IR 05000275/1993017
| ML16342A177 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1993 |
| From: | Ang W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16342A176 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-93-17, 50-323-93-17, NUDOCS 9307260019 | |
| Download: ML16342A177 (20) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
~3
-773/93-77 d
/
-17 Docket Numbers:
50-275 and 50-323 License Numbers:
Pacific Gas and Electric Company Nuclear Power Generation, B14A 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 P.O.
Box 770000 San Francisco, California 94177 Diablo Canyon Units
and
Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California Ins ection Date:
June 1 through June 4,
1993
~Ins ectors:
D. Acker, Reactor Inspector d
. Ang, C se
,
Engineering Section ate Soigne
~Summer:
Ins ection from June 1 throu h June
1993 Re ort Nos.
50-275 93-17 and 50-323 93-17 Areas Ins ected:
The areas inspected in this announced routine engineering inspection included auxiliary salt water cable failures, design modifications, and open items.
Inspection Procedures 37700,
"Design Changes;"
92700,
"Followup of Written Reports;"
92701,
"Followup of Open Items;"
and 92702,'Followup of Enforcement Items," were used as guidance for this inspection.
9307260019 930623 PDR ADQCK 05000275
0'
Results:
General Conclusion..
and S ecific Findin s:
The parts of the design change packages reviewed were complete and well documented.
Si nificant Safet Hatters:
None Summar of Violations:
None 0 en Items Summar
Four open items were closed and one licensee event report review was update DETAILS Persons Contacted Pacific Gas and Electric Com an
- R. Carvel, Procurement Auditor, Quality Assurance U. Faradj, Diesel Group Leader, Nuclear Engineering and Construction Services W. Fargo, Quality Group Leader, Environmental Qualification
- J. Fields, Engineer, Quality Control
- K. Hubbard, Engineer, Regulatory Compliance
- D. Miklush, Manager, Operations Services
- P. Sarafian, Senior Engineer, Operational Safety Review Group
- J. Shoulders, Onsite Project Engineer, Nuclear Engineering Services
- D. Vosburg, Director, Work Planning Center
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting on June 4,
1993.
The inspector also held discussions with other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection.
Desi n Chan es 37700 The inspector selected three design change packages (DCPs) for review which did not have NRC approval.
The inspector reviewed the DCPs for conformance with Technical Specifications,
CFR 50.59, the licensee's quality assurance program, and
CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III,
"Design Control."
The inspector also reviewed the three DCPs for approval authority, procedure control, proper testing criteria, proper licensee updating of operating procedures and training, as built drawing control, proper safety evaluations, proper supporting calculations, proper licensee updating of maintenance procedures, and control and update of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
These Unit 2 DCPs were:
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DCP J-48857,
"Feedwater Valves: Torque Switch Bypass"
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DCP E-48281,
"Replace Battery 21"
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DCP E-48591,
"Appendix R Modifications" The inspector chose DCP J-48857 for review because it made wiring changes to safety related motor operated valves.
The inspector chose DCP E-48281 for review because it replaced a Class 1E battery with a different model.
The inspector chose DCP E-48591 for review because it made numerous wiring changes to separate hot shutdown panel circuits from the control room.
The licensee completed all three DCPs in Unit 2 in the spring of 1993.
The inspector determined that the parts of the three DCPs reviewed met the review criteria, except for the minor administrative problem
discussed in the following paragraph.
Retestin of Bus F Hon-Safet In'ection Auto-Transfer Retesting of DCP E-48591 included performance of Procedure STP H-13F, Revision 8,
"4KV Bus F Hon-SI Auto-Transfer Test."
Step 12. 11.9 required the recording of auto-transfer timer readings.
This step also stated that if the readings had been previously recorded in Step 12.9 to mark the applicable data points of the associ ated table N/A.
Five of the six data points were blank.
The inspector discussed the blanks in the table with the licensee.
The licensee agreed that data or N/A should have been entered in the appropriate data points for Step 12.11.9.
The licensee reviewed Step 12.9 and determined that the auto-transfer timer readings had been recorded for the five data points that were blank in Step 12. 11.9.
The licensee concluded that the necessary data had been recorded, and that the failure to appropriately mark the table for Step 12. 11.9 was an editorial error with little safety significance, The inspector concurred.
No violations or deviations from HRC requirements were identified in the
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areas reviewed.
3.
Onsite Followu of Written Re orts 92700 a ~
0 en 50-275 50-323 Voluntar Licensee Event Re ort 93-05 Revision 0:
Hedium Volta e Cable Failures Re orted Problem Voluntary Licensee Event Report (LER) 93-05 reported five failures of buried 12 kilovolt (KV) and
KV cables, one in 1989, two in 1992 and two in 1993.
Severe jacket degradation caused two failures of Unit
12 KV circulating water pump (CWP) cables.
There were also three
KV cables failures, two in power cables for safety related auxiliary salt water (ASW) pumps.
However, no jacket degradation was found for the
KV cables.
All five failed cables were found to have been submerged in water.
These problems were previously discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 50-275, 50-323/93-03 and 93-07.
Corrective Action The licensee replaced the failed cable sections.
As a result of the CWP failures the licensee replaced sections of the three remaining Unit
CWP cables.
The sections replaced were in the same loc'ations as in the'failed cables.
During the 1993 Unit 2 refueling outage, the licensee also replaced the same section of the ASW pump l-l cables (these cables had not failed),
as a precautionary measure.
Ho jacket degradation was
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found on the removed cables.
In addition, the licensee replaced the entire length of one Unit 2 CWP 2-1 cable (1400 feet) to allow evaluation of one entire cable.
Ho jacket degradation was found on the removed cable.
The licensee determined that the cables had been submerged in water due to inoperable sump pumps.
The licensee repaired the pumps and initiated a preventive maintenance task to routinely maintain these pumps.
The licensee sent samples of all cables to three independent laboratories for analysis.
The laboratories determined that the I2 KV cable jackets had failed due to chemical attack.
The laboratories had not determined the cause of the
KV cable failures.
Since the LER was issued, the licensee had obtained additional, preliminary-, laboratory analyses of the cables.
In addition, the licensee formed an Integrated Problem Response Team to perform a
detailed root cause of the problem.
At the time of the inspection the licensee was still waiting on additional laboratory tests.
Ins ectors'eview The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions to date and preliminary laboratory reports received since the LER was issued.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's preventive maintenance program and verified that the applicable sump pumps were identified for routine preventive maintenance.
Discussion and Conclusion Preliminary laboratory information indicated that high levels of chlorides were found in water samples taken from the sumps.
The laboratory concluded that salt water spray was washed from the turbine building exterior surface into the 'sumps by rain water.
An unidentified chemical, similar to a cleaning agent, was also identified; A specific chemical compound could not be identified, due to the small amount of chemical present for analysis.
The unidentified chemical was being postulated to have attacked the
KV CWP cables and may have also been carried into the sumps via rain water.
Laboratory tests determined that the construction of the
KV cable jackets was more resistant to chemical attack than the
KV cables, due to a more dense construction.
In addition, the chemical which degraded the
KV cables was not found on the
KV cables.
Extensive electrical testing of the
KV cable insulation had not identified any significant manufacturing flaws.
Detailed microscopic examinations of the areas of cable failures also did not
identify a cause of the failures.
Since water in the sumps was common to all the failures, the licensee planned to have the cable manufacturer perform long term testing to determine the consequences of 12 KV and 4KV cables being submerged in water.
The licensee had scheduled to obtain final laboratory reports, perform a final review and root cause determination, and issue an LER revision by August 1, 1993.
The inspector concluded that the laboratory results received since the original LER had not identified any additional safety concerns with the safety related
KV cables.
The inspector considered that the licensee was still actively attempting to identify root causes of the
KV and
KV cable failures.
This item wHl remain open pending the licensee's final root cause evaluation and corrective action determination.
No violations or deviations from NRC requirements were identified in the areas inspected.
4.
Previousl Identified 0 en Items 92701 a.
Closed Followu Item 50-275 50-323 91-13-01:
Preventative Maintenance Risk Balancin Ori inal NRC 0 en Item The inspector noted that on-line preventive maintenance was being planned on emergency diesel generator (EDG) 1-3, two months after the EDG had full maintenance performed.
The licensee reviewed the EDG maintenance schedule and concluded that the preventive maintenance should have been rescheduled.
During discussions with the licensee, the inspector determined that the licensee had no written policy regarding balancing the risk of deferring preventive maintenance with the risk of equipment out of service.
The plant manager informed the inspector that a policy on the deferring of on-line maintenance would be established.
The inspector left review of this policy as an inspector followup item.
Licensee's Actions in Res onse to the 0 en Item The licensee issued a memorandum, dated August 29, 1991,
"DCPP On Line Haintenance Policy," for determining the need to perform on-line maintenance.
The licensee issued Inter-Departmental Administrative Procedure AD7. ID4, dated September 2,
1992,
"On-Line Maintenance Scheduling," to further define the scheduling of maintenanc '
Ins ectors'ction Durin the Present Ins ection The inspector reviewed the August 29, 1991, memorandum and Procedure AD7. ID4.
Discussi on and Conclusi on The inspector determined that the licensee's written policy was to limit voluntary entry into Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation.
In addition, the licensee provided guidance for determining the risks to be considered prior to performing or deferring on-line maintenance.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's written policy provided adequately guidance for determining whether to perform or defer on-line maintenance.
This item is closed.
b.
Closed Followu Item 50-323 93-01-01:
Emer enc Diesel Generator Deficiencies Ori inal NRC 0 en Item During inspection and testing of the new emergency diesel generator (EDG) 2-3 the licensee noted a number of deficiencies, including a
cracked insulator under the generator slip rings.
'In addition, an NRC inspector discovered damage to the air start motor turning gears and diesel ring gear.
The inspector left resolution of these items as an inspection followup item.
Licensee's Actions in Res onse to the 0 en Item The licensee evaluated as acceptable or corrected all the deficiencies.
The licensee smoothed out the rough edges on the damaged gears and then evaluated the remaining gears as acceptable.
The licensee added inspection of the gears to their routine maintenance program.
The licensee filled the crack in the generator insulator with epoxy.
Ins ectors'ction Durin the Present Ins ection The inspector reviewed the licensee's records for correction of EDG 2-3 deficiencies and verified by sighting a number of the corrective actions.
Discussion and Conclusion
~ The inspector considered the licensee's corrective actions were adequate to resolve the EDG 2-3 deficiencies.
This item is closed.
No violations or deviations from NRC requirements were identified in the areas inspecte.
Previousl Identified Enforcement Items 92702 a 0 Closed Violation 50-323 92-09-01:
Failure to Include Audit Findin Re orts in Audit Packa es Ori inal NRC 0 en Item The inspectors determined that the licensee had prepared and issued a draft Audit Finding Report (AFR) to Peebles Electrical Hachines (P-EP)
on December ll, 1989.
This AFR identified the P-EP had not fully developed a commercial grade dedication program for critical parts identified by the licensee.
The draft AFR was not tracked to resolution or addressed by the final AFR, facts which remained unknown to the licensee until brought to their attention by the NRC on February 20, 1992.
Failure to include and track the draft AFR was a violation of licensee procedures QAA-WI-305 and QAA-WI-317.
Licensee's Actions in Res onse to the Violation The licensee, in their Hay 8, 1992, response to the violation, committed to review other audit reports for similar omissions.
The licensee also committed to modify Procedure PQA-WI-18.8, dated
,October 21, 1992, "Audit Finding Reports," to clarify requirements for documenting, tracking and canceling draft AFRs.
Proce'dure PQA-WI-18.8 superseded procedure QAA-WI-317.
The licensee also committed to train procurement auditors and supervisors on the procedure change.
Ins ector's Action Durin the Present Ins ection The inspector reviewed the revised procedure and the training records.
The inspector reviewed the results of the licensee's review of other audits in conjunction with the closing of Violation 50-323/92-09-02, as discussed in Section 5.b of this report.
Discussion and Conclusion b.
The inspector determined that Procedure PQA-WI-18.8 specified adequate controls for the handling of draft audit reports and that the committed training had been completed as documented on Action Request A0260599.
Based on this review, the inspector concluded that the licensee's act'fons adequately resolved this violation.
This item is closed.
Closed Violation 50-323 92-09-02:
Failure to Ensure Su lier's ualit Assurance Pro ram Was Ade uate Ori inal NRC 0 en Item The inspectors determined that the licensee had failed to take appropriate measures to assure correction of deficiencies that had been identified by the licensee involving inadequate auditing of
suppliers of safety related equipment.
In particular, corrective actions for known deficiencies in the procurement program were identified on July 7, 1989, but not implemented for Audit 89295S, performed on December 11, 1989.
This failure resulted in the placing of a safety related electrical generator purchase order with a supplier (P-EP)
whose quality assurance program did not conform to the requirements of the procurement documents.
Licensee's Actions in Res onse to the Violation The licensee, in their Hay 8, 1992, response to the violation, committed to perform additional audits of P-EP and take compensatory measures for a one-time purchase of the safety related electrical generator.
In addition, the licensee noted that effective corrective actions for known procurement program deficiencies had not been fully incorporated in the time period between August 1989 and December 1990.
The licensee committed to review the adequacy of procurement audits performed during this time frame.
The licensee reviewed 121 audits.
The licensee determined that nine audits were unsatisfactory.
The licensee stated that the nine audits were found unsatisfactory because they lacked sufficient documented objective evidence to support the auditors'onclusions regarding significant requirements.
The licensee committed to perform a third party check of these nine audits, and if necessary re-audit the suppliers.
The licensee completed review of the nine unsatisfactory audits.
Licensee corrective actions included; removing suppliers from the qualified supplier lists and performing commercial grade inspections of any previously purchased material; performing new audits to reevaluate suppliers; and taking no action when no material had been purchased and the supplier was no longer qualified.
Ins ector's Action Durin the Present Ins ection The inspector reviewed the records and criteria for the 121 audits the licensee reviewed.
The inspector reviewed the conclusions and corrective actions for the nine audits the licensee found to be unsatisfactory.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions to resolve the quality assurance problems associated with the emergency diesel generator purchased from P-EP.
Discussion and Conclusion The inspector considered that the licensee's criteria for reviewing the 121 audits was acceptable.
for the nine unsatisfactory audits, the licensee re-audited those suppliers which were still needed for supplying material or services.
The inspector determined that the licensee performed commercial grade dedication of any material received from these suppliers during the time of the unsatisfactory audits.
The inspector reviewed the audit records and the commercial
grade dedication records for thermocouples received from Meed Instruments, Audit 89267S.
The inspector considered that the licensee's commercial grade dedication of the thermocouples was adequate.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's review and corrective actions were adequate.
The inspector determined that the specific procurement problem with the emergency diesel generator From P-EP was resolved by the licensee through a combination of audits, commercial grade dedication inspections, and an endurance test with a subsequent teardown inspection.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's actions to resolve the emergency diesel generator audit deficiency violation were acceptable.
This item is closed.
No violations or deviations from NRC requirements were identified in the areas inspected.
The inspector conducted an exit meeting on June 4,
1993, with members of the licensee staff as indicated in Section 1.
During this meeting, the inspector summarized the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings as described in this report.
The licensee acknowledged the concerns identified in the report.
During this inspection, the licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspecto