IR 05000280/1985025
| ML18143B439 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 08/20/1985 |
| From: | Burke D, Marlone Davis, Elrod S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18143B438 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-85-25, 50-281-85-25, IEB-80-12, NUDOCS 8509040321 | |
| Download: ML18143B439 (6) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:* Report Nos. : UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 50-280/85-25 and 50-281/85-25 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.: 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name: Surry 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: July 10 - August 5, 1985 Inspectors:~---'---=-~~~~-={:l.__c..,,_.:..*~-{)-~_-_* -'-~---I-,!--'-~~~~ D. Approved
Elrod, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Signed &/q?/h; 11vr 'D'<ite 'Signed Scope: This routine inspection involved 200 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of plant operations and operating records, plant maintenance and surveillance, plant security, followup of events, licensee actions on previous enforcement items and licensee event reports (LER).
Results: In the areas inspected, no violations were identifie \\
- Persons Contacted Licensee Employees REPORT DETAILS R. F. Saunders, Station Manager D. L. Benson, Assistant Station Manager H. L. Miller, Assistant Station Manager D. A. Christian, Superintendent of Operations E. S. Grecheck, Superintendent of Technical Services J. W. Patrick, Superintendent of Maintenance D. Rickeard, Supervisor, Safety Engineering Staff R. Johnson, Operations Supervisor R. Driscoll, Site Quality Assurance Manager Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors, chemistry, health physics, plant maintenance, security, engineering, administrative, records, contractor personnel and supervisor.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on a biweekly basis with certain individuals in paragraph The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) Violation ( 280/83-30-01 and 281/83-31-01), Failure to Take Prompt Corrective Actions on Four Adverse Condition This violation was previously closed in Inspection Reports 50-280, 281/84-07 and should have closed all of the following numbers: (281/83-31-01), (281/83-31-02), (280/83-30-01) and (281/83-31-04), which were identified (incorrectly) with the violatio (Closed) Violation (280, 281/84-10-02), Inoperable Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Vent Al though the licensee may have had appropriate reasons for operating with the head vents isolated, a specific exemption request for not meeting the 10 CFR 50.44 requirement was not submitted to the NRC following issuance of the rule, which resulted in the violatio (Closed) Violation (281/81-04-01), Isolation of the Flow Path From the Boric Acid Tanks to the Unit 2 Charging Pump The boric acid piping, insulation, heat tracing, etc., have been replaced in this area, and an independent verification program for valve tagging has been implemente *
(Closed) Violation (280/81-04-01), Valve Testing/Exercising Requirements Not Me The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI valve testing requirements are being met utilizing expanded, more comprehensive testing and administrative procedures and increased numbers of test personne (Closed) Violation (281/82-01-01), Inadequate Corrective Actions on Penetration A-18 Leakag Procedures and training were strengthened to ensure proper documentation and actions on Type B and C containment penetration. Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio. Operations Units 1 and 2 were inspected and reviewed during this inspection perio The inspectors routinely toured the control room and other plant areas to verify that plant operations, testing and maintenance were being conducted in accordance with the facility Technical Specifications (TS) and procedure The inspectors verified that: monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequat The inspectors al so determined that appropriate radiation contra ls were properly established, that clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, that excess material or equipment was stored properly and that combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiousl During tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, piping hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment and instrument calibration date Certain tours were conducted on backshift Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital battery rooms, diesel generator rooms, fire pump house, switchgear rooms, control rooms, auxiliary building, containment and cable penetration areas to verify certain breaker and equipment conditions and positions for safety-related component The inspectors routinely conducted partial wa l kdown s of emergency core cooling systems and engineered safety features systems to verify operability and observe maintenance and testing of certain equipment and components in these system Unit 1 began the reporting period operating at full powe On August 4, 1985, Unit 1 experienced a reactor trip when personrie l in containment entered the A main coolant loop room to adjust a valve on the loop header and, inadvertently, bumped the A loop flow instrumen-tation lines causing a momentary spike on the reactor coolant system loop flow instrumentation and logic which caused a reactor tri *
Safety systems responded normally during the transient except for one steam generator blowdown trip valve and the A main feedwater pump which tripped instead of going into its recirculation mod The pump and valve are being inspecte Unit 2 began the reporting period at low power following a refueling outag The turbine was ramped down and taken off line on July 8 to perform a balance move due to high vibration readings on the main turbin The turbine went back on line later in the day and the unit operated at power for the remainder of the reporting perio. Inspection Followup of Notification of Unusual Event On July 23, 1985, at 9:32 a.m., the licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) in accordance with the Surry Emergency Plan and procedures due to high gaseous activity in the process vent release pat The process vent blowers (300 standard cubic feet per minute) were immediately secured and the activity source isolated within approximately three minute Sampling and analysis of the release and review of the process vent radiation monitor charts and data determined that the maximum release amounted to 75 percent of TS limit The gaseous release occurred when manual valve BR-79 was opened to transfer radioactive gases from surge tank 1-BR-TK-6 to a holding tan Due to miscommunication between the valve operator and the control room personnel, valve BR-79 was rapidly opened instead of being "cracked" open slightly for the transfe The tank pressure (approximately 95 psig) lifted a relief valve in the transfer line, which relieved to the process ven The xenon-133 release was calculated to result in a total dose of 0.0015 millirem at the site boundary. A similar event occurred in July 198 A permanent caution tag was posted at valve BR-79 to ensure careful operation of this valv The inspectors also noted disparities between the process vent Victoreen and Kaman radiation monitor displays, which are being reviewe This is an Open Item (280/85-25-01). Fo 11 ow_up of Open Items Unit 2 LER 281/80-05, Leakage Through Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger Diaphragm Plate, discussed weld cracking in the recirculation spray heat exchanger diaphragm (end) plates. The defects were inspected and repaired, and the heat exchangers* pressure teste Rubber o-ri ng gaskets were also installed between the diaphragm plate and the heat exchanger cover to ensure integrity of the diaphragms during accident conditions. This LER was closed in Inspection Report 50-281/80-37, and also applies to Unit 1, where similar inspections and repairs were made and gaskets use The licensee also performs routine cleaning and inspection of the recirculation spray heat exchangers and tubes to verify operability and integrit Un resolved Item (281/80-39-04), Review of Actions to Prevent Long-term Deterioration of Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger Tubes, is close The copper source was appar-ently due to the grinding and weld repairs to the copper-nickel diaphragm plate... 4 (Closed) Open Item (281/84-20-03) Bypass Reactor Trip Breaker Returned to Adjacent Cubicle, the bypass breakers were returned to their original cubicles; test leads are installed on the main breakers to simplify testin (Closed) Open Item (280/83-08-01), Inspection and Testing of Service Water Motor Operated Valves (MOV) MOV-SW-103A-The valve operators have been replaced with upgraded units and the valves are tested quarterly; recent tests have been successfu (Closed) Open Item (280/82-27-01), Design Change 81-22 Review and Testin Reviews and appropriate testing were conducted to en sure operabilit (Closed) Open Item (281/82-17-01), Conax Electrical Penetration Support Bolt Adequac Documentation and analyses verified that the existing penetration assembly flange and bolts would support the assembly during seismic event (Closed) Open Item (281/81-04-04), Upgrading of Procedures and Personnel Training for Modifications to the Plant Ventilation System Appropriate training and procedures have been provided on these and other modified system (Closed) Open Item (280/81-22-06) Adjustment of Limit and Torque Switches on Motor Operated Valve This item is being followed under Open Item (281/85-07-02), Safety-related MOV inspection progra (Closed) Open Item (280/84-07-01) Additional Precautions for Working on Radwaste System Procedures have been revi sect and additional air sampling and monitoring implemente (Closed) Open Item (281/83-31-03), Intermediate Range (IR) Nuclear Instrumentation (NI) Trip Setpoints. The Units 1 and 2 IR NI rod stop and trip setpoints are currently in the 20-25 percent power rang The IR NI's were recently recalibrated due to the "low leakage" core (Closed) IE Bulletin 80-12, Decay Heat Removal System Operabilit This item was closed in Inspection Reports 50-280, 281/84-10 and is reclosed considering NUREG CR-4005 item The current TS require operability of two independent heat removal loops. Abnormal Procedures (AP-27) address the loss of these cooling system In addition Operating Procedures (OP-14) require opening of the electrical breakers to the residual heat removal inlet motor operated valves to prevent their inadvertent closur. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Construction activity has begun on the Surry Power Station Dry Cask ISFS The site has been cleared of trees and the soil leveling and compaction is in progres On July 30, 1985, the inspector and a team from NRC
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headquarters met at Surry to discuss and review the Safety Analysis Report, and performed a walk-through of the proposed cask pathway from the spent fuel pool to the ISFSI site. A Safety Evaluation Report is being prepared by the NR Spent fuel shipment to Department of Energency facilities in Idaho has also been initiate. Licensee Event Report Review The inspectors reviewed the LERs listed below to ascertain that NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine the appropriateness of corrective action taken and planne Certain LERs were reviewed in greater detail to verify corrective action and determine compliance with TS and other regulatory requirement The review included examination of logbooks, internal correspondence and records review of Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee meeting minutes and discussions with various staff member (Closed) LER 280/85-10 concerned the intermediate range high flux trip bistables being set too hig Lack of experience in developing setpoints for 11 low leakage 11 cores was a possible contributor to this even The setpoints were subsequently rese (Closed) LER 280/85-09 concerned the failure of the normal letdown pressure control valve to control plant pressure at 350 psig during solid plant operatio Relief valve PCV-1455C lifted at 410 psi Normal pressure control devices were used to return primary pressure to 350 psi The letdown pressure control valve was subsequently adjusted to maintain letdown pressur. Plant Physical Protection The inspectors verified the following by observation: Gates and doors in Protected and Vital Area barriers were closed and locked when not attende Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromised or obstructe Personne 1 were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessary for plant access control. }}