IR 05000282/2016002
| ML16218A357 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/2016 |
| From: | Kenneth Riemer NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B2 |
| To: | Northard S Northern States Power Company, Minnesota |
| References | |
| IR 2016002 | |
| Download: ML16218A357 (37) | |
Text
UNITED STATES ust 5, 2016
SUBJECT:
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000282/2016002 and 05000306/2016002
Dear Mr. Northard:
On June 30, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. On July 7, 2016, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff.
The enclosed report represents the results of this inspection.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
However, the inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Kenneth Riemer Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306;72-010 License Nos. DPR-42; DPR-60; SNM-2506
Enclosure:
IR 05000282/2016002; 05000306/2016002
REGION III==
Docket Nos: 50-282; 50-306;72-010 License Nos: DPR-42; DPR-60; SNM-2506 Report No: 05000282/2016002; 05000306/2016002 Licensee: Northern States Power Company, Minnesota Facility: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Welch, MN Dates: April 1, 2016 through June 30, 2016 Inspectors: L. Haeg, Senior Resident Inspector P. LaFlamme, Resident Inspector P. Zurawski, Senior Resident Inspector - Monticello S. Bell, Health Physicist M. Ziolkowski, Reactor Inspector Approved by: K. Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
Routine Inspection Report 05000282/2016002, 05000306/2016002; April 1, 2016, through
June 30, 2016; Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2.
This report covers a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced baseline inspections by regional inspectors. No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process," dated April 29, 2015.
Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, "Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas," dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated February 4, 2015. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," dated February 201
Licensee-Identified Violations
- Violations of very low safety or security significance or Severity Level IV that were identified by the licensee have been reviewed by the NRC. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP). These violations and CAP tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Units 1 and 2 operated at full power for the entirety of the inspection period, with the exception of brief down-power maneuvers to accomplish planned surveillance testing activities.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
.1 Readiness of Offsite and Alternate AC Power Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified that plant features and procedures for operation and continued availability of offsite and alternate alternating current (AC) power systems during adverse weather were appropriate. The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures affecting these areas and the communications protocols between the transmission system operator (TSO) and the plant to verify that the appropriate information was being exchanged when issues arose that could impact the offsite power system. Examples of aspects considered in the inspectors review included:
- coordination between the TSO and the plant during off-normal or emergency events;
- explanations for the events;
- estimates of when the offsite power system would be returned to a normal state; and
- notifications from the TSO to the plant when the offsite power system was returned to normal.
The inspectors also verified that plant procedures addressed measures to monitor and maintain availability and reliability of both the offsite AC power system and the onsite alternate AC power system prior to or during adverse weather conditions. Specifically, the inspectors verified that the procedures addressed the following:
- actions to be taken when notified by the TSO that the post-trip voltage of the offsite power system at the plant would not be acceptable to assure the continued operation of the safety-related loads without transferring to the onsite power supply;
- compensatory actions identified to be performed if it would not be possible to predict the post-trip voltage at the plant for the current grid conditions;
- re-assessment of plant risk based on maintenance activities which could affect grid reliability, or the ability of the transmission system to provide offsite power; and
- communications between the plant and the TSO when changes at the plant could impact the transmission system, or when the capability of the transmission system to provide adequate offsite power was challenged.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action program (CAP) items to verify that the licensee was identifying adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into their CAP in accordance with station corrective action procedures.
This inspection constituted one readiness of offsite and alternate AC power systems sample as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.01-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 External Flooding
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the design, material condition, and procedures for coping with the design basis probable maximum flood. The evaluation included a review to check for deviations from the descriptions provided in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) for features intended to mitigate the potential for flooding from external factors.
As part of this evaluation, the inspectors checked for obstructions that could prevent draining, checked that the roofs did not contain obvious loose items that could clog drains in the event of heavy precipitation, and determined that barriers required to mitigate the flood were in place and operable. Additionally, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the protected area to identify any modification to the site which would inhibit site drainage during a probable maximum precipitation event or allow water ingress past a barrier. The inspectors also walked down underground bunkers/manholes subject to flooding that contained multiple train or multiple function risk-significant cables. The inspectors also reviewed the abnormal procedure for mitigating the design basis flood to ensure it could be implemented as written. Documents reviewed are listed in the to this report.
This inspection constituted one external flooding sample as defined in IP 71111.01-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Quarterly Partial System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant systems:
- D5 emergency diesel generator (EDG) ventilation system;
- Bus 15 4KV electrical distribution system;
- 121 control room safeguards chilled water system; and
- D2 EDG starting air system.
The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the Reactor Safety Cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the USAR, Technical Specification (TS) requirements, outstanding work orders (WOs), condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also walked down accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the CAP with the appropriate significance characterization.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted four quarterly partial system walkdown samples as defined in IP 71111.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Routine Resident Inspector Tours
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant plant areas:
- Fire Area 58; Unit 1 695' Aux Bldg. Elevation;
- Fire Area 73; Unit 2 695' Aux Bldg. Elevation;
- Fire Area 81; Unit 1 715' Bus 15 4KV Room; and
- Fire Area 80; Unit 1 715' Bus 111 480 VAC Room.
The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if the licensee had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability, maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition, and implemented adequate compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features in accordance with the licensees fire plan.
The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk as documented in the plants Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE)with later additional insights, their potential to impact equipment which could initiate or mitigate a plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed in the Attachment to this report, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees CAP.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
These activities constituted four quarterly fire protection inspection samples as defined in IP 71111.05-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flooding
.1 Internal Flooding
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected risk important plant design features and licensee procedures intended to protect the plant and its safety-related equipment from internal flooding events. The inspectors reviewed flood analyses and design documents, including the USAR, engineering calculations, and abnormal operating procedures to identify licensee commitments. The specific documents reviewed are listed in the to this report. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee drawings to identify areas and equipment that may be affected by internal flooding caused by the failure or misalignment of nearby sources of water, such as the fire suppression or the circulating water systems. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees corrective action documents with respect to past flood-related items identified in the corrective action program to verify the adequacy of the corrective actions. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the following plant areas to assess the adequacy of watertight doors and verify drains and sumps were clear of debris and were operable, and that the licensee complied with its commitments:
- Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) and Unit 1 safeguards electrical switchgear rooms due to postulated high energy line break (HELB)-induced flooding of turbine building.
Documents are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted one internal flooding sample as defined in IP 71111.06-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
On May 31, 2016, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the plants simulator during licensed operator requalification training. The inspectors verified that operator performance was adequate, evaluators were identifying and documenting crew performance problems, and that training was being conducted in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:
- licensed operator performance;
- crews clarity and formality of communications;
- ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;
- prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;
- correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures;
- control board manipulations;
- oversight and direction from supervisors; and
- ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions and Emergency Plan actions and notifications.
The crews performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action expectations and successful critical task completion requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator requalification program simulator sample as defined in IP 71111.11-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Observation During Periods of Heightened Activity or Risk
(71111.11Q)
a. Inspection Scope
During the week of April 25, 2016, the inspectors observed control room operators during the replacement of the power supply for an area radiation monitor and post-maintenance testing of the 122 control room chiller. This was an activity that required heightened awareness or was related to increased risk. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:
- licensed operator performance;
- crews clarity and formality of communications;
- ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;
- prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms (if applicable);
- correct use and implementation of procedures;
- control board (or equipment) manipulations;
- oversight and direction from supervisors; and
- ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions and Emergency Plan actions and notifications (if applicable).
The performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action expectations, procedural compliance and task completion requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator heightened activity/risk sample as defined in IP 71111.11-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
.1 Routine Quarterly Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk-significant systems:
- Unit 1 EDG system; and
- Unit 1 & 2 safeguards chilled water systems.
The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance had resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition problems in terms of the following:
- implementing appropriate work practices;
- identifying and addressing common cause failures;
- scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule;
- characterizing system reliability issues for performance;
- charging unavailability for performance;
- trending key parameters for condition monitoring;
- ensuring 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification or re-classification; and
- verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2), or appropriate and adequate goals and corrective actions for systems classified as (a)(1).
The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability, and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance effectiveness issues were entered into the CAP with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted two quarterly maintenance effectiveness samples as defined in IP 71111.12-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
.1 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work:
- 21 safeguards screenhouse roof exhaust fan failure to start during the performance of monthly surveillance testing of the 22 diesel-driven cooling water pump (DDCLP);
- 21 shield building ventilation filter heater failure to energize during monthly surveillance test;
- 21 component cooling supply to residual heat removal (RHR) valve planned maintenance elevated risk evaluation; and
- SI 15-9, Unit 1 safety injection system throttle valve emergent work activities and subsequent repairs.
These activities were selected based on their potential risk significance relative to the Reactor Safety Cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that risk assessments were performed as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and were accurate and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified that the plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed TS requirements and walked down portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted four maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control samples as defined in IP 71111.13-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
.1 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following issues:
- Turbine building HELB environmental analysis;
- Potential miss-classification of component cooling water valves within the in-service testing program (IST);
- D5 EDG 21 safeguards cooling fan failure evaluation;
- Unit 1 Train B safety injection throttle valve packing leak evaluation;
- D5 EDG failure to pick up load while paralleling to grid evaluation; and
The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TS and USAR to the licensees evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sampling of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the to this report.
This inspection constituted six operability determinations and functionality assessments samples as defined in IP 71111.15-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
.1 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following modification:
- D5 EDG loading circuit modification.
The inspectors reviewed the configuration changes and associated 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation screening against the design basis, the USAR, and the TS, as applicable, to verify that the modification did not affect the operability or availability of the affected system. The inspectors, as applicable, observed ongoing and completed work activities to ensure that the modifications were installed as directed and consistent with the design control documents; the modifications operated as expected; post-modification testing adequately demonstrated continued system operability, availability, and reliability; and that operation of the modifications did not impact the operability of any interfacing systems. As applicable, the inspectors verified that relevant procedure, design, and licensing documents were properly updated. Lastly, the inspectors discussed the plant modification with operations, engineering, and training personnel to ensure that the individuals were aware of how the operation with the plant modification in place could impact overall plant performance. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted one plant modifications sample as defined in IP 71111.18-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
.1 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance activities to verify that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability:
- Train B to RHR supply valve maintenance;
- 1-SI 15-9, Unit 1 safety injection throttle valve repack and gland follower repair activities;
- 23 fan coil unit damper actuator repair activities;
- D5 EDG governor relay replacement activities; and
- 122 control room safeguards chilled water system maintenance activities.
These activities were selected based upon the structure, system, or component's ability to impact risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable):
the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed as written in accordance with properly reviewed and approved procedures; equipment was returned to its operational status following testing (temporary modifications or jumpers required for test performance were properly removed after test completion); and test documentation was properly evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the activities against TSs, the USAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents associated with post-maintenance tests to determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the CAP and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to safety. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted six post-maintenance testing sample as defined in IP 71111.19-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
.1 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the test results for the following activities to determine whether risk-significant systems and equipment were capable of performing their intended safety function and to verify testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedural and TS requirements:
- SP 1005, Nuclear Instruments System Power Range Daily Calibration (Routine);
- SP 2091, Monthly Containment Fan Coil Unit Test (Routine);
- SP 1089A, Train A Residual Heat Removal System Quarterly Test (Routine); and
- SP 2307, D6 Emergency Diesel Generator System Fast Speed Start Test IST.
The inspectors observed in-plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated records to determine the following:
- did preconditioning occur;
- the effects of the testing were adequately addressed by control room personnel or engineers prior to the commencement of the testing;
- acceptance criteria were clearly stated, demonstrated operational readiness, and were consistent with the system design basis;
- plant equipment calibration was correct, accurate, and properly documented;
- as-left setpoints were within required ranges; and the calibration frequency was in accordance with TSs, the USAR, procedures, and applicable commitments;
- measuring and test equipment calibration was current;
- test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy; applicable prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied;
- test frequencies met TS requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability; tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other applicable procedures; jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored where used;
- test data and results were accurate, complete, within limits, and valid;
- test equipment was removed after testing;
- where applicable for IST activities, testing was performed in accordance with the applicable version of Section XI, American Society of Mechanical Engineers code, and reference values were consistent with the system design basis;
- where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were addressed with an adequate operability evaluation or the system or component was declared inoperable;
- where applicable for safety-related instrument control surveillance tests, reference setting data were accurately incorporated in the test procedure;
- where applicable, actual conditions encountering high resistance electrical contacts were such that the intended safety function could still be accomplished;
- prior procedure changes had not provided an opportunity to identify problems encountered during the performance of the surveillance or calibration test;
- equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the performance of its safety functions; and
- all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented and dispositioned in the CAP.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted three routine surveillance testing samples and one in-service test sample as defined in IP 71111.22, Sections-02 and-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
.1 Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine licensee emergency drill on May 16, 2016, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the technical support center to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also attended the licensee drill critique to compare any inspector-observed weakness with those identified by the licensee staff in order to evaluate the critique and to verify whether the licensee staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the corrective action program.
As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the drill package.
This inspection constituted one drill evaluation sample as defined in IP 71114.06-06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
.1 Engineering Controls (02.02)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed procedural guidance for use of ventilation systems, and assessed whether the systems were used, to the extent practicable, during high-risk activities to control airborne radioactivity and minimize the use of respiratory protection.
The inspectors assessed whether installed ventilation airflow capacity, flow path, and filter/charcoal unit efficiencies for selected systems were consistent with maintaining concentrations of airborne radioactivity in work areas below the concentrations of an airborne area to the extent practicable. The inspectors also evaluated whether selected temporary ventilation systems used to support work in contaminated areas were consistent with licensee procedural guidance and as-low-as-reasonably-achievable.
The inspectors reviewed select airborne monitoring protocols to assess whether alarms and set points were sufficient to prompt worker action. The inspectors assessed whether the licensee established trigger points for evaluating levels of airborne beta-emitting and alpha-emitting radionuclides.
These inspection activities constituted one sample as defined in IP 71124.03-05
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (02.03)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed whether the licensee provided respiratory protection devices for those situations where it was impractical to employ engineering controls such that occupational doses were as-low-as-reasonably-achievable. For select instances where respiratory protection devices were used, the inspectors assessed whether the licensee concluded that further engineering controls were not practical. The inspectors also assessed whether the licensee had established means to verify that the level of protection provided by the respiratory protection devices was at least as good as that assumed in the work controls and dose assessment.
The inspectors assessed whether the respiratory protection devices used to limit the intake of radioactive materials were certified by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health/Mine Safety and Health Administration or have been approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The inspectors evaluated whether the devices were used consistent with their National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health/Mine Safety and Health Administration certification or any conditions of their U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission approval.
The inspectors reviewed records of air testing for supplied-air devices and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) bottles to assess whether the air used met or exceeded Grade D quality. The inspectors evaluated whether plant breathing air supply systems satisfied the minimum pressure and airflow requirements for the devices.
The inspectors evaluated whether selected individuals qualified to use respiratory protection devices had been deemed fit to use the devices by a physician.
The inspectors observed selected individuals donning, doffing, and functionally checking respiratory protection devices as appropriate and assessed whether these individuals knew how to safely use the device and how to properly respond to any device malfunction or unusual occurrence. The inspectors reviewed training curricula for use of respiratory protection devices to assess whether individuals are adequately trained on donning, doffing, function checks, and how to respond to a malfunction.
The inspectors observed the physical condition of respiratory protection devices ready for issuance and reviewed records of routine inspection for selected devices. The inspectors reviewed records of maintenance on the vital components for selected devices and assessed whether onsite personnel assigned to repair vital components received vendor-provided training.
These inspection activities constituted one sample as defined in IP 71124.03-05
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (02.04)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the status and surveillance records for select SCBAs. The inspectors evaluated the licensees capability for refilling and transporting SCBA air bottles to and from the control room and operations support center during emergency conditions.
The inspectors assessed whether control room operators and other emergency response and radiation protection personnel were trained and qualified in the use of SCBAs and evaluated whether personnel assigned to refill bottles are trained and qualified for that task.
The inspectors assessed whether appropriate mask sizes and types were available for use. The inspectors evaluated whether on-shift operators had no facial hair that would interfere with the sealing of the mask and that appropriate vision correction was available.
The inspectors reviewed the past 2 years of maintenance records for selected in-service SCBA units used to support operator activities during accident conditions.
The inspectors assessed whether maintenance or repairs on an SCBA units vital components were performed by an individual certified by the manufacturer of the device to perform the work. The inspectors evaluated the onsite maintenance procedures governing vital component work to determine whether there was any inconsistencies with the SCBA manufacturers recommended practices. The inspectors evaluated whether SCBA cylinders satisfied the hydrostatic testing required by the U.S.
Department of Transportation.
These inspection activities constituted one sample as defined in IP 71124.03-05
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Problem Identification and Resolution (02.05)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed whether problems associated with the control and mitigation of in-plant airborne radioactivity were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold and were properly addressed for resolution. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated the appropriateness of the corrective actions for selected problems involving airborne radioactivity documented by the licensee.
These inspection activities constituted one sample as defined in IP 71124.03-05
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment
.1 Source Term Characterization (02.02)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated whether the licensee had characterized the radiation types and energies being monitored and that the characterization included gamma, beta, hard-to-detects, and neutron radiation.
The inspectors assessed whether the licensee had developed scaling factors for including hard-to-detect nuclide activity in internal dose assessments.
These inspection activities constituted one sample as defined in IP 71124.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 External Dosimetry (02.03)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated whether the licensees dosimetry vendor is National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program accredited and if the approved irradiation test categories for each type of personnel dosimeter used are consistent with the types and energies of the radiation present and the way the dosimeter is being used.
The inspectors evaluated the onsite storage of dosimeters before their issuance, during use, and before processing/reading. For personal dosimeters stored onsite during the monitoring period, the inspectors evaluated whether they were stored in low-dose areas with control dosimeters. For personal dosimeters that are taken offsite during the monitoring period, the inspectors evaluated the guidance provided to individuals with respect to care and storage of the dosimeter.
The inspectors evaluated the calibration of active dosimeters. The inspectors assessed the bias of the active dosimeters compared to passive dosimeters and the correction factor used. The inspectors also assessed the licensees program for comparing active and passive dosimeter results and investigations for substantial differences. The inspectors assessed whether there were adverse trends for active dosimeters.
These inspection activities constituted one sample as defined in IP 71124.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Internal Dosimetry (02.04)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed procedures used to assess internal dose using whole body counting equipment to evaluate whether the procedures addressed methods for differentiating between internal and external contamination, the release of contaminated individuals, the route of intake and the assignment of dose. The inspectors assessed whether the frequency of measurements was consistent with the biological half-life of the nuclides available for intake. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation for use of portal radiation monitors as a passive monitoring system to determine if instrument minimum detectable activities were adequate to detect internally deposited radionuclides sufficient to prompt additional investigation. The inspectors reviewed whole body counts and evaluated the equipment sensitivity, nuclide library, review of results, and incorporation of hard-to-detect radionuclides.
The inspectors reviewed procedures used to determine internal dose using in vitro analysis to assess the adequacy of sample collection, determination of entry route and assignment of dose. The inspectors reviewed select analyses for adequacy and assessed the laboratorys Cross-Check Program to ensure quality assurance.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for dose assessment based on air sampling, as applicable, and calculations of derived air concentration. The inspectors determined whether flow rates and collection times for air sampling equipment were adequate to allow lower limits of detection to be obtained. The inspectors also reviewed the adequacy of procedural guidance to assess internal dose if respiratory protection was used.
The inspectors reviewed select internal dose assessments and evaluated the monitoring protocols, equipment, and data analysis.
These inspection activities constituted one sample as defined in IP 71124.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Special Dosimetric Situations (02.05)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed whether the licensee informs workers of the risks of radiation exposure to the embryo/fetus, the regulatory aspects of declaring a pregnancy, and the specific process to be used for declaring a pregnancy. The inspectors selected individuals who had declared pregnancy during the current assessment period and evaluated whether the Radiological Monitoring Program for declared pregnant workers was technically adequate to assess the dose to the embryo/fetus. The inspectors assessed results and/or monitoring controls for compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's methodology for monitoring external dose in non-uniform radiation fields or where large dose gradients exist. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's criteria for determining when alternate monitoring was to be implemented. The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging to evaluate whether the assessment was performed consistently with licensee procedures and dosimetric standards.
The inspectors evaluated the licensees methods for calculating shallow dose equivalent from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles.
The inspectors evaluated the licensees Neutron Dosimetry Program, including dosimeter types and/or survey instrumentation.
The inspectors reviewed select neutron exposure situations and assessed whether dosimetry and/or instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra, there was sufficient sensitivity, and neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated. The inspectors also assessed whether interference by gamma radiation had been accounted for in the calibration and whether time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events.
For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section, the inspectors assessed how the licensee assigns dose of record. This included an assessment of external and internal monitoring results, supplementary information on Individual exposures, and radiation surveys and/or air monitoring results when dosimetry was based on these techniques.
These inspection activities constituted one sample as defined in IP 71124.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.5 Problem Identification and Resolution (02.06)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed whether problems associated with occupational dose assessment are being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold and are properly addressed for resolution. The inspectors assessed the appropriateness of the corrective actions for a selected sample of problems documented by the licensee involving occupational dose assessment.
These inspection activities constituted one sample as defined in IP 71124.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Mitigating Systems Performance IndexHigh Pressure Injection Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MPSI) - High Pressure Injection Systems performance indicator, Units 1 and 2, for the period from the 2nd quarter of 2015 through the 1st quarter of 2016. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator (PI) reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, issue reports, MSPI derivation reports, event reports and NRC Integrated Inspection Reports for the period of April 1, 2015, through March 31, 2016, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the MSPI component risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the to this report.
This inspection constituted two MSPI high pressure injection system samples as defined in IP 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Mitigating Systems Performance IndexHeat Removal System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the MSPI - Heat Removal System performance indicator, Units 1 and 2, for the period from the 2nd quarter of 2015 through the 1st quarter of 2016. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, issue reports, event reports, MSPI derivation reports, and NRC Integrated Inspection Reports for the period of April 1, 2015, through March 31, 2016, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the MSPI component risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted two MSPI heat removal system samples as defined in IP 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Routine Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program
a. Inspection Scope
As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify they were being entered into the licensees CAP at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. Attributes reviewed included: identification of the problem was complete and accurate; timeliness was commensurate with the safety significance; evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes, extent-of-condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews were proper and adequate; and that the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective actions were commensurate with safety and sufficient to prevent recurrence of the issue.
Minor issues entered into the licensees CAP as a result of the inspectors observations are included in the Attachment to this report.
These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure they were considered an integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in Section 1 of this report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews
a. Inspection Scope
In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished through inspection of the stations daily condition report packages.
These daily reviews were performed by procedure as part of the inspectors daily plant status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the licensees CAP and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of daily inspector CAP item screening discussed in Section 4OA2.2 above, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The inspectors review nominally considered the 6-month period of January 1, 2016, through June 30, 2016, although some examples expanded beyond those dates where the scope of the trend warranted.
The review also included issues documented outside the normal CAP in major equipment problem lists, repetitive and/or rework maintenance lists, departmental problem/challenges lists, system health reports, quality assurance audit/surveillance reports, self-assessment reports, and Maintenance Rule assessments. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees CAP trending reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trending reports were reviewed for adequacy.
This inspection constituted one semi-annual trend review sample as defined in IP 71152-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues: Train B Safeguards Chilled Water System
Operability Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
During a review of items entered in the licensees CAP, the inspectors recognized a corrective action item (CAP 01488482) documenting several instances where past inoperability of the train B chilled water system challenged safeguards bus 16 operability. Specifically, the chilled water system supplies room cooling for several safeguards systems that mitigate room heat up temperatures during a design basis HELB event. Consequently, the inspectors concluded that based on current calculations for HELB events, bus 16 could have been rendered inoperable each time the chilled water system had been taken out of service for planned maintenance over the past 3 years. The inspectors reviewed control room logs, associated work orders, operating procedures, the USAR, the TS and interviewed engineering and operations personnel.
These reviews were performed to validate whether the licensee had adequately identified and evaluated each occurrence of the chilled water system being taken out of service and the associated impact on bus 16 operability. The inspectors noted that the licensee was in the process of reconstituting the HELB program. Therefore, the inspectors limited their review to verifying proper identification and evaluation of the train B chilled water system out of service and the impact on bus 16. The inspectors independently verified that apparent cause evaluation (ACE) 01488482 addressed the issue of concern, its impact on safeguards equipment, extent of condition, operating experience, safety culture, risk assessment and corrective actions taken to resolve the issue.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This review constituted one in-depth problem identification and resolution sample as defined in IP 71152-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.5 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues: Safety-Related Electrical Relay Preventive
Maintenance Program
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected the following condition report for in-depth review to gain insights into the licensees electrical relay preventive maintenance program:
- CAP 01521329; D5 KW Pick-up at BKR Closure <500kW.
As appropriate, the inspectors verified the following attributes during their review of the licensee's corrective actions for the above condition report and other related condition reports:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance and ease of discovery;
- consideration of the extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences;
- evaluation and disposition of operability/functionality/reportability issues;
- classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem commensurate with safety significance;
- identification of the root and contributing causes of the problem;
- identification of corrective actions, which were appropriately focused to correct the problem;
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance of the issue;
- effectiveness of corrective actions taken to preclude repetition; and
- evaluation of the applicability of operating experience and communication of applicable lessons learned to appropriate organizations.
The inspectors discussed the corrective actions and associated evaluations with licensee personnel.
This review constituted one in-depth problem identification and resolution inspection sample as defined in IP 71152.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000282/2015-006-00: Quarterly Containment Spray
Pump Surveillance Test Methodology
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed information provided by the licensee regarding the August 4, 2015, identification of inadequate procedure steps within quarterly containment spray pump surveillance procedures (SPs) 1090A & B, and 2090A & B.
Specifically, the SPs inappropriately credited Note 1 of TS 3.6.3 and created open flow paths from the Unit 1 and 2 containments under administrative control while vent and/or drain valves connected to the containment spray header were opened. The opening of these valves was to facilitate draining of the header and to verify no leakage past manual isolation valves during containment spray pump operation in recirculation mode.
These actions that occurred over the prior three years represented conditions that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the Units 1 and 2 containments and, conditions that were prohibited by TS.
During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the surveillance procedures, licensee CAP 01488454 that was generated as a result of the issue, the apparent cause evaluation, immediate corrective actions (SP changes), and longer term corrective actions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This licensee event report (LER) is closed.
This review constituted one event follow-up sample as defined in IP 71153-05.
b. Findings
One licensee-identified Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of very low safety significance (Green) was identified during the review of this LER. As a result, the inspectors documented information regarding this issue in Section 4OA7 of this inspection report.
.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000282/2016-002-00: Listed System Actuation -
Motor-Driven Cooling Water Pump Auto-Start
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed information provided by the licensee regarding the January 29, 2016, automatic actuation of the 121 motor-driven cooling water pump.
Specifically, during post-maintenance testing of the 22 DDCLP, a momentary low pressure condition existed within the cooling water piping header. The 121 motor-driven cooling water pump is designed to automatically start if low pressure is sensed in the cooling water header to ensure continuity of flow to cooling water loads following a postulated event. Since low pressure actually existed in the cooling water header (valid actuation signal) the licensee submitted an LER for this event/condition based on 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event or condition that resulted in automatic actuation of an emergency service water system that does not normally run and serves as an ultimate heat sink.
The inspectors reviewed licensee CAP 01510473 that was generated as a result of the issue, the apparent cause evaluation, and corrective actions (post-maintenance and SP changes). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This LER is closed.
This review constituted one event follow-up sample as defined in IP 71153-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting Summary
On July 7, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. S. Northard, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.
.2 Interim Exit Meetings
Interim exits were conducted for:
- The inspection results for the areas of in-plant airborne radioactivity control and mitigation; and occupational dose assessment with Mr. D. Lapcinski, Acting Plant Manager, on April 1, 2016.
The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as an NCV:
- Prairie Island TS 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, Required Action A.1 required, in part, isolation of the affected penetration flow path within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> if one or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable.
Contrary to the above, since August 4, 2012 on 21 occasions for Unit 1 and 23 occasions for Unit 2 (three year reporting window), the licensee failed to isolate containment spray header penetration flow paths within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> during the performance of quarterly containment spray pump surveillance procedures SP 1090A & 1090B and SP 2090A & 2090B. Specifically, the SPs inappropriately credited Note 1 of TS 3.6.3 and created open flow paths from the Unit 1 and 2 containments under administrative control while vent and/or drain valves connected to the containment spray header were opened. The opening of these valves was to facilitate draining of the header and to verify no leakage past manual isolation valves during containment spray pump operation in recirculation mode.
On August 4, 2015, the licensee generated CAP 01488454 which questioned whether use of TS 3.6.3 Note 1 to open the containment spray header vent and drain valves under administrative control was permissible. The licensee performed an apparent cause evaluation and determined that because the vent and drain valves were not considered part of a containment penetration flow path, Note 1 could not be applied. A past operability review was performed and it was determined that on multiple occasions (at 1-10 hour durations) over the prior three years, the vent/drain opening resulted in a 3/8 opening in the containment pressure boundary. Because the resultant leakage at peak containment pressure during a design basis accident (approximately 4 percent of the containment volume per day) would have exceeded the maximum allowable leakage rate, conditions that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the Units 1 and 2 containments and, conditions that were prohibited by TS, had occurred.
Because the inspectors answered Yes to question B.1 under Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, the inspectors transitioned to IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process. Because the leak rate through the vent/drain openings would not have exceeded greater than 100 percent of the containment volume per day at calculated peak containment internal pressure, the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green). The issues were entered into the licensees CAP as CAP 01488454. Corrective actions included immediate quarantine of the affected SPs and subsequent revisions to the SPs and TS Bases.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- S. Northard, Site Vice President
- T. Conboy, Director Site Operations
- S. Sharp, Director Performance Improvement
- W. Paulhardt, Plant Manager
- D. Lapcinski, Assistant Operations Manager
- J. Bjorseth, Engineering Director
- H. Butterworth, Business Support Director
- J. Boesch, Maintenance Manager
- T. Borgen, Operations Manager
- B. Boyer, Radiation Protection Manager
- B. Carberry, Emergency Preparedness Manager
- S. Martin, Performance Assessment Manager
- J. Kivi, Regulatory Affairs Manager
- P. Wildenborg, Health Physicist
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- K. Riemer, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2
- R. Kuntz, Senior Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
None
Closed
- 05000282/2015-006-00 LER Quarterly Containment Spray Pump Surveillance Test Methodology (Section 4OA3.1)
- 05000282/2016-002-00 LER Listed System Actuation - Motor-Driven Cooling Water Pump Auto-Start (Section 4OA3.2)
Discussed
None