IR 05000293/1982012
| ML20055B558 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1982 |
| From: | Briggs L, Eichenholz H, Elsasser T, Jerrica Johnson, Shedlosky J, Shedlosky T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055B552 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-82-12, NUDOCS 8207220497 | |
| Download: ML20055B558 (11) | |
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DCSi 50293-820S08 820409 820426
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 820430 REGICN I l
Report No.
50-293/82-12 Docket No.
50-293 License No. DPR-35 Priority
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Category C
Licensee:
Boston Edison Company 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Facility Name:
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Inspection At:
Plymouth, Massachusetts Inspection Conducted: April 5._1982 - May_9,_1982__
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6//M PL Inspectors:
_J.UJohnson, Senior Resident Inspector date bn O b
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fln /rb date g H. Eichenholz, Resident Inspector
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1. Briggs, R#actor Inspector (April 6-9,1982)
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&/zf/8L-( d Shedlosky,'Sr. Resident Inspector MS
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date
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f (April 28-30 1982)
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T. ElsasserVChief, Reactor Projects date
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Section No.1B, Projects Branch No.1 Inspection Sunrnary:
Inspection on April 5,1982 - May 9,1982 (Report No, 50-293/82-12)
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced safety inspectior of plant operations, includ-ing followup of previous inspection findings, an operational safety verification, followup of plant trips, events, and LER's, a review of surveillance and maintenance activities, and a review of actions to implement the Performance Improvement Program.
The inspection involved 292 inspector-hours by three resident and one region-based inspectors.
Results: One violation was identified in one area (Failure to follow actions required by T.S. Table 3.1.1 with inoperable reactor vessel water level instru-mentation, Paragraph 2).
Region I Form 12 (Rev. February 1982)
8207220497 820707 PDR ADOCK 05000293 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted J. Aboltin, Sr. Reactor Engineer J. Alukonis, Watch Engineer A. Caputo, Fire Prevention and Protection Officer W. Deacon, Senior Electrical Engineer R. DeLoach, Group Leader - Operations QC J. Dwyer, Sr. QC Engineer B. Eldredge, Sr. HP Supervisor G. Fiedler, Watch Engineer J. Frazer, I&C Supervisor W. Harrington, Senior Vice President, Nuclear
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E. Larson, Sr. QC Engineer R. Machon, Nuclear Operations Manager (Pilgrim Station)
P. Mastrangelo, Watch Engineer C. Mathis, Deputy Nuclear Operations Manager J. McCann, Watch Engineer T. McLoughlin, Sr. Compliance Engineer S. Musial, Tool Management Supervisor J. Nicholson, Staff Assistant L. Olivier, Watch Engineer E. O'Rork, Watch Engineer L. Oxen, Director of Operations Review E. Peters, Fire Protection Engineer K. Roberts, Chief Maintenance Engineer P. Smith, Chief Technical Engineer R. Smith, Chemical Engineer K. Taylor, Day Watch Engineer P. Willard, I&C Engineer E. Ziemianski, Management Services Group Leader The inspector also interviewed other members of the health physics, operations, maintenance, security, and technical staffs.
2.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (50-293/82-10-05)
Safety Relief Valva (SRV) Solenoid Misorientation. The inspector discussed this event with station personnel, reviewed maintenance procedure 3.M.4-6, the vendor technical manual, and installation records. Maintenance and QC records indicate that pro-cedure 3.M.4-6 was followed during the installation of the solenoid valves. The Target Rock Corp. technical manual (SRV Model 7567F dated October 1980) contains valve and subassembly drawings and installation instructions but does not con-tain written cautions or steps in part 9.1 " Solenoid Valve Assembly" to preclude misorientation. The solenoid assembly (1/2 SMS-A-01) does not contain location pins or flow / placement markings to preclude misorientatio.
-3-procedure 3.M.4-6 has been revised to include cautions and specific details to ensure proper orientation of the SRV solenoid valves. The NSSS (G.E.) has been informed of this misorientation problem by the onsite representative.
No violations were identified. This item is considered closed.
(0 pen) Inspection Follow Item (50-293/82-10-06) Reactor Vessel Level Divergence.
The licensee issued a prompt report (LER 82-11) to the NRC on April 27, 1982, that describes the plant operations and reactor water level divergence observed during startup from the refueling outage.
On April 26, 1982, the licensee re-viewed logs and data sheets for the period of March 26, 1982 through April 5,1982 and determined that, although the requirements in the T.S. for Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) instrumentation had been met, the requirements for Reactor Protection System (RPS) instrumentation had not been met.
The licensee had reviewed the T.S. requirements for level instrumentation and was following the actions specified in Table 3.2.B for inoperable ECCS instru-mentation.
T.S. Table 3.2.B, Note 1, requires that the reactor be placed in the Cold Shutdown Condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of trip system inoperability.
However, the licensee inadvertently failed to recognize that the actions speci-fied in Table 3.1.1, Note 1. A, required insertion of control rods within four hours.
The RPS low water level trip would have functioned but the required redundancy was not met during periods when the 'A' side instrumentation rack was out of service.
On March 29, 1982 and April 5,1982, the actions required by T.S. Table 3.1.1 Note 1. A to initiate and complete insertion of operable rods within four hours, were not performed. This is a violation (50-293/82-12-01).
Although the problem is not currently evident, the exact cause of the level divergency of the ' A' side instruments has not been determined. On April 19, 1982, during an Operations Review Committee (CRC) meeting, the licensee approved proccdure TP 82-34, " Sensing Line Air Pocket Testing". The purpose of this procedure was to provide instructions to isolate and test sensing line instru-mentation for possible air entrapment. The inspector attended this ORC meeting and reviewed TP 82-34. The inspector questioned the licensee concerning the necessity of performing this test during periods when the instrumentation was
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required, and voluntary entering the action statements of the T.S.
Following this discussion, the Nuclear Operations Manager required an entry be made in l
the Watch Engineer's Instruction Log which prohibited performance of TP 82-34 without his permission.
This item remains open pending a review of the licensee's actions to preclude l
recurrence of the level divergency during system heatup and pressurization.
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Operational Safety Verification
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A.
Scope and Acceptance Criteria The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed selected logs and records, and held discussions with control room operators. The in-spector reviewed the operability (including valve positions) of the Emergency Diesel Generator and Nitrogen Supply System. Tours of the turbine building, intake structure, reactor building, radwaste area, station yard, switchgear rooms, cable spreading room, emergency diesel generator rooms, auxilliary bay, CAS, SAS, and control room (daily) were conducted. The inspectors observations included a review of equipment conditions, control room annunciators, potential fire hazards, physical security, housekeeping, radiological controls, equipment control (tagging), and gaseous release rates from the station.
The inspector reviewed records of a radioactive liquid discharge on April 28, 1982, and sampling of the Standby Liquid Control System boron concentration on April 27, 1982.
The inspector observed shift turnover in the control room on April 7, 1982, and attended an Onsite Review Committee Meeting on April 19, 1982.
These reviews were performed in order to verify conformance with the facility Technical Specifications and the licensee's procedures.
B.
Findings (1) On April 7,1982, the inspector reviewed the Watch Engineers' Tag Log index and noted that isolation tagging for several components were listed as active when the components were in operation.
Equipment involved included ventilation fans, feed pumps, residual heat removal pumps and traversing in-core probe (TIP) machines. The in-spector verified that the appropriate isolation tagging had been re-moved prior to system operation, as required, and that the index was subsequently updated for these components.
No violations were identified.
A review of the timelines of updating the tag log index will be performed during future routine inspections of the facility.
(2)
On April 7, 1982, the inspector observed a reactor building ventilation system exhaust fan disassembled for investigation of bearing noise.
The maintenance request, MR 82-24-24, did not reference a radiation work permit (RWP) number. The operating supervisor stated that a radiation survey performed prior to work indicated no need for an RWP.
The inspector questioned the licensee health physics representative concerning verification of acceptable airborne activity and contamina-tion levels. Survey results on April 7,1982 indicated acceptable
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The inspector had no further question.
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(3) On April 13, 1982, the inspector reviewed implementation of RWP 82-852 and extended RWP 82-El.
RWP 82-852 was issued on April 10, 1982 for I&C personnel to perform required surveillance tests on instruments in the TIP room. The inspector noted that the RWP required a full face respirator but that_ the sign-in sheet did not indicate that one was worn.
Following discussions with the health physics supervisor, the inspector-detennined that a health physics technician monitor %g the work had authorized the change in respirator equipment (as aliowed by station procedures) but had not noted this fact on the RWP.
The inspector reviewed the postings and records of recent entries into the ' A' Residual Heat Removal room and steam tunnel under RWP 82-El. An entry was made on April 12, 1982, but the most recent survey map posted was dated March 8, 1982. Station procedures re-quire monthly surveys for entry to areas covered. by an extended RWP.
Subsequently, the inspector determined that the only entry made to this area was by a health physics technician for the purpose of performing a survey. The inspector verified that this entry was authorized by station procedures ard had no further questions.
Although no violations were identified, the inspector questioned the licensee health physics supervisor concerning the method of periodically reviewing areas of the plant for required extended RWP posting. On April 13, 1982, a memo was issued to all health physics technicians designating personnel responsibilities for specific areas of the station.
Reviews of radiological controls associated with extended RWP's will be performed during future routine inspections of the facility.
(4) At about 1:00 pm, on April 29,1982, the inspector observed an un-restrained high pressure nitrogen gas cylinder outside the turbine building in front of the station transformers.
After removal of the cylinder to the outside storage rack, the inspector determined that the cylinder was empty. However, upon review of about 125 other high pressure cylinders in the storage rack, the inspector questioned the licensee concerning the method of segregation and restraint of the cylinders and storage of wooden material in close proximity.
The licensee immediately assigned personnel to improve storage condi-tions. Actions were completed at 6:30 pm on April 29, 1982.
On April 30, 1982, the inspector met with senior licensee management personnel to discuss plans for future control of high pressure gas cylinders and other hazardous material at the station.
The licensee management considered the control of hazardous material a priority issue requiring additional support and authorized approval for the installation of a new high pressure gas cylinder storage facilit.
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No violations were identified. The storage of hazardous material will continue to be reviewed during routine inspections.
(5) At 9:30 am on May 5, 1982, the inspector noted that the control room was unusually warm.
A wall thermometer indicated 820F. The inspector determined that the two control room air conditioning units (V-RC-101A,B) were out of service for component repairs. The FSAR (Amend-ment 18, Part II, Item 7.1.7) states that all control room instrumentation is operable up to 1200F, and is not dependent on normal station air con-ditioning.
The inspector verified that the two parallel high efficiency filter trains in the Control Room Environmental system were operable as required by Technical Specifications, and that the cooling capability was restored on May 6, 1982.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
4.
Followup on Plant Events / Trips A.
At 1:10 pm on April 8,1982, the reactor tripped from 20%
power due to high reactor pressure.
Prior to the trip, the ma',n turbine generator was disconnected from the grid and pressure was controlled with the Bypass Valves (BPV). Testing of the Stop Valves (SV) and Control Valves (CV) was in progress. The BPV's shut causing reactor coolant system pressure
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to increase to the trip setpoint.
The inspector reviewed control room logs, strip charts, and dis-l cussed the event with licensee personnel. The cause of the BPV's closing l
was determined to be an error in the test method being conducted under the direction of vendor representatives. Shutdown and recovery procedures were followed, and the reactor brought critical at 10:12 pm on April 8,1982.
l The inspector noted that following the reactor trip, a high reactor water level isolation condition existed and that the operator had manually operated the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system to control reactor pressure and prevent the safety-relief valves from operating. The inspector I
questioned the licensee concerning operation of tho RCIC system with a high water level. turbine trip signal present.
The design of the RCIC system is such that the turbine will start with a trip signal present but will not subsequently trip. This is because oil pressure will not build up to overcome the trip throttle valve latch.
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Procedure 2.2.22, RCIC, Revision 12, cautions the operator not to start i
the RCIC turbine manually (for injection into the vessel) with a trip signal present. The manual operation of the RCIC turbine following this scram was performed in accordance with Procedure 8.5.5.1 in the test recirculation
mode without injection into the vessel.
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Following discussions with the inspector, the licensee initiated a review of normal operation and test procedures to determine whether additional clari-fications should be made for operation of the RCIC and HPCI system for pressure control especially at low speeds.
No violations were identified.
B.
Turbine Trip. At 2:24 pm on April 9,1982, the main turbine tripped from 23% power.
The turbine bypass valves operated as designed and the reactor ramained at power.
The cause of the trip was a high level in the 'B' Moisture Separator.
The backup Moisture Separator level control dump valve (3005) was in service due to maintenance on the 'B' feedwater heater block valve motor. The dump valve was not operating properly because of a blockage in the instrument air line.
The air line was blown down and the high level condition cleared.
The turbine was placed on the grid at 3:20 pm the same day.
No violations were identified.
C.
Fire in Parking Lot. At 10:00 pm on April 15, 1982, station security personnel observed a fire involving two parked trucks in the contractor's parking lot outside the protected area but on the licensee's property. The local fire departmant was called and responded within five minutes. The fire was out at 10:10 pm.
The inspector observed the actions of the licensee, noted that no plant equipment was damaged, and that station fire procedures were followed.
The two trucks were owned by a local construction company and used for winter sanding of plant roadways. The cause of the fire was taken under investigation by the local Plymouth authorities.
l No violations were identified.
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D.
' A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG).
At 4:00 am on April 30, 1982, the
' A' EDG experienced an automatic shutdown following an inadvertent start.
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The inspector verified that alternative testing was performed as required l
by the Technical Specification and that a faulty electronic tachometer unit
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was repaired and the EDG subsequently tested satisfactorily.
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The inspector reviewed the test procedure being used during the inadvertent start and discussed the event with Instrument and Control (I&C) personnel
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performing the test.
Procedure No. 8.M.2-2.10.1.4 " Core Spray System Logic System A Functional Test", Revision 5 uses a temporary test switch and per-manent equipment to simulate an initiation of the 'A' Core Spray Logic.
The 'A' EDG is not intended to be started during this test because by having the portable test switch installed into a test jack, a blocking relay is energized preventing the EDG start.
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The licensee stated that the EDG started when the test plug was being removed from the jack at tne completion of the tests. The blocking relay was deenergized prior to the " initiation" signal (developed by the last specified position of the test switch) being deenergized.
The licensee submitted a procedure change notice to specify positioning the test switch to the "off" position prior to removal of the test plug.
The inspector determined that the procedure had been followed as specified and had no further questions. No violations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Activities A.
Scope and Acceptance Criteria The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions associated with surveillance testing in order to verify that the testing was performed in accordance with approved station procedures and the facility Technical Specifications (T.S.).
Portions of the following tests were reviewed:
- post repair operability testing of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
discharge-to-radwaste isolation valve (1001-21) on April 7, 1982 alternative testing on April 8,1982 prior to removing the 'B' Core
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Spray system from service to repair the recirculation test valve (1400-48)
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- routine testing of MSIV's on April 14, 1982 f
- redundant equipment testing for removal of the 'A' RHR system from service on April 21, 1982 for torque switch inspection
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- redundant equipment testing for removal of the 'B' RHR system from service on April 22, 1982 for torque switch inspection redundant equipment testing on April 22 and 23, 1982 for sequential
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removal of the High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isola-tion Cooling systems from service for torque switch inspection.
- testing of redundant equipment on April 27, 1982 prior to removal of the ' A' Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water heat exchanger from service for inspection.
- routine jet pump operability tests on April 27, 1982
- routine Core Spray system logic tests on April 30, 1982 l
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- redundant equipment testing for the inoperable ' A' EDG on April 30, 1982, and
- routine turbine control valve closure calibration on May 6,1982.
The. inspector also compared the licensee's procedures for calibrating Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) setpoints and independently calculated reactor power using the licensee's procedure for a heat balance.
B.
Findings (1) On April 12, 1982, with the reactor at about 50% power, the inspector independently calculated core thermal power using installed instru-mentation and the licensee's procedure 9.3 " Core Thennal Power Evalua-tion", Revision 7.
The inspector's calculated power agreed with the value specified by the process computer within about 1.5%.
The inspector noted that the licensee had performed a heat balance calculation on April 11, 1982 and had substituted a value for the
'3' feedwater train temperature because of an out of service instru-ment (34968). The inspector verified that M.R. No. 82-6-9 had been issued for repairs, and that the licensee had chosen a value of feedwater temperature from a redundant temperature element (3496A).
The inspector questioned the licensee concerning the lack of guidance in procedure 9.3 for value substitution. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments and stated that procedure 9.3 would be reviewed and revised appropriately _to provide this guidance. The licensee's review of procedure 9.3 will be followed in a future inspection (50-293/82-12-02).
(2) The inspector noted that the station procedures for ATWS instrument calibration (8.M.1-29 Revision 5, and 8.M.1-30 Revision 0) do not include a lower bound for the high pressure trip setting.
T.S. 3.2.G specifies the high reactor dome pressure setting to be 1175 1 15 psig.
The station procedures specify the trip setting to be less than or equal to 1203.65 psig (1190 psig plus a correction factor).
The inspector reviewed completed test data and verified that the high pressure trip has been set in accordance with T.S. 3.2.G.
Following discussions with the inspector, + % licensee imediately initiated a change to procedures 3.M.1-29 and 3.M.1-30 tc include this lower bound. The inspector had no further questions at this time; however, the review of procedures for technical adequacy will continue to be reviewed during future routine inspections of the facility.
No violations were identified during this review.
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Maintenance Activities The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions associated with maintenance activities in order to verify that they were conducted in accordance with station procedures and the facility Technical Specifications. The inspector verified for selected items that the activity was properly authorized and that the appropriate radiological controls, equipment control tagging, and fire protection were being implemented.
The items / documents reviewed included the following:
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M.R. 82-29-23,
'A' RBCCW heat exchanger salt water inspection
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M.R. 82-24-24, fan VEX 203A - investigation of noise
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M.R. 82-1322, 'A' EDG inoperable
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M.R. 82-1230, 'B' Core Spray M0V 1400-4B inoperable
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M.R. 82-1224, torque switch inspection
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M.R. 82-1231, MOV 1001-21 red light indication The inspector also toured the condenser bay with the on-shift Watch Engineer on April 15, 1982 to observe conditions of feed and condensate piping under pressure, and followed the licensee's actions to repair packing and flange leaks.
No violations were identified.
7.
Response to Order for Modification of License / Performance Improvement Program Boston Edison Company responsed to the NRC's Order (dated January 18, 1982 and revised on February 16,1982) by submitting a Performance Improvement Program dated March 18, 1982, which describes an 18-24 month program for im-provements in management and oversight. The NRC, Region I tentative acceptance of this program (subject to resolution of several concerns) is described in a lettcr from the NRC to BECo. dated April 23, 1982.
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selected milestones planned for completion in April, 1982. These items are described btlow:
Item numbers refer to those described in the licensee's Performance Improvement Program dated March 18, 1982.
I.l.2 Management Analysis Co. (MAC) - complete diagnostic review; The MAC diagnostic review has been completed with a report to be issued to the (utility) PEER Review Group on April 30, 1982.
I.2.4 PEER Review Group - review preliminary MAC diagnostic results; The PEER Review Group has reviewed the MAC diagnostic working papers, and provided written comments during a meeting held on April 21, 1982.
A meeting is planned for mid-May,1982 to discuss the MAC report and provide comments on the development of an Action Plan.
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III.l.A.1.1 Initiate development of an NRC commitment data base and reporting format; The development of a data base has been initiated. On April 9,1982, the Nuclear Operation Support Department submitted the appropriate portions to the Operations, (NOD) Operations Support (NOSD), Quality Assurance (QAD), and Engineering (NED)
Department Managers, for their review. A status reporting format has been intitated which will include periodic reports to the Senior Vice President.
The inspector determined that the licensee has completed the milestones planned for completion in April,1982 and had no further questions. The inspector will continue to review licensee progress during routine inspections.
8.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
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