively implemented, and was consistent with the emergency plan requirements and
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approved implementing procedures.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
17.
Recovery Planning (82301)
This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13),
Paragraph IV.H of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and the specific guidance promulgated in Section II.M of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
The licensee conducted an effective recovery planning meeting prior to termination of the exercise.
Licensee planners discussed and established the following:
administrative and logistical support, manpower and engineering services; radiological surveillance; development and assignment of a recovery organization consistent with the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures. A comprehensive review of reentry plans and status was conducted.
No violations or deviations were identified.
18.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise, were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
A formal critique was held on June 20, 1986, with exercise implementors and observers, licensee management, and NRC representatives.
Findings identified during the exercise designated for licensee corrective action were discussed.
Licensee action on identified findings will be reviewed during subsequent inspections. The licensee's critique was detailed, and addressed both substantive findings and indicated improvement items. The conduct and content of the critique were consistent with regulatory requirements and guidance cited above.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
19.
Federal Evaluation Team Report The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II staff) concerning the
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activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.