IR 05000280/1985033
| ML18144A032 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/1985 |
| From: | Cunningham A, Decker T, Marston R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18144A031 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-85-33, 50-281-85-33, NUDOCS 8511250434 | |
| Download: ML18144A032 (12) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 NOV O 8 1985 Report Nos.:
50-280/85-33 and 50-281/85-33 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection Conducted: ~985 Inspectors: /~ ~
A~m
~
/4R.R.d~
Accompanying Personnel:
A. Gooden, NRC, Region II; J. M. Will, Jr., A. L. Smith; A
(} J* B. Stockton, and M. P. Moeller Approved by: \\-J'£M_g_/ep<-
T. R. Decker, Chief
/()kJs-Datel Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection entailed 210 inspector-hours onsite in the ~rea of an emergency preparedness exercis Results:
No vioiations or deviations were identifie,
-8511250434 9511.0B o,DR ADOCK 05000280 G
- PDR
- REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- W. L. Stewart, VP - Nuclear Operations
- R. F. Saunders, Manager - Surry Power Station
- H. L. Miller, Assistant Manager - Surry Power Station
- R. J. Hardwick, Manager - Nuclear Programs and Licensing
- J. W. Martin, Jr., Director - Emergency Planning
- N. E. Clark, Director - Safety Evaluation & Control
- S. R. Burgold, Supervisor - Advisory Operations - Surry
- J. S. Fisher, Operations Coordinator - Surry
- L. Garner, Training Coordinator - Surry
- B. Garber, Health Physics Supervisor - Surry
- B. R. Parkhurst, Coordinator - Emergency Planning Surry
- R. E. Beckwith, Coordinator - Emergency Planning - Corporate
- G. A. Polson, Coordinator - Emergency Planning - Corporate
- S. A. Harrison, Coordinator - Emergency Planning - North Anna Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechan'ics, security force members, and office personne NRC Resident Inspectol's
- 0. Burke, SRI M. Davis, RI
- Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 5, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding No dissenting comments were received from the license The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) Violation 50-280, 281/85-16-01:
Failure to require issuance of a protective action recommendation upon declaration of a general emergenc The licensee's procedures required issuance of a protective action recommendation upon declaration of a general emergenc The minimum protective action recommendation was sheltering in the 0-2 mile 360° area and 2-5 miles in the 67\\ 0 affected downwind sector *
- .
Exercise Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements defined in the licensee's emergency plan and organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.N of NUREG 0654, Revision The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives on several occassion While no major problems with the scenario were identified during the review, several inconsistencies became apparent during the exercise. These inconsistencies did not detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organizatio Scenario problems were discussed by management representa-tives during the exercise critique on October 5, 198 The scenario developed for this exercise was detailed, and adequately exercised the onsite emergency organization The scenario also provided sufficient information to the State and local government agencies consistent with the scope of their participation in the exercis No violations or deviations were identified.
Drill Scenario (82301)
Scenarios for the fire and medical emergency drills were reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test specific functions in the licensee's emergency plan pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.N of NUREG 065 The scenarios developed for the drills were detailed and adequately exercised the participating licensee organization and offsite local emergency agencie The scenarios provided sufficient information to local support agencies consistent with the scope of their participation in the drill No violations or deviations were identifie.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l), paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.A of NUREG 0654, Revision The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff was available to respond to the simulated emergenc The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives; however,
- because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not require Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that sufficient technical staff was available to provide for continuous staffing of the augmented emergency organization if neede The inspectors also observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC), Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF) and Operations Support Center (DSC).
At each response center, the required staffing and assignment of responsibility appeared to be consistent with the licensee's approved procedure No violations or deviations were identifie.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301) The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),
paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.B of NUREG 0654, Revision 1:
(1) responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined; (2) adequate staffing was provided to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; (3) onsite and offsite support organizational interactions were specifie The inspectors observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined and that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the emergency organizatio The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Station Emergency Manager promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency and directed the response until relieved by the Station Manage Required interactions between the licensee's emergency response organization and State and local support agencies were adequate and consistent with the scope of the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to assure that the following arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.C of NUREG 0654, Revision 1, namely:
(1)
accommodation of State and local staff at the licensee's near-site Local Emergency Operations Facility; (2) organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified.
'
Licensee contacts with offsite organizations were conducted in accordance with approved procedures and were consistent with the scope of the exercis Assistance resources from local agencies were available to the license No violations or deviations were identifie.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.D of NUREG 0654, Revision An emergency action level matrix was used to promptly identify and properly classify the emergency and escalate to more severe emergency classifications as the simulated emergency progresse Licensee actions in this area were considered adequat An inspector observed that the emergency classification system was consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure The system appeared to be adequate for classification of the simulated acciden The respective emergency procedures provided for i nit i a 1 and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated emergenc No violations or deviations were identifie.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations was establishe This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.E of NUREG 0654, Revision An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were established and available for use in providing information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response organizations, and to alert the licensee 1 s augmented emergency response organization The licensee notified the State within 15 minute The prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway was in p 1 ace and ope rationa The system was actuated during the exercise to simulate warning the public of significant events occurring at the plant sit No violations or deviations were identifie *
1 Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to assure that prov1s1ons existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section I I. F of NU REG 0654, Revision Communications among the licensee 1 s emergency response facilities and emergency organization, and between the licensee 1 s emergency response organization and local offsite authorities were adequate and consistent with the scope of the exercise and drills (fire and medical).
The public address system was used very effectively, especially for plant status reports, which were started after the TSC was activate No violations or deviations were identifie.
Public Education and Information This area was observed to determine that information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for disssemination to the public pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.G of NUREG 065 Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercis The information included details on how the public would be notified and what initial actions they should take in an emergenc A rumor control program was also in place. A Local Emergency News Center (LENC) was established and was well equippe The LENC functioned as a satellite to the primary news center in Richmond, however, and was manned by State and Federal personne The licensee operated from the center in Richmon No violations or deviations were identifie.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.Hof NUREG 0654, Revision The inspectors observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilities involved, and evaluated the equipment therein provided for emergency use during the exercis Emergency response facilities activated during the exercise included the control room, technical support center (TSC), operations support center (OSC), and the emergency operations facility ( EOF). Control Room -
The inspector observed that reactor control room operations personnel acted promptly to initiate required responses to the simulated emergenc Emergency procedures were readily available,
generally followed, and factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercises. It was noted that the Shift Technical Advisor was not effectively used by the Shift Superviso Centro l room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those assigned routine and special operational duties. The Shift Supervisor and control room operators were cognizant of their duties, responsi-bilities, and authoritie These personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system and demonstrated the ability to use specific procedures to determine and declare the proper classificatio Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated and promptly staffed following notification by the Station Emergency Manager of the simulated emergency conditions leading to the Alert Classificatio The facility staff appeared to be knowledgeable concerning their emergency duties, authorities, and responsibilitie Operation of the facility appeared to be adequat This facility was provided with adequate equipment for support of the assigned staf TSC security was promptly establishe It was noted that no formal announcement was made in the TSC that the Station Manager had assumed direction of the response effort. Although effective decisions were made, management appeared to place too much reliance on memory of plant details rather than consulting procedures or directing the staff to conduct researc Inspectors observed that the TSC radiological group maintained no tabular and/or survey map data to chronicle in-pl ant and off site radiological conditions reported by monitoring team At the onset of the offsite release, dose projection responsibilities were transferred from TSC to EOF with the TSC performing a backup functio Operations Support Center (OSC)
- The OSC was promptly staffed fo 11 owing activation of the emergency pl an by the Station Emergency Manage The OSC supervisor appeared to be cognizant to his duties and responsibilities and was clearly identifie Appropriate briefings by OSC Supervisors were provided to the entry team Radiation cautions were added by Health Physics personne Communications between the TSC and OSC were adequate and the flow of information was timely, efficient, and effective. The status board was continuously updated to provide a continuous means of accounting for OSC personne The OSC ALARA team made routine habitability surveys in the DSC and provided the OSC Director with current radiological conditions throughout the exercis Inplant Health Physics activities observed generally appeared to be adequat NRC and licensee observers did note, however, that Health Physics personnel were slow in responding to
- the contaminated injury in the first aid dril The first aid team, though working with a highly contaminated i ndi vi dua 1, did not check their dosimeters up to the time they placed the injured individual in the ambulanc Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF) -
The LEOF was promptly activated and staffed in a manner consistent with the exercise scenari The facility staff appeared to be knowledgeable regarding their emergency duties, authorities, and responsibilities, and the required operation appeared to be adequat The facility was provided with adequate equipment for support and maintenance of the assigned staf Security was promptly established and effectively maintaine Personnel in the LEOF attempted to troubleshoot problems in an effective manner, and the flow of plant parameter information appeared to be adequat Maintenance of logs and recordkeeping appeared to be adequat Personnel in the LEOF appeared to maintain accountability and continuously monitored habitabilit The inspector noted that plant data trends were not being maintained and that plant status updates and offsite information briefings could have been performed more frequently..
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II. I of NUREG 0654, Revision The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status, and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident. During the exercise, the engineering accident assessment team functioned adequately in analyzing the plant status to provide recommendations to the Station Emergency Manager concerning
- mitigating actions required to reduce damage to plant equipment, prevent releases of radioactive materials, and terminate the emergency conditio Radiological assessment activities involved both onsite and offsite group Offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the path of the plum Radiological effluent data was received in the TSC and LEO The offsite dose assessment and protection calculations were consistent with scenario value The inspector noted that the offsite monitoring team demonstrated familiarity with the use of the procedure and monitoring equipment and demonstrated good health physics measures during the collection and handling of air sample The team had no difficulty in locating predetermined monitoring location Radio communication was clear throughout the exercis Sample handling and labeling appeared to be adequat NRC and licensee observers noted that the offsite teams were not adequately briefed prior to deployment, that no check sources were available in the teams I kits to perform instrument operabi 1 i ty checks, and that unnecessary exposure was received due to long sampling times in the plum The conversion chart provided in EPIP 4.16 was not valid for samples of less than one cubic foo The NRC inspector noted that the batteries in the RM-14 instrument were both lo It was also noted that the pocket dosimeters were zeroed enroute to the first monitoring location rather than prior to deployment and that the team had been in the field two hours before the LEOF requested dosimeter reading Other areas where improvement could be made were:
(1)
Forceps provided in kits to handle filters; (2)
Air sampler should be directed toward the plant; ( 3)
An addi ti ona 1 team member should be provided or the driver given additional responsibilities; and (4)
More training should be provided on radio net contro As indicated above, these improvement i terns were al so observed by the license Items were documented during the licensee 1 s Controller/Evaluator Critique convened following termination of the exercis The licensee noted that the standard offsite monitoring team is confined to two members; therefore the comment cited in item (3) is not applicable. The driver in this instance was not a member of the monitoring tea The licensee's corrective actions for the identified exercise weaknesses are an inspector followup item and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-280, 281/85-33-01).
The inspector noted that the particulate filter and silver zeolite cartridges were counted together rather than separatel This methodology would not provide separate particulate and iodine informatio The
licensee acknowledged this findin This is an inspector followup item which will be evaluated during subsequent exercises (50-280, 281/85-33-02).
The inspector noted that the dose assessment calculations transmitted from the TSC to the LEOF were not passed on to the Recovery Manage These calculations would be important to protective action decisionmakin Deci si onmakers in the LEOF appeared not to understand the basis of the projected dose Consequently, the protective action recommendations could have been affecte The dose assessment team did not attempt to determine an estimate of the duration of the releas A default value of three hours was use This could have an effect on protective action decisionmakin Calculated dose rates verified by offsite measurements were not emphasize In addition, an estimate of the total dose received up to the current time should have been calculated and presented with the projected doses to assist in protective action decisionmakin NRC and licensee observers noted that the Dose Assessment Coordinator had very little involvement in protective action decisionmakin No violations or deviations were identifie.
Protective Response (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions, consistent with federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly pursuant to the require-ments of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria defined in Section I of NUREG 0654, Revision The inspector observed the licensee 1 s program for personnel accountabilit The inspector noted that upon sounding of the site evacuation alarm, personne 1 appeared to proceed promptly to designated assembly point Initial accountability appeared to be completed approximately 27 minutes after initial accountability check The protective measures decision making process was observed by the inspectors. It was noted that the initial protective action recommendation ( PAR) under the genera 1 emergency condition was not consistent with the licensee 1 s procedur The PAR should have included sheltering from zero to two miles completely around the plant, in addition to zero to five miles in the downwind three sectors (67\\ degrees).
The licensee acknowledged this findin This is an inspector followup item which will be evaluated during subsequent exercises (50-280, 281/85-33-03).
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Radiological Exposure Control (82301)
This area was observed to determine that methods for controlling radiological exposures in an emergency were established and implemented for emergency workers, and that such methods included exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(ll), and specific criteria defined in Section II.K of NUREG 0654, Revision An inspector noted that the radiological exposures were controlled throughout the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers and by conducting periodic radio 1 ogi ca 1 surveys in the emergency response _facilitie Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of emergency actions, and adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection were available for use as require Health Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination control, and radiation area access appeared to be adequat Health Physics supervisors were observed to brief teams adequately, with the exception of offsite monitoring teams (paragraph 14).
Dosimetry was available and was use High range dosimeters were available if neede No violations or deviations were identifie.
Medical and Fire Drills (82301)
A medical drill and a fire drill were also held in conjunction with the annual exercis Objectives of both drills were accomplishe The inspector noted that, while the Smithfield Volunteer Fire Department responded in 30 minutes, the Surry Volunteer Fire Department took 52 minutes to arriv The inspector noted that security for the fire drill was posted on the access road to the fire area rather than at the main road, which resulted in the fo 11 owing:
(1)
The Smithfield Volunteer Fire Department took the wrong access road; and (2) A semitractor-trailer inadvertently turned onto the access could have prevented access of the fire department truck were discussed with the license The licensee concurred finding roa This These items with these This is an inspector followup item which will be evaluated during subsequent drills (50-280, 281/85-33-04).
No violations or deviations were identifie..
Recovery and Reentry Planning 1 This area was observed to determine that general plans are made for recovery and re-entry pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.H. and specific criteria defined in Section II.M of NUREG 0654, Revision The licensee briefly discussed recovery and reentry planning, but the exercise was terminated at this poin No violations or deviations were identifie The licensee 1s critique of the emergency exercise was observed to that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise were brought attention of management for corrective action, as required 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F, and the criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I assure to the by specific A formal critique was held on October 5, 1985, with exercise controllers and observers, licensee management, and NRC representative Weaknesses i dent ifi ed during the exercise and p 1 ans for corrective action were discusse Licensee action on weaknesses identified will be reviewed during a subsequent inspectio Observation of the licensee controller/evaluator critique, held prior to the exit critique, was included as part of the exercise evaluatio Observation disclosed that the licensee conducted a detailed critique of the exercise and operation of the emergency response facilitie The critique included identification and discussion of weaknesses and re qui red improvements, documentation thereof, and required corrective action Significant findings were summarized during the exit critiqu No violations or deviations were identifie.
Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Report A copy of the RAC report pertaining to offsite support agency performance will be provided via a separate transmitta.
Inspector Followup (92701) (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-280, 281/84-27-01:
Dose assessment personnel in TSC and LEOF should cross-check dose calculations in an exercis The licensee demonstrated an ability to cross-check radiological dose assessment calculations between the two facilities.