IR 05000275/1993030

Insp Repts 50-275/93-30 & 50-323/93-30 on 930930.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Recent Organizational Changes at Util & Various Issues at Plant Re Use of Crane Near Turbine Bldg & Recent Boron Dilution Events at Plant

ML16342C023
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	10/28/1993
From:	Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML16342A316	List: IR 05000275/1993030 ML16342A315
References
50-275-93-30-MM, 50-323-93-30, NUDOCS 9312030048
Download: ML16342C023 (52)

Text

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report Nos:,

Docket Nos:

License Nos:

Licensee:

Facility Name:

Meeting at:

Meeting Conducted:

Prepared by:

Approved by:

50-275/93-30 and 50-323/93-30 50-275 and 50-323 DPR-80 and DPR-82 Pacific'Gas and Electric Company Nuclear Power Generation, B14A 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 P.

O.

Box 770000 San Francisco, California 94177 Diablo Canyon Units 1 and

Region V Office, Walnut Creek, California September 30, 1993 D.

E. Corporandy, Project Inspector I o (ZZ/gg Meeting Summary:

son, ie Reac Projects Section

a e sgne This management meeting discussed recent organizational changes at PG&E and current issues at Diablo Canyon, which included:

1) the use of a crane near the turbine building, 2).recent boron dilution events at Diablo Canyon, 3)

an update on the

KV and

KV cable failures, and 4) key findings of the licensee's safety system functional audit of the residual heat removal (RHR)

system.

9312030048 931028 PDR ADOCK 05000275

PDR,

J

0 TA LS l.

eetin Partici ants Pacific Gas and Electric Com an

'. Rueger, Senior Vice President and General Manager, Nuclear Power Generation Business Unit J.'Townsend, Vice President and Plant Manager, Diablo Canyon Operations J. Sexton, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Services B. Giffin, Manager, Maintenance Services R. Powers, Manager, Nuclear guality Services M. Angus, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Services J. Holden, Acting Manager, Operations Services R. Russell, Nuclear Regulatory Services uclear Re ulator Commission B. Faulkenberry, Regional Administrator S. Richards, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects C. VanDenburgh, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch L. Miller, Chief, Reactor Safety Branch P. Johnson, Chief, Reactor ProjectsSection I W. Ang, Chief, Engineering Section

'H. Hiller, Diablo Canyon Senior Resident Inspector S. Peterson, Diablo Canyon Project Hanager, NRR A. Wilford, NRR D.

Cor por andy, Project Inspector 2.

g~c ground On September 30, 1993, an open meeting was held at the NRC Region V

office in Walnut Creek, California, between representatives of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PGEE)

and the NRC.

The purpose of this meeting was to discuss recent organizational changes at PG&E and current issues which included:

I) the use of a crane near the turbine building, 2) recent boron dilution events at Diablo Canyon, 3)

an update of the

KV and

KV cable failures, and 4)

key findings of the licensee's safety system functional audit of the residual heat removal (RHR) system.

3.

eeti Discussions The meeting convened at 9:00 a.m.

- Hr. Rueger opened 'the meeting by noting that PGKE had experienced a good year but that he was concerned about the effectiveness of PGKE's corrective action program for items of relatively low safety significance and about the communication of management expectations to employees.

Consequently, the licensee had targeted these areas for improvement.

ucle r ualit Servi s Or ani atio Mr. Powers discussed changes to the Nuclear guality Services (NgS)

Organization and ways in which NgS was working to improve the effectiveness of the corrective action program for items of relatively

low safety significance.

A copy of the presentation material on the NgS-organization is included as an enclosure to this report.

Highlights of the discussion =follow.

Hr. Powers pointed out that PG&E's corrective action program had been responsive to more significant problems, but that some less safety significant problems were continuing to recur."

He attributed this to a less than effective corrective action program for the less safety

.

significant problems.

He explained that in most of the cases, a formal root cause evaluation had not been performed.

The licensee's procedure for root chuse determinations provides detailed guidelines for evaluating problems, but there are no requirements to follow the guidelines.

The licensee found that quality assurance (gA) evaluations had not been completed for most of the recurring problems.

The licensee is now

'evising its procedures to require performance of one of the two guideline methods for root cause determination when an action request (AR) requires a quality evaluation (gE).

Furthermore, the revised procedure will require that such root cause determinations be performed by an engineer trained in root cause evaluation.

Cl h

Hr. Faulkenberry asked if the licensee was concerned that the threshold for evaluating issues might be too low.

Mr. Powers responded that PGSE was trying to maintain an effective gA evaluation process, which iricluded maintaining an acceptance threshold to determine which ARs require gEs.

Hr. Powers mentioned that in that vein, the licensee was planning to conduct an action forum of about 40 employees and outside facilitators in November 1993, to explore ways of improving the effectiveness of the correc'tive action program.

Hs. Hiller asked how the licensee was dealing with AR reviews during refueling outages and noted that the line organizations appeared to be fully occupied with the scheduled activities of the outage.

Hr. Giffin responded that the licensee was working to improve in this area.

He acknowledged that PGKE recognized that failure to address an AR during an outage 'could potentially impact operations during and after startup.

Messrs.

Rueger and Giffin addressed the issue of management expectations and noted that fewer problems were encountered at Diablo Canyon when activities. were well planned.

They recognized that employees tend to focus on the issues they perceive receive the most management attention.

Consequently, management has the responsibility to emphasize personnel accountability and plant performance.

To that end, PGSE senior management conducts plant walkabouts with foremen a minimum of once per week.

Hr. Faulkenberry remarked that it was important that the licensee continue to strive to sustain the plant's successful performance and to seek additional improvements.

pron Dilution vent Mr. Holden discussed the two boron dilution events of April and July 1993.

These events did not ha've,a significant impact on reactivity increase, but Hr. Holden considered them to be. significant events because they showed that the licensee still had more to do to improve in plant operations.

Hs. Peterson asked why the second event had occurred, in l

-3-

'light of the first.

Hr. Holden noted that there were differences between the first and second boron dilution events, but acknowledged that more timely corrective action on the first event might have prevented the second event.

Hr. Molden described procedure changes which the licensee had made to preclude future boron dilution events.

He also noted that the licensee was in the process of reviewing other procedures to identify other ways in which undiluted water might be added to the reactor coolant system.

Hr. Miller pointed out that the licensee had missed opportunities to caution operations personnel in a more timely manner following the first dilution event.

For example, shift supervisors and operations managers could have communicated the information to operations personnel.

M

. Townsend "suggested tKat part of the problem was that the licensee did not fully recognize the significance of the situation at the time.

Use of a Crane Near the Turbine Buildin Hr. Townsend discussed a September 15, 1993, incident in which the licensee used a large crane to lift air conditioner condensers onto the roof of the Diablo Canyon administration building.

The NRC resident inspectors had expressed concern as to whether the licensee had properly considered potential risks to the Unit 2 emergency diesel generator (EDG)

exhausts and if the exclusion area around the main bank and startup transformers was adequate.

Hr. Townsend stated that he believed the crane operators had been made aware of the precautions and electrical hazards associated with this job and noted that the crane had not been operated within the exclusion area and that the job had been completed without incident.

Hr. VanDenburgh questioned if the basis for the exclusion area had taken into account the large size of the crane.

Hr. Townsend stated that he would further review the basis for the exclusion area.

U date on the

KV and

KV Cable Failures Mr. Giffin summarized that PG&E had determined the root cause of the

KV cable failure to be a chemical attack on the cable jacket, probably from fatty acids deposited on the cable from solvents used during Diablo Canyon's construction phase.

The 12.KV'cables have now been replaced with new cables that have a polyethylene jacket, which resists the type of chemical attack experienced at Diablo Canyon.

The licensee had not yet determined the root cause of the

KV cable failures, and studies were still ongoing.

The licensee plans to replace the 4 KV cables to auxiliary salt water pump 1-2 during the next refueling outage.

afet S stem Functional Audit SSFI o

the Residual Heat Remova S ste Significant findings of the subject audit were presented by the licensee as shown in the enclosed presentation materia ~

~

4.

~d'r.

Faulkenberry explained that details of the Region V consolidation with Region IV were still being worked out, but that, in the interim the licensee should continue to report to the same NRC counterparts.

Hr.

Faulkenberry thanked the licensee participants for their participation, and adjourned the meeting at 12:30 II

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR)

SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL AUDIT REVIEW (SS EAR)

"VERTICAL SLICE AUDIT" RHR$

SSFAR PLANNING

~

One year in planning

~

Uses PRA input

~

Multidisciplined team

~

Training (system, simulator, INPO observation techniques)

~

Detailed technical review 'plans

~

Budget and resources committed RHR2

CONCLUSIONS Ma'or audit issues

~

RHR suction piping elevation

~

1ST program improvements RHR pump 1-1 performance testing MOV/AOV stroke times Manual valve 8741 Check valve leak testing AHA~

I 0 ~

'T

T A

'T l

g I P

y k

I I

'

T ~.p

~

~

o~

I

t

~

~

IJ

I*7 8703

! I'iQP I ~

600 P~4'p lO PR1 8708.

~PRav L 9005A 0 tn I:.IARraWG 8804A PUMP SUC IIOtt I.

~

1GV. 64th I

I l

CI 874I I~)t u: I IIIC.

Wa t)tt 5!ORA~

lOOP 2<

8809A PR1 i-600 PSIG IICV-638 Q.

8716A 5734A a716A

~ CVCS B700A 898)

i%U LCCS tNP 3 4.

888cl 8/I68 D.

}ICY-670

HCV-637 87zne 87268 IICV-1/3 RESIOUAI. fIKA1 RKMQVAI. PttMS 1-2 tr~ 4<

."~N1>>rt-i PR1 500 PSIG.

SPRAY RHR SN flC l

l I

87008 RECIRC. SIIMP

8982B l

Bb04B ~

St PUMP l-2 fCV-65tB SL'C1IOH 1'707 8987A

I NCRB ADDRESSlNG lST CONCERNS NCR N041 n w CR M042 new NCR N043 net NCR 028 exi in MOV/AOVstroke time ManUal Valve 8741 not RHR Pump 1-1 Testing N028 vias existing basis for 6 valves in IST Plan.

and Performance NCR to address check questioned by SSFAR.

issues.

valves in IST Program.

NCR expanded concern TRG expanded to to review all stroke review all manual times.

valves.

TRG 'expanded to review overall adequacy of IST Plan.

TRG expanded to review all Series A Performance Tests.

SSFAR concerned with leak testing of 3 ECCS pump suction check valves.

(8924/8977/8981)

'TAG expanded to systematically review of all check valve OTHER ISSUES

~

Failure to perform required dedication activities on components installed in RHR pump seal assembly

~

Annunciator response manual procedures lack conformance with field setpoints

~

RHR heat exchange/CCW interface problems FoUling factors Minimum and maximum flow settings CCV/ flovr instrument accuracy standard AHBA

I, I

~

Improved communications between Westinghouse and NES

~

Improved quality of scaling calculations System team concept

~

Technical capability of NES (PEGISYS,

'xperienced personnel)

II

CONCLLISIONS Antici ated im rovements resultin from RHR SSFAR C

~

Identified mid-loop limitations

~

Contributed to improved testing plans

~

Identified reductions in margin

~

Material condition improvements (tags, ARs, tubing clips, electrical supports, etc.)

~

Supporting documents improved (drawings, caiculations, DCMs)

RHRQ

FUTURE DlRECTION

~

QA surveillances and audits will be targeted in areas identified to have problems during this SSFAR

~

NQS evaluating other systems for future SSFARs RHB12

NQS ORGANIZATION HIGHLIGHTS

~

Supervisory selections completed Directors selected May 1993 Seniors selected June 1993

~

Relocation of =26 employees from San Francisco to San Luis Obispo area nearing completion

~

Consolidation completed and organizational duplications eliminated

~

CI teams for trending program and Technical Review Groups (TRGs) established

~

Early Warning Indicators established and being finalized

~

Enhanced communication and quality oversight coordination NOS2

NUCLEAR UAIIT% SERVICES Maasger

, Robert P. Powers Nuclear Quality Services Director Jeffrev A. Hays Site Qccstity Control Director DavM A.Taggart Site Qasllty Assurance Director Jacqaeilne R. Hinds Naclcar &feb Eagfneertng Director Jsy C. Yoang Gcnecal ONce Qnalky Senior DickCrandas hfahtenance Inspection Senior Charles Doagherty Engineer. 4 Nods. hssesscncnt Scnlor Ken Bych Indepcn. Safety Englnccrhg Senior Glen Fcrcz QA Prey ans Management Senior Don Geske hfodltlcatlon Inspection Senior Robert Glyna IO Operations h Malat. Asscssnccnt Senior Kent Ollnr HPES Coorcmnator Senior Mchael Jawbson General ONce QC Sentor Derek BeN Inspection Ptannlag Senior Richard Flohaag Technical Servlccs Assesscneat Scnlor ANan CovNe RelhbiQty Engineering Senior Mark Frennd Supplier Assess. - Western Reg.

Scntor John So PcocnrelNcnt Inspectha Scnlor Quality Support Senior Nnclear Exce5eace Team Senior Sccppller Assess. - Eastern Reg.

Scnlor TerylMcKnlgt QC Eaglncerhg

k II

NUCLEAR SAFET Y ENGINEERING HIGHLIGHTS

~

Integrated reliabiiity engineering into NSE

~

integrated the OSRG and OEA groups into one ISEG

~

Consolidated trending activities into one gl OUP

~

implemented a

CI team on NPG quality trending

~

Assumed safet evaluation r

NLJCLEAR SAFETY ENGINEERING EARLY WARNING INOICATORS

~

SREF OEA backlo Status No adverse trend.

~

lSEG OSRG back lo Status No trend.

Assessment completed of outstanding issues.

Schedules and priorities established to resolve items.

~

Com onent database DCN and FCT in uts Status No adverse trends.

~

Other com onent database chan es Status No adverse trends.

~

Em lo ee feedback Status-No adverse trend..

~

Substance of NSE documents Status No. adverse trend.

~

Overtime usa e

Status No adverse tren SITE QUALITYCONTROL HIGHLIGHTS

~

Consolidation of Quality Control functions

~

Realignment of welding inspection and NDE activities

~

Timeliness of quality problem identification and QE initiation

V

SITE QUALITYCONTROL EARLY WARNING IN-DICATORS

~

AR reviews Status No adverse trends.

Performance improving.

~

Procedure review backlo Status No adverse trends.

~

Recei t ins ection Status No adverse trends.

~

Procurement document reviews Status No adverse trends.

C ins ections Status No adverse trends.

~

Ins ection su ort Status No adverse trends.

. ~

Overtime Status No adverse trends.

~

Em lo ee in ut Status No adverse trend Jl

GENERAL OFFICE QUALITY HIGHLIGHTS

~

Corisolidation of NES QC function with General Office Quality Assurance I

lt

~

Supplier 'audits. performed as required and QSL maintained

~

Initiated effort to minimize the number of qualified suppliers maintained and maximize the use of the third-.party supplier audits NQSS

f t

GENERAL OFFICE gUALITY EARLY WARNING INDICATORS Product Status:

ualit No adverse trends noted in:

Supplier quality problem reports Receipt rejection rates Procedures approved by GO 'uality Sub'ective ualit Status:

No adverse trends noted in:

Quality of supplier assessments and findings Concerns expressed by GO quality personnel Substance of document review comments Sick leave usage S hedule ualit Status:

No adverse trends noted in:

Extensions for annual or triennial supplier requalifications Document review turnaround time Overtime usage

SITE QUALITYASSURANCE HIGHLIGHTS

~

Provides single focus for quality surveillances and for quality oversight of corrective actions and Nonconformances

~

Plant site resource enhanced Movement of staff from San Francisco Technical qualifications strengthened (eg.

10 licensed operators)

. ~

QA assessments performance-based and site focused

~

Audit support staff consolidated with site QA section

~

Level of effort maintained in area of training, special audits, and assessments N 0811

~

A i

~

~

SITE QUALITYASSURANCE SPECIAL AUDITS AND ASSESSMENTS

~'pecial EQ audit

~

SSFAR on RHR system

~

Repetitive problem trends surveillance

~

CCW surveillance

~

Equipment control guidelines NR81R

X

SITE CIuALITYASSuRANCE EARLY WARNING INDICATORS ua it of Audits Status:-

No adverse trends.

improvement based on early formal feedback.

alit of Sur veillances Status:

No adverse trends.

Formal feedback measure being established.

ud t Re ort issuance Status:

No adverse trends.

Audits performed and reported as required.

Corrective Action Verification E-AFRs Status:

No adverse trends.

Corrective Act on Ver ica ion N

Rs Status:

No adverse trends.

Status:

No adverse trend <fj il J