IR 05000293/1979022
| ML19294B418 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 01/10/1980 |
| From: | Kehoe D, Martin T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19294B415 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-79-22, NUDOCS 8002280326 | |
| Download: ML19294B418 (4) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-293/79 '/'>
Docket No. 50-293 License No. DPR-35 Priority
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Category C
Licensee: Boston Edison Comoany M/C Nuclear 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Facility Name: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection at: Plymouth, Massachusetts Inspection condu ted: December 13 14, 1979
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Inspectors:
c D. Kehoe, Reactor Inspector date signed date signed
,j date signed rF/44M#
///rO Approved by:
T. Mart,in, Chief, Reactor Projects Section date signed
- 3,10&NS'Iranch Insoection Summary:
Inspection on December 13-14, 1979 (Recort No. 50-293/79-22)
Areas Inspected:
Special, unannounced inspection by a regional based inspector of the December 11, 1979 inadvertent lift of a spent fuel assembly. Facility tours were conducted.
The inspection involved 19 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC regional based inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
8002280 324
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted P. McGuire, Station Manager
- R. Machon, Assistant Station Manager C. Mathis, Methods Training and Compliance Group Leader M. Hensch, Chief Radiologio! Engineer R. Trudeau, Health Physics Engineer E. Hegerich, QC Engineer J. McEacheon, Security Supervisor C. Vantrease, Chief Technical Engineer
- denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Unplanned Lift of Spent Fuel Cell On December 11, the licensee informed NRC Region I that a spent fuel assembly had been accidentally lifted from its normal storage location.
During this inspection, the inspector determined that the following had occurred.
At 5:30 a.m. on December 11, 197.9. the licensee had just completed trans-ferring a new unirradiated fuel' assembly to its pre-refueling location in the spent fuel pool at location X-18.
As soon as it was verified that the auxiliary hook had disengaged from the new fuel assembly, the QC Engineer supervising the movement left the area to update the tag board and the tag man proceeded to wipe down the tag line.
This left no one in a position to monitor the auxiliary hook.
Unknown to the crew, the auxiliary hook had swung over and wedged itself between the bale handle and fuel assembly corner pin of spent fuel assembly 279 at location Y-13.
As the hook was being lifted, spent fuel assembly Y-13 was also being lifted from its normal storage location in the spent fuel pool.
This operation continued until the refueling floor high radiation area monitor alarmed (setpoint is 20 mr/hr).
At this point, the crane operator realized what had occurred and reinserted the assembly until the alarm cleared.
It was estimated that only the upper tie plate of the assembly broke the surface of the water.
The assembly remained in this position, suspended over the spent fuel racks, for about two hours while a course of action was being discussed.
At approximately 7:30 a.m., it was decided that to move the assembly with the present friction fit engagement presented too high a risk of dropping the assembly.
Therefore, it was decided to engage the bale handle of the assembly with the auxiliary hoist on the refueling bridge and once this hoist held the full weight of the assemt..y, the auxiliary hook would be freed from its friction fit.
This was accomplished and the assembly was placed in storage location FF-32 using the hoist on the refueling bridg Subsequent to this operation, the pocket dosimetry of personnel involved indicated that there was no discernible exposure as a result of the event.
All exposures were in the range expected for work on the refueling floor.
As a result of this event, the following administrative controls were added to prevent recurrence.
Prior to transferring channeled fuel from the inspection stand to the
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fuel pool the following steps shall be taken:
a.
The fuel orientation map shall be scanned to determine which fuei assemblies (both new fuel and irradiated assemblies) are close to the location specified on the transfer form.
b.
The fuel pool shall then be scanned to verify that the indicated assemblies are as identified on fuel orientation map.
c.
Based on a. and b. the direction in which the hook will be unlatched shall be determined in order to minimize the hook from engaging another fuel assembly when the hook swings free.
When hook is unD t8 ed, notch signals only shall be used until the
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hook, crane cable, and tag line are in equilibrium and the hook is free of all other components or structures.
The tagman's only duty while the crane is operating the hook is to
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watch the hook.
The inspector monitored the movement of fuel with the above administrative controls implemented and noted that it appeared these controls would prevent a recurrence of this type. The inspector had no further questions.
3.
Prompt Reporting During the inspector's review of the unplanned lift of a spent fuel assembly the inspector noted that some of the infonnation was not consistant with the information supplied by the Station Manager during the telephonic prompt report.
The licensee acknowledged the inspectors comment and stated that the call dealt with preliminary information and that the more detailed and accurate information resulted from a critique which was held subsequent to the telephone call.
The inspector impressed on the licensee the need for accurate information and prompt updates of changes and/or corrections.
The licensee stated that their prompt reporting procedure and policies would be reviewed to ensure that the NRC is kept appraised of any changes or corrections.
The inspector had no further question.
4.
Facility Tour Facility tours were conducted during the course of the inspection on December 13-14, 1979.
These tours included the Control Room, various levels of the Reactor Building, and various areas within the protected area.
Facility conditions were checked for general housekeeping, fire and safety hazards, radiation areas access, and posting.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representative (denoted in Paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on December 14, 1979.
The inspector summarized the purpose, scope, and findings of the inspection.
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