IR 05000280/1985032
| ML18144A004 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1985 |
| From: | Burke D, Caldwell J, Marlone Davis, Elrod S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18144A003 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.D.2, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-2.F.2, TASK-2.K.3.02, TASK-2.K.3.04, TASK-2.K.3.05, TASK-2.K.3.10, TASK-TM 50-280-85-32, 50-281-85-32, NUDOCS 8511040354 | |
| Download: ML18144A004 (8) | |
Text
Report Nos.:
50-280/85-32 and 50-281/85-32 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 Faci 1 i ty Name:
Surry 1 and 2 3 - October 7, 1985 Inspector Date Signed Id /,z,,/ /rs -- sident Inspector D'ate 'Signed Inspector (Grand Gulf)
<ft-1"/rs D te Signed
/?J/~r/fS-Bate'Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This inspection entailed 220 inspector-hours on-site in the areas of plant operations and operating' records, plant maintenance and surveillance, plant security, follow-up of events, emergency drill evaluation, and NUREG-0737 item Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8511040354 851028 PDR ADOCK 05000280 G
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees R. F. Saunders, Station Manager D. L. Benson, Assistant Station Manager H. L. Miller, Assistant Station Manager D. A. Christian, Superintendent of Operations E. S. Grecheck, Superintendent of Technical Services J. W. Patrick, Superintendent of Maintenance D. Rickeard, Supervisor, Safety Engineering Staff S. Sarver, Superintendent of Health Physics R. Johnson, Operations Supervisor D. Driscoll, Site Quality Assurance Manager C. R. Silcox, Supervisor, Administrative Services Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors, chemistry, health physics, plant maintenance, security, engineering, administrative, records, contractor personnel and supervisor.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on a biweekly basis with certain individuals in paragraph 1 abov The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters Not inspecte.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
Operations Units 1 and 2 were inspected and reviewed during the inspection perio The inspectors routinely toured the control room and other plant areas to verify that pl ant operations, testing and maintenance were being conducted in accordance with the facility Technical Specifications (TS)
and procedure The inspectors verified that monitoring equipment was recording as required, that equipment was properly tagged, and that plant housekeeping efforts were adequat The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, that clean areas were being controlled in accordance with
- procedures, that excess material or equipment was stored properly, and that combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiousl During tours, the inspectors monitored the plant for unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, piping hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment and instrument calibration date Certain tours were conducted on backshift Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital battery rooms, fire pump house, underground fuel pump houses, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, and cable penetration areas to verify certain breaker and equipment conditions and positions for safety related component the inspectors routinely conducted pa rt i al wa l kdown s of emergency core cooling systems and engineered safety features systems to verify operability and observe maintenance and testing of certain equipment and components in these system The inspectors verified that the Units 1 and 2 turbine drive auxiliary feedwater pumps (AFW-P-2) are each driven by a Z S-4 Terry Turbin The turbine external pedestal mounting bolts appear secure; the licensee will clean and inspect the bolts during upcoming outage The inspectors also observed that the Unit 1 AFW pumps (P-2, P-3A and P-3B)
each have a seal water supply system piped to the pump stuffing boxes and seals, but that the unit 2 AFW pumps do not have this seal water supply system; the piping is capped at the pump the plant P&ID 1 s (FM-68A 1 s) correctly depict the Unit 1 and 2 installation A review of the AFW pump vendor and design specifications determined that either installation is acceptable if the suction pressure is positive to provide lubrication and cooling and prevent air inleakag In both installations, the AFW pump suction pressure is some 10 psi Certain of these AFW pump seal water lines appeared bent or leaking (at joints) and certain seal water catch basins on the pumps were overflowing due to plugged drain line Licensee corrective action on these items, as well as determining the reason for the differences in the Units 1 and 2 seal water systems, is IFI (280/85-32-01). Unit 1 began the reporting period operating at full powe On September 11, 1985, Unit 1 experienced a reactor trip by turbine trip due to a loss of condenser vacuu The reactor operator was attempting to throttle the condenser outlet valves, MOV-CW-lOOA, B, C, By mistake, the operator closed the condenser inlet valves MOV-CW-106A, B, C, and D, which do not throttle, but travel fully closed when the control switches are placed in the 11close 11 position. The rapid loss of condenser vacuum caused a turbine trip with resulting reactor tri The rupture discs on the main turbine blew to protect the condenser from overpressur All safety systems functioned as require Temperature control following*the trip was via the 1C1 steam generator
power-operated relief valve since the steam dump valves were not available due to the unavailability of the main condenser (lack of vacuum).
Reactor Cool ant System dose equivalent Iodi ne-131 activity peaked at 1.25 microcuries/m The unit was restarted later in the day and returned to power operation On September 26, 1985, both Units 1 and 2 commenced an orderly rampdown in power as a precautionary measure due to the approach of Hurricane Glori Unit 1 was taken off line and Unit 2 was held at 29 percent powe As an additional precautionary measure, the licensee manned the Technical Support Center (TSC) throughout the night of September 26 until 7:00 a.m. the following mornin NRC personnel were also present on site during the nigh Peak winds in the area of the plant were approximately 55 mph, and no wind damage was observe Unit 1 was restarted on September 27th and operated at power for the remainder of the reporting perio Unit 2 operated at power for the duration of the reporting perio No other reactor trips or shutdowns occurre While reviewing the containment isolation trip valve panels in the control room, the inspectors observed that several trip valves such as TV-DA-lOOA and Band 200A and B, had identification tags which stated that the trip valves close on high containment pressure, although they actually close on other Safety Injection (SI) signals as well - which was verified by functional testing. The licensee stated that the valve tags will be corrected. (IFI 280/85-32-03). Surveillance and Maintenance Inspections During the reporting period the inspectors reviewed various surveillance and maintenance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures and T Inspection areas included the following: Maintenance on containment instrument air compressors was observe A walkdown inspection of instrument air and service air systems was also conducte Weaknesses in the survei 11 ance and maintenance programs were discussed in the licensee; corrective actions are in progress on the non-safety-related air system Maintenance activities were observed on the Unit 1 1A1 main feed pump discharge check valve, following separation of the disc from the valve bod The inspectors observed preparations for hurricane Gloria such as the inspection of missile doors and securing of potential missile Additional checklists and protective measures are being discussed with the licensee.
- The inspectors observed concrete pouring for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). A Region II construction inspector also performed an inspection of ISFSI activities during the reporting perio His comments are included in Inspection Report 280,281/85-2 A walkdown inspection of Circulating Water and Emergency Service Water Systems was conducted at the low level intake structur Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated and evaluated and that appropriate actions were taken, if require The surveillance inspection included a review of several Periodic Test (PT)
procedures for specification of appropriate prerequisites, preparations, acceptance criteria and instructions ensuring systems and components are being properly tested and restored following the PT These PTs were also reviewed for conformance with TS and ASME Boiler and Pres sure Vessel Code Section XI requirements, test performance being performed within time frequencies specified by TS and Section XI, and verification that appropriate action was being taken for any item which failed its acceptance criteri The following PTs were reviewed in whole or in part:
1-PT-18.11 1-PT-1 PT-1 PT-1 PT-1 SI check valve leakage Boric acid pump operability and performance Charging pump operability and performance test Low head SI test and flushing of sensitized stainless steel piping Verification of local and remote valve position indications of* safety related valves The review of the above PTs resulted in the following comments which were discussed with the licensee:
(1)
The acceptance criteria for pumps stated in Section XI gives an operable range, an alert range, and an inoperable rang The alert range re qui res testing to be doubled which, in the case of monthly tests, should be increased to every two week The requirements for testing pumps every two weeks when in the alert range is also stated in ADM 89.8 and in some of the acceptance criteria sections of the PT Several of the PTs reviewed showed pumps in the alert range for several months but the testing was not being increased to every two week These pumps were the 1B1 boric acid pump, 1A1 charging pump service water pump, and 1 B1 charging pum The Section XI Code requirements were met since the pumps are required to be tested quarterly (twice per quarter if in Alert), but are actually tested monthl However, the failure to perform increased testing for equipment with acceptance criteria in the alert range will be identified as IFI 280/85-32-02 until the program or procedures are revise J
...
(2)
Certain errors in completed PTs were not properly corrected in that the single line, initial, and date were not placed on the i tern being correcte The single 1 i ne through the i tern being corrected was being performed but in severa 1 in stances, the initial of the person making the corrections or dating of the corrections was not properly performed per ADM 60, Section This licensee will review this requirement and reinstruct engineering, operations and QA personnel on the proper method of making correction (3) A review of the acceptance criteria for PT 18.9 for the Boric Acid Transfer Pumps against the criteria in Section XI also revealed certain instances of non-conservative rounding of number For example, the minimum pressure limit for acceptable 1B1 Boric Acid pumps discharge pressure is stated in the PT as 94 psig, but the actual acceptance criteria given by Section XI should have been 9 This is notable since the 1B1 Boric Acid Transfer pump had a recorded discharge pressure of 94 psig recently and was only considered to be in the alert rang The licensee stated that test numbers are normally rounded off in the conservative direction; a special engineering test (ST-182) is in progress to verify the Units 1 and 2 Boric Acid Transfer pump performance curves and acceptance criteri.
Design Change Review
- The inspectors reviewed several Design Change (DC) packages to veri-fy the fo 11 owing:
(1)
DC reviews and approval were performed in accordance with the TS requirements and Quality Assurance (QA) control (2)
DC were controlled by established procedure (3) As-built drawings were changed to reflect DC modification (4)
That the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 were properly evaluated and me (5)
Technical Specification revisions were made as required by the D (6)
DC implementing and test procedures were properly completed by licensee personne The design changes reviewed included the following:
(1)
DC 82-llA, 11Control Room Habitability -
Redundant Bottled Air Supply
(2)
DC 80-51, 11Accident Monitoring Instrument Panel
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(3)
DC 80-52, 11 Containment Hi-Rad Monitors
(4)
DC 80-96, "Reactor Vessel Level Monitor" Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie.
NUREG-0737 Review The fo 11 owing NUREG-0737, Post TMI Requirements, i terns were inspected to determine if installation and review of these items was complet (Open - Units 1 and 2) ITEM I. Plant Safety Parameter Display Console" (SPDS).
The SPDS is currently installed and is undergoing functional and reliability testin The systems are scheduled to be fully operational following the 1986 refueling outage These items remain ope (Open - Units 1 and 2) ITEM II.F.2.3.b concerns the installation of the Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS).
The-systems on Surry Units 1 and 2 have been installed and are in operatio However, the licensee's review of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3, concluded that existing core exit thermocouple systems required upgrading to meet Regulatory Guide 1.97 requirement The licensee will attempt to purchase and install the incore thermocouple upgrade system by the conclusion of the next refueling outage This item remains open for Surry Units 1 and 2, due to the re qui red upgrading and qualification of the incore instrumentation system (Closed - Units 1 and 2) ITEM K.3.10 concerns a proposed anticipatory trip modificatio This item was previously closed for Surry Units 1 and 2 in inspection report 280,281/82-2 (Closed - Units 1 and 2) ITEM II.F.1.1.B.2 concerns the installation of noble gas effluent monitors with an extended range designed to function during accident conditions as wel 1 as during normal operating condition Monitors have been installed and are operating in the following potential accident release paths:
process vents stack, ventilation vent stack, main steam safety valve and atmospheric dump valve discharges and auxiliary feedwater pump turbine exhaust This item is closed for Surry Units 1 and (Closed -
Units 1 and 2)
ITEM II.F.1.2.B.2 concerns the continuous collection of post accident releases of radioactive iodine and particulate Equipment has been installed and is operational to monitor the process vent and ventilation vent effluent release path The monitoring system will continuously sample and collect particulates and iodides on shielded filters with provisions for removal and laboratory analysi This item is closed for Surry Units 1 and (Closed - Units 1 and 2)
ITEM II.F.1.3 concerns the installation of containment high-range radiation monitors qualified to function in an accident environmen The containment high-range radiation monitors have been installed and teste The systems were initially not considered
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operable since the final in-site calibration had not been performe The in-site calibration was subsequently performed and the systems are considered operable for Surry Units 1 and This item is close (Closed -
Units 1 and 2) ITEM II.K.3.5 concerns the automatic trip of reactor coolant pumps (RCPs)
during loss of coolant acciden In correspondence dated June 28, 1985, NRR accepted the Westinghouse Owner 1 s Group (WOG)
submittal justifying manual RCP tri Licensee emergency procedures require manual RCP Trip at 1600 psi This item is closed for Surry Units 1 and (Closed - Units 1 and 2) ITEM II.K.3.2.5b.2 concerns the consequences of a loss of reactor coolant pump seal cooling caused by a loss of offsite powe This item was previously closed for Surry Units 1 and 2 in inspection report 280,281/82-2 (Closed - Units 1 and 2) ITEM II.D.3.4 concerns control room habitability modification The following control room modifications have been completed: Installation of a redundant control room bottled air syste Installation of redundant control room isolation dampers in the normal supply and exhaust duct Replacement of sodium analyzers utilizing dimethylamine gas with sodium analyzers whic.h do not utilize dimethylamine ga Installation of chlorine gas detectors at the control room air intak By letter dated June 28, 1982, NRR considered this item resolved, pending post-implementation review by Region II. This item is considered closed for Surry Units 1 and.
Plant Physical Protection
The inspectors verified the following by observation: Gates and doors in Protected and Vital Area barriers were closed and locked when not attende Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromised or obstructe Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessary for plant access control.