IR 05000293/1979018
| ML19257A702 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 10/11/1979 |
| From: | Architzel R, Mccabe E, Mcnatt T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19257A696 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-79-18, NUDOCS 8001070245 | |
| Download: ML19257A702 (8) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION I
Report No.
79-18 Docket No.
50-293 License No.
DPR-35 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Boston Edison Company 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts Facility Name:
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At:
Boston and Plymouth, fiassachusetts Inspection Conducted:
September 10-13, 1979
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Inspectors:
/ [dP C R.'Architzel, Reaciok Inspector date V
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Cfh'f79 T. 'McN4t'/, ReactorfInspector
' date date Approved by:
f,0. d M h.
/o l a i I-71 E. C. McCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects date Section No. 2 Inspection Summary:
Inspection on September 10-13, 1979 (Report No. 50-293/79-18)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by two regional based inspec-tors (46 hours5.324074e-4 days <br />0.0128 hours <br />7.60582e-5 weeks <br />1.7503e-5 months <br /> onsite, 4 at the corporate offices) of licensee action on previous inspection findings; plant operations; IE bulletin and circular review; and Licensee Event Report review.
Facility tours were conducted.
Noncortpliances:
None were identified in three areas; one apparent item of noncompliance (Infrac-tion - vital area access control; paragraph 3) in the other.
1693 105 Regica I Form 167 80 010 70 2.4 $
(August 1979)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- E. Kearney, Operation and Construction Quality Control Group Leader
- C. Vantrease, Chief Technical Engineer J. McEachearn, Security Supervisor P. McGuire, Station Manager J. Keyes, Licensing Engineer W. Shia, Engineer, NED N. William, Engineer, NED The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staff and reactor operators.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliance (293/77-24-01):
Contrary to TS 6.8.A, Revision 3 of Procedure 3.M.4-1 was used for maintenance vice the effective Revision 4.
The Maintenance Request (MR) procedure has been revised to include review of backlogged MR's to ensure procedures specified have not been superceded.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (293/77-24-04):
Change procedure 3.M.4-28 to include surveillance of spring hangers.
The inspector reviewed the spring hanger surveillance to be performed in conjunction with the ASME XI Inservice Inspection Program including a listing of hangers.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (293/77-22-08):
Procedure 8.7.3.1 does not require calibration of the manometers used fcr testing secondary containment.
The licensee is revising procedure 8.7.3.1 to include che:: king, filling, calibrating the manometers as necessary. This item remains open pending review of the approved procedure.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (293/77-26-04):
Test Vent and Drain Valve Controls.
The licensee has received tags for installation on the test valves during lineup for the next ILRT.
The tags will specify that Watch Engineer Approval is required prior to opening and that the normal position is closed.
This item remains open pending installation of the tags.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (293/79-09-07):
The inspector reviewed (new)
procedure 1.3.30, On Call (Station) dated August 31, 1979.
This proce-dure establishes provisions for an ORC member to be on call and provide guidance to the operations staff, including " beeper" communications and a briefcase of reference materials.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (293/79-06-02):
Missed Surveillance Test. LER 79-024 was submitted on July 9, 1979 describing the occurrence of a missed surveillance test which was identified during a Quality Assurance Audit.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (293/79-06-04):
CRD Module High Temperature Alarm.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's jumper placement for the alarming modules and noted that a new alarm would now be received in the control room to allow investigation.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (293/79-03-01), Administrative Controls for Dry-well and Nitrogen Purge / Exhaust Isolation Valves.
Instructions have been issued requiring stationing personnel by the control switches for the 20 inch valves if they are opened during power operation other than the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period prior to shutdown /after startup.
The 2 inch bypass valves are controlled by key lock switches to open/ emergency open.
The keys for the switches are administratively controlled as stated in the licensee's response, however, the inspector noted that these keys remain in the switches (cannot be removed) if the respective valves are left open.
The administrative controls referred to consist of a one time sign out for the TORUS purge exhaust isolation valves.
3.
Facility Tour a.
Facility tours were conducted during the course of the inspection on September 10-13. 1979.
These tours included the Control Room, various levels of the Turbine Building, accessible areas within the Reactor Building, and the Intake Structure.
Facility conditions were checked for general housekeeping, fire and safety hazards, radiation E.rea access, monitoring equipment and selected equipment positions.
One item of noncompliance was identified as described in the following paragraph b.
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This paragraph, containing 10 CFR 2.790 Information, not for public disclo-sure, is intentionally left blank, 1693 108
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4.
IE Bulletin 79-02 - Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts The inspector reviewed Procedure No. TP 79-24 " Pipe Support Base Plate Inspection" Revision 0 dated August 24, 1979 to determine that adequate testing and repair programs exist to satisfy the requirements of the Bulletin.
The inspector also observed the actual preparation and pull testing of shell type anchor bolts.
As a result of inspector review of documents and discussions with person-nel, no discrepancies were noted with the exception of the following items.
The dimensions of the support plate bolt holes were not being mea-
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sured as required by the bulletin.
The licensee has commenced taking these measurements and has modified the data table to document them.
All types of anchor bolts were not being pull / torque tested as
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required by the bulletin.
The licensee has been pull. testing shell type anchor bolts and torque testing PARA (sleeve type) bolts but has not tested any wedge type anchors including those category 1 anchors reported as being completed in BECo. Ltr.79-137.
At the time the category 1 anchors were inspected, the revision of Bulletin 79-02 did not require testing.
The licensee stated that wedge and sleeve type anchor bolts would be pull or torque tested to the requirements of IEB 79-02.
Inspection reports from other licensees have revealed instances
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where anchor bolts have been cut off and welded to the back of sup-port plates.
As a result of this occurrence it is the NRC position that the anchor bolt randomly selected for testing should be tested to completion.
The licensee has generated instructions that if difficulty develops breaking free a selected bolt an alternate should be selected.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's concern but stated that this installation practice had not been discovered at their station and if this testing technique were implemented it would result in the unnecessary destruction of anchor bolts.
During a subsequent telephone conversation the licensee stated that the selected anchor bolt would either be tested to completion or that ultrasonic testing or equivalent would be performed on frozen anchors to ensure they are of proper embedment and not welded to the plate.
IE Bulletin 79-02 remains open pending completion of licensee actions and reinspection by the NRC.
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5.
IE Bulletin 79-10, Requalification Training Program Statistics The subject Bulletin requested the licensee to provide the NRC selected statistics relating to the failure rates on the operator requalification examinations.
The licensee responded to this Bulletin in a letter dated May 24, 1979. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response and veri-fied the statistics provided on a sampling basis by checking the 1977 calendar year results.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
6.
IE Bulletin 79-03, Longitudinal Weld Defects in ASME SA-312 Type 304 Stainless Steel Pipe Spools Manufactured by Youngstown Welding and Engi-neerir.g Company The licensee responded to this Bulletin in a letter dated April 17, 1979.
The licensee performed a complete review of the quality verification records in the station records vault and determi".ed that the subject steel had not been installed at Pilgrim Station.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response and conducted a sampling review of QA vault records (vendor supplied Mill Test reports) to verify that the subject steel was not utilized.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
7.
IE Bulletil 79-14, Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety Related Piping Systems This Bulletin was issued on July 2 and revised on July 18 and August 15, 1979.
The inspector discussed the NRC position regarding scheduled com-pletion of the actions requested by the Bulletin.
Specifically the licensee was informed that the time schedule (126 days) must be met for inspection of accessible and inaccessible areas and for report submission.
The following items identified exceptions which could be applied.
(1) If an extended outage begins before the 120 day deadline, bulletin completion and corrective action completion may be delayed until the end of that outage.
(2) If the accessible component inspection results are excellent, then the licensee may submit a request for deadline extension.
That request must specify, comprehensively, the rationale for the delay, and must include the accessible component inspection results.
The 120 day deadline must be adhered to unless an affirmative response has been received from the NRC.
If a time extension is granted, it will not extend past June of 1980.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments.
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8.
IE Circular Review The following IE Circulars were reviewed on site to determine that the circular was received by licensee management, a review for applicability was performed, and that further action taken or planned was appropriate.
79-05 Moisture Leakage in Stranded Wire Conductors The inspector reviewed a NED to N00 Memorandum dated April 6, 1979 address-ing the concerns of the circular.
The only applicable conductors are used in the Main Steam Isolation Valve position indication switches which have been ordered and are scheduled for replacement during the 1980 refueling outage.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
9.
IE Informat:on Notice 79-20, NRC Enforcement Policy - NRC Licensed Individuals The NRC forwarded Information Notice 79-20 to the licensee in a letter dated August 14, 1979.
The purpose of this information notice was two-fold:
(1) To remind the NRC licensed individuals of their responsibilities, not only in the proper operation of the facility controls, but in compliance with the facility administrative procedures, and (2) To summarize the enforcement sanctions available to the NRC for use against licensed individuals.
The inspector verified that this notice had been issued as required reading to all NRC licensed individuals (routed August 20, 1979) and verified, on a sampling basis, that they had reviewed the notice.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
10.
NRC Review of Licensee Reports a.
NRC: RI in office and onsite review of the following LERs has been completed with no unacceptable conditions identified:
LER Dated Subject 79-027 August 9, 1979 Loss of Offsite Power, Lighting Strike 79-025 July 20, 1979 Drywell Personnel Hatch Left Open 1693 III
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LER Dated Subject 79-018 June 6, 1979 secirculation Pump Started High Differer.tial Temperature 79-030 August 22, 1979 Containment Cooling Subsystem Inoperable LER 79-030 described operation in a degraded mode (B Containment Cooling Subsystem) caused by a motor operated valve overloading, tripping its supply breaker, and not opening.
The valve in question (MOV-1001-368)
was the TORUS Cooling Supply and the cause of the malfunction was deter-mined to be shearing of the valve stem guide key.
The licensee's inves-tigation revealed that this was the fourth such failure of this type valve, with the other three having occurred on the 36-A valve. M0V 1001-36 A&B are 12" - 300 lb. globe valves (Anchor Co. Dwg. 1779-3, Revision A).
The stem is restrained from rotating by a stem clamp, which transmits torque to the stem by a 1/4" square key.
Meetings were held by the licensee with Limitorque (Operator Manufacturer) and Anchor / Darling (Valve Manufacturer) and stress calculations indicated that the key strength was marginal and design obsolete (present d%5fgn incorporates two 3/8" square keys).
A Plant Design Change Requeit.{PDCR 79-19) was initiated and approved September 7,1979 to increase shear force fiy a factor greater than 100% by installing 2 allen set screws attaching the clamp to the stem. The licensee will continue to monitor the performance of the modified design.
This item (LER 79-030) remains open pending implementation of the PDCR and generic review by the NRC.
b.
NRC: RI in office review of the following reports has been completed with no unacceptable conditions identified:
July 1979 Monthly Report (BECo Letter 79-161 dated
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August 1, 1979)
Revised July 1979 Monthly Report (BECo Letter 79-167 dated
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August 1, 1979)
August 1979 Monthly Report (BECo Letter 79-178 dated
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September 1, 1979)
11.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on September 13, 1979.
The inspector summarized the purpose, scope and findings of the inspection.
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