IR 05000275/1993002
| ML16341G845 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1993 |
| From: | Mcqueen A, Pate R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341G844 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-92-12-01, 50-275-92-12-1, 50-323-92-12, 50-323-93-02, 50-323-93-2, NUDOCS 9302180018 | |
| Download: ML16341G845 (24) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-275/92-12 and 50-323/92-12 License Nos.
DPR-80 DPR-82 Licensee:
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PGLE)
77 Beale Street San Francisco, California 94106 Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant (DCPP), Units 1 and
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection Conducted:
January 11 through 15, 1993 Inspector:
rt ur
.
cgueen, mergen repare ness Ana yst ate Sigpe Approved by:
~Summar:
o ert
.
a e, C i
,
Sa eguar s,
mergency Preparedness, and Non-Power Reactor Branch ate sgne
~AI<<d:
Tli l
d by dl-b dl d t l
d the following portions of the licensee's emergency preparedness program:
Items identified during previous emergency preparedness exercises, Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program, Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities, Onsite Follow-up of Events at Operating Power Reactors, and Inspector Identified Items.
During this inspection, portions of Inspection Procedures 82701, 92700, and 93702 were used.
Results:
In the areas inspected, the licensee's emergency preparedness program appeared adequate to accomplish its objectives.
The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas examined during this inspection.
9302180018 930129 PDR ADOCK 05000275 PDR
INSPECTION DETAILS Ke Persons Contacted P. A. Bishop, Secretary, Emergency/Safety Services R.
H. Bliss, Emergency Planner
- E.
Carlson, Regulatory Compliance A. I. Dame, Access Supervisor, Training C.
C. Dressier, Training Instructor D. J.
Dye; Operations Superintendent R.
P. Flohaug, Senior Supervisor, guality Performance E Assessment
- L. A. Hagen, Director, Safety, Health 5 Emergency Services J.
A. Hays, Supervising Engineer,
- H. T. Hug, Supervisor, Emergency Planning R. H. Norris, Emergency Planner D.
W. Patty, Shift Supervisor D. V. Pierce, Shift Supervisor
- R. P.
Powers, Manager, Support Services C.
B. Prince, Emergency Planner
- D. A. Stetson, guality Control Engineer
- R. L; Thierry, Sr. Engineer, Regulatory Compl'iance
- J.
D. -Townsend, Vice President and Plant Hanager
- E. V. Waage, Senior Engineer, Emergency Planning W.
R. White, Senior GET Instructor
The above individuals denoted with an asterisk were present during the exit meeting.
The inspector also contacted other members of the licensee's emergency preparedness, administrative, and technical staff during the course of. the inspection.
NRC Personnel at Exit Interview A. D. Mcgueen, Emergency Preparedness Analyst, RV Functional or Pro ram Areas Ins ected The licensee seemed to be maintaining their previous level of performance in the following areas and their program appeared adequate to accomplish their objectives.
The inspector reviewed licensee emergency preparedness implementing procedures (EPIP) revised since the last emergency preparedness inspection (subparagraph a.(1) below).
The inspector toured and inspected emergency preparedness facilities which included the Control Room, the Technical Support Center (TSC),
and the Operations Support Center (OSC).
0 erational Status of Emer enc Pre aredness (HC-82701)
(1)
Emer enc Plan and Im lementin Procedures Licensee Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP),
which had been revised since the last routine,inspection,,
reviewed during this inspection included:
(a)
EP G-2, Activation and Operation of the Interim Site Emergency Organization (Control Room), Revision 14, dated December 7,
1992.
(b)
EP G-3, Notification of Off-Site Agencies and Emergency Organization Personnel, Revision 22, dated October 6, 1992.
(c)
EP RB-3, Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking, Revision 3, dated October 26, 1992.
(d)
(e)
(g)
EP RB-15:A, Post-Accident Sampling System Initial Actions, Revision 11, dated August 18, 1992.
EP RB-15:B, Post-Accident Sampling System Stripped-Gas and Diluted RCS, Revision 6, dated August 18, 1992.
EP RB-15:C, Sentry Post-Accident Sampling System Containment Air Sampling and Analysis, Revision 6, August 18, 1992.
r EP RB-15:0, Post-Accident Sampling System Gas Chromatograph Calibrations, Revision 5, August 18, 1992.
(h)
EP RB-15:E, Post-Accident Sampling System, Sample Handling and Boron Analysis, Revision 6, dated August 18, 1992.
(i)
EP RB-15:G, Post-Accident Sampling System Ion Chromatograph Chloride Calibration, Revision 4, dated'ugust 18, 1992.
(j)
EP RB-1'5:H, Post-Accident Sampling System pH/Dissolved Oxygen Calibrations, Revision 4, dated August 18, 1992.
No degradations in site emergency preparedness in procedure changes indicated were note I
(2)
Emer enc Facilities E ui ment Instrumentation and
~Su 1 1es The Control Room, TSC, and OSC were.toured and inspected, to include response equipment,- instrumentation and calibration, and supplies on hand.
Maintenance records for emergency preparedness facilities executed within the past quarter were inspected as follows:
STPG-17F, Form Number 69-10766, Control Room Checklist, completed October 9, 1992.
STPG-17G, Form Number 69-10767, Technical Support Center Checklist, completed November 12, 1992.
STPG-17H, Form Number 69-10769, Operational Support Center Checklist, completed October 28, 1992.
It was verified that in instances where supply items were short, equipment deficient or malfunctioning, were identified; appropriate on-the-spot action or Action Requests (AR) for correction were initiated.
Equipment was verified as being in calibration and properly scheduled for re-calibration.
It was verified that these emergency facilities appear in a ready mode for activation, with appropriate supplies and equipment.
k (3)
Or anization and Mana ement Control Changes to the emergency preparedness (EP) organization were reviewed and they app'eared to appropriately reflect emergency plan and emergency procedures requirements.
Emer enc Pre aredness Trainin (a)
On January 14, 1993, the inspector observed practical emergency response training in the simulator with a Control Room crew then in training.
It was indicated that this is a new program which will provide
, additional emergency response training for reactor operations personnel.
In this exercise, the crew had to respond to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Leak and degraded Startup Power (Lesson No.
LR925S2).
This training appeared to appropriately reflect current plant procedures, commitments, and regulatory requirements; and is an apparent enhancement to emergency response training at the site.
(b)
A change implemented at the site since the previous routine EP inspection was to consolidate nuclear emergency preparedness and response training at the Diablo Canyon site.
Previously, the training had been
separated between the corporate level and the site.
Interviews with site EP and training personnel indicated that the new system is an apparent improvement i'n allowing emergency training to be managed with one set of procedures, records, and training personnel.
(c)
An audit finding of the 1992 annual emergency plan audit (Audit 920151) indicated that licensee
"AP B-50/EP AD-I and NUREG-0654 FEHA-REP-I Rev 1" were inconsistent and issued an action request to track this item (AR A0269711).
The inconsistency as described in the audit indicated
...the auditors determined that, in some cases, annual requalification training for emergency response organization members is satisfied via satisfactory performance in a drill without the beoefit of classroom instruction.
This appears to conflict with the intent of NUREG-0654, FEHA REP-1, Rev.
1, Planning Standard 0, Evaluation criteria 2 which states:
"The training program...shall, besides classroom training, include practice drills...". It is also inconsistent with procedure AP 8-50/EP AD-1 Appendix 6.2 which denotes certain lessons requiring a score of at least 70% on an examination/test to demonstrate satisfactory completion of requalification training.
The evaluation of drill performance is considered a form of "oral examination" which is permitted by Training Department procedures.
However, individuals not qualified as classroom or OJT instructors are assigned to observe drill performance and determine if that performance was sufficient to warrant granting credit for successful completion of the requalification class.
Although the Training Department procedures for instructor qualification and administration of examinations were not examined as part of this audit, the industry practice is that only "qualified" instructors administer examinations.
The audit team recommended
"that methods used for requalification be reviewed and revised as necessary to ensure consistency with NUREG-0654, INPO training
(5)
Inde (a)
(b)
guidelines, and existing PGRE training department procedures governing instructor qualification and the administration of oral examinations."
A meeting to review this audit item and appropriate solutions was scheduled for January 14, 1993.
This item will be reviewed as an inspection followup item in a future routine EP inspection since it is an instance of implementing and enhancing NRC guidance.
(93-02-01)
endent and Internal Reviews and Audits Annual Audit The 1992 Emergency Plan Audit (Audit 920151),
the report of which was in preparation during the last routine inspection, was reviewed during this inspection.
The audit was conducted from April
through June 3, 1992.
Two Action Requests were initiated as appropriate to document an audit recommendation and an audit open item.
One audit finding pertaining to NRC guidance was identified for NRC inspection followup (paragraph (4)(c) above).
ualit Performance and Assessment Audit One Quality Performance and Assessment Surveillance Report had been prepared since the last routine EP inspection.
This audit (Audit 920301, titled Emergency Plan Drill and Exercise Corrective Actions)
was also reviewed during this inspection.
The indicated scope of the audit
"was to verify by review of pertinent documents that deficiencies noted (in)
previous EP drills and exercises
'had been adequately documented and corrected.
This was a special audit-
'y-objective that was requested by the Manager of Quality Assurance (QA)."
The documents reviewed in the audit included
"emergency planning drill reports; NRC inspection reports; Federal Emergency Management Agency reports; and quality problem reports for the years 1989, 1990, and 1991."
The report indicated
"No Audit Finding Reports or Nonconformance Reports were issued as a result of this audit."
(c)
Also reviewed during the inspection were the 1992 annual exercise report and two emergency response drill reports pertaining to emergency response drills conducted since the last EP inspection at the site.
The reports reviewed were
~
1992 Emergency Preparedness Annual Exercise Report, NOS Log ¹ 3650, dated December 28, 199 ~
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Medical Drill of December 2,
1992.
This drill was observed by
.
FEMA evaluators as it involved offsite medical activities.
~
4th quarter Drill of December 9,
1992.
The reports appeared appropriate to drill and exercise activities and areas for improvement and correction were identified and documented for action.
For example, the 1992 annual exercise resulted in an Exercise To Do list of 76 items.
b.
Onsite Followu of Written Re orts of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities (MC-92700)
One licensee event was reviewed during the inspection wherein the licensee had declared an emergency unusual event since the last routine inspection.
This event is reviewed in section 3 below as inspection follow-up item 92-AM-OI.
Follow u on Previous Ins ection Findin s
(MC-92701)
(Open)
Follow-up Item (92-15-01).
Failure to Verif Reactor Shutdown in the 1992 Annual Emer enc Exercise.
It was observed by an NRC inspector during the 1992 annual emergency
.
exercise that Control Room operators did not properly verify that the reactor was shutdown after a reactor trip.
Despite the clearly indicated failure of the Power Range (PR),
Intermediate Range (IR), and Source Range Nuclear Instruments (SRNIs)
and of Digital Rod Position Indicator (DRPI), step 1 of E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," was verified completed satisfactorily by the crew.
Subsequent questioning revealed the operators responsible for this verification believed the NIs and DRPI were operable during the performance of step 1.
Step
involves verifying power is decreasing by using these NIs and all rods are bottomed by using DRPI.
DRPI was flashing indicating failure and all NIs were pegged low indicating failure.
Seventeen minutes after the trip, the SRNI was reported failed to the Senior control Operator (SCO);
and 19 minutes after the trip, the DRPI was reported failed to the SCO.
In this instance the operators did not properly verify the reactor was shutdown.
The inspectors concluded that the operators effectively implemented the emergency plan based on the limited observation that the simulator mode of operation provided.
However, the inspectors also concluded that the failure of the crew to properly verify the reactor was shutdown was of major concern.
The licensee followed up on this item with an Action Request (Number A0273101).
The latest entry to the action request, dated January 14, 1993, indicated that "consensus was reached that a procedure change is not needed, and that training will emphasize in requal training" in April and May of 1993,
"the importance of verifying the reactor tripped, most likely with a simulator training
scenario."
This item will be reviewed as appropriate in future emergency response exercises.
(Open)
Follow-up Item (92-15-02).
Simulator or Ta e Procedures in 0 erator Pla in the 1992 Annual Emer enc Exercise.
A problem regarding the use of a taped scenario for control room actions was identified by the NRC inspection team during the 1992 annual emergency exercise as an apparent weakness in scenario implementation and development.
NRC inspection procedure 82301 (Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors)
indicates that inspectors will assess the performance of the control room staff as it conducts the task of
"analysis of plant conditions and corrective actions."
This could not be appropriately observed during the most critical times of the exercise (after the explosion leading to a General Emergency)
since reactor control activity was taped and fed to the staff rather than their responding to the event in their normal manner.
This could result in an inability for the licensee and the NRC to evaluate the exercise due to lack of observation opportunity., This type scenario activity will be reviewed in future NRC inspections to insure that ability of the control room staff to respond to degrading plant conditions is appropriate to effectively implement the site emergency plan and to respond to plant conditions, to mitigate the event in progress, and coordinate with other emergency response facilities.
The licensee followed up on this item also with Action Request Number A0273101.
The latest entry to this element of the action request, dated January 14, 1993, indicated that
"PGEE will use live scenarios in the beginning of a drill and exercise to allow the NRC adequate time to evaluate control room crews.
However, portions of a scenario may still require a taped portion as to allow proper conditions to be developed so that players out side of the Control Room can be exercised."
In order to assess the performance of the control room staff as it conducts the task of analysis of plant conditions and corrective actions; this item will remain open for review during the 1993 annual emergency exercise.
(Closed)
Follow-up Item (92-AH-Ol).
Power Outa e at California Office of Emer enc Services.
- On September 20, 1992, at 6:03 (ET), the licensee telephonically reported to the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO - Event Number 24272) that the dedicated tie line and commercial AT&T line to the California Office of Emergency Services (CA OES)
was lost due to an automobile accident which took out a telephone pole in Sacramento, CA.
The event time was indicated by the HOO as 1:30 a.m.
(PDT).
An Unusual Event (UE) was declared at 2:08 a.m.
(PDT)
and terminated at 2:25 a.m.
(PDT) after temporary communication was established between the site and the OES.
The HOO recorded the time of notification as 6:03 a.m.
(ET)
(3:03 a.m.
PDT).
The event was reviewed during this inspection by interviews with personnel involved and documentation pertaining to circumstances of the event.
From these interv'iews and document reviews, a chronological time table was developed to establish the sequence of events (Attachment hereto).
Issues reviewed by the inspector were
~
Known precursors to and circumstances regarding an Unusual Event specified in the site emergency plan.
The approved emergency plan for the DCPP at Table 4.1-1 (Emergency Action Level Classification),
Revision 3, Change 12, indicates that one event required for Notification of an Unusual Event is Total loss of communication capabilities with SLO County, California OES or NRC.
The precursors to this event included a telephone line trouble alarm, Failed attempts to contact CA OES by telephone, and at 2:08 a.m.
(PDT) when an accident was reported as being responsible for the communications problems.
Timeliness of event classification based on the precursors.
The Shift. Supervisor indicated that after contacting, the CA OES at about 2:25 a.m.
(PDT)
he began to recognize that a reportable event may have occurred.
At that time, review of reporting procedures was initiated and the "loss of communications with OES" was recognized as an unusual event in accordance with Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) G-l.
Analysis of the event circumstances by the licensee.
The Licensee initiated a Technical Review Group (TRG) to review this event and to produce a Non-Conformance Report (NCR DCO-92-EP-N046).
The NCR Management Summary indicates that (after the event)
"It was later determined that the loss of communication was not complete."
In the NCR Event Description, is a statement that
"A subsequent review of the event documentation indicated the loss of communications capability was not totals
"
This analysis appears again 'under
"Root Cause."
These statements do not appear to take into account the known precursors discussed above, or the timeliness of the classification based on those known precursors.
These s'tatements also appear to be of questionable relevance to this event, since the CR crew was unaware of the availability of the "other communication means."
Uniqueness of this Unusual Event Emergency Action Level (EAL) to Diablo Canyon and Safety Significance of this event.
This EAL, as worded, appears unique to DCPP.
This helps to explain the NRC HOO surprise as to why the event was being reported as an Unusual Event.
NRC NUREG-0654 indicates an example Unusual Event initiating condition as "...significant loss of assessment or communication capability."
And certainly, loss of communication capability to alert offsite agencies and the public
in event of an emergency situation is necessary.
The uniqueness of wording in this EAL may explain its unfamiliarity to the NRC HOO and the Shift Supervisor.
The PG&E NCR.Safety Analysis of the event concluded that "the safety and health of the general public was. not jeopardized."
'his appears sound in that SLO county has in place the decision making and execution capability to respond to protective action recommendations from the site, and the site has redundant radio and telephone communications with that authority.
~
Licensee indi.cated corrective actions.
The licensee indicated in the NCR apparently appropriate corrective actions to prevent recurrence of the event, as long as procedures are consulted and implemented (i.e.,
EPIP EP G-3 was updated to include the alternate CA OES phone numbers for future use).
Also, action was initiated to review and revise EPIPs G-l and G-2 as needed to provide additional guidance regarding the time of NUE (Notification of Unusual Event) declaration and alternate methods of notification.
Another action initiated was to "Send a letter to the PG&E Telecommunications Wire Chief requesting that DCPP be notified immediately of any loss of communications capability to the CA OES, SLO County OES, 'or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."
The review of this event and documentation pertaining thereto indicated that the event classification was appropriate based on'he emergency plan requirement and that notifications were made to the county, state and the NRC in accordance with approved procedures once the event was recognized and classified.
This does not however explain why the event was not classified at the time the (precursors) criteria for the unusual event was known or communicated to the DCPP CR.
The licensee indicated telephonically to the inspector on January 26, 1993, that the event circumstances, and in particular, the event identification and classification issue, will be reviewed to insure that all pertinent issues have been properly addressed.
This action by the licensee will
. be reviewed in the next routine EP inspection.
(93-02-02)
4.
Exit Interview.
On January 15, 1993, at the conclusion of the site visit, the inspector met with the licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1 above to summarize the scope and the preliminary results of this inspection.
ATTACHMENT:
Chronology of Unusual Event (NRC HOO Event Number 24272)
i
e ATTACHMENT CHRONOLOGY OF UNUSUAL EVENT DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT {DCPP)
EVENT:
LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES '(CA OES).
NRC Event 24272, Inspection Followup Item 92-AM-Ol:
-Re ort to NRC Head uarters 0 erations Officer HOO Event Time:
01:30 (PDT)
Notification Time:
06:03 (ET), 03:03 (PDT)
~Date Time
~ES Times below are in 24-hour clock time, (PDT)
Se tember 1992 i
22:43 23:40
Se tember 1992 01'30 02:08 DCPP IES Link 8084 (from DCPP Radiation Monitor to CA OES)
alarmed at Pacific Gas and Electric Company Telecommunications (Telecom).
CA OES Warning Center Log indicates attempt to contact DCPP and San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
{SONGS) to advise of telephone outage problem.
Subsequent statement by CA OES member indicates this contact with DCPP likely did not occur.
Senior Control Operator (SCO) received notification of Alarm from Telecom, with recommendation the Control Room (CR) try to contact CA OES, Attempts by Automatic Tie Line (ATL) and Pacific Telephone L
Telegraph (PacBell) telephone lines were not successful as the ATL would not ring and the PacBell phone rang, but with no answer.
This was not considered unusual as the phone had gone unanswered in past events for several minutes at a time and requiring several phone call attempts.
San Luis Obispo (SLO) County Sheriff Watch Commander (WC)
was requested by the DCPP CR to obtain an alternate phone number to reach CA OES.
SLO County Sheriff WC provided temporary service number for CA OES to the DCPP Control Room (CR).
The WC further indicated there had been a power outage due to an accident at the CA OES building which was responsible for the communications problem.
Licensee documentation indicates
,
Oi
this was confirmation that a "total loss" of communications had occurred.
The DCPP Shift Supervisor stated that prior.
to this time, he had no known means of directly contacting CA OES.
Hr.
Brown of SLO OES again notified DCPP CR (Unit-1) of.
temporary number for CA OES.
DCPP re-established communications with CA OES via the alternate telephone lines with the new number provided.
Shift Supervisor (SS) determined that Unusual Event had occurred and notification to the NRC would be made.
Backdated time of Unusual Event.(UE) to 0208, as it was felt this appeared to be the time the criteria for an Unusual Event had'een communicated to them.
Unusual Event was also terminated since contact with the CA OES had been re-established.
NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) notified of declaration and termination of UE.
(DCPP Event Notification Form [ENF], September 20, 1992)
The SS.indicated the BOO expressed surprise and asked why this event was being reported.
He was informed it was an emergency plan requirement, which he entered in the event report.
SLO Sheriff's Watch Commander notified of declaration and termination of UE.
(ENF)
I CA OES notified of declaration and termination of UE.
(ENF)
V 0'