IR 05000275/1993023
| ML16342C034 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 01/04/1994 |
| From: | Pate R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Rueger G PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9401250132 | |
| Download: ML16342C034 (10) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION V
1450 MARIALANE WALNUTCREEK, CAUFORNIA94596-5368 JAN-4 igg4 Docket Nos.
50-275 and 50-323 Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 San Francisco, California 94106 Attention-:
Hr.
G.
H. Rueger, Senior Vice President and General Hanager Nuclear Power Generation Business Unit Gentlemen:
Thank you for your letter of December 17, 1993, File: DCL-93-285, in response to the exercise weakness indicated in Inspection Report Nos.
50-275/93-23 and 50-323/93-23, dated November 19, 1993, informing us of the steps you have planned in response to this item.
Your corrective actions appear appropriate and will be reviewed during a future inspection.
Your cooperation with us is appreciated.
Sincerely, Safeguards, Emergency Preparedness and Non-Power Reactor Branch CC:
Dr. Richard Ferguson, Energy Chair, Sierra Club California Hs.
Nancy Culver, San-Luis Obispo Hothers for Peace Hs. Jacquelyn C. Wheeler Hanaging Editor, The County Telegram Tribune Chairman, San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors Hr. Truman Burns, California Public Utilities Commission Hr. Robert Kinosian, California Public Utilities Commission Robert R. Wellington, Esq.,
Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Hr. Steve Hsu, Radiologic He'alth Branch, State Department of Health Services Hr. Peter H. Kaufman, Deputy Attorney General, State of California Christopher J.
Warner, Esq.,
PGEE Hr. John Townsend, Vice President and Plant Hanager, Diablo Canyon 9401250132 9'40104 PDR ADOCK 05000275
bcc -w/copy of letter dated 12/17/93:
Docket File Inspection File G.
Cook R.
Huey B. Faulkenberry State of California Dottie Clevenger bcc w/o copy of letter dated 12/17/93:
M. Smith Region V/ann AMc ueen ( /3/9V S
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Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beat. Street, Room 1451 P.O. Box 770000 San Francisco, CA 94177 415/973-4684-Fax 415i973-2313 Gregory M. Rueger Senior Vice Presirtent anit
. General Manager Nuclear Poi Generation December 17, 1993 PG&E Letter No. DCL-93-285 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Re:
Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80 Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82.
Diablo Canyon Units
and
Response to Reques or n
t f I formation in NRC Inspection Report 50-275/93-23 and 50-323/93-23 tD Mi CD~M(
pq CD Gentlemen:
t 50-275/93-23 and 50-323/93-23, dated November 19, obser ved by the NRC during the 1993 Annual
9
,
en
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n s
o s
v y
PG&E's response is provided in the aredness Exercise and requeste a
actions to address this weakness.
enclosure.
Sincerely, Gregory M. Rueger cc:
Bobby H. Faulkenberry Ann,P.
Hodgdon Arthur D. Mcgueen Nary H. Hiller Robert J.
Pate.
Sheri R. Peterson CPUC
. Diablo Distribution Enclosure 1159S/85K/KAH/2237
PG&E Letter No. OCL-93-285 ENCLOSURE RESPONSE TO RE(UEST FOR INFORNATION IN NRC INSPECTION REPORT.50-275/93-23 and 50-323/93-23 NRC Inspection Report 50-275/93-23 and 50-323/93-23, dated November 19, 1993, identified a weakness observed by the NRC during the 1993 Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise regarding the technical support provided by PG&E's engineering staff at the Technical Support Center (TSC)
and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
PG&E's response to these concerns fol.lows.
NRC Comment Based on observations by the inspectors in the TSC and EOF; there was a concern that technical support provided by the engineering staff at the TSC and the EOF did not appear to provide emergency management with appropriate assessments regarding the areas of core damage and probable release path.
Accurate information in this area is needed to mitigate the event and to estimate the magnitude of the offsite releases and environmental consequences.
Concentration of the TSC and EOF engineering staffs on the "purge line release path concept" precluded their'searching for and identifying the true release path for virtually the entire plume phase of the exercise.
This occurred despite the availability of area radiation alarms in the vicinity of the containment leak area to the HP-oriented staff at the TSC.
Amount of core damage and release pathways are significant because they have a direct impact on offsite consequences.
Accurate assessment of radioactive inventory available for release, which is a function of core damage, and identification of potential release pathways, including filtration and other in-containment removal processes, are critical for assessment of ongoing and potential offsite consequences.
PG&E Response PG&E agrees that identification of release pathways and determination of core damage is critical for assessment of offsite consequences.
The purpose of the emergency scenario is to assess the emergency staff performance and to identify the need for enhancements.
The exercise scenario conducted this year was particularly difficult from an engineering assessment perspective, and was designed to challenge the engineering staff.
The responsibility for determination of core damage and identification of potential release pathways was recently reassigned to the TSC and EOF engineering staffs.
Although training for these responsibilities was conducted, the exercise identified that procedures and associated training for this function need to be improved.
To improve performance in this functional a'rea, the following actions are being taken.
1159S/85K
i Emergency Plan (EP)
Implementing Procedures EP RB-14,
"Core Oamage Assessment,"
EP EF-1, "Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center,"
EP EF-3A, "Interim EOF Activation and Operation,"
and.
EP EF-3B,
"Long-term EOF Activation and Operation," will be revised to provide guidance to the engineering staff regarding 1.
When core damage
'assessment calculations are needed.
2.
Timely provision of the results of these calculations to emergency management.
3.
'The necessity of verifying assumptions using information. that may be available from on-line monitors and other sources such as the radiological assessment group.
This information will be included in the lesson plans. used during annual emergency response training for the engineering group.
In addition, engineering personnel assigned to positions in the TSC and EOF will receive a
briefing on these changes upon procedure approval.
.
1159S/85K
l)
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