IR 05000275/1993025
| ML16342A256 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 08/30/1993 |
| From: | Bocanegra R, Brewer R, Reese J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16342A255 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-93-25, 50-323-93-25, NUDOCS 9309290102 | |
| Download: ML16342A256 (18) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION Y Report Nos.:
Licenses:
Licensee:
50-275/93-25 and 50-323/93-25 DPR-80 and DPR-82 Pacific Gas and Electric Company
{PGLE)
77 Beale Street San Francisco, California 94106 Facility:
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
{DCPP), Units 1 and
Inspection location:
San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection duration:
August
20, 1993 Inspected by:
er, a iation pecia ist an gra, a i ion pecia ist 8 ~4" 'f'F ate Signe
'2t'-" 80-) 3 ate igne Approved by:
~Summar:
acilities Radiolog cal Protection Branc a
.
eese, h
8 3o '7 a e S gne Areas Ins ected:
Routine, announced inspection of occupational exposure controls, external exposure, control of radioactive materials, contamination controls, and radiological postings and surveys.
NRC Inspection Procedure 83750 was used.
Result's:
The licensee's program for controlling occupational exposure, in the aspects reviewed, was adequate in meeting the licensee's safety objectives.
The observed activities were accomplished in accordance with ALARA practices, licensee procedures and the requirements of the NRC.
No violations or deviations were identified.
930929020Z 930830 PDR ADOCK 05000275
DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee
- H. Somerville, Senior Engineer, Radiation Protection (RP)
- T. Irving, General Foreman, RP R.
Gagne, Foreman, Radwaste J. Knight, Foreman, RP S. Ehrhart, RP Engineer
- K. Hubbard, Engineer, Regulatory Compliance
- T. Grebel, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance
- D. Hiklush, Manager, Operations Services
- D. Taggart, Director, guality Assurance
- H. Burgess, Director, Systems Engineering
- H. Leppke, Assistant Manager, Technical and Support Services
- J. Welsch, Supervisor, Operations Training
- J. Griffin, Group Lead, Onsite Project Engineering Group
- B. Hess, Assistant Director, Onsite Nuclear Engineering Services
- J. Hinds, Director, Nuclear Safety Engineering
- C. Seward, Senior Engineer, Mechanical Maintenance
- G. Gurley, Engineer, Mechanical Maintenance
- J. Engelbrecht, Engineer, guality Control
- D. Oatley, Director, Material Services
- C. Groff, Director, Plant Engineering NRC
- M. Tschiltz, NRC Resident Inspector
- H. Royack, NRC Project Engineer (*) Denotes those individuals who attended the exit meeting on August 20, 1993.
The inspectors met and held discussions with additional members of the licensee's staff during the inspection.
Followu of Items of Noncom liance (92702)
Item 50-275 93-11-01 0 en:
This item involved the licensee's failure to control unauthorized and inadvertent entries into posted High Radiation Areas (HRAs).
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the Notice of Violation, dated June 9,
1993.
The inspector noted that the licensee's corrective actions to prevent recurrence were not scheduled for completion until December 31, 1993.
This item will remain open until such time as the licensee's corrective actions have been fully implemented.
Occu ational Radiation Ex osure (83750)
The inspectors examined the licensee's radiation protection program for compliance with 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20, Technical Specifications and licensee procedures.
The examination focused on radiation protection activities conducted by the licensee since the previous inspection on June 7-11, 1993 (50-275/93-18'nd 50-323/93-18).
Work In Pro ress Both Units were operating at 100 percent power at the time of this inspection, thus limited radiological work activities were being conducted.
The licensee's radiation protection (RP) activities associated with the Unit-1 Spent Fuel Pool
{SFP) cooling system flange leak repair and the Unit-1 Primary Water Storage Tank (PWST) bladder repair were reviewed for compliance with the requirements
CFR Part 20, and TSs 6.8, 6. 11, and 6.12.
~Chan es The inspectors noted that no significant changes had been made in the site Radiation Protection organization since the previous inspection.
The inspectors verified that the licensee had received the new NRC Form-3, June 1993 version.
At the time of this inspection the licensee was preparing to post the new NRC Form-3 in place of the older version.
Audits and Reviews During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the following guality Assurance (gA) audits and surveillance reports.
~ Audit 93018I, Radiation Protection, Hay 12 - June 17, 1993.
~ Surveillance Report gP&A-93-0027, ALARA High Impact Team {HIT)
activities for Refueling Outage 2R5, Hay 10, 1993.
~ Surveillance Report gP&A-93-0032, Transfer and Storage of Radioactive Haterials during 2R5, Hay 20, 1993.
~ Surveillance Report gP&A-93-0033, Immediate actions associated with the discovery of a Hot Particle outside the RCA on April 7, 1993, Hay 20, 1993.
~ Surveillance Report SgA-93-0037, Process Control Program using the Vinyl Ester Resin In-situ Solidification Process, June 22, 1993.
~ Surveillance Report S(A-93-0036, Review of the TLD Processing Data, June 22, 1993.
I
~ Surveillance Report gP&A-93-0035, Continuous RP Coverage during 2R5, Hay 20, 1993.
~ Surveillance Report gP&A-93-0018, Primary Steam Generator Radiological Controls during 2R5 for Shot Peening, Eddy Current Testing, and Tube Plugging, Hay 10, 199 ~ Surveillance Report S(A-93-0034, RP Job Coverage,
"R.P. Start of Job",
June 22, 1993.
gl While reviewing the gA annual audit of RP'audit 93018I),
the inspectors noted two gA-identified weaknesses.
The first identified weakness involved the control of radioactive sources.
A 15 yCi mixed gamma source was identified as missing for eight months without RP personnel initiating the proper actions as required by RP procedures.
A guality Evaluation (gE-AFR f0010773)
was initiated to address concerns regarding missing radioactive sources.
The incident involving the 15 yCi mixed gamma source is discussed in further detail in Section 3.f.2.b of this report.
The second gA-identified weakness-involved System Particulate, Iodine, and Noble Gas (SPING) continuous air monitors (CAMs).
SPING channels were identified as being out of service for extensive periods of time without compensatory measures in place.
The Action Request (AR) system was inconsistently and improperly used by RP to document SPING problems.
The problems regarding improper use of ARs and extensive inoperability due to continual channel failures were also identified during the 1992 annual gA audit.
gA concluded that past corrective actions had been ineffective and that RP should assess the importance of the SPING program prior to implementing further corrective actions.
One guality Evaluation (gE-AFR (0010780)
and one AR (A0311572)
were written to document the audit findings and track the progress of the corrective actions.
The inspectors considered the licensee's handling of the SPING issues as adequate to accomplish a suitable resolution of the problems.
The inspectors noted that the audits and surveillance reports appeared adequate in scope and depth to accomplish their objective.
With the exception of the weaknesses identified above, the audits and reports reviewed showed the RP program to be operating in an effective manner.
External Ex osure Control During facility tours, observations of work in progress, discussions with licensee personnel, and reviews of procedures, the inspectors verified that adequate personnel exposure controls were being implemented.'he inspectors noted that radiation workers were issued appropriate dosimetry and that dosimetry was worn properly.
Pre-job briefings adequately addressed the radiological hazards present at the job location and the precautions to be taken to minimize personnel exposure The inspectors interviewed RP personnel covering jobs and the workers performing the work.
Workers were found to be knowledgeable regarding the radiological conditions to be encountered during the job and the RP pro'cedures governing the work.
The following procedures were reviewed during this inspection.
~
RCS 8, Reporting and, Record Keeping, Revision 6.
~
RCS 9, Notices, Instructions and Reports to Workers -
NRC Inspections, Revision 6.
~
RCP G-100, Radiation Work Permits, Revision 12.
~
RCP G-110, Personnel External Exposure Dosimetry and Control, Revision 13.
~
RCP D-200, Writing Radiation Work Permits, Revision 7.
~
RCP D-205, Performing ALARA Reviews, Revision 3.
~
RCP D-240, Radiological Posting, Revision 2.
~
RCP D-500, Radiation and Contamination Surveys, Revision 9.
~
RCP D-501, Issue and Return of Radiation Protection Equipment, Revision 1.
~
RCP D-620, Control of Radioactive Sources, Revision 1.
~
NPAP D-502, Receipt of Radioactive Materials Shipments, Revision 12.
The procedures reviewed and the work practices observed appeared to be consistent with 10 CFR 19 5 20 and Technical Specifications requirements.
Contamination Control Surve s
and Monitorin Facilit Tours During facility tours, the inspectors observed that adequate personnel survey instruments were conveniently located near exits from'urface contamination areas (SCAs).
All instruments observed were functional, within their calibration period and had been daily performance tested.
Worker use of personnel survey instruments was observed to be adequat The inspectors performed independent exposure rate measurements of areas inside the Units 1 and 2 radiological controlled area (RCA) using a Geiger-Mueller type detector (Xetex Model,305B, NRC serial No. 008422)
due for calibration December 28, 1993.
All areas observed were adequately posted and were conducive to alerting workers to the radiological conditions present.
The inspectors noted that surface contamination, radioactive materials and radiation areas were posted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.203.
~Surve s
Routine and non-routine contamination surveys of radiologically controlled areas were examined.
Based on reviews of survey records, the inspectors verified that the licensee's radiation and contamination survey program was consistent with the requirements specified in 10 CFR 20.201 and licensee procedures.
However, the inspectors noted the licensee's inconsistent
.
use of their Instrument Issue Log (Form 69-11511).
Procedures RCP D-500 and RCP D-501 both require workers to log-out an RP instrument from the 85'evel RP instrument room prior to use and to log that instrument back in upon returning it to the instrument room.
While reviewing survey records and comparing them against Instrument Issue Log entries, the inspectors noted that on numerous occasions the instruments used by RP technicians to perform surveys had not been entered in the Instrument Issue Log.
The following examples were a few of the instances identified by the inspectors.
~ Survey Number:
Survey Date/Time:
Survey Location:
Instrument Used:
Inst.
Log Status:
~ Survey Number:
Survey Date/Time:
Survey Location:
Instrument Used:
Inst.
Log Status:
~ Survey Number:
Survey Date/Time:
Survey Location:
Instrument Used:
Inst.
Log Status:
93-06103 August 4, 1993 at 0600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> 100'uxiliary Bldg.
RO-2 (I.D.8 3.9.55)
NOT CHECKED OUT FOR THAT TINE PERIOD 93-06225 August 8, 1993 at 0400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> Access Control RO-2 (b 3.9.31)
& E-140 (0 1.1.8)
NOT CHECKED OUT FOR THAT TIME PERIOD 93-06227 August 8, 1993 at 0830 hours0.00961 days <br />0.231 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15815e-4 months <br /> Auxiliary Bldg. East RO-2 (8 3.9.10)
& E-140 (5'.1.27)
NOT CHECKED OUT FOR THAT DAY
y'7 ~ Survey Number:
Survey Date/Time:
Survey Location:
Instrument Used:
Inst.
Log Status:
93-06257 August 10, 1993 at 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> East Yard/North Gate RO-2 (¹ 3;9. 15)
8E E-140 (¹ 1. 1.22)
NOT CHECKED OUT FOR THAT DAY The failure to routinely log instrument use in the Instrument Issue Log was of concern as it reflected on the licensee's lack of attention to procedural detail.
The issuance of RP instruments and the use of the Instrument Issue 'Log will be evaluated in a future inspection (50-275/93-25-01).
Control of Radioactive Material 1.
Semi-Annual Sealed Source Leak Testin The inspectors reviewed the licensee's two most recent semi-annual source leak tests (January 1993 and July 1993) for compliance with TS 3/4.7.8 and procedure RCP D-620.
The inspectors noted no discrepancies.
The licensee's leak test program appeared adequate to meet its safety objectives.
2.
. Radiolo ical Occurrence Re orts The following licensee Radiological Occurrence Reports (RORs) were reviewed during this inspection.
a ~
Radiolo ical Occurrence Re ort ¹A0313929 This ROR involved the failure to perform a receipt survey of a liquid Strontium-89 source within the time limits specified in procedure NPAP D-502 section 6.1.2 and
CFR. 20.205; The source arrived at the licensee's facility, via a common carrier, on August 10, 1993, in the early afternoon.
The source was contained in a small package which had a Yellow II transportation label affixed.
The licensee speculated that initial attempts by warehouse personnel to contact RP by telephone had failed.
A successful notification was made at 18:50 hours on August 10, 1993.
However, a
receipt survey was not performed on the package until August 12, 1993, at 13:40 hours, well beyond the time limits that would be required for a package not meeting the exemptions specified in 10 CFR 20.205.
Survey results indicated the exposure rate on the external surface of the package to be less than 0. 1 mR/hr beta/gamma and 5.0 mR/hr beta/gamma on the sample itsel Further investigation by the licensee revealed that the source activity was approximately 5.5 pCi, which was below the activity limits requiring a Yellow II transport label.
The source 'activity was also below the activity limits in 10 CFR 20.205 for which a
receipt survey would be required.
The licensee's investigation was ongoing at the time this inspection concluded.
k A concern was raised regarding this incident because of the lack of radiological controls that existed on an unknown radioactive source for a period in excess of two days.
The licensee's corrective actions will be evaluated in a future inspection (50-275/93-25-02).
Radiolo ical Occurrence Re ort ¹A0308310 This ROR involved a. missing 15 pCi mixed gamma source.
The source, which was listed as being installed in a
radiation detector, consisted of 10 pCi Cobalt-60 and 5 pCi Cesium-137.
The source and detector were listed as missing during a quarterly source inventory in October 1992.
The source continued to be unaccounted for during two subsequent quarterly inventories.
During a gA audit (¹93018I)
conducted from Hay 12 through June 17, 1993, it was identified 'that RP had failed to initiate an AR and notify the cognizant RP Engineer regarding this missing
"non-exempt" source as require by procedure RCP D-620.
Upon identification by gA that an AR was required, RP initiated this AR (ROR ¹A0308310)
on Hay 28, 1993. 'After RP initiated the AR, they began an investigation to determine the disposition of the missing source.
gA subsequently issued an AR (¹A0302298)
and a equality Evaluation (¹g0010773)
to track RP's investigation and corrective actions.
The result of RP's investigation concluded that the source had never existed.
The source had inadvertently been created on paper due to personnel error.
The licensee determined that during a material receipt activity in the warehouse, a package containing a mechanical part was erroneously marked with'
radiation symbol, a nuclide identification, and an activity value.
This information was then taken back to the plant and a radioactive source identification number was subsequently assigned.
The licensee's investigation was ongoing at the conclusion of this inspectio Although the source in question was later determined to have never existed at the facility, this incident was of concern because for the eight months prior to the gA audit, a "non-exempt" source was missing with no attempt to ascertain its disposition.
The licensee's source accountability and level of attention to detail is of concern as evidenced by this incident, and will be evaluated in a future inspection (50-275/93-25-03).
The licensee's ROR program appeared adequate for tracking and resolving radiological occurrences at the licensee's facility.
f With the exception of the incidents noted above, the licensee's program for controlling occupational exposure appeared adequate in accomplishing the licensee's safety objectives.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 20, 1993.
The scope and findings of the inspection were summarized.
The licensee acknowledged the inspectors'bservation \\t t