IR 05000280/1985022
| ML18143B349 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1985 |
| From: | Burke D, Marlone Davis, Elrod S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18143B348 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-85-22, 50-281-85-22, NUDOCS 8508080252 | |
| Download: ML18143B349 (6) | |
Text
Report Nos. :
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 50-280/85-22 and 50-281/85-22 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
June 4 - July 9, 1985 (/(YI,, ~ 0 f;
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Inspectors:
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D. J. Burke, Senior Resider1 Inspector fl)tfx-3~_))_
~Or M. J.Oavis, Resident Insp tor Approved by:
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S. Elrod, Section CnTef Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY
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'7 *-1 '?.. :iY5 Date Signed Scope:
This inspection involved 200 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of plant operations and operating records, plant maintenance and surveillance, plant security, followup of events, licensee actions on previous enforcement items and licensee event reports (LERs).
Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
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L Persons Contacted Licensee Employees REPORT DETAILS R. F. Saunders, Station Manager D. L. Benson, Assistant Station Manager H. L. Miller, Assistant Station Manager D. A. Christian, Superintendent of Operations E. S. Grecheck, Superintendent of Technical Services J. W. Patrick, Superintendent of Maintenance D. Rickeard, Supervisor, Safety Engineering Staff S. Sarver, Superintendent of Health Physics R. Johnson, Operations Supervisor R. Driscoll, Site Quality Assurance Manager W. R. Runner, Supervisor, Administrative Services Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors, chemistry, health physics, plant maintenance, security, engineering, administrative, records, contractor personnel and supervisor.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on a biweekly basis with certain* individuals in paragraph The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed)
Violation (280,281/84-20-0l),
Inadequate maintenance procedures for setting motor operated va 1 ve (MDV) torque switche Procedures have been revised to ensure proper torque switch inspections and settings (EMP-C-MOV-50).
In addition, the licensee has reverified the torque switch settings on all but nine Unit 1 safety-related MOVs which were satisfactorily tested. Open item (280,281/84-20-02) is also close (Closed) Violation (280,281/81-15-06), Failure to periodically review plant procedures in accordance with ANSI N1 Administrative Procedure ADM-13, Review of Procedures, re qui res periodic review of station procedures by appropriate personne 1 to ensure adequacy and current applicability.
- 2 (Closed) Violation (280/82-04-01), Inoperable steam flow instruments on A main steam lin The proper use of approved tags for pulling fuses and the pre-startup checklists ensure system status and operabilit Enforcement Action (EA)-58 was previously close (Closed) Violation (280,281/84-30-01), Inadequate electrical testing and maintenance procedure The station procedures have been revised and new procedures issued (EMP-C-EPL-146 and 148) to ensure appropriate preplanning of the electrical activitie (Closed) Violation (281/84-34-01), Failure to follow an Operating and Administrative Procedur Retraining was implemented and the Operating Procedure upgraded to ensure complianc This violation was incorrectly identified as (280/84-34-01) in the report detail (Closed) Violation (281/84-36-01), Opposite auxiliary feedwater unit (AFW) train not available in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.6. The AFW system drawing (FM-688) was corrected, and procedures upgraded to ensure compliance with the requirement (Closed)
Violation (280/85-01-01),
Failure to follow Operating Procedure 1-0P-l Operations personnel were reinstructed and additional guidance is being incorporated into the startup procedure (Closed) Violation (281/85-07-01), Charging pump intermediate seal cooler not operable per TS 3.13.B.3. This event was emphasized to and reviewed by all operating and management personne (Closed) Violation (280,281/85-09-0l), Electrical cable tray covers and supports out of position or loos The covers and supports were corrected, and periodic inspections and reviews are performed during electrical maintenance or modifications to ensure compliance with the requirement.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
Operations Units 1 and 2 were inspected and reviewed during the inspection perio The inspectors routinely toured the control room and other plant areas to verify that plant operations, testing and maintenance were being conducted in accordance with the facility TS and procedure The inspectors verified that monitoring equipment was recording as required; equipment was properly tags; and plant housekeeping efforts were adequat The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established; clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures; excess material or equipment
- was stored properly; and combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiousl During tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, piping hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment and instrument calibration date Certain tours were conducted on backshift Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital battery rooms, diesel generator rooms, fire pump house, switchgear rooms, control rooms, auxiliary building, containment and cable penetration areas to verify certain breaker and equipment conditions and positions for safety related component The inspectors routinely conduct partial walkdowns of emergency core cooling systems and engineered safety features systems to verify operability and observe maintenance and testing of certain equipment and components in these system On June 12, 1985, with Unit 2 in a cold shutdown condition, reactor coolant system flow indication anomalies during jogging of the C reactor coolant pump led to the discovery that the C loop cold leg stop valve (MOV-2595)
had failed close The valve disc assembly had separated from the stem assembl The most probable cause for the failure was determined to be manual overtorquing of the valve during the refueling outage to stop leakage past the valve seat. The stem to disc locking pin was found sheared, and subsequent valve cycling is believed to have caused the threaded connection between the stem shaft and disc assemblies to become disconnecte Thread damage was al so discovered at the bottom of the threaded stem shaf The licensee removed the disc assembly and performed a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation for Unit operation with the loop C cold leg stop valve disc remove Plans call for the replacement of MOV-2595 in the C cold leg at a future outage when replacement parts are availabl Unit 1 operated at power for the duration of the reporting perio No reactor trips or shutdowns occurre Unit 2 began the reporting period in a cold shutdown condition completing the refueling and 10 year Inservice Inspection outag A reactor startup was conducted on June 27, 1985, to perform low power physics testing following refuelin During physics testing control rod F-12 in Control Bank B failed to respond after reaching 24 step The reactor was shut down and the rod did unlatch (scram) upon deman The problem was later determined to be a loose pin in a electrical connector inside containment not supplying power to the lift coi Following repairs, the unit was restarted on June 28; Unit 2 ended the reporting period at power.
4 Licensee Event Report Review The inspectors reviewed the LERs listed below to ascertain that NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine the appropriateness of corrective action taken and planne Certain LERs were reviewed in greater detail to verify corrective action and determine compliance with TS and other regulatory requirement The review included examination of logbooks, internal correspondence and records review of Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee meeting minutes and discussions with various staff member (Closed) LER 280/85-12 concerned a low chemical addition tank (CAT) level caused by MOV-CS-102B reopening fo 11 owing remote manua 1 closure. A failed closed contact caused the valve to reopen, The flow path was isolated; the failed contacts replaced; and the CAT refilled to the required leve (Closed) LER 281/85-05 concerned the locking out of certain fire suppression systems while assigned fire watchstanders were not patrolling the affected area A specific procedure was developed for operations personnel to lockout carbon dioxide systems in safety-related area The fire watch-stander is required to report to the shift supervisor to ensure the physical boundaries of the assigned zones are reviewed and understoo The fire watchstander is required to read and sign an instruction sheet detailing his responsibilitie (Closed)
LER 280/84-26 concerned a reactor trip which occurred during reactor protection system logic testing (PT 8.1).
The B reactor trip breaker opened when the newly installed shunt trip test pushbutton for the A reactor trip breaker was actuated during performance of the tests. The open B breaker led to a reactor trip signal that opened the A trip breaker and the A bypass breake An inspection of the B reactor trip breaker yielded no discrepancies. The shunt trip devices were successfully tested with the unit shutdow No specific cause could be determined a 1 though personne 1 error was suspected (wrong button actuated). All equipment was subsequently proven to function properly and additional identification tags were installe (Closed) LER 281/84-17 concerned the loss of AFW crosstie capability from Unit 1 to Unit 2 during Unit 2 operatio A drawing error in the design change package that installed the crossties led to the AFW isolation from Unit The drawing (FM-68B) was correcte The Unit 2 AFW piping and valves were verified correct per the station drawings (See Inspection Report 50-281/84-36). Plant Physical Protection The inspectors verified the following by observation: Gates and doors in Protected and Vital Area barriers were closed and locked when not attende r
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5 Isolation zones described in the* physical security plans were not compromised or obstructe Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessary for plant access control.