IR 05000275/1993005
| ML16342A180 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 06/28/1993 |
| From: | Morrill P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16342A179 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-93-5, 50-275-93-05, 50-275-93-5, 50-323-93-05, 50-323-93-5, NUDOCS 9307260045 | |
| Download: ML16342A180 (20) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
Re ort Numbers:
Docket Numbers:
License Numbers:
Licensee:
50-275/93-05 and 50-323/93-05 50-275 and 50-323 DPR-80 and DPR-82 Pacific Gas and Electric Company Nuclear Power Generation, B14A 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 P.O.
Box 770000 San Francisco, California 94177 Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California Ins ection Date:
~Ins ector:
Hay 3 through Hay 7, 1993, Hay 17 through Hay 21, 1993, and June 8 through 9, 1993 G. Johnston, Senior Licensing Examiner LA Ad
~Summar:
0 rl, le Opera ions Section Ins ection from Ha 3 throu h
Ma
1993 Ha 17 throu h
Ma
1993 and June 8 throu h
1993 Re ort Nos.
50-275 93-05 and 50-323 93-05 Areas Ins ected:
The inspection was to confirm that the facility licensee's requalification program for licensed operators incorporates requirements for both evaluating operator mastery of training objectives and revising program content in accordance with 10 CFR 55.
The inspection was also to assess the facility licensee's effectiveness in evaluating and revising the requalification program for licensed operators based on the operational performance of licensed operators, including requalification examinations, as required by 10 CFR 55.
9307260045 930628 PDR ADOCK 05000275
Results:
The facility licensee's operator requalification training was found to have the characteristics of a Systematic Approach to Training based program.
The conduct of the program was found to be thorough and conforming to
CFR 55.
Pro ram Stren ths:
The facility licensee required a management review of examination material as a lesson plan.
This requirement ensured a thorough review was conducted by management prior to examination administration.
The facility training staff conducted dry runs of the validated simulator scenario sets on training staff evaluators prior to actually administering them to the operators.
This preparation effort assisted the evaluators by ensuring they were familiar with critical tasks and complex evolutions prior to administering the examinations.
~
Post simulator examination critiques were conducted several hours after the simulator examinations.
The evaluators utilized the time to prepare detailed critiques of crew performance.
Pro ram Weaknesses:
The inspector determined that complexity of the scenario sets administered during the period of Hay 1) through June 9,
1993, were marginal with respect to Examiner Standard guidance.
Form ES-604-1 provides a range of 10 to 14 total malfunctions and 3 to 6 malfunctions after Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) entry for each scenario set.
The simulator scenario sets had 6 of 9 sets with 10 or 11 total malfunctions, and 5 of the 9 sets had 3 or 4 malfunctions after EOP entry.
This was determined by the inspector to be indicative of lower than expected complexity for evaluations.
The written examination administered Nay 21, 1993, had an overemphasis on one topic area.
Three questions covered a single Knowledges and Abilities Catalog item.
The facility licensee does not have an administrative policy or procedure governing examination security.
Observation by the inspector however determined security was adequate.
The inspector determined that the evaluations of Senior Reactor Operators (SROs) did not assure that the ability of directing crew activity during emergency events was assessed for each SR '
Si nificant Safet Matters:
None.
Summar of Vio1ations:
None.
0 en Items Summar
Non '
DETAILS Persons Contacted Pacific Gas and Electric Com an
- D. Hiklush, Operations Services Hanager, Acting Plant Hanager
- W. HcLane, Training Director
- S. Fridley, Operations Director
- J. Welsch, Operations Training Supervisor
- J. Becerra, Senior Training Instructor
- S. Hichals, Senior Training Instructor
- D. Dye, Shift Supervisor
- W. Crockett, Technical and Support Services Hanager
- W. Barkhuff, guality Control Director
- J. Bigelow, Principal Simulator Engineer R. Jett, Simulator Supervisor
- E. Carlsen, Regulatory Compliance Engineer
- C. Belmont, guality Assurance Auditor B. Terrell, Senior Training Instructor
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting on Hay 21, 1993 Nuclear Re ulator Commission
- F. Gee, Resident Inspector
- G. Johnston, Senior Licensing Examiner
- L. Hiller Jr., Chief,'eactor Safety Branch The inspector also held discussions with other licensee personnel during the inspection.
A followup site visit was made on June 8-9, 1993, the inspector met briefly with Hr. B. Terrell prior to leaving the site.
Licensed 0 erator Re uglification 0 eratin Examinations The inspector reviewed the facil.ity licensee's simulator and job performance measures (JPHs) for use during the week of Hay 17, 1993.
The material conformed with the facility Program of Instruction, and Sample Plan for the training cycle of 1992-1993.
The format of the simulator scenarios and JPMs conformed to the facility lesson plan format.
The scenarios and JPHs therefore were reviewed and approved as a lesson plan package.
The inspector concluded that this administrative practice maintained good management of the examination process.
During the week of Hay 3, 1993, the inspector watched the facility licensee training staff prepare for administration of the operating examinations.
The technique employed by the staff was to administer the proposed examinations to members of the training staff.
This served two functions, a dry run of the previously validated scenarios, and qualification examinations for the certified staff member On Hay 19, 1993 the inspector determined during the administration of a set of two scenarios, on two crews examined that day, that the Shift Supervisor did not rotate through the Shift Foreman position.
The Shift Foreman position at Diablo Canyon is expected to direct the crew during an emergency event.
The Shift Supervisor provides an oversight function and implements the Emergency Plan as the Emergency Coordinator.
The inspector determined that the Shift Supervisor of the second crew did not provide direction to the crew during either of the two scenarios.
The inspector stated his concern to the Operations Training Supervisor that the Shift Supervisor on that crew did not show an ability to direct crew activities.
This is a senior reactor operator (SRO)
competency of importance because it is the single most determining factor between a
SRO and a reactor operator (RO).
The practice observed represented a
weakness in the evaluation process for simulator scenario examinations.
NRC policy does allow the facility to not rotate personnel during simulator examinations (ES-604.D. l.f).
The rotation of personnel must conform to the facility's requalification program requirements.
The exception to this policy is that all personnel must be examined in a required licensed position that conforms to the level of their license.
Therefore, some rotation may be required to meet that requirement.
The facility licensee's practice at the time of the inspection was to only rotate personnel through their qualified positions.
This practice conformed to the Examiner Standards requirements.
However, the facility licensee is still obligated by 10 CFR 55.59(c)(4) to provide a
comprehensive examination.
On a followup visit on June 8 9, 1993, the inspector discussed the facility licensee effort to resolve the inspector's concern regarding SRO competencies.
During the period following the inspection of Hay 17 - 21, 1993 the facility licensee training staff reviewed their examination practices for simulator evaluations.
A video tape review by the training staff of the examinations given on Hay 19, 1993, confirmed the inspector's observation.
The training staff on the basis of this observation re-examined the Shift Supervisor of the crew in question.
The Shift Supervisor was placed -in the Shift Foreman position during a
scenario and subsequently passed the examination, demonstrating an ability to direct crew activities.
The Shift Supervisors previously examined the week of Hay 12, 1993, and the morning of Hay 19, 1993, were reviewed on video tape and were determined to have provided clear direction to their crews.
The facility licensee had also implemented a post scenario checklist to determine whether Shift Supervisors who do not rotate to the Shift Foreman position had performed activity that clearly indicated direction of crew activity.
The inspector observed on the morning of June 9, 1993, that the Shift Supervisor and Shift Foreman of the crew being examined rotated between the two positions.
The inspector determined that the facility licensee's responsiveness addressed his concer The inspector discussed the actions taken by the training staff with the Operations Director.
The Operations Director stated that he agreed with the inspector's observations regarding direction of crew activity by the Shift Supervisors and supported the actions of the training staff.
The Operations Director also, indicated that he has conveyed to all Shift Supervisors his expectation that they should provide some direction to the crews and to not rely solely on the Shift Foreman during events requiring entry into the EOPs.
The inspector observed portions of the JPH walkthrough part of the operating examinations.
The performance of the operators appeared to be generally good, with no failures among the 10 persons participating the week of Hay 17, 1993.
The training staff had scheduled the administration efficiently, avoiding any potential conflicts or possibility of compromise.
No generic problems were identified by the facility training staff.
The inspector concluded that the operating examinations conducted by the facility were in conformance with the regulations and the facility Systematic Approach to Training program.
Simulator Scenario Com lexit The inspector noted that the simulator scenarios selected for the Hay 19, 1993, simulator examinations just met the minimum Examiner Standards Form ES-604-1 quantitative guidance.
The inspector reviewed the other scenario sets for examinations given to all of the other crews to determine if this was a characteristic of the examination practices of the facility licensee.
The inspector determined from this review that the scenarios for the Hay 19, 1993, simulator examinations were low with respect to the other scenario sets used over the course of the examinations.
This particular scenario set was the lowest with respect to the other scenario sets for major transients, EOPs used beyond E-O, and EOP contingency procedures.
During this review the inspector. also determined that two quantitative factors related to scenario complexity averaged on the low side for all of the scenario sets.
Specifically, a scenario set should have between 10 to 14 total malfunctions.
Six scenario sets had 10 to 11 total malfunctions, while three had 14 or more.
Further, the malfunctions after EOP entry should be between three and six.
Five of the 9 sets had three to four malfunctions after EOP entry.
The inspector also noted that the scenario sets in general did meet or exceed other factors of complexity.
Notably, EOPs used beyond EOP E-O, the use of EOP contingency procedures, and crew critical tasks were within expectations.
The inspector concluded from these reviews that the facility licensee had met the guidance in Examiner Standard ES-604 Form ES-604-Written Examination The inspector reviewed the written examination to be administered on May 21, 1993.
The inspector determined that the examination adhered to the facility sample plan and met the requirements of the Examiner Standards.
The inspector did note that the examination overemphasized one topic area by having three questions with the same Knowledge and Abilities (K/A)
Catalog number.
The K/A topic the questions focused on concerned the Auxiliary Feedwater system.
The inspector concluded that this was inadvertent.
The inspector brought this concern to the attention of facility management.
The Operations Training Supervisor acknowledged that this appeared to be in excess of what he expected.
The inspector concluded that despite the repetition of the Auxiliary Feedwater topics the examination was sufficiently diverse to ensure a comprehensive written examination.
Re uglification Examination Evaluators During the weeks of Hay 17 to 21, 1993, and June 8 to 9, 1993, the inspector observed facility evaluators performing operating examinations of crews and individual operators.
The inspector determined that the evaluators were well prepared and efficient in the administration of the examinations.
Post scenario critiques were done several hours after the examinations were administered.
The evaluators prepared a detailed critique that addressed crew performance on the crew based competencies in ES-604.
The evaluation included assessments of both good and weak performance with emphasis on points to improve.
Overall the inspector concluded that the facility evaluators demonstrated a more than sufficient capability in administering operating examinations for requalification.
Examination Securit The inspector observed close control of examination security by the facility evaluators during the conduct of pre-examination activities and during the examinations.
The facility licensee conformed to the guidance in the Examiner Standards.
During an inquiry into administrative guidance the inspector found that the facility licensee did not have formal policy guidance or a procedure to maintain examination security.
The Operations Training Supervisor stated that the policy had been to follow the guidance in the Examiner Standards.
A policy or procedure describing the responsibilities of instructors, examinees, and other personnel would provide a basis for determining the severity of any possible compromise.
Further, if a person was informed of his obligations, a possible compromise might be averted before it presented a serious problem.
The Operations Training Supervisor stated that he understood the concern of the inspector and would pursue instituting a training department policy regarding examination security.
The inspector concluded that the training staff had effectively maintained examination security during his observation of the examination activitie,
Remediation of Examination Failures 8.
The inspector noted that none of the operators on Crew B examined the week of Hay 21, 1993 had failed the examinations.
A Shift Technical Advisor (STA) had failed Part A, Plant Systems, of the written examination.
The facility treats STAs in the same fashion as licensed operators regarding remediation.
The inspector discussed the process of remediation with the Operations Training Supervisor.
The STA was removed from shift duties and placed in a program of remediation.
The results of his examination was reviewed to identify weak areas and the course of remediation focused on those weaknesses.
Examinee failures from previous examinations were handled in the same fashion.
The inspector concluded that the facility licensee's program for remediation met the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59(c)(4)(v).
Pro ram Feedback and Events Related Trainin The inspector reviewed several Training Improvement Proposals (TIPs)
pertaining to plant and industry events.
From this review the inspector determined that the facility licensee has incorporated information from multiple sources into the licensed operator requalification training program.
Those sources include Diablo Canyon facility events reports, NRC Information Notices, INPO provided documents and event reports, NRC notices of violation, and Operations and Training department suggestions.
The licensee has set aside specific classroom and simulator time to implement training identified from these sources.
The inspector reviewed a lesson plan generated for events related training from several TIPs and determined it to be of good quality.
During interviews of instructors associated with the licensed operator requalification program and operators the inspector determined that the instructors and operators were encouraged to provide feedback on training effectiveness and quality.
The instructors and operators interviewed indicated varying views on the necessity of the events related training.
Some operators indicated that the operations department has required reading assignments that cover topics that are later presented in requalification tr aining.
The repetition of the information was felt by some operators to be excessively redundant.
The operators did convey a consistent praise for the quality of the training and support from the training department.
The instructors indicated that even casual remarks by the operators during training in classroom or the simulator have been incorporated into the training program through the use of TIPs.
The instructors appear to be responsive to operator criticism.
The operators are required to provide feedback on the training they have received.
The feedback is reviewed and any item that could be incorporated into the program is placed in the TIP program for formal revie The inspector discussed the feedback process and administration of the program with the Operations Training Supervisor.
A detailed systematic statistical analysis of examination results is done following the annual examinations and is used in the planning of the subsequent annual training cycle.
This information is reviewed by a planning group that includes requalification training instructors and operations department personnel.
Some information may also be incorporated in the initial license training program.
This represents a significant feedback loop for ensuring weaknesses in crew or individual performance are addressed in appropriate training.
The inspector concluded from the interviews and review of TIPs and lesson plans that the facility licensee has maintained a diligent effort to incorporate feedback and events related information into the licensed operator requalification training program.
An exit meeting was held by the NRC with representatives of the licensee's staff as denoted in Paragraph 1 on Hay 21, 1993.
The inspector discussed the findings and observations of the inspection previously described in this report.
The licensee acknowledged the findings and observations of the inspector.
The facility licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT Facility Licensee:
Diablo Can on Faci 1 ity Docket N.:
50-275 50-323 Operating Tests Administered on:
5 4
19
9 93 This for is to be used only to report observations.
These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b).
These observations do not affect NRC certification or approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information that may be used in future evaluations.
No licensee action is required in response to these observations.
While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were observed (if none, so state):
ITEM DESCRIPTION Computer data bus overload.
During a scenario the simulator locked up due to a data bus overload.
This only occurred once and was toward the end of the scenario and did not affect the results.
A discussion with the Simulator Supervisor indicated that this was a rare occurrenc