IR 05000293/1979006
| ML19208B072 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 06/14/1979 |
| From: | Architzel R, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19208B066 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-79-06, 50-293-79-6, NUDOCS 7909190019 | |
| Download: ML19208B072 (12) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 79-06 Docket No. 50-293 License No. DPR-35 Priority:
Category:
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Licensee:
Boston Edison Company M/C Nuclear 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Facility Name: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection at:
Plymouth, Massachusetts Inspection conducted: April 10-i3,1979 Inspector:
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/I R. Architze 36r Inspecthe date signed Approved by: YARAc)
C /I+f79 E. C. MdCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor date signed Projects Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on April 10-13,1979 (Report 50-293/79-06)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by one NRC regional based inspector (33 hours3.819444e-4 days <br />0.00917 hours <br />5.456349e-5 weeks <br />1.25565e-5 months <br />) of review committee activities, licensee action on previous inspection findings, non routine event report review, and IE Circulars.
The inspection conmenced during off normal hours (6:00 a.m., April 9,1979). A facility tour was conducted.
Noncompliances:
None in 3 areas, one in the other (Deficiency -
Failure to have documentation supporting the performance of an operability retest, Paragraph 2).
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-2-DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The following technical and supervisory level personnel were
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contacted:
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G. Anderson, Watch Engineer H. Balfour, Methods Training and Compliance Group Leader E. Cobb, Chief Operating Engineer J. Dolan, Maintenance Staff Engineer J. Fulton, Senior Plant Engineer
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Mathis, Senior Plant Engineer
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McGuire, Station Manager R. Sevigny, Chief Maintenance Engineer
- P. Smith, I&C Engineer K. Taylor, Watch Engineer C. Vantrease, Chief Technical Engineer
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
Other licensee employees were also interviewed.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findir3s (Closed) Noncompliance (79-01-01):
Failure to Lock Valves.
The inspector verified the licensee's actions as stated in a letter dated February 20, 1979. The ORC reviewed this item in meeting 79-07 (February 7, 1979).
The inspector reviewed revised procedures (8.5.3.2, Salt Service Water Pump Operability, Revision 8, February 21, 1979; and 8.5.3.1., RBCCW Pump Operability; Revision 9, February 21, 1979) requiring the verification of valve restoration to locked status following the attrveillance test.
(Closed) Noncompliance (79-01-02): Watch Engineer's Red Tag Not Placed.
The Red Tag on the Radioactive Uaste compactor was placed on the day of discovery (January 5, 1979).
The licensee responded to this item in a letter dated February 20, 1979.
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-3-The inspector reviewed the minutes of ORC meeting 79-07 (February 7, 1979) documenting review of this item and entries in the Watch Engineer's Tag Log Book documenting performance of Tag audits on February 25, March 11 and 25, and April 1,1979. This frequency is greater than the six months comitted to in the licensee's response.
(Closed) Noncompliance (79-01-03):
Reactor Water Cleanup System Valve Blocked.
This item was reviewed by the ORC in meeting 79-02 (January 11,1978) and responded to in a letter dated February 20, 1979.
Reactor Startup and Recovery from Scram Procedures were revised on January 11, 1979 to allow placing this block to prevent valve cycling provided the valve is caution tagged and placement of the block is entered in the Lifted Wire and Jumper Log Books.
-(Change) Unresolved Item (79-04-03):
Core Spray Pump Operability Retest.
As stated in NRC inspection report 293/79-04 the acceptance criteria for Core Spray Pump P-215A (observed 3575 gpm, 262 psig, required > 3600 gpm, > 252 psig) had not been satisfied during the per-formance of surveillance testing (Procedure 8.5.1.1.) on September 7, 1978.
The licensee stated that a retest in fact was run to verify pump operability, and the Watch Engineer on duty confimed that the retest was run, however, no documentation could be found supporting these statements. The inspector stated that lack of documentation of the retest was in noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion XI requiring documentation and evaluation of surveillance test results.
This unresolved item was changed to an item of non-compliance (293/79-04-03).
(Closed) Followup Item (78-22-02):
Review A0G Loop Seal Operation.
The loop seal of concern is located in the A0G system downstream of the recombiners, a flow path in which a normally nonexplosive mix-ture of gases exist.
The loop seal drains to either a Rad Waste Tank or to an A0G building sump. A seal tank is provided with level instrumentation to alert the operators of a continuous leakage con-dition.
This instrumentation is consistant with NRC-00R's position regarding offgas stream potential openings in portions of the offgas system where normally explosive mixtures do not exist.
3.
Operations Review Comittee (0RC)
a.
A review was conducted to determine whether the ORC performed in conformance with the requirements of the facility Technical Specifications.
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-4-The following meeting minutes were reviewed:
78-21 (4/28/78) to 78-59 (12/27/78), and 79-01 (1/3/79)
to 79-17 (3/30/79).
Results of the review showed that meetings were conducted during the previous year at the frequency required by the Technical Specifications and meeting membership satisfied the quorum requirements.
Proposed Technical Specification changes, violations of
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Technical Specifications identified in NRC inspection reports, facility operations, facility changes, and Licensee Event Reports were reviewed by the ORC as required.
The following items were verified to have been reviewed (ORC Meeting reviewed in parenthesis).
LERs 78-53 (78-56), 78-59 (78-57), 78-55 (79-01),
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78-56 (79-03), 78-57 (79-05).
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Violations of Technical Specifications Identified in NRC Inspections (Inspection containing noncompliance, (Meeting (s) Reviewed)):
78-16, 3 Infractions (78-37), 78-18, 1 Infraction (78-40,43),78-19,1 Deficiency (78-40, 43), 78-20, 1 Infraction (78-40, 43)
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Modifications to Plant Systems:
(1) PDCR 78-25B, In Plant Security Fencing, ORC Meeting 78-48.
(2) PDCR 78-42, Additional ARMS for Rad Waste Area, ORC Meeting 78-52.
(3)
PDCR 78-43, Raise Valve Operators in HPCI Quadrant, ORC Meeting 78-52.
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-5-Proposed License, T.S. changes:
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(1) Proposed change to License DPR-35, paragraphs 2.B, C and D., reviewed in ORC Meeting 78-45, September 2, 1978.
(2) Proposed T.S. changes to previous submittal (10 CFR 50, Appendix I, Radiological Effluents),
reviewed in ORC Meeting 79-09, February 16, 1979.
(.3) FSAR Amendment 38 (Revision 1 to FSAR Appendix N, Emergency Plan), reviewed in ORC Meeting 78-58,
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December 15, 1978.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
b.
The inspector reviewed the following administrative procedures governing the ORC activities and responsibilities to ensure that the procedures and changes were consistent with T.S. requirements.
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PNPS Procedure 1.1.1, Station Organization and Responsi-bilities, Revision 4 dated December 27,.1978.
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PNPS Procedure 1.2.1, Operating Review Committee, Revision 8 dated December 29, 1978.
The inspector noted that procedure 1.1.1 designates the PNPS Manager as a Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee (NSRAC)
member and the Methods, Training and Compliance Group Leader as an NSRAC alternate.
Technical Specifications require that NSRAC members be appointed by the Vice President, Nuclear and that alternates be appointed by the NSRAC Chairman.
In addition, several recent organizational changes have not been incorporated into procedure 1.1.1, for example, the position of Chief Radiological Engineer.
This item is unresolved (79-06-01) pending revision of procedure 1.1.1 to reflect actual station organization and T.S. requirements.
c.
The inspector reviewed the content of the meeting minutes referenced in paragraph 3.a above on a sampling basis.
The minutes general format was:
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Review of Deficiency Reports
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Facility Operations NRC Correspondence
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LERs
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Procedures
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Other items on a case basis Not all of the above listed items were reviewed in every meeting.
The inspector attended an ORC Meeting conducted on April 12, 1979. NRC correspondence and facility operations were reviewed. During the review of meeting minutes two un-resolved items were identified as described in paragraphs 3.d and e below.
d.
During a review of the minutes for Meeting No. 78-39 (August 17, 1978) the inspector noted the ORC review of a Quality Assurance Deficiency (QAD) Report No. 395.
This QAD described an occurrence of a missed surveillance test, specifically, the requirement (Technical Specification Table 4.1.2) to perform response time tests of the reactor pro-tection system once per operating cycle.
The tests had not been conducted since November, 1975.
They were satisfactorily performed in June of 1978 follow-ing discovery. Corrective action in addition to performing the test included dispositioning of surveillance schedules for I&C surveillances through the Compliance Engineer in the future. No Licensee Event Report (LER) had been submitted for this missed surveillance test.
The inspector noted that numerous other reviewed items had been correctly evaluated for reportability during the twelve months of records reviewed and stated that this appeared to be an isolated case.
The licensee stated that an LER would be submitted describing the missed surveillance.
This item is unresolved pending NRC receipt and evaluation of the LER (79-06-02).
e.
A review of ORC Meeting No. 78-43 (September 20, 1978)
documented ORC review of operation with a slow opening time for the CARD 0X system selecto valve.
A fire watch was
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-7-stationed and the valve repaired within one day as allowed per T.S. 3.12.D.b.
During a review of this issue the inspector noted that the licensee's T.S. were different than the inspector's copy of T.S.
Specifically, there was a typographical error in the word "or" in specification 3.12.D.b and one sentence for T.S. 4.12.c.3 was on page 206 d for the licensee and 206 c for the inspector.
Although these inconsistencies were not of themselves of concern, the method of retyping and resetting T.S. which are basically provided in the proper format for the licensee is of concern in that future changes to the T.S. may result in deletions of requirements.
This item is unresolved pending discussions and evaluation of the T.S. with the Licensing staff (79-06-03).
4.
IE Circular Review The following IE Circulars were reviewed on site to determine that the circular was received by licensee management, a review for applicability was performed, and that further action taken or planned was appropriate.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
Circular 77-12, Dropped Fuel Assemblies, assigned for review September 23, 1979 and incorporated in Station Operator Training.
Circular 77-13, Safety Signals Negated During Testing, assigned for review October 6, 1977.
Reviews performed by I&C personnel, Performance Engineers, and the Operations Staff.
Circular 78-09, Arcing of General Electric Company Nema Size 2 Contactors.
This circular was reviewed by the ORC in mceting 78-31 (June 22, 1978) and responsibility for station checks assigned to the Chief Maintenance Engineer (CME).
Completion of this review was documented via a memorandum dated December 21, 1978, stating that contactors with oversized tip supports are not installed at PNPS.
Circular 78-16, Limitorque Valve Actuators.
This circular was reviewed by the ORC in meeting 78-37 and assigned for station checks by the CME.
A review indicated (memorandum dated August 20, 1978) that the affected valves are installed at PNPS, however, no further action has been taken.
The licensee stated that the recommendations of the circular would be evaluated.
This circular remains open pending further action by the licensee and NRC review.
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Facility Tours The inspector comenced the inspection during off normal hours (6:00a.m., April 10, 1979).
The reactor was operating at full power (1998 MWth) at this time.
The inspector discussed control room annunciators with the licensed staff.
The annunciators included the following.
CRD Drive Water Filter Differential Pressure High: The
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Watch Engineer said that this condition had been checked and that the differential pressure was slightly above the 10 psid set point.
Filter changeout was delayed until the next shift due to the need for Health Physics coverage.
Suppression Chamber Low Water Level:
Actual level was-5",
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the set point is -4".
The licensee is required to operate at reduced torus water levels as a part of the STP (Short Term Program) for BWR MK 1 Containments.
The level switch must be cut out and repositioned to an acceptable level band during the next scheduled refueling outage.
TMTs. item will be followed in future NRC inspections '(79-06-04).
Auto Blowdown Permissive, RHR/CS Pump Running':
This annunciator
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indicates that a low pressure cooling system is available to allow the ADS to actuate following an initiating signal.
RHR A pump was being operated in the torus cleanup mode via the fuel pool demineralizers in preparation for the next scheduled refueling outage (January, 1979).
RHR Shutdown Cooling High Pressure A and B:
This is a normal
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alarm at power blocking the LPCI injection valves from opening due to high reactor pressure.
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A Standby Gas Treatment System Running: The licensee operates the plant with the 2" torus purge valves open and runs the SBGTS during periods of containment purging.
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High Radiation, Rad Waste Shipping Area Lock: The operators stated that this was due to the presence of a loaded rad waste shipping cask, and that the area was locked as a High Radiation Area.
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CRD High Temperature (Alarm Card Pulled):
A maintenance request had been submitted to correct the alarm condition (No. 78-1676).
The licensee stated that this alarm came off a multipoint point recorder and that if any CRD module o, (1 (o i9 u
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_g-had a high temperature the alarm would come in.
Discussion with the COE demonstrated that he was knowledgeable of the temperature trends for the modules, however, these were only taken every several months.
Corrective action is to replace CRDs with leaking seals during the 1980 refuel outage.
In the interim, the licensee stated that the CRD control room temperature alarm would be made operational by jumpering the existing alarming inputs in order to alert the operators of a new alarm condition in another module.
Operability of this alarm is unresolved (79-06-04) and will be reinspected during a future NRC inspection.
Additional tours were conducted during the course of the inspection, including accessible portions of the Reactor and Turbine buildings and Rad Waste Area.
Areas examined included housekeeping, fire and safety hazards and radiological controls.
6.
Non Routine Event Review The inspector performed an onsite review of selected Licensee Event Reports (LERs) to verify ".he following:
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The report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specifications;
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Events are accurately reported as to safety significance and actual occurrence of events; That corrective action taken was as stated in the report; and,
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That operations subsequent to the event were not in violation of regulatory or license requirements.
The following i.ERs were reviewed:
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78-057/03L, dated January 22, 1979.
On December 30, 1978, during HPCI operation in full flow test the turbine tripped due to loss of lubrication oil.
Investigation revealed that a discharge pressure gauge fitting had come loose and resulted in oil being pumped out the fitting.
Al ternate systems were tested as required.
The fitting was reconnected and HPCI tested satisfactorily.
The turbine was run a total of seven times for periods ranging from 20 to 45 minutes for the next several days without a recurrence.
The ORC reviewed this Failure and Malfunction (F&M) No.78-114 in Meeting 79-01 on January 1, 1979.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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79-001/03L, dated February 1, 1979, and 79-009/03L, dated
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March 13, 1979.
Reactor Building Vent Process Radiation Monitor Pump Inoperable, These LERs describe operations on January 4, 1979, when the fuse for the sample purnp blew three times and on February 18, 1979, when the fuse blew once. On the January 4 occurrences, the pump was determined to be rotating freely, on February 18, the pump was bound.
Licensee action in the second case involves quickly replacing these pumps. The fuse sizes were not increased.
The ORC reviewed these items in meetings 79-02 (January 11,1979)
and 79-11 (March 1, 1979).
The inspector questioned the licensee concerning any planned actions as a result of the recurring failures of these sample pumps.
The licensee stated that a preventive maintenance program has been initiated to change the operating pump on a monthly basis with a rebuilt pump and quick disconnects have-been installed.
The licensee stated that a PDCR may be initiated to upgrade the quality of the PRM sample pump.
No unacceptable condi-tions were identified.
79-008/03L, dated February 23, 1979.
This LER described
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a surveillance test initiation of the HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) System on February 14, 1979, and tripping of the turbine.
During investigation of the trip, it was discovered that the lower head gasket of ne gland seal condensor had ruptured.
Operability of the backup systems was demenstrated.
Repairs were completed and HPCI tested satisfactorily returned to serv':e.
The ORC reviewed F&M Report No. 79-13 in meeting 79-0J (February 14,1979).
During review of this LER the inspector questioned why rupturing the gland seal condensor gasket would trip the HPCI turbine.
Further investigation revealed that this would not trip the turbine, and in addition, a maintenance request (Nc.79-278)
had been issued on February 14, to investigate why the Auxiliary Oil Pump had tripped before the HPCI turbine was up to speed.
The inspector stated that an update LER would be reouired addressing the correct cause of inoperability of the HPCI System on February 14, 1979.
This LER remains open.
79-010/03L, dated March 13, 1979.
This LER described a slow
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scram time for CRD 46-31 on March 4, 1979.
The LER stated that investigation revealed a sticky ASCO solenoid pilot valve delaying the venting of the scram valves.
The inspector reviewed Maintenance Request 79-400 completed on March 6, 1979.
This MR indicated that the reason for failure of the solenoid valve was exhaust port blockage by fragments of a
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nylon spring loaded seat in the solenoid's core assembly.
The inspector requested that the licensee provide an update LER stating the exact cause of the slow scram time due to other recent problems with ASCO solenoid valves (Refer to IEB 78-14; Deterioration of BONA-N COMP 0NENTS IN ASCO SOLEN 0IDVALVES).
This LER remains open.
7.
NRC in Office Review a.
NRC:
RI in office review of the following LERs has been completed:
LER Dated Subject 79-002/03L February 6, 1979 RBV-PRM Low Flow 79-005/03L February 20, 1979 ADS Timer Setpoint Drift 79-006/03L February 20, 1979 High Reactor Water Conduc vity 79-011/03L March 26, 1979 Fire Water Storage Tanks Level LER 79-011 concerned the stored volume of the Fire Water storage tanks.
The surveillance being performed did not insure that the automatic fill valves maintained tank level at greater than 240,000 gallons.
The inspector called the licensee to request clarification of the underlying cause of the low level (calibration of the automatic fill set point).
In addition, certain editorial errors were noted in the LER.
The licensee stated that a corrected LER would be submitted.
The corrected LER (79-011/99L-1) was received on April 16, 1979.
The inspector had no further questions regarding this LER.
b.
NRC:
RI in office review of the following reports has been completed with no unacceptable cond1Jons identified:
February,1979, Monthly Report (BECo letter No. 79-54,
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dated March 6, 1979)
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March,1979, Monthly Report (BECo letter No. 79-70, dated April 11,1979)
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Unresolved Item An item about which more information is required to determine acceptability is considered unresolved.
Paragraph 5 contains an unresolved item.
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Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspection, the intocetor held a meeting (see Paragraph 1 for attendees) to discuss the inspection scope s and findings. The items of nonc6:npliance and unresolved item were identified.
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